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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an ethnography of an Integrated Rural Development Project which began 
its activities in 1984 and is aimed at ‘fighting against desertification’ in the Ader 
Doutchi Majiya Region of Niger. The Project is financed by the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and, until 2000, was implemented by the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations. The thesis aims at contributing to our 
understanding of ‘development’: how it works; what configurations of power and forms 
of agency it produces; and how it is perceived by different categories of actors involved 
in it, including planners, project staff, and the men and women living in the 
‘intervention area’.
The thesis contains nine chapters. Chapter one introduces the thesis’ aim, theoretical 
import and methodological approaches. Chapters two and three provide an introduction 
to the historical and socio-economic context of the Ader Doutchi Majiya. Chapter four 
unravels the discourses of development which made the Project and its strategies 
possible in the early 1980s. Chapter five looks at the concepts and practices of 
development of project staff, and Chapter six focuses on local people’s perceptions and 
patterns of agency in relation to the Keita Project. Chapters seven and eight compare the 
discourses and practices of planners, project staff, and local people, with reference to 
two axes of project ‘intervention’: gender (Chapter seven) and participation (Chapter 
eight). Chapter nine concludes the thesis.
The thesis contributes to theory in the anthropology of development, bringing together 
actor-oriented and structural explanations into one analytical framework and arguing 
that there are limits to the productive pursuit of either on its own. It contributes to 
anthropological studies of change in West African societies; and it adds new insights to 
the ‘ethnography of aid’, making available some ‘lessons learned’ from the Keita 
Project to a potentially interdisciplinary audience.
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s ......................................................................................................................7
Ab br ev ia tio n s  and  a c r o n y m s ..................................................................................................9
C om m ents on  the t e x t ............................................................................................................... 10
1. INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................11
1.1 Th e  K eita  Pr o je c t ..................................................................................................................12
1.2 Problem a tisin g  th e  O b ject  of St u d y .......................................................................... 15
1.3 Iden tify in g  A n a ly tic a l  Fr a m ew o r k s : A c to r-o rien ted  a n d  Stru c tu r a l- 
discu rsiv e  A ppro a ch es  R e c o n sid e r e d ................................................................................20
1.4 R ela tio ns b etw een  D iscourse  a nd  H ie r a r c h y : In teg r a tin g  A c to r - 
o rien ted  and  Stru c tu r a l-d iscursiv e  Pe r spe c t iv e s .............................................  27
1.5 Reco n ceptu a lisin g  the  Ob ject  of  Stu d y : D ista n c e  a n d  D ista ncia tion  in 
D e v elo pm en t ...................................................................................................................................32
1.6 M eth o d o lo g y  a n d  F ield w o r k  O r g a n isa t io n .......................................................... 42
1.7 Th esis  O r g a n is a t io n ........................................................................................................... 47
2. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE ADER DOUTCHI MAJIYA........................49
2.1. In tr o d u c tio n ..........................................................................................................................49
2.2 Fr o m  th e  E a rly  m igratio ns  to  K a n t a ’s Su prem a c y  (X I -  X V II C e n tu ries) 
...............................................................................................................................................................52
2.3 The  Istam bu law a  in the  A D M  (X V III C entu ry) .....................................................56
2.4 Th e  Soko to  J ihad  of U sm an  d an  F odyo  U n til  th e  Z a m a n i (X IX  C entu ry )59
2.5 Th e  A D M  D urin g  Fren ch  C o l o n ia l is m ...................................................................... 63
2.6 Th e  A D M  in In d epen d en t  N ig er  as a  S ite ‘of C o m m o n  P ro blem s  and  
C o m m o n  D ev elopm en t  Po ssib ilities’ .................................................................................. 70
2.7 C o n c l u sio n ...............................................................................................................................75
3. CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT...........................76
3.1 In t r o d u c t io n ...........................................................................................................................76
3.2 So cial  O rga nisatio n  in  the  A D M  B efore  C o l o n ia l ism ......................................79
3.3 C ontem po ra ry  L iv eliho od  Pa t t e r n s .......................................................................... 84
3.4 E colo g ica l  V u ln era b ility , M a le  M ig ratio n  a n d  th e  R elev a n c e  of 
P r o jec t  A c tivities fo r  L o ca l  L iveliho od s  and  th e  Sex u a l  D iv isio n  of 
La b o u r ............................................................................................................................................... 89
3.5 T he  H o u seho ld  a nd  F ood  P ro d u c tio n , Tr a n sfo r m a tio n , a nd  C o nsu m ption  
P a t t e r n s ...........................................................................................................................................95
3.6 W o m en 's L ives a n d  th e  Sexu al  D iv isio n  of La b o u r ............................................. 97
3.7 Co n c l u sio n .............................................................................................................................100
4. ‘FIGHTING AGAINST DESERTIFICATION IN THE SAHEL’: 
UNRAVELLING THE MACRO NARRATIVE AND RELATED REGIMES OF 
PRACTICES................................................................................................................102
4.1 In tr o d u c t io n .........................................................................................................................102
4.2 Settin g  the  Sc e n e ............................................................................................................... 103
4.3 ‘D e s e r t i f i c a t io n ’ in  t h e  S a h e l  a n d  t h e  E s ta b l i s h m e n t  of  A d  H o c  
I n s t i t u t i o n s ...................................................................................................................................106
4.4 T he  ‘D e ser tific a tio n ’ N a r r a t iv e ............................................................................... 108
4.5 Th e  In itia tiv e  o f  Italia n  C o o pera tio n  in th e  Sa h el  (1 9 8 4 ).............................110
4.6 Ita lia n  In teg ra ted  R u ra l  D ev elopm en t  P rojects  in  th e  Sa h e l .................. 113
4.7 ‘D e ser tific a tio n ’ in  N ig e r ’s D evelo pm en t  So c ie t y ........................................... 117
3
4.8 T he  PD R /A D M  O rig in a l  Pr oject  D o c u m e n t ..........................................................119
4.9 C o n c l u sio n .............................................................................................................................122
5. T H E  P R O J E C T ........................................................................................................................... 125
5.1 In t r o d u c t io n .........................................................................................................................125
5.2 Pro jec t  M a n a g e m e n t ........................................................................................................ 127
5.2.1 Carotti, the sarkin aiki.....................................................................................128
5.2.2 Oumarou, the Coordinateur National.............................................................134
5.3 T h e  D iv isio ns  a n d  the  P erso n n el : D isco urses  o f  D ev elo pm en t  a m on g  the  
PD R /A D M  St a f f .......................................................................................................................... 138
5.3.1 Niger is an underdeveloped country ’: the project sta ffs  view o f  the 
desertification narrative and o f Niger’s problems...................................................139
5.3.2 ‘The peasant’ and ‘sensitisation ’ : staffperceptions o f  the ‘target population ’ 
......................................................................................................................................146
5.4 C o n c l u s io n .............................................................................................................................151
6. T H E  P E O P L E ..............................................................................................................................153
6.1 In t r o d u c t io n ......................................................................................................................... 153
6.2 T in k ira n a  T o u n g a .............................................................................................................. 155
6.2.1 Perceptions o f  environmental crisis in Tinkirana Tounga............................ 157
6.3 L iv elih o o d  o f  B o u zo u  H o useho lds in  T in kira na  T o u n g a  a nd  Im pa c t  of 
Fo o d -fo r -w o r k ............................................................................................................................ 159
6.3.1 Issouf’s household............................................................................................ 160
6.3.2 Mohamed’s household: a wealthy household................................................ 162
6.4 W o rk in g  f o r  t h e  P r o j e c t  o n  t h e  Ch an tie r s  (A ik in  Ga n d a r i) ........................... 164
6.4.1 Work organisation on project worksites.........................................................164
6.4.2 ‘Aikin gandari ’ (chantier work)...................................................................... 165
6.5 S ig n if ic a n c e  o f  A ik in  Ga n d a r i a n d  F o o d - f o r - w o r k  {Ta im a k o n  A b in c i): t h e  
G e n d e r  F a c t o r .............................................................................................................................169
6.5.1 ‘Muna son aiki ’ (we want work): women’s perspectives o f  Project 
interventions............................................................................................................... 169
6.5.2 Men and the Project’s impact on productive resources................................ 170
6.5.3 Men and women’s attempts to attract the Project to their villages............ 173
6.6 T h e  H ier a r c h y  Fa c to r  in In te r -v illa g e  C o m petitio n  O v e r  the  
‘D ev elo pm en t  R e v e n u e ’ ......................................................................................................... 174
6.6.1 Requests to the Project by the Chef du Groupement Kel Gress....................175
6.6.2 The women’s field  operation in Tinkirana Tounga.......................................176
6.7 Co n c l u s io n .............................................................................................................................180
7. T H E  F E M M E  D E  K E IT A ,  T H E  F E M M E S  D U  S A H E L  A N D  T H E  W O M E N  O F  
T H E  A D E R  D O U T C H I M A JIY A : IN T E R F A C E S  B E T W E E N  ‘W O M E N ’ A N D  
P L A N N E D  D E V E L O P M E N T ................................................................................................... 182
7.1 In tr o d u c t io n ......................................................................................................................... 182
7.2 W ID  N a rr a tiv es  a n d  N a tio n a l  P a rtic ipa to r y  Id e o l o g y : Pa rtia l  
O v e r l a p s .........................................................................................................................................184
7.3 T h e  ‘F e m m e  d e  K eita  ’: W om en  W o rk in g  in  t h e  Ch a n tie r s  B eco m e t h e  Ic o n  
o f  N a t i o n a l  a n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  P r o p a g a n d a ...............................................................186
7.4 T h e  ‘Fe m m e s  d u  Sa h e l  ’ : G e n d e r  a n d  D e v e lo p m e n t (G A D ) a s  a  D is c u rs iv e  
T e m p la te  f o r  a  G e n d e r  C r i t iq u e  o f  t h e  P D R /A D M ....................................................190
7.5 Th e  D iv isio n  fo r  t h e  P ro m otio n  o f  W o m e n ’s R o l e .............................................194
7.6 The  W om en  o f  th e  Ad e r  D outchi M a jiy a ................................................................199
7.6.1 Aminatou: a ‘project woman ’....................................................................... 199
4
7.6.2 Keita ’s elite women: elections at the FFK ...................................................201
7.7 Co n c l u sio n .................... :................................................................................................... 206
8. T H E  P A R A D O X  O F  P A R T IC IP A T IO N : D E V E L O P M E N T  P O L IC Y  
M A K IN G  A N D  P A R T IC IP A T O R Y  A P P R O A C H E S  IN  K E IT A ..............................210
8.1 In t r o d u c t io n ........................................................................................................................ 210
8.2 The N ew  ‘P r o g r a m m e  to  F ight  a ga inst  D e ser tific a tio n  fo r  th e  Redu ction  
o f  Poverty  in th e  Sa h e l ’ ........................................................................................................212
8.3 In  Ro m e : th e  B riefin g  w ith  the  Italia n  C o o r d in a to r  o f  th e  Pro g ra m m e  to 
F ig ht  D eser tific a tio n  fo r  the  Redu ction  of P o v er ty  in  th e  Sa h e l .................. 213
8.4 In N iam ey: M e e tin g s  w ith  t h e  M in is te r  a n d  w i th  t h e  Co m ite  d e  P ilo ta g e . 
............................................................................................................................................................ 214
8.5 In  K e ita :  ‘K a m a n A n Fara  Gin e , Sa i a n K a r y e  Sh i ’ (It  Is L ike  W h e n  Y o u  S t a r t  
C o n s t r u c t in g  a  B u ild in g : Y o u  H a v e  t o  C o m p le te  I t ) ..............................................216
8.6 The  O ffic ia l  V isit  to  the  Sa r k i: F in ish  W h a t  Y o u  H a v e  Sta rted  o r  G o 
A w a y ............................................................................................................................................... 218
8.7 T he M e e t in g  w ith  t h e  P r o j e c t  S t a f f  a n d  t h e  W o r l d  F o o d  P ro g ra m m e  
E x p e r t:  ‘a  P ro b le m  o f  M e n t a l i t y  [Me n talite]’ .......................................................... 219
8.8 B a ck  in  R o m e : Th e  M issio n ’s C o nclusio n  a n d  th e  P r o g r a m m e  
C o o r d in a to r ’s C o m m en ts ......................................................................................................221
8.9 Co n c lu sio n : So m e  P ersonal  Re m a r k s ..................................................................... 222
9. C O N C L U S IO N ............................................................................................................................ 225
9.1 In ter preta tio n s  o f  the  K eita  Pr o jec t ...................................................................... 225
9.2 D ifferen t  P erspectiv es  on  the  P ros a n d  C ons o f  th e  K eita  Pr o je c t ........229
9.3 Co m pa r a tiv e  Ex a m p l e s ...................................................................................................234
9.3.1 The development-centric project..................................................................... 234
9.3.2 The perceived ‘failure ’.....................................................................................239
9.3.3 The perceived ‘success’....................................................................................243
9.3.4 Learning from Keita.........................................................................................244
9.4 Im plica tio n s  fo r  D evelopm en t  Pr actice  a n d  A n th r o po lo g ica l  
In v o lv e m e n t .................................................................................................................................246
B IB L IO G R A P H Y ........................................................................................................................... 252
P u blish ed  B ooks  a n d  A r t ic l e s ............................................................................................252
O fficia l  R e p o r t s .........................................................................................................................278
U n pu b lish ed  D o c u m e n t s ........................................................................................................283
A P P E N D IC E S .................................................................................................................................. 288
A PPEN D IX  1: M A P S ................................................................................................................. 288
Map I -  Niger and the Project intervention area.................................................... 289
Map II-N iger, the Department ofTahoua, and the Ader......................................290
Map III -  Ader: physical map...................................................................................291
Map IV  -  Regions o f  Niger........................................................................................292
Map V -  Main Tuareg Groups..................................................................................293
Map VI — The Ader at the end o f the 17 th century.................................................. 294
Map V II- The Ader Kingdom in the 18th century.................................................. 295
Map V III- The ‘Zamani’: areas o f Tuareg occupation and independent Ader
around 1875............................................................................................................... 296
A PPEN D IX  2: T A B L E S ............................................................................................................ 297
Table 1 -  PDR/ADM Organisation chart................................................................298
Table 2 -  Project Results (first three phases)..........................................................299
5
Table 3 -  Variation o f the price o f a kilo o f  millet at the market ofIbohamane in
1999........................................................................................................................... 300
APPENDIX 3: FIGURES............................................................................................301
Figure 1 -  The Basic Territorial Unit (BTU or UTE)............................................302
Figure 2 -  Request for a dam...................................................................................303
Figure 3 -  Text o f the discourse o f the Chef du Groupement Kel Gress to Project
delegation..................................................................................................................304
APPENDIX 4: PICTURES..........................................................................................305
Picture 1 -  View o f a village o f the Ader Doutchi Majiya.................................... 306
Picture 2 - A compound (gida)............................................................................... 306
Picture 3 -  Project headquarters in Keita..............................................................307
Picture 4 -  Interior o f project headquarters.......................................................... 307
Picture 5 -  Tinkirana Tounga farm er.....................................................................308
Picture 6 -  Village chief..........................................................................................308
Picture 7 -  Young Bouzou shepherd....................................................................... 309
Picture 8 -  Little Fulani shepherd boy....................................................................309
Picture 9 -  Bouzou elder..........................................................................................310
Picture 1 0 -  Tuareg woman with grandchild......................................................... 310
Picture 11 -  Tuareg women ofKossongo...............................................................311
Picture 12 -  Tuareg men ofKossongo....................................................................311
Picture 13 -  Communal pounding site at the outskirts o f  Tinkirana Tounga 312
Picture 1 4 -  Hausa women preparing food fo r  a marriage.................................. 312
Picture 1 5 -  Hausa girl selling foods prepared by her secluded mother............313
Picture 1 6 -  Woman preparing food in Tinkirana Tounga................................... 313
Picture 17 -  Girl weaving a mat............................................................................. 313
Picture 18-Italian engineer and project mechanic.............................................. 314
Picture 1 9 -  Project tractors....................................................................................314
Picture 20 -  Man weaving a gabion weir...............................................................315
Picture 21 -  Workers installing the gabions during the construction o f  a dike.... 315
Picture 22 -  Workers assembling the spillway o f an earthfill dam ......................315
Picture 23 -  Fulani nomad women watering donkeys at the Project dam o f Seyte
.....................................................................................................................................316
Picture 2 4 -Livestock watering at the Tabotaki dam............................................316
Pictures 25 and 26 -  Femmes de Keita digging reforestation trenches.............. 317
Picture 27 -  ‘Stones work’ (aikin doutchi) in the worksites (chantiers).............. 318
Picture 28 -  Youths working at Project worksites................................................. 318
Pictures 29, 30 and 31 -  Chantier work (aikin gandari).......................................319
Picture 32 -  Women watering reforestation seedlings..........................................320
Picture 33 -  Girls sewing skirts in the Foyer Feminin de Keita...........................320
Picture 34 -Author in the school o f Tinkirana Tounga........................................321
Picture 35 -Author's house in Keita...................................................................... 321
Picture 3 6 - Author’s house in Tinkirana Tounga................................................. 321
6
Acknowledgements
This thesis would have been impossible without the cooperation of many people. My 
parents, Alessandro Rossi and Federica Rossi Germani, have been called on, over a 
period of five years, to show forbearance in the face of ‘neglect’. They have supported 
me and encouraged me in the course of all my studies, and to them goes my deepest 
gratitude and affection.
My supervisor, Professor Henrietta Moore, has provided guidance, inspiration, and 
encouragement throughout my PhD. Through her constant intellectual support and 
compassionate understanding of my project, she has played an invaluable part in the 
working out of my ideas and turning them into this thesis. I am grateful, too, to 
Professor Alexander Robertson, my advisor at the University of California at Santa 
Barbara, who found time to read a large part of the manuscript, and encouraged me 
when I was beginning to flag. My postgraduate study was made possible by fellowships 
granted by the London School of Economics and the Economic and Social Research 
Council.
I hope that all of those who generously helped me as I learned about the Keita Project 
find nothing to offend them in the ideas advanced in this thesis. At the PDR/ADM, I am 
grateful to all the members of staff, for sharing with me their views on development in 
Niger and their experience working in Integrated Rural Development Projects. In Italy 
and Keita, my deepest gratitude and respect goes to Dr. Renato ‘Carotti’, ‘Sarkin A iki\ 
and to Eng. Dario Tricoli, ‘Ingenierissimo’, to whom I owe anything I understand about 
dams, and much more. In Italy, I am grateful to many people in the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Particular thanks go to Dr. Mariano Foti, for being a great ‘boss’ and 
for showing me how to deal with Italian and Nigerien bureaucracy. I should also like to 
acknowledge Dr. Benedetto Saieva, for his initial trust, Dr. Enzo Caputo and Dr. 
Alberto Varusio. At the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), I wish to thank Dr.
O. Bemey, and Dr. M. Malogioglio. I am grateful to Dr. Pier Luigi Rossi of the 
ORSTOM (France) and Dr. Massimo Marino of the Gruppo Intemazionale di 
Consulenza (GICO - Italy), for helping me to get hold of archival material.
In Niger I owe thanks to far too many people to list here. I will only mention a very 
special few, and register my thanks to all the people who helped me with my research 
and made me feel welcome so far from home. I am indebted to Mr. Paolo Giglio, for his 
hospitality (especially with salmonella at Christmas) and for countless precious 
suggestions in Niamey. I am grateful to my friends Mohamed Bachar, whose help was 
invaluable at the early stages of fieldwork, and Hajara Kader, my ‘twin’ and Hausa 
teacher. Many men and women in the villages of the Ader Doutchi Majiya have 
contributed to this thesis, sharing their knowledge and ideas with me on many 
occasions. In particular, I should like to mention Salifou, Hama, Fatimata, and Rakiata 
in Tinkirana Tounga.
My colleagues of the London School of Economics, the University of Sussex, and the 
University of California at Santa Barbara have contributed to this thesis with thought 
provoking discussions at seminars and more relaxed chats over a glass of wine. I am 
also grateful for the intellectual stimulus provided by my students of the 2000/2001
7
course ‘Aid and Projects’ at the University of Sussex. Many friends have advised and 
encouraged me in the process of writing this thesis, and I owe a special thank to Marco 
Calabresi, for always being there, and to Steve Young, for his unwavering 
encouragements to avoid distractions. Finally, I wish to thank Dimitri, for reminding me 
that development in Niger is not the totality of life’s experience.
Although the support and criticism of the people mentioned above enriched this thesis, 
the usual disclaimer applies: the conclusions, opinions, and other statements of this 
thesis are those of its author and not necessarily of the persons and organisations with 
which I have been associated.
8
Acronyms
ADM Ader Doutchi Majiya
AFN Association des Femmes du Niger
AIN Association Islamique du Niger
AOF Afrique Occidentale Fran?aise
CES/DRS Conservation des Eaux des Sols/Defense et Restauration des Sols
CILSS Comite Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Secheresse au Sahel
CSRD Conseil Sous-Regional de Developpement
DFD Division Femmes-Developpement
DPFSE Division Promotion Feminine et Socio-Economique
FAC Fonds d’Aide et Cooperation
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FCFA Franc de la Communaute Financiere Africaine
FFK Foyer Feminin de Keita
FIDES Fonds d’Investissement pour le Developpement Economique et Social
GAD Gender and Development
GICO Gruppo Intemazionale di Consulenza
GR Genie Rural
IRDP Integrated Rural Development Project
MAE-DGCS Ministero degli Affari Esteri -  Direzione Generale per la Cooperazione 
alio Sviluppo
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAM Programme d’Alimentation Mondiale (UN)
PDR/ADM Projet de Developpement Rural de l’Ader Doutchi Majiya
PPN Parti Progressiste Nigerien
PRA participatory rural appraisal
RDA Rassemblement Democratique Africain
RDFN Rassemblement Democratique des Femmes du Niger
SD Societe de Developpement
UBT Unite de Betail Tropicaux
UN United Nations
UNC Union Nationale des Cooperatives (Niger)
UNCC Union Nigerienne de Credit et Cooperation
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
USRC Union Sous-Regionale des Cooperatives (Niger)
UTE unite territoriale elementaire
WFP World Food Programme (UN)
WID Women in Development
9
Comments on the text
In the text, I refer to the Integrated Rural Development Project of the Ader Doutchi 
Majiya (PDR/ADM) either as PDR/ADM, or as ‘Keita Project’, or simply as ‘the 
Project.’ ‘Keita Project’ is the expression most frequently used by various groups 
involved in it to refer to the Integrated Rural Development Project of the Ader Doutchi 
Majiya, and this is why I have used it in the thesis title.
The adjective for Niger -  Nigerien -  is used to distinguish the people, economy, society, 
and political system of Niger from those of Nigeria.
The term ‘Bouzou’ to refer to the descendants of Tuareg captives can carry a derogatory 
connotation (cf. Tidjani-Alou 2001). However, because it is commonly used to refer to 
this group in the literature and in the Ader Doutchi Majiya, and in the absence of 
another term to refer to ex Tuareg captives and slaves, I have used it throughout without 
implying any negative connotation.
The translation of all the quotes from French and Italian documents and interviews is 
my own.
All proper names of persons mentioned in this thesis are pseudonyms.
The bibliography is arranged in three sections: the first includes published books and 
articles, the second official reports, and the third unpublished documents.
I have translated the text of the maps in Appendix 1. I have taken all the pictures in 
Appendix 4.
Currency conversion rates:
1 FCFA = 0.0015 $ USA 
1 FCFA = 0.001 £ UK
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1. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an ethnography of an Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP) which 
began its activities in 1984 and is aimed at ‘fighting against desertification’ in the Ader 
Doutchi Majiya Region of Niger. The Keita Project, whose official name is Rural 
Development Project of the Ader Doutchi Majiya (Projet de Developpement Rural de 
I ’Ader Doutchi Majiya), or PDR/ADM, is a complex formation involving multiple 
institutions and categories of actors disposed to make sense of the Project in different 
ways (cf. Long 1997:2). Not only do these sets of actors perceive project activities 
differently, but they follow different patterns of agency vis a vis project ‘intervention’. 
For the purposes of an ‘ethnography of aid’ (Crewe and Harrison 1998), ‘intervention’ 
cannot be seen simply as ‘the implementation of a plan for action, [but] it should be 
visualised as an ongoing transformational process in which different actor interests and 
structures are located’ (Long 1992:9). The task attempted here is to ‘unfold’ this 
complex construct and look at the perceptions and practices of different groups, trying 
to explain what ‘development’ involved for each of them, and what configurations of 
power became evident in the course of the Project. The aim of the thesis is to contribute, 
from an anthropological perspective, to our understanding of the phenomenon of 
‘development’ and of the meanings it acquires for different groups and individuals, 
including planners, consultants, project management and staff, and men and women 
living in the ‘intervention area’.
In this chapter I first provide some general information about the Project, its 
origins and the types of activities it carried out throughout almost 20 years. Then, I 
problematise the object of study, showing that its complexity raises new challenges to 
conventional ethnographic research focused on a single site of intensive investigation 
and, often, on a single society. In the third section of this chapter, I critically discuss 
existing theoretical approaches to the study of development, and in the fourth and fifth 
sections I lay out the analytical framework and conceptual tools adopted in the thesis. In 
the last two sections I describe the methodology I have followed to carry out my 
research, and provide an outline of the thesis organisation and contents.
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1.1 The Keita Project
The end of the 1960s, 1973-1974 and 1984-1985 were years of drought in the Ader 
Doutchi Majiya and in Niger as a whole. In December 1982, a joint identification 
mission in which participated the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), an Italian team, and the CILSS (Comite Inter-etats de Lutte contre la 
Secheresse dans le Sahel), outlined the problems related to desertification, soil erosion, 
and drought afflicting the Keita District in the Department of Tahoua. A second mission 
was sent to the same area by the Cooperation section of the Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in March/April 1983, resulting in the formulation of an ‘Operational Plan for the 
Integrated Rural Development Project of Keita’ (GICO 1998:12). This document 
contained the foundations for the establishment of the PDR/ADM.
On 6 December 1983, the Governments of Italy and of Niger signed an 
agreement which assigned the execution of the Project to FAO. The World Food 
Programme of the United Nations (WFP) would provide food-for-work rations for local 
labour working for the Project. By 1998, the Keita Project was still financially the most 
important project of all Italian interventions in the Sahel, and of all FAO and WFP 
interventions in Niger1 (GICO 1998:36-37).
The PDR/ADM started its activities in May 1984 under the name of ‘PIK’ 
{Projet Integre Keita). During the First Phase (May 1984-June 1991), the project 
covered only the District of Keita (approximately 3,200 km with a population of
156.000 inhabitants at project inception). In the Second Phase (July 1991-June 1996), 
the interventions were extended to the adjacent Districts of Bouza and Abalak, and the 
project intervention area reached its present extension of 13,000 km2, with about
330.000 inhabitants (cf. map I). In the Third Phase (July 1996-June 1999) a further 
extension towards the southern Majiya Valley had been contemplated, but not 
implemented.
1 While the Keita Project was the ‘most expensive’ project financed by Italy in the whole of the Sahel, 
and the project absorbing most food rations financed by the WFP in Niger, by 1998 the FAO was 
implementing projects in Niger for Italy, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Belgian 
Cooperation. The total value of these operations amounted to approximately US $ 67,5 million, 81% of 
which were the PDR/ADM’s ‘stake’.
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In the first three phases, project management was shared between a National 
Director (Coordinateur National) and an Italian Primary Technical Coordinator 
(Conseiller Technique Principal, CTP). At the end of the Third Phase, management was 
unified in the sole figure of a Nigerien Coordinateur National The project institution is 
divided into ‘Divisions’, whose number and denomination changed over the years. 
‘Divisions’ are organisational units specialised in different fields (e.g. agronomy, 
administration, women and development), responsible for programming and conducting 
sectoral activities in the Project’s intervention area. Today, there are seven project 
divisions2 (cf. table 1). In the course of the Third Phase, relations between the Italian 
Government and the FAO changed, leading to the end of the FAO’s participation in the 
PDR/ADM. Today, the PDR/ADM is a bilateral project (Italy-Niger), and the World 
Food Programme is still providing food-for-work rations.
The funds provided by the Italian Government for each phase of the Project 
amount, respectively, to US $ 36.3 million; 18.7 million; and 8.5 million for the first 
two years of the third phase, i.e. a total of about US $ 63.5 million up to the end of 
1999. The World Food Programme contributed 12 million individual food rations, 
whose value is estimated to correspond to about US $ 17 million (Smart 2000:2).
The PDR/ADM is a project for ‘fighting against desertification’. Although 
‘environmental rehabilitation’ always remained its primary aim, the PDR/ADM carried 
out a whole range of different types of activities. In general, PDR/ADM activities can 
be divided into two main categories: the first group is specifically aimed at the physical 
rehabilitation of the territory, the second, at the promotion of social welfare and 
economic growth. Together, all operations are performed with the purpose of attaining 
‘economic independence and food self-sufficiency and strengthening] local 
institutions’ (FAO 1995:6).
The peculiarity and popularity of the PDR/ADM derive from the nature of its 
territorial approach. The PDR/ADM methodology to fight against desertification is 
based upon the concept of Unite Territoriale Elementaire (UTE or BTU, Basic 
Territorial Unit), devised by its first Technical Coordinator, Dr. Carotti. The 
intervention area is subdivided into UTEs, corresponding to sub-catchment systems
2 In fact, an eighth ‘Communications Division’ was formally established after the end of my fieldwork,
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with an area of some 10 km2 (cf. figure 1). It is possible to distinguish a first group of 
interventions in the field of soil and water conservation {conservation des eaux et des 
sols) aimed at protecting the environment against erosion and at rehabilitating degraded 
lands for farming and herding purposes. These include:
- Sylvo-pastoral and sylvo-agricultural anti-erosion bunds (banquettes sylvo- 
pastorales et sylvo-agricoles) aimed at rehabilitating (amenagement) plateaux 
and glacis through subsoiling (soussolage), construction of anti-erosion bunds, 
and planting trees along these;
- Reforestation trenches {tranchees de reboisement) on slopes (versants) and hill­
sides: tree planting on rocky slopes;
- Windbreaks (brise-vents): tree planting in rows in the valleys;
- Dense tree planting along the sides of water-courses (koris);
- Dense planting of trees and rows of dry millet-stalks {fixation des dune or
clayonnage).
Other activities, all in the field of soils and water conservation, are specifically aimed at 
controlling the hydraulic regime, and include:
- Check dams in gabion weirs (seuil en gabions) on small scale catchment 
systems, with an area of some 10 hectares, usually serving as cross-structures 
upstream detention dams {barrages d ’ecretage), and aimed at decreasing the 
erosive force and runoff carried by the rains;
Detention dams {barrages d ’ecretage) on large catchment systems (with an area 
of 1-15 km2), which temporarily store the runoff, and release it gradually
through a spillway {buse) and outlet system {deversoir);
- Water-spreading dams {seuils d ’epandage) in gabion weirs and earthfill 
embankments, used to build up the streambed causing floodplain inundation in 
areas where runoff overflow is an important factor in groundwater recharge and 
irrigation practices;
- Earth dams (digues) with outlet system in gabions in the valleys, for the 
reconstitution of pre-existing lakes {mares), degraded by the progressive 
accumulation of sediments and by erosion.
which is not included in the organisation chart reproduced in table 1.
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The PDR/ADM also conducts different types of activities in the field of social 
development. These include farming, herding, and fishery extension; hygiene and 
sanitation; micro-credit; rural radio; and activities for the ‘promotion of the role of 
women.’3
1.2 Problematising the Object of Study
The description of the Project provided above is the kind of story one would find in 
official project documents. While it may be useful as a schematic introduction to project 
history and aims, the apparently ‘objective’ and ‘technical’ account it offers inevitably 
de-politicises project ‘intervention’ (cf. Ferguson 1995) and plays the ‘God’s eye’ trick 
by concealing the ‘situatedness’ of its own perspective (Haraway 1988). This section 
problematises the object of study, showing that the Project opened a multi-vocal (Grillo 
and Stirrat 1997) and multi-sited (Marcus 1995; 1999) space, within which different 
categories of actors occupied different strategic positions and attributed different 
meanings to project activities. Here, I deal with the difficulties that arise when trying to 
conceptualise and write about such a ‘space’.
The different categories of actors involved in the Keita Project include the 
planners in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Niger’s government officials; FAO 
professionals responsible for project ‘implementation’; project management and staff 
(national and international); short-term consultants (national and international); and the 
men and women of different societies and statuses living in the area covered by project 
‘intervention’. These actors belong to institutions situated in Rome, Niamey, and in the 
Ader Doutchi Majiya region. Some actors are highly mobile and active across different 
sites (e.g. the consultants, some members of project staff); others experience only those 
facets of the Project which reach them in their villages. Inevitably, the Keita Project is 
perceived and understood differently by different categories of actors.
The ‘boundaries’ of the Project stretch out across various countries and 
institutions, and the strategies unfolded within spaces opened by project ‘intervention’ 
vary substantially as the focus of the analysis is shifted across the various settings which
3 See table 2 for a summary of Project results by the end of the Third Phase.
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constitute it. The notions used by different sets of actors to make sense of project 
‘intervention’ are diverse and account for competing discourses about the Project, which 
are hierarchically stratified (cf. Moore 1994:100). Some discourses produce ‘official’ 
knowledge about the Project, others are confined to the work-sites (ichantiers) on the 
rocky hills of the Ader. Different categories of actors carry out distinct ‘projects in the 
Project’ and unfold different strategies to achieve their respective goals (cf. Bierschenk 
1988; Long 1992). The establishment of the Keita Project constituted a new, supra­
national field which intertwined with other ‘local’ fields in complex ways. It is a 
peculiarity of this field that it does not occupy a bounded geographical, social, cultural, 
or linguistic space, and therefore the actors who occupy positions within it belong, 
simultaneously, to other fields which, in many cases, do not overlap.
A number of recent anthropological contributions have drawn the discipline’s 
attention to complex social formations which, like the Keita Project, do not constitute 
geographically, socially, or culturally bounded and/or uniform objects of study (Galjart 
1981; Hannerz 1987; Appadurai 1991; Hannerz 1991; Fardon 1995; Marcus 1995; 
Kearney 1996; Gupta and Ferguson 1997a; 1997b; Martin 1997; Shore and Wright 
1997; Keeley and Scoones 1999; Marcus 1999; Arce and Long 1999). In doing so, they 
have exposed the limits of conventional ethnographic tools to deal with these spaces. 
These contributions have emphasised, on the one hand, the need to apply 
anthropological research to new structural formations developed, historically, from 
dynamics characteristic of a ‘globalising world’; and, on the other, they have critically 
highlighted the ways in which ethnography contributes to essentialising identities and 
spatialisations (cf. Fardon 1995:5). Trying to deal with the issues raised by both of these 
arguments (i.e. the suggestion that a world made up of distinct societies is moving 
through a phase of transition, and the suggestion that the world was never accurately 
described as a mosaic of distinct societies), several authors have developed new 
analytical concepts.
Claiming that ‘in the space of modernity, modem and traditional communities 
were distinct and spatially separated [but] in a globalised world, they interpenetrate and, 
in doing so, dissolve the distinctions between them’ (Kearney 1996:117), Kearney uses 
the notion of ‘hyperspace’, which he borrows from Jameson (1984), a socially 
constructed space of relations, not anchored permanently in a specific locale, and
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inhabited mainly by transnational communities of strangers (Kearney 1996:118). 
International airports, shopping malls, food chains and transnational corporate 
agriculture, are fields that could be characterised as ‘hyperspaces’. This notion serves 
Kearney’s purpose to relocate the category ‘peasant’ from a social type coterminous 
with ‘rural’, ‘local’, ‘traditional’, to one which reproduces itself within complex 
economic and social relationships and global networks. Also looking at the workings of 
transnational ‘food networks’, Marsden and Arce ask ‘how do international economic 
processes and policies become embedded in local production systems, and what degree 
of “room for manoeuvre” do local actors have?’ (1995:1263)
Along similar lines, Appadurai claims that there are ‘facts about the world of the 
twentieth century that any ethnography must confront. [...] Groups are no longer tightly 
territorialized, spatially bounded, historically unselfconscious, or culturally 
homogenous’ (1991:191). To deal with these new landscapes of group identity, he 
employs the concept of ‘global ethnoscapes’. Other attempts to identify new analytical 
tools to come to terms with social actors not comfortably embedded in a single 
social/spatial reference system, but confronted with diverse social constructs and 
institutions, have used notions such as ‘global ecumene’ (Hannerz 1991) and 
‘creolization’ (Hannerz 1987). These attempts suggest that in certain anthropological 
circles there is ‘a concern about the lack of fit between the problems raised by a mobile, 
changing, globalising world, on the one hand, and the resources provided by a method 
originally developed for studying supposedly small scale societies, on the other’ (cf. 
Gupta and Ferguson 1997).
Other authors have focused their attention on phenomena which, by their very 
nature, are not anchored to one society or one culture, but instead cut across different 
groups and analytical levels. Examples of these approaches are anthropological studies 
of policy: ‘[...] by focusing on policy, the field of study changes. It is no longer a 
question of studying a local community or ‘a people’, [but rather of] exploring how 
these processes work in different sites: local, national, global’ (Shore and Wright 
1997:14; cf. Keeley and Scoones 1999); or of science:
The contexts in which [...] fieldwork on science is being done are not like we imagined the 
fieldsites of our forebears to be: these field ‘sites’ are not primarily spatial. Or rather, they 
include many different spaces that are discontinuous from each other. For this reason, we need 
new images to guide our thinking about how to define an appropriate context to produce 
understanding. (Martin 1997:146)
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A set of new analytical images, supposedly better suited to deal with what may 
be called ‘unorthodox’ objects of study for anthropology, is being developed. It includes 
notions such as ‘citadels, rhizomes, string figures’ (Martin 1997); ‘networks, reticula, 
rhizomes’ (Kearney 1996: 120-127); ‘hybrids, cyborgs, mutants’ (Arce and Long 
1999:17); ‘counterworks’ (Fardon 1995); ‘counter-development’ (Galjart 1981); and, 
already mentioned, ‘hyperspace’ (Keamey 1996); ‘global ethnoscapes’ (Appadurai); 
‘creolization’ (Hannerz 1987); and ‘global ecumene’ (Hannerz 1991).
Along with the identification of new analytical concepts and critical 
reconsiderations of the epistemological space occupied by ‘the field’ and ‘fieldwork’ in 
anthropological research (cf. Gupta and Ferguson 1997a), new research approaches and 
methods have been called for. In order to explore processes that do not occur in a single 
field-site, Marcus has suggested anthropologists adopted ‘multi-sited ethnography’, a 
mode of research which
claims that any ethnography of a cultural formation in the world system is also an ethnography 
of the system, and therefore cannot be understood only in terms of the conventional mise-en- 
scene of ethnographic research, assuming indeed it is the cultural formation, produced in several 
different locales, rather than the conditions of a particular set of subjects that is the object of the 
study. (Marcus 1995:99)
The fact of conducting research across different locales and of interacting with 
subjects of different status produces, ‘a distinctly different sense of “doing research’” 
(Marcus 1995:113), one in which the researcher needs to periodically recalibrate his/her 
positioning vis a vis the subjects of his/her analysis. This constant renegotiation of one’s 
identity and interests as a researcher generates a greater awareness of the 
anthropologist’s political commitments (cf. Gupta and Ferguson 1997b:24), reflected in 
ethnographic writing: ‘multi-sited fieldwork is thus always conducted with a keen 
awareness of being within the landscape, and as the landscape changes across sites, the 
identity of the ethnographer requires renegotiation’ (Marcus 1995:112). I pointed out 
above that different categories of actors (extension workers, consultants, farmers, etc.) 
in the Keita Project carry out their own ‘projects in the Project’ developing various 
strategies to reach their respective goals. The self-reflexivity implied by a multi-sited 
approach entails that the researcher be seen as just another situated actor, with his/her 
own distinct ‘project in the Project’, be it a Ph.D. thesis at the University of London, or
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some kind of ‘circumstantial activism’ within his/her research field (Marcus 1995:113; 
Marcus 1999:17).
Self-reflexivity with regard to the actual positioning of the researcher throughout 
fieldwork finds its counterpart in an awareness of the ways in which one’s writings fit 
into the wider arena of multi-vocal representations concerning the object of research. 
Because ‘[tjhere is virtually no space or scene of contemporary fieldwork that has not 
already been thoroughly mediated by other projects of representation’ (Marcus 
1999:23), part of one’s research consists in ‘disentangling dense webs of already 
existing representations, some of which are likely to have been produced by the subjects 
themselves’ (Marcus 1999:23). Hence, one’s writings, in this case an anthropological 
study of the Keita Project, exist in parallel with a vast array of other situated texts: 
‘[ejthnography thus becomes a kind of writing machine among others’. (Marcus 
1999:23)
I have argued above that anthropologists confronted with objects of research 
characterised by ‘peculiar’ spatial boundaries and social constituencies have developed 
their reflections in at least three directions. Firstly, they have tried to devise new 
analytical concepts fitted to deal with new cultural formations; secondly, they have 
called for self-reflexivity throughout the practice of fieldwork and for an active 
monitoring of the practices of renegotiating one’s ethnographic persona; and thirdly 
they have emphasised the political nature of ethnographic writing within competing 
projects of representation.
The Keita Project has to be observed keeping all these provisos in mind. It is an 
international development project which created a new field of interaction between 
Italian and Nigerien Ministries, FAO and WFP offices, Italian and Nigerien 
agronomists, economists, sociologists, extensionists, and men and women of the Ader 
Doutchi Majiya. Trying to make sense of how different categories of actors situated 
themselves within this field, I found myself negotiating my own project and identity as 
a researcher, with people of strikingly different status. And before writing up my own 
findings and interpretations, I had to unravel a plethora of ‘official documents’, media 
reports, and ‘local’ representations, which were other situated perspectives about the 
Project.
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While many of the authors mentioned in this section would probably not see 
themselves as primarily concerned with ‘structure’, I think that their work is, to some 
extent, an attempt to find new structural concepts to deal with new structures, or with 
old structures in new ways (cf. Booth 1994 :20). It is not enough to contrast ‘different’ 
identities or ‘worldviews’ (what might be called a ‘strict’ actor-oriented perspective), 
without trying to understand the wider field of relations in which individuals or groups 
exist in and through difference (cf. Bourdieu 1998:31). Here, this is the field opened by 
the Keita Project’s ‘rural development intervention’, and it has properties which 
influence the behaviour of the actors negotiating within it. The fact that the Project does 
not occupy a bounded geographical, social, cultural or linguistic space allows for 
particular configurations of power.
It is also not enough to simply contrast ‘global development’ with ‘local’ 
realities: not only does it dismiss the moral assumptions ‘hidden’ in the global-local 
opposition, but it also conceals the ways in which we can see the local and the global in 
one another (Fardon 1995). In order to use analytical tools in meaningful ways, it is 
important to find a way to conceptualise the structural characteristics of this object of 
research, because they partly account for the patterns of agency available (or not 
available) to different categories of actors. In the following section I discuss the 
function of the notions of structure, discourse, and agency in the study of development 
projects.
1.3 Identifying Analytical Frameworks: Actor-oriented and Structural-discursive 
Approaches Reconsidered
It has been remarked that contributions to development studies are characterised by a 
deplorable tendency
to formulate problems either from the point of view of how peasants react to development 
intervention without really analysing the nature of the wider encapsulating system, or from the 
point of view of how external forces determine local patterns of change without taking into 
account how the actions of peasants themselves or of other local groups may shape these 
processes. (Long 1989:4; cf. Booth 1994:xiv)
Agreeing with Booth that ‘while action-based and structural explanations are 
permissible, there are limits to the productive pursuit of either on its own’ (Booth 
1994:27; cf. Arce and Long 1999:24), here I shall attempt to bridge this gap and show
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that dismissing one of these two dimensions is likely to lead to misleading 
interpretations4. The structural explanations I shall look at here are the ones which, 
taking a discursive approach, emphasise the structural properties of development 
discourses, of which the work of Ferguson (1996) is a case in point. Before I move on to 
a discussion of the problems inherent in each of these approaches, I will briefly describe 
their respective arguments and their contributions to development studies.
An actor-oriented perspective, as exemplified in the work of Norman Long and 
colleagues in Wageningen, ‘entails recognising the “multiple realities” and diverse 
social practices of various actors, and requires working out methodologically how to get 
to grips with these different and often incompatible social worlds’ (Long 1992:5). This 
perspective leads to the development of the analytical notion of ‘interface’, which 
involves ‘the interplay of different “worlds of knowledge” [...] such as those of the 
farmer, extensionist, and agricultural scientist’ (Long 1989:222), and its methodological 
counterpart, ‘interface studies’, which carries with it a set of ad hoc research techniques 
(see Long 1989:247 and ff.)
A guiding analytical concept in Long’s actor-oriented approach is the notion of 
agency (cf. Long and Van der Ploeg 1994:82). Following Giddens (1984), agency is 
seen as dependent on the capability of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to a pre­
existing state of affairs or events. ‘This implies that all actors (agents) exercise some 
kind of “power”, even those in highly subordinated positions’ (Long 1989:223). Here, 
agency is inseparable from the related notions of projectuality, strategy and negotiation. 
The ethnographic contributions of actor-oriented perspectives highlight local actors’ 
strategies to develop their own projects within the ‘room for manoeuvre’ (cf. Long 
1992:36) available in specific situations within the context of development 
interventions. The capacity of local actors to unfold what may be called ‘projects in the 
Project’ is described as a way to exercise power: ‘power [...] is intrinsic to the 
elaboration, adaptation and reproduction of projects, and is a crucial element in strategic 
action’ (Long and Van der Ploeg 1994:74).
This perspective contradicts interpretations which overemphasise the 
constraining potential of development interventions (structures, institutions, and
4 For a discussion of the reasons why it has been difficult to integrate structural and actor-oriented
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discourses) vis a vis local agency. It entails a redefinition of the notion of ‘intervention’ 
to imply ‘a socially constructed and negotiated process, not simply the execution of an 
already specified plan of action with expected outcomes [...], not simply a top-down 
process’ (Long 1989:241; cf. Long and Villarreal 1989:103; Long 1992:9). Long and 
colleagues are not alone in developing this line of thinking (cf. Crehan and von Oppen 
1988; Olivier de Sardan 1988). Along very similar lines, Bierschenk argues that
project implementation does not mean carrying out an already planned programme but is a 
constant process of negotiation. One must begin with an analysis of the project’s participants and 
other interest groups, the goals and reasons for their negotiations, resources they have at hand -  
in short of their own respective projects. (1988:146)
Following this argument, Elwert and Bierschenk claim that the way forward in 
the study of development projects is to analyse the motivations, interests and ensuing 
strategies of the subjects involved in it: ‘the history and result of a project can be best 
understood through detailed analysis of the (hidden) struggles between the different 
interest groups involved (...). The analysis of development projects thus presupposes an 
analysis of strategic groups involved in their implementation’ (Bierschenk and Elwert 
1988:102). However, their focus on actors’ ‘interests’ and the weight they cast on 
intentionality and power struggles between negotiating parties generated reactions from 
scholars writing from different analytical perspectives. Thus, against these views, 
Ferguson argues that:
seeing a “development” project as the simple projection of the “interest” o f a subject (the World 
Bank, Canada, Capital, Imperialism) ignores the non- and counter-intentionality of structural 
production [...]. One must entertain the possibility that the “development” apparatus in Lesotho 
may do what it does, not at the bidding of some knowing and powerful subject who is making it 
all happen, but behind the backs or against the wills of even the most powerful actors. (Ferguson 
1996:18)
Ferguson argues that focusing on the strategies of individuals or groups as if 
these were responsible for the course taken by events dismisses the fact that actors exist 
within wider historical and social forms of rationality which have structural properties: 
‘if the process through which structural production takes place can be thought of as a 
machine, it must be said that the planners’ conceptions are not the blueprint for the 
machine; they are parts of the machine’ (Ferguson 1996:276). Following Foucault, 
instead of thinking of ‘development’ as the outcome of struggles and negotiations 
between actors controlling different stakes of power, he perceives actors as embedded in
perspectives, see Long 1992:18 and ff.
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particular forms of knowledge which imply certain power relations and strategies of 
struggle (cf. Foucault 1995:27).
Against those studies which take a development project to be explained ‘when 
all the interests behind it have been sorted out and made specific’ (Ferguson 1996:16), 
Ferguson sees overarching ‘discourses of development’ as ‘structures of knowledge’ 
which (pre)determine the ways in which development projects are ‘allowed’ to function 
and development practitioners are ‘allowed’ to act in specific historical contexts. 
However, his analysis goes further than looking at the work of ‘power/knowledge’ in 
the development apparatus, to enquire into the specific effects of development, 
explicitly following Foucault’s approach in his analysis of the prison. He claims that, 
just as prisons fail to reform the inmates, so development fails to reduce poverty. Such 
apparent failure in achieving its explicit objective, however, corresponds to a success in 
the real function of development, namely expanding state power while at the same time 
depoliticising its own (pre-eminently political) task:
“Development” institutions generate their own forms of discourse, and this discourse 
simultaneously constructs Lesotho as a particular kind of object of knowledge, and creates a 
structure of knowledge around that object. Interventions are then organised on the basis of this 
structure of knowledge, which, while “failing” on their own terms, nonetheless have regular 
effects, which include the expansion and entrenchment of bureaucratic state power. (Ferguson 
1996:xiv)
We are told that the effects produced by ‘development’ are the outcome of 
‘unacknowledged structures’ (Ferguson 1996:20), and the ‘constellations of control’ 
they give rise to are ‘all the more effective for being “subjectless”’ (1996:19). However, 
these assertions are repeatedly followed by rather unconvincing disclaimers: *[...] this is 
not to say that such institutions do not represent an exercise of power; only that power is 
not to be embodied in the person of a “powerful” subject’ (1996:18), and: 
‘unquestionably, there are a number of different interested parties whose interests can 
be identified and made explicit’ (1996:16). By trying to maintain a strictly structural- 
discursive approach, Ferguson finds himself in the untenable position of suggesting that 
individuals or groups do not actively exercise power in ways which influence the course 
taken by events, a position which is not supported by his own brilliant ethnography of 
the Thaba Tseka Development Project (see particularly Chapter 6).
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Other writers who have applied a Foucaultian approach to the study of 
development have managed to do so without downplaying the effects produced by 
hierarchy (local, national, and global) within the spaces opened in the name of 
‘development’. Hence, Escobar talks of ‘the production of discourse under conditions of 
unequal power’, which entails ‘specific constructions of the colonial/Third World 
subject in/through discourse in ways that allow the exercise of power over it’ (1995:9). 
Indeed, in his analysis of development as a ‘historically produced discourse’ (1995:6), 
one sees powerful subjects having a greater impact upon events (e.g. President 
Truman’s Point Four Program, p.36), and marginal subjects being influenced by the 
decisions of others: ‘almost by fiat, two thirds of the world’s people were transformed 
into poor subjects in 1948 when the World Bank defined as poor those countries with an 
annual per capita income below $100’ (1995:23). However, Escobar fails to theorise the 
relation between discourse and agency leaving unclear the relative importance he 
accords to each of these notions.
I believe that the problem is not to establish which one of the two perspectives 
briefly discussed above (actor-oriented and discourse/structural) is right and which is 
wrong. Authors writing from each one of them have undeniably made relevant 
contributions to our understanding of the workings of development. Their difference 
lies primarily (but not only) in a question of emphasis. For instance, in a study of the 
slave trade in the 15th- !  7th centuries, one could try to unravel the historical conditions 
which made discourses of slavery and their related practices possible at a specific time 
and in specific places, thereby highlighting the ways in which actors involved in the 
‘slavery apparatus’ assumed roles and behaviours ‘suggested’ to, or ‘imposed’ on, them 
by the regime of rationality they partook of; or one could emphasise the exploitative 
nature of the relation between slaves and masters, and the subjective nature of power 
and resistance. Problems arise when trying to employ one of these theoretical models on 
its own, because, as I shall argue in the following section, each of them sheds light on 
different aspects of the phenomenon under study; in other terms, they are better used in 
a complementary way. With reference to the analysis of development projects, in the 
remaining part of this section I will schematically review the faults of either model on 
its own, and in the following section I will attempt to integrate actor-oriented and 
structural approaches into a single approach to the study of development projects.
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On the one hand, too much emphasis on external structures and discourses fails 
to give a cogent account of human agency (cf. Giddens 1987:98). As Grillo has put it, ‘a 
discursive perspective [...] embraces a totalising conception of how society constitutes 
its members’ (1997:12). A vast number of contributions from different perspectives 
have shown that so-called ‘project beneficiaries’, or marginalised groups in general, 
resort to a multiplicity of strategies and forms of negotiation or resistance in order to 
carry out their own ‘projects in the Project’ (Long 1989; Grillo and Stirrat 1997; Arce, 
Villarreal and de Vries 1994; Bierschenk, Chauveau and Olivier de Sardan 2000; Torres 
1997; Arce and Long 1999).
If a somewhat greater weight has been given to demonstrating what might be 
called ‘room for manoeuvre at the bottom’, several authors have highlighted the ways in 
which people ‘at the top’ are able to make a difference to policy events (Grindle and 
Thomas 1991; Haas 1992; Keeley and Scoones 1999). Amongst those supporting this 
view, de Vries has the merit of raising the issue of responsibility, which tends to be 
obfuscated in discursive approaches:
there is (...) something wrong in assigning responsibility to some impersonal ‘development 
apparatus’. Blaming some abstract ‘anti-politics machine’ for the marginalization of the settlers 
absolves a number o f actors who might, rather consciously indeed, have been in favour of such 
an outcome, and others who did not care very much about its consequences, (de Vries 1992:93)
A second order of problems raised by discursive approaches, highlighted by 
McNay in her critique of Foucault’s writings and pertinent to discursive approaches to 
development, consists in the insufficient distinction they operate between ‘practices that 
are merely “suggested” to the individual and practices that are more or less “imposed” 
in so far as they are heavily laden with cultural sanctions and taboos’ (McNay 1992:75). 
How does one ‘measure’ the relative hold of development discourses upon the beliefs 
and choices of individual and collective actors? What are the probabilities that 
development projects, ‘while “failing” on their own terms, nonetheless [will have] 
regular effects, which [will] include the expansion and entrenchment of bureaucratic 
state power’ (Ferguson 1996:xiv)? There are at least some examples of actors who have 
challenged reflexively the activities of development institutions and have suggested 
alternatives which would not lead toward the expansion of state power (e.g. Galjart 
1981; Escobar 1995). Be it only for their contributions, the effects produced by 
‘development’ cannot be seen as the outcome of ‘unacknowledged structures’ (Ferguson 
1996:20). These structures are acknowledged (as proved, ironically, by Ferguson’s own
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work), albeit by an elite minority, and to some extent resisted in the form of writing and 
political activism5.
Finally, another problem with structural explanations of development is that they 
tend to attribute excessive importance to the potential influence of some external 
structures (such as development projects) upon the lives of actors living in the Project’s 
‘intervention areas’. This problem, which I refer to as ‘development-centric bias’, 
dismisses the possibility that, from the point of view of the ‘receiving society’, the 
project may be just one (external) institution amongst others (both external and 
autochthonous), primarily relevant only insofar as it makes available new sources of 
revenue (cf. Bierschenk, Chauveau, Olivier de Sardan 2000:7). Hence, a more realistic 
analysis should recognise that
the fate of individual development actions can best be understood in a historical perspective. 
This perspective brings to the surface modes o f transformation which existed well before the 
development projects and which will probably continue to exist after they have done their task, 
because the projects themselves are in most cases appropriated and transformed by these 
historical dynamics. (Bierschenk and Elwert 1988:110)
Due to the geographic and cultural distance between the sources of development 
‘structures of knowledge’ (e.g. international and national development institutions) and 
the sites where projects are installed and implemented, these ‘structures of knowledge’ 
are syncretically integrated into different structures, thus undergoing a process of 
‘localisation’ (Long 1996:50), which is rarely taken into account by discursive and/or 
structural approaches.
Focusing only on ‘local room for manoeuvre’ is equally problematic. First, it 
underestimates the constraints upon ‘local’ action that emerge at international and 
national levels, when, for example, funds are allocated for particular types of 
intervention in specific regions (cf. Booth 1994:17). The ‘room’ of ‘local room jor 
manoeuvre’ depends to a great extent upon the planners’ agenda, and the Project’s pre­
defined objectives and working methods. As shown by my own evidence in Chapter 8
5 This is different from saying, with Giddens, that (unacknowledged) structures have both constraining 
and enabling properties (1984:25), but instead it converges with Mouzelis’ observation that ‘participants 
are capable and willing to take a discriminatory stance vis-a-vis institutional and figurational wholes in 
order consciously to generate transformational or conservational projects. Bourdieu and Giddens’ key 
concepts hinder the explanation of situations where actors try, in a quite deliberate and conscious manner, 
to use rules and resources (in Giddens’ case) or their positions and dispositions (in Bourdieu’s) not as 
means but as topics’ (1995:125).
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of this thesis, the above mentioned process of ‘localisation’ does not mean that project 
‘recipients’ are able to change the premises upon which the ‘intervention’ was originally 
set, but only that some of them (usually elites) are at best able to manipulate activities 
and interpretations authorised ‘from the top’.
Even in so-called ‘participatory’ and ‘empowering’ models of development, the 
modes of participation, as well as, paradoxically, the outcomes of participation, are 
often already determined by the same actors who decide that ‘local participation’ is 
necessary: ‘[pjrojects clearly influence the way in which people construct their “needs”. 
Not all the information recorded in PRAs will register as legitimate “needs” and so 
influence technology preferences or programme decisions’ (Mosse 2001:29).
However, it is not only that, within the field of project intervention, the agency 
of some actors (typically project ‘beneficiaries’) is more limited than that of other actors 
(e.g. the planners), because it is encapsulated in an international structure to which the 
planners have easier access. Rather, it is also that, on a different analytical level, 
becoming the target population of a development project (a status which is usually not 
willingly chosen by the interested actors, but ‘bestowed’ upon them by external 
institutions) incorporates the ‘beneficiaries’ in a new system which tells them ‘who’ 
they are and what their ‘needs’ are. It is in this sense that Cooke and Kothari point out 
that ‘“empowering” participants to take part in the modem sector of developing 
societies is tantamount, in Foucaultian terms, to subjection* (2001:13).
In this section, I have provided some examples of approaches emphasising 
structural properties and of those defending ‘actor-oriented’ perspectives. I have then 
highlighted, with reference to an anthropology of development, the faults likely to be 
generated by each approach on its own. In the following section I will discuss how and 
why both structural-discursive and actor-oriented approaches should be adopted to look 
at the workings of development projects.
1.4 Relations between Discourse and Hierarchy: Integrating Actor-oriented and 
Structural-discursive Perspectives
The development apparatus is characterised by structural properties. It reflects a 
dominant discourse of development which entails particular forms of rationality with
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related regimes of practices; it implies a particular ‘structure of knowledge’ (Ferguson 
1996) which defines subjectivities and implies certain configurations of power. This 
does not mean that there are no different or external perspectives, but only that these 
other ‘discourses’ are marginal to dominant views and practices of development. A first 
step in integrating actor-oriented and structural-discursive perspectives, consists in 
recognising that there is substantial evidence that discourses are not independent from 
hierarchy configurations which imply subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. Before 
addressing the modes and conditions of appropriation of discourses, the notion of 
‘discourse’ has to be ‘unpacked’.
Leaving aside, for the moment, strictly linguistic uses of ‘discourse’ (cf. 
Apthorpe and Gasper 1996), I shall refer to the meanings and uses of discourse derived 
from the work of Foucault, adopting the very general definition provided by Grillo: ‘A 
discourse (e.g. of development) identifies appropriate and legitimate ways of practising 
development as well as speaking and thinking about it’ (Grillo 1997:12)6.
In anthropological writings using the analytical notion of ‘discourse’, some 
confusion is generated by the above mentioned lack of specification of whether it 
implies practices which are ‘imposed’ or ‘merely suggested’ to socialised actors. This 
confusion is all the more legitimate, given that Foucault himself uses this notion with 
different meanings at different points. It is possible to distinguish between two primary 
meanings. The first one is implicit in the following quote:
Discourse is constituted by the difference between what one could say correctly at one period 
(under the rules o f grammar and logic) and what is actually said. The discursive field is, at a 
specific moment, the law of this difference. (Foucault 1978:18)
This first definition seems to work best on grand-scale historical reconstructions, 
and implies that ‘practices don’t exist without a certain regime of rationality’ (Foucault 
1991a:79); that this regime of rationality is socially and historically rooted; and that it 
functions, in Ferguson’s words, as a ‘structure of knowledge’ allowing certain events 
and patterns of agency, and rendering others un-thinkable, un-sayable, and un-doable. 
Hence, for example, we live at a time when the World Bank can say correctly (under the 
rules of grammar and logic) that a certain amount of funds has been allocated for
6 Unless otherwise stated, it is with this meaning that the notion of ‘discourse’ will be used throughout 
this thesis.
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‘development programmes’ in the Africa region, but it could not be equally said 
correctly (under the rules of grammar and logic) that an expedition for capturing 
thousands of ‘slaves’ is being sent to Africa. Viceversa, at a different time in history the 
latter sentence might have been plausible and the former un-thinkable. The 
philosophical issue at stake here, which for the purpose of this introduction I am not 
going to address, is how, if actors are fully cultural and social beings, could they do 
anything which is not already present, suggested, or imposed on them by their culture, 
society and social group (cf. Ortner 1984:155; McNay 1992:61). Here, discourses seem 
to be structures external to individual or collective actors and are, to a large extent, 
unacknowledged by social actors. Actors may use them, but do not control or produce 
them: ‘power produces; it produces reality, it produces domains of objects and rituals of 
truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
production’ (Foucault in Rabinow 1984:204).
However, in his later work on Govemmentality, Foucault’s thinking allows more 
space to agency and inter-subjectivity in the deployment and control of discourses:
What individuals, what groups or classes have access to a particular kind o f discourse? How is 
the relationship institutionalised between the discourse, speakers and its destined audience? How 
is the relationship of the discourse to its author indicated and defined? How is struggle for the 
control of discourses conducted between classes, nations, linguistic, cultural or ethnic 
collectivities? (Foucault 1978:15)
and:
Discoursing subjects form a part of the discursive field. They have their place within it (and their 
possibilities of displacements) and their function (and their possibilities of functional mutation). 
(Foucault 1978:13)
I take these questions to indicate an awareness of hierarchically stratified 
subjectivities handling, appropriating, controlling, creating, and reacting to discourses, 
even though Foucault does not tell us how he reconciles these views with his work on 
the prison and his earlier studies (cf. McNay 1992:49).
I do not think that it is necessary to choose between the two meanings of 
discourse discussed above, but it is useful to specify which meaning one adopts for the 
purpose of a specific analysis. The historical and social conditions of possibility of 
‘development’ may be researched with the first meaning in mind; with Escobar, ‘to 
speak of development as a historical construct requires an analysis of the mechanisms 
through which it becomes an active, real force. These mechanisms are structured by
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forms of knowledge and power and can be studied in terms of processes of 
institutionalisation and professionalisation’ (1995:44). Chapter 4 of this thesis 
reconstructs the ways in which certain forms of rationality, reflected in narratives about 
‘desertification in the Sahel’, paved the way to a process of institution building and to a 
set of practices of which the Keita Project is a case in point.
In the remaining part of this section I will focus on the second meaning of 
‘discourse’, a meaning which allows for the active manoeuvring of (competing) 
discourses on the part of different categories of actors. The question addressed here is: 
how does this manoeuvring, bargaining and negotiating process take place? The answer 
requires taking on board the peculiar characteristics of the object of study (an 
international development project) discussed in section 1.2.
‘Discourses’ in this sense have been used by several authors. I have already 
mentioned Escobar’s focus on ‘the production of discourse under conditions of unequal 
power’ (Escobar 1995:9). With this formula, Escobar aims to direct the readers’ 
attention to the non reciprocal ways in which knowledge about the ‘Third World’ is 
produced, a knowledge which allows for the establishment of exploitative relations in 
which ‘experts produced a regime of truth and norms’ (1995:46) and ‘many in the Third 
World began to think of themselves as inferior, underdeveloped and ignorant’ 
(1995:52). Along similar lines, criticising Foucault’s use of the notion of discourse, 
Mouzelis asks ‘what, for example, are the connections between [the discourses of] 
national, regional, local elites and those of peasants? In other words, how are discourses 
hierarchically organised in social space?’ (1995:56)
Shore and Wright, looking at discourses of policy, try to identify the types of 
resources which political actors bring to bear on policy processes to make their 
discourses prevail. ‘Although some discourses are deeply embedded in institutional 
policy and practice’, they argue that contributions to their volume ‘reveal how they are 
constantly contested and sometimes fractured’ (1997:20). ‘A key concern is “who has 
the power to define”: dominant discourses work by setting up the terms of reference and 
by disallowing and marginalizing alternatives’ (Shore and Wright 1997:18). Central to 
this issue is Henrietta Moore’s observation that contestations and negotiations over 
discourses are rarely interpretative contests between equals : ‘it is not just that there are
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competing discourses about rights and needs, but also that such discourses are stratified 
[along axes of inequality]’ (Moore 1994:100). Socially-established differences between 
categories of people influence the relative ‘leverage’ that differently situated actors can 
exert when negotiating over the interpretation of identities, needs and rights.
There can be little doubt that, in the field of development, discourses are 
stratified and that the point of view of the dominant (what Bourdieu would call ‘doxa’, 
cf. Bourdieu 1998:75) presents itself as a universal point of view and has effects of a 
much greater scale than those of other discourses. One of the clearest examples of this is 
Fairhead and Leach’s examination of the contrast between the formulation of problems 
in development environmental policy and the perspective of villagers ‘whose views 
have been subjugated and everyday activities criminalized, within this formulation’ 
(Fairhead and Leach 1997:35). The authors contrast official readings of environmental 
change, supporting the argument of a ‘savannization’ of tropical forest supposedly due 
to, inter alia, destructive human practices, with the villagers’ view that their land use 
has maintained or enhanced woody vegetation cover. Although oral recollections 
concerning vegetation use, comparative analysis of air photographs from 1952, and 
satellite data confirm that the area in question is actually a ‘post-savannah’, not a ‘post­
forest’ zone, the convergence of multiple factors reinforces the narrative of official 
development sources. This narrative is operationalised into development projects and 
environmental policies which have far reaching consequences for the lives of the 
Kissidougou villagers observed by Fairhead and Leach. ‘Today, villagers’ own 
ecological knowledge and experience have been unable successfully to challenge the 
landscape readings driving policy. This is partly because of the power relations at the 
farmers’ interface with environmental agencies and urban intellectuals’ (Fairhead and 
Leach 1997:35; cf Swift 1996).
The field of development intervention is characterised by sharp power 
inequalities, with important consequences for whose discourses prevail. Mouzelis’ 
analytical distinction between macro, meso and micro actors may prove a useful point 
of entry to explain the hierarchic interplay of the different categories of actors involved 
in a project: ‘actors at the top of hierarchically organised wholes play games the 
consequences of which tend to be macro (i.e. they stretch widely in time and space). 
The opposite is true for those at the bottom of social hierarchies’ (Mouzelis 1995:157).
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With reference to the case discussed above, environmental policy makers play games 
the consequences of which can be seen as ‘macro’, while Kissidougou’s villagers are 
unable to make their interpretation prevail.
I have argued in this section that, at any particular time, the structure of the field 
of project ‘intervention’ is disproportionately influenced by the agency and rationality 
of ‘macro’ actors. Using a more ‘subjective’ reading of ‘discourse’ (the 'second 
meaning' mentioned above) allows an analysis of the ways in which, in Mouzelis’ 
terms, ‘macro actors’ are able to impose their discourses and interpretations, with 
consequences that are far reaching and influence the lives and activities of ‘meso’ or 
‘micro’ actors. This does not mean that 'micro actors' are powerless. In order to explain 
the conditions which make possible widely documented forms of ‘local room for 
manoeuvre’ and/or resistance, the ‘peculiar’ spatial-social structure of the field of 
project intervention must be taken into account as explanans.
As noted above, the field of project intervention includes many different spaces 
that are discontinuous from each other. The socio-cultural and spatial distance between 
these spaces increases the room for manoeuvre available to actors situated within any 
one constituting space, and the chances of independent strategising for the unfolding of 
separate ‘projects in the Project’. In the following section I will clarify this statement 
with reference to the workings of ‘distance’ in the development field, illustrated though 
examples taken from my own evidence and other anthropological studies of 
development.
1.5 Reconceptualising the Object of Study: Distance and Distanciation in 
Development.
The hyperspace (Kearney 1996) created by the Keita Project’s intervention encroaches 
upon the semi-autonomous social fields which constitute it (Moore 1973). These fields 
are geographically and socio-culturally distant from each other. The men and women of 
the Ader Doutchi Majiya, the planners, the Italian and Nigerien consultants, and the 
members of project staff, ‘belong’ simultaneously to the field of project intervention 
and to fields that are more circumscribed, such as Keita’s village politics and UN and 
Italian bureaucratic contexts. Development discourses and ‘rules of the game’, which 
are determined to a large extent by ‘macro’ actors, are only one of a number of factors
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that affect the decisions people make. But actors also respond to pressures from smaller 
fields, which are, in turn, internally stratified. Hence, actors are strategising across 
different hierarchical wholes at the same time, and ‘macro’ referents may differ across 
these wholes.
This way of conceptualising the object of research draws attention to the 
connections between the field of project intervention and the semi-autonomous fields 
which constitute it. The research problems raised here are: how do actors belonging to 
culturally, socially and geographically ‘distant’ contexts understand the ‘project 
intervention’ to which they all -  with different roles - partake? How do they 
operationalise their understanding of what ‘development’ can do for them? What forms 
of inter-subjectivity arise between actors? These are interpretative questions, which take 
spatial and socio-cultural distance as a starting point.
The conditions for understanding across historical and cultural ‘distance’ have 
been theorised by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his philosophy of hermeneutics. Gadamer 
originally developed his hermeneutic theory as an attempt to answer the question of 
how understanding is possible across historical distance (cf. Bemasconi 1995:178; 
Gadamer 1975). He addresses the distance which characterises alterity in his analysis of 
the I-Thou relation. ‘Conventionally, hermeneutics has represented alterity as a problem 
to be overcome’ (Bemasconi 1995:179). However, Gadamer has challenged this 
approach by resorting to the notion of the Socratic dialogue, which implies an 
‘openness’ to the other7. Dialogue does not stem from assertiveness and self-certainty, 
but from questioning one’s own assumptions and trying to comprehend the other’s 
message from the other’s perspective. This requires a ‘distanciation’ (Verfremdung) 
from one’s own prejudices and a willingness to put one’s beliefs ‘at risk’: ‘Openness to 
the other, then, includes the acknowledgement that I must accept some things that are 
against myself, even though there is no one else who asks this of me’ (Gadamer 
1975:324). The emphasis is on the intersubjective, rather than the subjective, dimension 
(cf. Scheibler 2000:61). In his later work, Gadamer suggests that this model applies to 
understanding across cultural distance:
7 ‘[t]o understand what a person says is, as we saw, to agree about the object, not to get inside another 
person and relive his experiences’ (Gadamer 1975:345).
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To understand someone else is to see the justice, the truth of their position. And this is what 
transforms us. And if we then have to become part of a new worldcivilisation [sic], if this is our 
task, then we shall need a philosophy which is similar to my hermeneutics, a philosophy which 
teaches us to see the justification for the other’s point of view and which thus makes us doubt 
our own. (1986:152)
Distance across time or culture is not seen as an insurmountable hermeneutic 
barrier, but as the precondition for distanciation from one’s historical or cultural 
prejudices, because it is through the experience of distance that we become aware of our 
‘historicality’ (Gadamer 1975:324) and ‘culturality’.
The difficulty arises when trying to apply Gadamer’s dialogic model to relations 
characterised by unequal power and diverging interests. In these circumstances the 
possibility of understanding may be refused and mutual ‘openness’ may be absent, 
because parties are brought together by socio-political concerns other than ‘seeing the 
justification for the other’s point of view’. Relations found in the world of development 
belong to this category. Here, as we have seen in previous sections, discourses are 
hierarchically stratified and the conditions of mutual openness and status equality 
necessary for the establishment of reciprocal understanding do not occur. As has been 
argued by Edelmann (1984), this is all the more paradoxical in the case of ‘the political 
language of the helping professions’, because, while appearing to give help to the poor, 
they portray a power relationship as a helping one:
One of the consistent characteristics of the “helping” institutions is their care to limit forms of 
help that would make clients autonomous: money for the poor; liberating education and freedom 
for children of the poor or for “criminals”; physical and intellectual autonomy. The limit is 
enforced in practice while denied in rhetoric. (Edelman 1984:58)
While it can be argued reasonably that Gadamer’s conceptions of dialogue, in 
general, tend to underestimate alterity and power inequality (cf. Bemasconi 1995), he 
does not entirely dismiss these cases. Gadamer mentions as another, flawed, mode of 
experience of the ‘Thou’, the mode in which one claims to understand the other even 
better than the other understands himself/herself, only with the purpose of dominating 
the other: ‘This can have very varied degrees of tension, to the point of the complete 
domination of one person by the other’ (Gadamer 1975:323)8. It is noteworthy that he 
illustrates this with the example of the helping professions:
8 Bemasconi does in fact acknowledge this passage (1995:179), but seems to attribute less weight to it in 
Gadamer’s thought than I would be prepared to do.
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The dialectic of charitable or welfare work in particular operates in this way, penetrating all 
relationships between men as a reflective form of the effort to dominate. The claim to understand 
the other person in advance performs the function of keeping the claim o f the other person at a 
distance. (Gadamer 1975:323).
These instances of ‘false dialectical appearance’ (Gadamer 1975:323) explain 
‘the production of discourse under conditions of unequal power’ (Escobar 1995:9) 
which, as we have seen, characterises the field of development intervention. Here, in the 
majority of cases, the other is seen ‘as a tool’ (Gadamer 1975:323), and knowledge of 
the other is sought in an instrumental way, to facilitate the unfolding of one’s ‘projects 
in the Project’. This is true for different categories of actors. The ‘developers’ seek 
knowledge of ‘the poor’ to legitimise ‘intervention’, and the ‘target population’ tries to 
manipulate ‘development’ actors and rationales in order to maximise its access to 
services and resources (material, social or cultural) made available by ‘development 
interventions’. The geographic, social, and cultural distance which characterises 
relations between different actors in the development field facilitates what may be 
called ‘room for manoeuvre’ at the top and at the bottom, diminishing the accountability 
between actors. It is the effects of the project on closer domains of each actor’s 
experience which usually account for the patterns of agency that are followed.
Below I illustrate this with some examples taken from my own evidence and 
other ethnographies of development. These case studies exemplify three main 
situations. First, they show that local patterns of agency in development are more 
responsive to local pressures and concerns than to the rationales of the overarching 
development field (room for manoeuvre at the bottom). Secondly, development 
planners and bureaucrats are also shown to base their decision-making not upon a 
concern with local priorities and expressed ‘needs’, but rather with other factors closer 
to their everyday life and work constraints (room for manoeuvre at the top). Finally, I 
will discuss the function of two specialised institutions, ‘development brokerage’ and 
‘sensitisation’, which have the function of manipulating the other into doing something 
for one’s own purposes. In both cases, the other is a tool for the unfolding of one’s 
strategies, and understanding the other in a certain way is instrumental to one’s 
(unspoken) ends.
In her study of development projects in an Indian village in Ecuador (Lentz 
1988), Carola Lentz discusses the ‘partial acceptance or redefinition of external offers’
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(1988:200) in Shamanga, a small Indian community in the parish of Cajamba in 
Chimborazo province. In Shamanga, most village households had insufficient access to 
land, and relied on urban migration as a primary source of income. When Shamanga’s 
five-year elected village committee (cabildo) was able to initiate a cattle-breeding 
project in cooperation with FODERUMA,9 numerous households expressed an interest 
in obtaining credit from FODERUMA for the purchase of piglets for fattening (pig- 
breeding based on kitchen refuse being open even to families without much land). 
However, the state advisers insisted that any possible credit be used for the purchase of 
cattle (cf. Lentz 1988:213). FODERUMA advisers here were able to impose their 
original plans without trying to understand the position of Shamanga’s villagers. As a 
consequence, only one third of the village families finally took a loan with 
FODERUMA, which some used for other purposes. However, those households for 
whom migration was the most important form of income and for whom the village had 
little importance as a site of production, were indifferent or opposed to the project, and, 
at the following elections for a new cabildo, the councillors responsible for the project 
were replaced by new members ‘whom most of the villagers quite openly dismissed as 
“incompetent” and who did not pursue the matter further’ (Lentz 1988:213). The same 
strategies had already been adopted in similar circumstances in the past. ‘The election of 
an incompetent community council can thus be seen from this perspective as a strategy 
to prevent a group of families in the village “developing” at the cost of those who 
concentrate their income strategies more strongly in the urban area’ (Lentz 1988:214). 
While FODERUMA agents were able to quite rigidly determine the objectives of the 
project, dismissing the expressed wishes of Shamanga villagers, local ‘room for 
manoeuvre’ was evident in the election of an incompetent elite, which represented a 
form of ‘sabotage’ of the plans of ‘macro’ actors.
In Chapter 7 of this thesis, I look at the case of the Foyer Feminin de Keita, an 
institution made available by the Project to improve the conditions of Keita’s women. 
At first, it may seem that local strategies to gain some benefits from the Foyer should 
seek the support of project staff. However, at the elections of a new committee for the 
Foyer, local elite actors who had been responsible for the failure of Foyer initiatives a 
few years earlier, were re-elected by Keita women instead of lower status candidates, 
undeniably better suited for the task and supported by the Project. Keita women were
9 Fondo de Desarrollo del Sector Rural Marginal, a subdivision of the Central Bank founded to improve
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‘investing’ in their relation with local elites, a relation from which they gained benefits 
in domains other than that of project activities. At the local level, the field of Project 
intervention intertwines with other fields of action, giving rise to strategies which 
cannot be explained only in the light of forces at play in the project field. Also in this 
case, the local strategy of electing elites was at the same time a more effective way to 
use project operations from a local perspective, and a refusal of project rationales and 
criteria of efficiency.
A more complex example is provided by Arce and Long’s ethnography of 
peasant-bureaucrat relations in Western Mexico (1993). Their study looks at the 
consequences of the application of the Mexican Food Program (SAM, Sistema 
Alimentario Mexicano) in the peasant community (ejido) of La Lobera in San Cristobal 
de la Barranca. It focuses on the figure of Roberto, a tecnico (technical agronomist) 
working for the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (SAHR). The central 
aim of SAM in districts like La Lobera was the increase of rain-fed maize production. 
However, both richer and poorer peasants resisted the ‘modernisation’ implied by the 
SAM development programme, partly due to their mistrust of the Government, partly to 
different perceptions of agriculture and agricultural development between development 
agency personnel and producers. Bureaucrats at the SAHR district office failed to 
recognise the diversified nature of the local economy and system of production 
(1993:189-192), and entertained a stereotypical image of La Lobera as a geographically 
isolated ‘rough place’ (1993:183) associated with illegal activities and suspicious of 
outsiders. The peasants’ belief that the government works against them and does not 
understand their problems functioned as an ideological barrier to developing 
relationships of trust (confianza) with government personnel. Hence, both ‘openness’ 
and ‘dialogue’ are absent in the relation between peasants and bureaucrats. However, 
the geographic ‘isolation’ of San Cristobal acted in favour of producers, who could 
sometimes divert programme resources to finance their own economic ventures, while 
limiting administrative interferences in their lifestyle and production system:
[...] producers are basically oriented toward keeping control over the organization of their 
households and local enterprises, while at the same time attempting, where possible, to profit 
from whatever outside resources may come their way. [...] Thus, despite their geographical and 
institutional ‘marginality’ and their poverty vis a vis other social strata or sectors, they
living conditions for the poorest strata of the rural population (Lentz 1988:201).
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nevertheless know how to live with their ‘isolation’ and extract some benefits from it. (Arce and
Long 1993:194)
Nevertheless, in the course of a meeting with La Lobera producers, Roberto 
managed to win the confianza of a peasant leader, and to have a petition for a bailing 
machine signed by the producers, which he presented to the head of his unit. In turn, 
Roberto promised the producers’ leader that he would try to further the leader’s plan to 
develop fruit tree production in La Lobera. The head of the unit pointed out, however, 
that ‘the policy of the ministry was not to support livestock activities, but the production 
of maize’ (1993:200), and eventually Roberto and the head entered into an open 
confrontation. Some weeks later Roberto was transferred to another unit.
Long and Arce argue that the case reveals ‘the enormous gaps in communication 
and the power differentials in Mexico between peasants and state development 
agencies’ (1993:206). Also in this case bureaucratic authorities (the head of the unit) are 
able to impose a particular interpretation of agricultural development (irrespective of its 
actual accuracy and profitability to the producers) within the field of project 
intervention. However, due to their distance from the centres of bureaucratic control, La 
Lobera producers maintain considerable freedom to continue pursuing their economic 
strategies almost undisturbed. At a certain moment, Roberto could establish some 
confianza with the leader of the producers, but the episode had no following. Roberto 
opted to disregard ministerial policies and carried out his own ‘project in the Project’, 
which failed. The system worked so as to make him unaccountable, first toward the 
ministry (he disregarded the ministry’s policy), and then toward the producers (he was 
transferred to another site).
A similar situation is described in Chapter 8 of this thesis, when Italian planners 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to apply new approaches in international 
development to the Keita Project, and sent a series of ‘missions’ to evaluate the 
conditions for the implementation of these changes. Taking into account the resistance 
of the ‘target population’ to the intended changes, the consultants’ report suggested that 
the new approaches be introduced in a less pervasive and more gradual way. 
Disappointed by the results of the mission, the planners sent a second mission which 
produced recommendations in line with the new approaches, taking no heed of the first 
mission’s report. Consultants were de-responsibilised and project activities were
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determined by adherence to international discourses rather than by the situation of the 
‘intervention’ area.
My last examples focus on the role of ‘development brokers’ (Bierschenk, 
Chaveau and Olivier de Sardan 2000; cf. Bierschenk and Elwert 1988:104) and on the 
notion of ‘sensitisation’. Development brokers are engaged in a farce, through which 
they use their understanding of the development logic to make development work for 
their own priorities, which may not be the same priorities identified by the ‘developers’. 
Through ‘sensitisation’, which is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5 of this thesis 
with reference to its function in the Keita Project, rather than responding to the genuine 
demand of the ‘target population’, development creates a demand for the type of 
services it has to offer. These two phenomena are related, because the villagers learn the 
logic of development as they are being ‘sensitised’, and use the language and criteria 
learned this way in forms of brokerage aimed at achieving their own priorities (or, more 
frequently, the priorities of a powerful local elite). These practices set up a secretly 
acknowledged mutual deception, which makes available what, in this case, both parties 
want: a project (cf. Neubert 2000).
Brokers in development (<courtiers en developpement) function as intermediaries 
between the ‘developers’ and the ‘target populations’. Amongst their distinctive traits, 
brokers (who in most cases are originally representatives of the -potential- ‘target 
population’) are characterised by a command of development discourses (Bierschenk, 
Chaveau, Olivier de Sardan 2000:22); and they ought to have travelled acquiring 
experience abroad and contacts with development projects (2000:25). The broker must 
be able to speak ‘the development language’ and he is located exactly at the ‘interface’ 
between ‘developers’ and ‘beneficiaries’ (2000:26); he has the confidence of each of 
these categories of actors because he is assumed to be in close contact with the other 
category: ‘it is because the dominant actors of the englobing society believe that 
peasants mandate him that he is listened by power and, respectively, peasants mandate 
him because they believe that power listens to him’ (2000:18, my translation from 
French).
Mongbo brilliantly exemplifies the role of development brokers in his 
ethnography of the village of Gliten in Benin. Gliten is conducting ‘a real hunt for
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NGOs’ (2000:235), ‘primarily with a view to obtaining WFP food-for-work rations 
(vivres PAM)*(2000:221). Praising the operations of the brokers who have managed to 
bring the representatives of an NGO to the village, the President of the village 
federation (of development groups -  groupements) says
If you have a hunt dog and it is a real hunt dog, you bring him to hunt and you reach the borders 
of a forest where you do not dare to penetrate because it is entirely unknown to you. Well, you 
remain there, your dog will go into the forest and will bring you some game. We greet and thank 
these young akowe sitting at the back who have brought us this game... (2000:234, my italics)
The metaphor of the hunt dog and the game reverses some of the cases discussed 
above, showing how ‘local room for manoeuvre’ can operate not only in contrast to 
projects, but also to attract the potential benefits a project has to offer to a local 
community. Here, the broker ‘bridges’ the (potential) intervention area and the sources 
of development, contributing to ‘joining’ together the sites which will end up 
constituting the multi-sited field of project intervention. Cultural and geographic 
distance justifies the need for the figure of the development broker, capable of speaking 
the ‘development language’ and dealing with a field ‘entirely unknown’ to villagers.
The term ‘sensitisation’ (sensibilisation) is commonly used in the development 
jargon of Francophone Africa, to refer to a set of activities carried out by development 
practitioners to ‘help’ the target population ‘become aware’ of their problems and the 
solutions to these problems. In his ethnography of the Timidria association in Niger, 
Tidjani-Alou argues that the term sensibilisation ‘suggests that the constituted group is 
not always aware of its needs. It is the [development] association which defines [the 
needs for the population] and which shows them their meaning’ (2000:288).
Writing about the same phenomenon, Bierschenk notes that ‘with sensibilisation 
[sic] meetings it is a matter of convincing a small group [...] that a certain measure 
decided by the project is worth carrying out and of mobilising the target group for the 
tasks that were intended for them in this setting’ (1988:155). Here too, if the discourses 
produced by development institutions and the system o f knowledge of the ‘target 
population’ were not geographically, culturally, and linguistically so distant, the 
‘developers’ would not require a specialised function to create a need framed according 
to their own forms of rationality, and villages would not need brokers to take advantage 
of the ‘development revenue’.
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The cases discussed above show that the cultural and spatial distance which 
characterises relations in the development field allows ‘room for manoeuvre’ at the 
bottom and at the top. The former is evident in the manipulation of Project aims by the 
part of so-called beneficiaries to achieve results which are relevant to their life and 
production strategies (and which it is their ‘project’ to achieve), but which the 
‘developers’ refuse to incorporate in their plans. This refusal, which may at first appear 
paradoxical, has been analysed by Clay and Schaffer (1984) who argued that, against 
‘common-sense models of policy’ (1984:12), the ‘real priorities’ of planners (such as 
getting funds disbursed on time) are explained by factors closer to their everyday life 
and work constraints, than the actual ‘priorities’ of the ‘target population’. This is what 
Clay and Schaffer refer to as ‘the bureaucratic irony’: ‘the development of policy cannot 
be understood or assisted if we neglect the bureaucratic irony (avoiding risk, surviving 
but still getting something done, e.g. spending funds)’ (1984:10). One of the reasons 
why development planners can take little account of the ‘real needs’ of the target 
population is that the system works in a way by which individual or collective actors 
accountable for the implementation of plans are external to the intervention area, in 
most cases based in distant sites and/or highly mobile (cf. Shore and Wright 1997:11).
Distance here is actively maintained. It functions not so as to distanciate one 
from one’s prejudices and open up to the other’s perspective, but to maximise one’s 
room for manoeuvre in spite o f  the other’s perspectives. This pattern of agency is partly 
made possible by the multi-sited structure of the development field. Mutual 
understanding is not impossible. In fact, the success of the Keita Project in its first 15 
years of intervention is explained by a commonality of intents among the actors 
involved in it. Development projects open spaces for the unfolding of ‘projects in the 
Project’, and different categories of actors ‘use’ (development) projects for their 
respective strategies. These strategies must be understood in the light of the connection 
between the explicit objectives that dominate the ‘field of project intervention’, and the 
idiosyncratic objectives of actors who simultaneously occupy positions in the ‘project 
intervention field’ and in more circumscribed fields closer to their life experiences. An 
actor involved in a development project, be he/she the project manager or a Keita 
woman working on project worksites for food-for-work, is confronted by the question 
of how the project can contribute or help him/her to realise his/her aspirations. These
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aspirations must be understood in the light of the different fields to which the actor 
belongs at a particular time (e.g. the field of marriage strategies, of land transactions, of 
career strategies, of technological and scientific achievements).
Keita’s ‘success’ is usually presented as an exception to the rule of development 
failures. What is perhaps even more exceptional is that, in the first three phases, the 
idiosyncratic projects of different actors involved in the Keita Project did not run 
against each other. Keita accommodated and contributed to the realisation of the 
strategies of different categories of actors, and hence ‘it worked’ (Chapters 4,5,6). When 
the premises for its ‘intervention’ changed, the cooperation between the parties to the 
project began to fail (cf. Chapter 8). This thesis tries to document the story of the Keita 
Project, exploring the different perspectives of the actors involved. It illustrates the rise 
and the likely beginning of the fall of the Keita Project. Waiting for time to write the 
epilogue of this story, the thesis’ conclusion only advances some hypotheses for further 
reflection on what Keita has to teach about the workings of rural development projects.
1.6 Methodology and Fieldwork Organisation
The broader framework of my research methodology is multi-sited ethnography. I have 
conducted research in Italy and Niger. The greatest part of my fieldwork took place in 
the intervention area of the PDR/ADM. Here, I spent approximately 16 months, broken 
up as follows: I resided for about 12 months in the town of Keita, where the project has 
its headquarters; and about 4 months in the village of Tinkirana Tounga, which has 
received, since the beginning of PDR/ADM activities, a range of different types of 
proj ect ‘ interventions ’.
Keita, district capital at the time of my research, is a medium size town of about 
6,000 souls, where the Project has established its headquarters. Keita hosts the district’s 
administrative offices (sous-prefecture) and the court of the highest ranking ‘traditional 
authority’ (<autorite coutoumiere) at the Canton level, the Sarki or Chef du Canton.
In Keita I conducted standard participant observation within the PDR/ADM 
offices, with project management, division chiefs, and extensionists, and among the 
people of the town of Keita. In addition to participant observation in the Project, I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with project management (2 interviews), with
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Division Chiefs and Assistants (14 interviews), and with women extensionists (10 
interviews and one group encounter). The interviews allowed me to compare the 
individual views of almost all members of staff working in the headquarters offices, and 
to gain a more systematic understanding of what project staff thought about 
‘development’, ‘intervention’, and the ‘target population’. However the interviews were 
only one tool in the constant informal chats and exchange of ideas about various issues 
and happenings which characterised the considerable amount of time I spent in the 
company of project staff members. I had many occasions to talk about the project with 
members of another category of staff, comprising about 60 people, and including 
electricians, mechanics, machine and tractor drivers, meeting them in the field (and 
sometimes asking for lifts to certain villages), following the engineering consultant 
during his meetings with them and joining the dinners they sometimes organised.
After the first month of fieldwork, during which I familiarised myself with Keita 
and the project staff, on week-days I often followed project staff ‘expeditions’ to 
villages where different types of activities were being implemented. On these and other 
occasions, I carried out situational analysis (Van Velsen 1967), taking notes and 
recording extended case studies of project staff meetings and interactions with villagers, 
observing the activities going on in various types of project work-sites (dam building, 
reforestation trenches, anti-erosion bunds, etc.), and following the activities of local 
men’s or women’s income generating groups ‘supported’ by PDR/ADM extension. 
Throughout more than two years of research and consultancy work at the Keita Project, 
I have followed activities in more than 70 villages in the project intervention area. 
However, for the purposes of this thesis, I have recorded detailed case studies in 20 
villages (Chadawanka; Garadawa; Gounzou; Kourega; Kossongo; Koutki; Ibohamane; 
Insafari; Laba; Loudou Grab Grab; Loudou Ibagatan; Mansala Kel Gress; Mansala 
Sedentaire; Ouroub; Seyte; Tamaske; Tinkirana Ibarogan; Tinkirana Tounga; 
Toumboulana; Zangarata). Sometimes I remained in a village overnight or for a few 
days, to enquire into the local debates following the visit of project staff.
Tinkirana Tounga is a ‘Bouzou’ village (cf. Chapter 6) of about 500 people 
(Simonelli 1994:11), where almost all adult men practise seasonal urban migration to 
earn money needed to buy cereals to integrate local production. For more than four
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months10, in Tinkirana, I carried out participant observation of the life-style of local 
men and women, spending time with actors of different genders and ages, following 
village events, with a focus on household livelihood strategies and interactions with the 
Project. I also looked at those categories of actors who did not, apparently, interact with 
the Project, or who were kept from doing so (e.g. a few secluded women).
In the villages of Tinkirana Tounga and Seyte I conducted separate interviews 
with adult men and women of 8 separate households in each village, aiming at 
achieving a better understanding of intra-household resource allocation and livelihood 
strategies (Bernstein, Crow and Johnson 1992; Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman 1997). 
I was able to compare my findings with two extensive surveys of 85 families carried out 
by the Monitoring and Evaluation Division of the Project in 1994 and 1998. During the 
second 1998 survey I followed the interviewers and witness their interviews with local 
people. With reference to the economic sphere of women and women’s activities, I 
could compare my findings with the studies of Lucia Cremona (1985) and Bayard 
(1995). These studies are part of a number of studies and surveys carried out by various 
consultancies at the Keita Project (see in particular Paoletti and Taliani 1984; Simonelli 
1994; Cremona 1995; 1996; Bayard 1995; Bayard, Paoletti and Traore 1997). Most of 
these sources provide quantitative data and statistics which were needed by the Project 
to compare the situation ex ante and ex post its interventions, and which I occasionally 
refer to, to give the reader a sense of the dimensions of certain phenomena.
I spent about three weeks in Niamey, carrying out archival research and doing 
ethnography in the PDR/ADM Niamey-based office, in the FAO office, and in the 
Italian Honorary Consulate. I spent about two months in Italy, doing archival research 
and conducting semi-structured interviews11 in the FAO and the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Rome.
10 The 4 months were broken up into three periods of 1 to 1.5 months each, which allowed me to compare 
local activities during the rainy season, when male migrants return to carry out agricultural work, with life 
in the slack season (November -  May). During the first of the three periods spent in Tinkirana, I carried 
out a general ethnographic study of the village. During my first stay in Tinkirana I did not speak the 
language well and I benefited from the invaluable help of Mohamed Bachar, a Tuareg geographer at the 
time doing research for his dissertation at the University of Niamey.
11 These interviews were rather informal open ended discussions about the Project, guided by a set of 
questions I had prepared in advance, which allowed some members of staff of institutions involved in the 
PDR/ADM to confidentially explain me their own reconstructions and interpretations of events relevant 
to the Project’s history.
44
Doing multi-sited ethnography has meant that I quite literally followed a plot (cf. 
Marcus 1995:109), the plot of the PDR/ADM’s ‘intervention’, in the different locales 
where it was unfolding and where it acquired different meanings. This plot was being 
narrated and operationalised in different languages. I learned Hausa by following an 
introductory course at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) during my 
M.Phil., and in the field I learned the local dialect, closer to the ‘Sakkwatanci’ variant of 
Hausa (Caron 1991). In the course of fieldwork, I have alternatively used Hausa, 
French, Italian, or English. Tuareg and Bouzou people (native Tamasheq speakers), as 
well as Fulani (or Peul) herders in the Ader Doutchi Majiya are all fluent in Hausa as a 
second language, so speaking Hausa gave me access to almost all social constituencies 
present in the area.
In order to make sense of the ‘macro’ narratives justifying the PDR/ADM’s 
establishment and the nature of its activities, I applied discourse analysis to the 
extensive documentation available on the Project, including consultants’ reports and 
programmatic documents of Niger, Italy, or the FAO, produced at different moments of 
the Project’s life (Roe 1994; Apthorpe and Gasper 1996; Grillo and Stirrat 1997).
Toward the end of my fieldwork, I worked as an independent consultant for the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for four separate periods of one month. My employer 
was always aware of the topic of my Ph.D. and I discussed the possibility of working as 
a consultant with my informants, who encouraged me to do so. Everything started from 
my own informal discussions about local perspectives of PDR/ADM activities with 
visiting officers of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the Italian 
Programme Manager of the Project. They expressed interest in my findings, and 
contacted me, after their return to Italy, asking me to write a report on the impact of 
project activities on women’s status. After this first consultancy, I was asked to 
participate in other joint consultancies for the formulation of the PDR/ADM’s Fourth 
Phase.
My experience as a consultant provided me with significant opportunities to gain 
insights into, and information about, the process of policy making and implementation 
from the vantage point of those who work within a project, from a particular situated 
perspective (cf. Grindle and Thomas 1991 :xii; Allen, Porter and Thompson 1991:xvi).
45
Participant observation in the field of project intervention broadened my understanding 
of the strategies of different categories of actors, and of the different conceptualisations 
and operationalisations of different actors with regards to the project. I participated in 
different types of meetings where certain ‘facts’ (such as changes in the composition of 
the WFP food ration) were interpreted according to different perspectives, resulting in 
different patterns of agency by different actor categories. Some meetings were 
conducted ‘at the interface’ between different stakeholders, and their respective 
bargaining and negotiation strategies exposed their respective views and interests.
Working as a consultant also gave me a stronger sense of my own positioning 
within the field of PDR/ADM intervention. Through the assumption of a new role, 
which did not substitute my researcher role, but was added to it, it became even more 
evident that as a researcher I was ‘merely a different institutional interest, and a 
thoroughly elite one at that’ (Marcus 1999:17). The field I was studying had been, and 
was being, mediated by other projects of representation: there are countless accounts of 
the PDR/ADM’s ‘intervention’, official documents in different media produced by 
Italy, Niger, the FAO, the WFP, as well as project staff interpretations and local voices.
I cannot claim ‘objectivity’ nor pretend neutrality with regards to the story of the 
Keita Project. In this introduction I have laid out my theoretical perspective and 
described my positioning and research methodologies in the field; in Chapter 8, my own 
activities are documented, with those of other actors, in an extended case study of the 
negotiations which characterised the adaptation of new approaches to the Project’s 
working methods. By situating my own perspective, I hope the reader will make better 
sense of the broader consequences of the story told in these pages for our understanding 
of ‘development.’ There are some aspects of my identity which have interfered with my 
informants’ approach toward me. Being white and Italian, I was often perceived as a 
project staff member by people in the ‘intervention area’, and I had to explain my role 
and the purposes of my presence when I visited new villages. Although Niger is a 
Moslem country, being a woman did not represent an obstacle in my interactions with 
men. Instead, my relatively young age seemed to generate diffidence among people 
older than myself, both Nigerien and Italian, and it generally took me some time to gain 
the confidence of elders and senior development workers.
46
1.7 Thesis Organisation
The thesis contains nine Chapters. After this introduction, Chapter 2 covers the 
historical background of the Ader Doutchi Majiya. It highlights the historical process 
which led to a form of interethnic and complementary hierarchy between Tuareg 
herders and Hausa farmers, and describes the configurations of power which resulted 
from these historical events. Chapter 3 presents the ethnographic background of the 
societies living in the project intervention area, with a particular focus on aspects 
relevant to project intervention.
Each of the three following chapters illustrates a different perspective and 
pattern of agency vis a vis the Keita Project. Chapter 4 unravels narratives of 
‘desertification’ and ‘lost equilibrium’ between people and the environment, which 
characterise ‘macro’ development discourses about the Project. It analyses the 
intervention strategies devised to ‘fight against the advancing desert’, focusing on the 
First Italian Initiative to Fight Against Desertification in the Sahel, which set the 
premises for the establishment of the PDR/ADM. Chapter 5 is an ethnography of the 
Project and the members of staff within it. It enquires into the perceptions of 
‘development’ entertained by project staff and explores how the ‘desertification 
narrative’ presented in Chapter 4 was appropriated and readapted by the actors 
responsible for ‘doing development’. Chapter 6 focuses on local people’s perspectives 
and practical involvement in project intervention. It highlights the interactions between 
four key factors to explain the meanings acquired by project ‘intervention’ at a local 
level: the sexual division of labour; intra-household resource allocation; the 
PDR/ADM’s environmental impact on productive resources; and the distribution of 
food-for-work rations.
Chapters 7 and 8 cut across the three perspectives analysed separately in the 
previous chapters, looking at how these perspectives confronted each other with 
reference to two axes of project ‘intervention’: gender and participation. Chapter 7 
describes critiques of the Project which came from a gender perspective, how they were 
integrated in the Project through the opening of a new Division for the Promotion of 
Women, and how activities carried out by this division intertwined with local ‘projects 
in the Project’. Chapter 8 is an ethnography of change in development practice. By 
looking at how different categories of actors (planners, consultants, local authorities,
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ADM men and women) confronted the problem of changing the Project’s approach, it 
explores the different rationalities and interests of these actors with reference to project 
activities. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis with some reflections on ‘lessons learned from 
the Keita Project’, both from the perspective of an anthropology of development and 
with regards to development policy.
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2. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE ADER DOUTCHIMAJIYA
2.1. Introduction
The Republic of Niger (cf. map I) is divided into seven departments which, in turn, are 
subdivided into 35 districts. It has a population of approximately 9 million with an 
annual growth rate of 3.2 percent (FAO 1995). The capital is Niamey. The majority of 
its soils fall within the Saharan desert and the sub-Saharan arid belt of the Sahel:
‘The territory of the Republic of Niger lies between 11.37 and 11.23 north latitudes, which 
means the vast majority of its territory lies in the Saharan region, not in the Sahel. Its Sahelian 
territory, a tiny strip of land perhaps 150 miles (240 km) wide receiving between 10 inches and 
30 inches (250 mm and 750 mm) of rainfall a year, gives Niger whatever human and economic 
interest it may have, and hence Niger is known as a Sahelian country’ (Charlick 1991:2).
The Nigerien section of the Sahel is characterised, historically, as a zone of 
transition, between the Saharan desert to the north and the Sudanic savannah to the 
south. For analytical purposes, the Sahel has itself been subdivided into two main areas: 
the northern part, falling between the 150 and 350 mm isohyets, where the influence of 
nomadic herders prevails; and the southern subdivision, between the 350 mm and 550 
mm isohyets, inhabited mostly by sedentary farmers (Bemus 1974:138). The boundary 
between these two areas is not fixed, but shifts conspicuously with changing levels of 
rainfall. As a consequence of the droughts of 1968-74 and 1984, the Sahel has become a 
major pole of attraction for international aid interventions. The PDR/ADM was 
launched in 1984, on the basis of a tripartite partnership established between the FAO, 
and the Governments of Niger and of Italy. Located in the southern half of the 
Department of Tahoua, the intervention area of the PDR/ADM coincides with the 
region of Niger known as ‘Ader Doutchi Majiya’ (cf. maps I and II).
The Ader Doutchi Majiya12 (ADM) is ‘the region comprised in a rough square, 
the four comers of which coincide with [the cities of] Tawa [sic], Gadamata, Madawa,
12 The term ‘Ader’ is attested since the beginning of the 18th century (Echard 1975:17). According to the 
local oral tradition wants it derived from the words o f the Sultan of Agadez, Mohammed A1 Mubarek, to 
his son Agabba who was going to conquer and rule over the Ader: ‘ Agabba, Indabat-tagla tubuza 
waadar’, ‘Agabba, you shall take care of that foot’(Hamani 1975:104). ‘Ader’ means foot in Tamashek, 
and the sultan may have used this term just to mean ‘part’, or to indicate that the Ader region lay to the 
south of the Air. Urvoy (1936:257) argues that Agabba himself named the country Ader, upon a false step 
he did when entering the area. According to Francis Nicolas, Ader in Tamashek means ‘land of crevasses 
(ravins)' (Nicolas 1950:1; 51). Doutchi in Hausa means ‘stone, rock’. The expression ‘Ader Doutchi’, 
would then mean ‘Ader of the mountains’, and would be contapposed to ‘Ader Gulbi’, used to refer to the
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and Bimi’n Konni’ (Echard 1964:6). According to Bonte, the ADM region ‘derives its 
unity from a unique policy of economic development, hydro-agricultural intervention 
and concerted administrative action. It coincides neither with a natural region, nor with 
traditional or actual administrative sectors. It is only the existence of common problems 
and common development possibilities which has led to the creation of this new 
regional entity’ (1976:1). Therefore, the ADM owes its first appearance as a geographic 
entity to the phenomenon of ‘development’. Nevertheless, due to its geographical 
boundedness, the inhabitants of the ADM share a common history and common 
institutions, in part developed to face similar ecological conditions.
The largest agricultural societies settled in the Nigerien Sahel comprise the 
Kanouri in the East, the Songhay-Djerma in the West, and the Hausa in the centre; the 
two principal nomadic societies are the Tuareg and the Peul or Fulani (Bemus 
1974:138; Bourgeot 1975:280). The ADM region is characterised by the coexistence of 
Tuareg and Hausa settlements, and villages originated from the detachment (at least 
partial) of ex-Tuareg captives from the relation of dependence which tied them to their 
former patrons. The Peul or Fulani constitute an important minority, which more than 
any other group has maintained a pastoral and nomadic lifestyle.
This chapter reconstructs the main historical events of the ADM. The long 
period between the 11th and the 16th century saw the arrival and settlement of successive 
waves of Hausa speaking migrants in the ADM. In a process which lasted four 
centuries, autochthonous groups and immigrants fused into a single Hausa speaking
thsociety, which, by the 17 century, had developed some internal stratification and was 
organised into chieftaincies (sarauta). The most powerful chieftaincy in the area was 
headed by the Kanta of Kabi. In the 17th century, Prince Agabba, son of the Sultan of 
Agadez in the Air Region, defeated the Kanta’s armies and established direct Tuareg 
control in the Ader-Doutchi. Agabba came accompanied by the Lissawan confederation. 
The Lissawan today speak Hausa and are the recognised traditional authority in the 
Canton of Keita. This first group of Tuareg invaders substituted their direct control, 
exercised mainly through the levying of tributes, to the Kanta’s indirect control over the 
Hausa chieftaincies, which otherwise remained in place with few exceptions. After a
eastern area which connects the Ader to the Majiya (Nicolas 1950:1). According to Echard, the terms 
‘doutchi’ and ‘majiya’ would have been introduced by the French colonial administration ‘preoccupied 
with geographic nomenclature’(1975:17).
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relatively peaceful 18th century, the 19th century was characterised by the arrival of the 
Tuareg Iullemden and Kel Gress in the ADM and their struggle for power over the area; 
by the expansion of the Sokoto Sultanate following the jihad led by Usman dan Fodyo; 
and by the minor jihad of A1 Jilani, which originated in the Azawak and spread to the 
Ader. By the beginning of 20th century, the arrival of French missions put an end to the 
ongoing strife between Kel Gress and Iullemden, defeating them, respectively, in 1901 
and 1917. In 1922 Niger became a French Colony (Colonie du Niger). French 
intervention significantly undermined the Tuareg influence over the ADM, through 
coercive repression and the abolition of slavery. The new colonial administration was 
characterised by an extractive economic policy, levying taxes also in years of drought 
and food deficit. After World War n, Niger acquired the status of Territoire d ’Outre 
Mer, and France established a development fund (first FIDES, then FAC) which marked 
the beginning of Niger’s ‘development history’. In 1960, Niger acquired independence 
under the presidency of Diori Hamani, and the Hamani government published the first 
Ten Year Development Perspectives (1965-1974). One of the first Rural Development 
Projects financed by the Fonds d ’Aide et Cooperation (FAC) targeted the Ader Doutchi 
Majiya between 1964 and 1972. In 1974 Colonel Seiny Kountche seized power with a 
coup d’etat and a few years later he established the ‘Development Society’, an 
institutionalised form of government in which distinctions between ‘development’, the 
state and the population are blurred. The Keita Project started its activities in the ADM 
in 1984 and, initially, its programme was influenced by the rationales and structures of 
the Development Society.
From this quick overview, it is possible to discern some important traits which 
characterised the history of the area known today as ADM: its nature as a boundary 
between northern (mainly pastoral, Tuareg) and southern (mainly agrarian, Hausa) 
societies and its consequent importance as an area of trade and exchange between the 
products of the north and of the south, testified by the existence of strategic market- 
cities, often specialising in particular goods. Agabba’s invasion of the Ader Doutchi is 
recorded to have taken place in the course of one of the frequent trade expeditions of the 
prince of Agadez to today’s Northern Nigeria.
Another important trait of the Ader Doutchi Majiya today, which finds its roots 
in the series of historical events described below, is the hierarchical nature of the
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societies living in it, organised in a peculiar form of ‘interethnic hierarchy’ whereby the 
strata of the same hierarchy comprise groups belonging to different societies. Since the
tli19 century episodes of Islamic reformism, the ADM hosted a latent tension between 
the values of hierarchy and the Moslem belief in the equality of all men before God.
Finally, in this century, after the colonial episode, the ADM region derives its 
unity from being recognised as facing common environmental, social, and economic 
problems, and being targeted by similar ‘development’ interventions.
2.2 From the Early Migrations Until Kanta’s Supremacy (11th -  17th Centuries)
The earliest known indigenous population of the Ader Doutchi Majiya was Hausa- 
speaking, and is referred to in the literature as ‘Asna’, ‘Azna’, or ‘Anna’13 (Hamani 
1975; 1979; Echard 1975; Nicolas 1975). It was found in the region by the first wave of 
migrants, also Hausa-speaking, pushed south by the pressures of Tuareg groups to the 
North. The history of the first Azna settlements in the ADM is characterised by one 
essential trait, the north-south movement of populations under the pressure of other 
groups coming from the north, and obliging the previous occupiers to move southwards 
(cf. Echard 1964:11; Bonte 1967:41).
The first Berber groups to reach the Air14, probably from what is nowadays 
Libya, did so under the pressure of the Arabs Beni Hilal in the 11th century (Hamani
13 In the literature, this appellation is found either referring to ‘the peoples settled [in southern Niger] 
before the establishment of Hausa dynasties’ (Nicolas 1975:30), or to contrast the followers of the 
original autochtonous animist religion with Moslem believers (musulmai) (Nicolas 1975:59). This double 
meaning was recorded by early commentators: Sere de Rivieres states that ‘it is both an ethnic expression 
and a religious designation’ (1965:47), and Urvoy notes that ‘this term probably referred to the people of 
the Ader, and has been gradually extended to all pagans [paiens]* (1936:252). Today, people in the ADM 
are almost all Moslem, and never refer to themselves or others as Azna. In contrast with Echard’s finding 
that, in the mid 1970s, ‘Asna’ meant ‘people of the Ader’ as opposed to other Hausawa or Tuareg (Echard 
1975:11), my informants used the term very rarely and with a religious connotation to indicate animist 
belief (cf. Echard 1964:12). ‘Asna’ belief was considered incompatible with Islam and carried derogatory 
associations, even though ‘in the majority of [Niger’s] regions, a strict practice of Islam does not exclude 
participation in the cult of the genies' (Gar?on 1998:13). Cf. Hamani: ‘Today, everywhere in the ADM 
animism has been defeated by Islam. In Bagga, [a renown] Azna sanctuary, the last Sarkin Tsafi has 
converted to Islam [...]. However, the influence of the traditional religion is still strong in the countryside 
and, in the cities, the kora is still performed, for example in Tawa [sic]’ (1975:51).
14 According to H. Barth (quoted in Echard 1975:69), the terms Absen or Abzin would precede that of 
‘Air’, used for the first time by Leon the African in the 11th century. ‘Air’ is a mountainous region to the 
south of the Sahara (Tenere) and to the east of the Tamesna (cf. map IV), falling between the 300 mm 
isohyet at its southern border, and the 50 mm isohyet at its northern border. According to Hamani, ‘at a 
time difficult to establish, the entire [Air] region was inhabited by black populations, ancestors of the 
ones which occupy ‘Central Niger’ today, and maybe also the western part of [the Ader]’ (1950:26). On
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1975:31). At that time, according to Urvoy (1936:143), small groups of the Tuareg 
Igdalen and Iberkoreen were already scattered in the Air. They rapidly integrated into 
bigger Tuareg tribes escaping Arab pressure, and included the Lamta (Ilemteen) and, 
later, the Santal, Kel Gress, and Kel Ewey. All these groups claim to have originated 
from Aujila in today’s Libya (for the Kel Gress, cf. F. Nicolas 1950:47), whereas the 
Lissawan (Illissawan), who reached the Ader at the time of Agabba’s conquest (see 
below), give Albarka (Libya) as the point of departure of their migration (Hamani 
1975:32).
In the early 12th century at the latest, the Tuareg southward movement triggered 
the displacement of Hausa-speaking groups settled in the Air and Azawagh regions15 
(see map II). These Abzinawa groups (people from Abzin or Air), also called ‘Azna 
Mahalba’16 (herding Azna) to distinguish them from the autochthonous Hausa speaking 
populations (called ‘Aznan Ramu’, see below), are likely to have been leading a semi- 
nomadic lifestyle for some time in the area between Azawagh and Ader until, under 
persistent Tuareg pressures, they reached the Ader Doutchi, which, due to its hilly 
topography, provided safe areas for shelter and defence from Tuareg attacks (Hamani 
1975: 33).
In the ADM, the Azna Mahalba found the region inhabited by sparse Hausa- 
speaking groups, which are reported by the oral tradition to have lived in caves (from 
which their name, Aznan Ramu: Azna of the caves), naked or wearing leather clothing
this subject, Francis Nicolas (1950:47) quotes Gouvemeur Foureau’s Documents Scientijlques de la 
Mission Saharienne, 1905, t. II, p.848 : ‘Berbers did not always occupy the country of Aer [sic] or Abzen, 
but they have invaded it around the XIV century, establishing their domination over local Hausa 
populations, who had been the original owners of the soil’. (This version is supported by Ibn Khaldoun, 
Paris 1925, vol. II, p3; and by Urvoy 1934, vol. IV, p. 154, both cited in Hamani 1975:88). The first 
Tuareg confederation to dominate the Air would have been that of the Sandal of Libya, followed by 
several other groups (Hamani 1975:88). The oral tradition reports that the Commander of the Believers of 
Constantinople, having been asked to do so by the Tuareg of Air, designated as the first Sultan of Air, the 
cherif El-Hajj el-Bacha from Fezzan (Nicolas 1950:50). This legend would sanction the claim to a 
Turkish origin of the Tuareg of Air. The Sultanate of Air established its capital in the city of Agadez.
15 Echard omits the distinction between Azna Mahalba and Aznan Ramu, and seems to suggest that a 
single group of Azna moved south and settled in the Ader at the same time under Tuareg pressures.
(1963 :12). Guy Nicolas, in a more general discussion of the origins o f Hausa society, does not refer to 
the initial Tuareg ‘push’, but mentions a different division between hunters (Maharba) and farmers 
characterised as a ‘millet civilisation’, whose descendants would be referred to as ‘masters o f cultivation’ 
{sarakunan noma) (Nicolas 1975:24-25). Here, I follow Hamani’s version, as Hamani is the only one to 
have carried out in depth historical research specific to the Ader Doutchi Majiya.
16 Due to their place of origin, the Azna Mahalba are also referred to as ‘Abzinawa’ (people o f Abzin or 
Air) (cf. Hamani 1975:34; Hamani 1979:392; Echard 1964:12), creating great confusion in the literature, 
as also the Tuareg resided in the Air. The Tuareg, however, are sometimes referred to as Istambulawa, as 
in their origin myths they claim descent from people coming from Istambul.
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(Echard 1963:12; Hamani 1975:34). The Azna Mahalba reached the Ader Doutchi 
gradually, in small, uncoordinated groups of migrants. Each group had a distinctive 
name, reflecting its historical origins, or, more frequently, the area of the Ader where it 
settled at the end of its migration. According to Hamani (1975:34), the first wave of 
Azna Mahalba or Abzinawa groups to establish in the Ader Doutchi at different times
t lisince the 11 century, and following different routes were:
- The Gazurawa, who settled next to the Kalfu Valley;
- The Darayawa, settled on the northern branch of the Badeguisheri Valley, some 
kilometers to the south of the present-day village of Darey;
- The Gunamawa on the southern branch of the Badeguisheri Valley;
- The Kayasawa, next to the northern fringes of the Majiya Valley;
- The Magorawa and the Labatawa, along the Valley going from Laba to 
Tarwada.
Successively, and possibly between the 15th and the 16th century (cf. Hamani 
1975:41), other migratory waves of Hausa speaking people reached the Ader Doutchi 
Majiya. Three main groups can be distinguished: those from the western Immanan 
region {Immigrants de I ’Ouest); those from the east (mainly the Gobirawa coming from 
the nearby Gobir); and the Gazurawa, called ‘Gazurawa of Gao’ from their origin in the 
Songhai Empire, who settled in Gazaur in the Kalfu Valley, next to the above 
mentioned Gazurawa of the Air. Other Hausa-speaking groups having reached the ADM 
by the 18th century are the Maradawa, Kwannawa, Bitirawa, and Kambarawa (Hamani 
1975:41-5).
Today, the Hausa population of the ADM consists of the descendants of the 
Aznan Ramu, the Azna groups who came from the Air (Abzinawa), the Gobirawa, the 
‘Immigrants from the East’, and the various successive migratory waves from relatively 
nearby places.
i L
By the mid 17 century, the bulk of Azna migrations, consisting of the Azna of 
Air, Gobirawa, and Azna of the East, had mixed with the original inhabitants of the 
Ader Doutchi and they had all adopted the common name of ‘Azna’, yet maintaining 
the distinction between Azna Mahalba (hunters) and Aznan Ramu (Azna of the caves).
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According to Hamani
the tradition relative to the indigenous inhabitants of the Ader suggests that they spoke the same 
language (Hausa) of the immigrants, considerably facilitating the first contacts which were, it is 
said, pacific; we find no mention o f conquest or war against the indigenes; the latter, rather 
fearful, had sought refuge in their caves at the arrival of the Azna of Abzin. In the majority of 
cases, this is how the oral tradition reports the establishment of ties between Azna of Abzin and 
indigenes: the immigrants suspected that there might be other inhabitants in the region, but could 
not see them; in fact, they were hiding for some time, but finally they were discovered. They 
were naked and this is why they hide, they explained to the newcomers. The strangers then gave 
them clothes, made them come out of their caves, and together they founded new villages, 
sometimes living in different neighbourhoods. (1975:34-35)
Today, the social organisation and power relations in the ADM are the result of a 
complex interaction between Hausa and Tuareg components. However, it is noteworthy 
that the Aznan Ramu were essentially hunter-gatherers. Although they came from drier 
latitudes, agriculture was known to the Aznan Mahalba, who introduced it in the Ader, 
together with more sophisticated craftsmanship styles and with the habit of living in 
villages (cf. Hamani 1975:45-52). In these new types of settlement, the Aznan Ramu 
maintained a primary religious role over the earth and natural forces. Tradition 
attributed them with supernatural powers over the land’s fertility and some animal 
species, and their status was that of iyan kasa>: sons of the land (Hamani 1975:39).
Already at the beginning of the 16th century, the settlements created by the 
fusion between Aznan Ramu and the first (Abzinawa) migratory waves had overcome 
the basic village-level organisation, developing internal hierarchical distinctions 
between telakawa (commoners) and a political/religious aristocracy resulting from the 
lineages who had led the Azna Mahalba migrations to the Ader. Often, specific roles 
were maintained by the descendants of the Aznan Ramu in ceremonies related to natural 
cycles and fertility.
The most important local chieftaincies mentioned by the historical records were 
those of Darai, Magori, Mambe, and Follakam. All of these seemed to recognise the 
sovereignty of the Kanta17 of Kabi in northern Nigeria, who had defeated the Songhai
1 ftpower and had become the greatest power in the area. Sarkin Darai, attested to be the 
most powerful local chieftaincy (Urvoy 1936:253; Sere de Rivieres 1965:162; Hamani
17 ‘Kanta ’ is the title given to the king of the Kabi state.
18 ‘Sarki' means king or prince in Hausa.
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1975:64), received tributes from the minor chieftaincies of Gazaur, Kayasa, Gudube, 
Konni and Rafi; despite his local influence, Sarkin Darai was inferior to the Kanta, to 
whom he sent gifts in recognition of his formal submission.
The capital of Sarkin Darai was Bimin Darai, located a few kilometers south of 
the actual village of Darey (cf. map VI). In the capital, lived the prince (<Sarki), his 
family with their captive slaves (a privilege of the royal family, as slavery is not 
reported as a very common phenomenon at that time), and the court (fada). The 
majority of the population consisted of farmers and craftsmen, who lived scattered on 
the plateau in villages surrounding Bimin19 Darai.
Ader chieftaincies remained vassals of the Kabi until about 1674, when Agabba, 
the son of the Sultan of Agadez, Mohammed A1 Mubarek, defeated the Kanta’s armies, 
thereby terminating the Kabi’s supremacy over Ader (Urvoy 1936:256; Hamani 1975: 
91; Hamani 1979:393).
2.3 The Istambulawa20 in the ADM (18th Century)
Although several explanations of Agabba’s attack against Kabi have been recorded, 
they are all concordant in identifying an insult to Agabba’s pride at the origin of the 
conflict. Hamani collected the following tradition in Ader villages:
One day, prince Agabba, son o f the Sultan o f Agadez Mohammed al Mubarek went to Surame, 
the capital of Kabi, to sell horses. He was accompanied by some slaves. He went directly to the 
court, because he was a prince and consequently had to be hosted by the king. He was introduced 
to the Kanta, who was playing his favourite game, the dara. The king raised his head and stared 
at the prince, then continued his game commenting upon Agabba’s very modest attire: Ashe a na 
dan Sarki da taggo? (Is it possible, the son of a King dressed in a taggo21). Agabba and his men 
were kept waiting for a long time, until Kanta gave them a place to stay and bought all his 
horses. Agabba then returned to Air with his men, but could not forget the offensive remarks of 
the Kanta. Once he reached Agadez, he reported to his father about Kanta’s insults, expressing 
his desire to take revenge. Al Mubarek answered [his son] that he himself [the Sultan] was not in 
a position to confront the Kanta. But the son insisted so much that he finally persuaded his 
father, (in Hamani 1975:92; cf. Urvoy 1936:256)
19 ‘Bimi ' in Hausa means fortified city.
20 The dynasty o f Agadez, and its related dynasties of Illela and Dogarawa (Ader), refer to themselves 
through the appellation ‘Istambulawa ’, which refers to the supposed Turkish origin of the first Sultan of 
Air (cf. Urvoy 1936:161).
21 Short male shirt without sleeves, worn by commoners and mainly for fanning and other manual tasks.
22 According to another version, narrated by Sarkin Adar Ummanin, descendant of Agabba, Agabba 
refused to sell the horses.
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Whatever the reasons behind Agabba’s clash with the Kanta, their consequences 
were important both for the Kabi and for the Ader. The former was weakened by 
repeated confrontations with the Zamfara and the Gobir throughout the 17th century 
(Hamani 1975:91). Agabba’s 1674 expedition against the Kabi resulted in the 
amputation of the Ader from the Kabi’s sovereignty. In 1720 the Kabi suffered other 
defeats by the Zamfara and Gobir, which went close to menacing Surame, the capital of 
the Kabi. In 1721 Agabba gave the final blow to the vacillating power of the Kabi, 
killing Kanta Ahmadu and forcing the court to disperse toward west. It was the end of 
the Kabi, which left the Istambulawa firmly installed in the Kabi’s ancient vassal 
region, the Ader. Here, the Istambulawa created a dynasty of Sarakunan Adar whose 
descendants are still at the head of a canton of the Ader, Illela (Urvoy 1936:259; 
Hamani 1975:96).
In his descent to the Ader, Agabba was escorted by some dozen Tuareg tribes, 
including the Lissawan, Tawantakat, Inussufan, Gawallay, Watsakkawa, and Takarawa 
(Hamani 1979:393). Sarkin Darai chose to oppose Agabba’s rule, and was defeated: 
Bimin Darai was destroyed and its population dispersed. Agabba took the title of Sarkin 
Adar and established his capital in Bimin Adar. Hence, the Sarakunan Adar was now a 
junior branch of the royal family of Agadez, and the Adar had become an avant poste of 
Air at the boundary of the main Hausa states of northern Nigeria.
Sarkin Magori, Sarkin Mambe, and Sarkin Follakam remained at their place, but 
became tributaries of Sarkin Adar. Hamani notes that this did not represent a simple 
‘change of masters’, from the Kanta to Sarkin Ader, for the Azna chieftaincies: ‘While 
the suzerainty of the Kebbi [sic: Kabi] was distant, intermittent, and little burdensome, 
that of Air was direct and permanent.’ (Hamani 1979:393).
The remaining, and greatest part, of the ADM was divided into three sectors that 
were distributed amongst three clans of the Lissawan (cf. map VII), who had a special 
status amongst the tribes who followed Agabba in his first expedition against the Kanta. 
The chiefs of these three clans were the Amattaza, the Alamtai, and the Amattokes (cf. 
F. Nicolas 1950:52; Sere de Rivieres 1965:164). The latter obtained the privilege to 
elect the successors to the Sarakunan Adar. In 1687 Agabba succeeded to his father the
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Sultan of Air, upon his death, and returned to Agadez, and Agabba’s younger brother 
Saleh replaced him as Sarkin Adar (cf. Hamani 1979:393)23.
But the Agadesawa, as the Tuareg groups coming from Agadez are called, were 
not to remain the only Tuareg group in the ADM. Around the end of the 18th 
century/beginning of the 19th century, a section of the Kel Iullemden, who came to be 
known as Kel Dinnik24 or Kel Azawak, broke away from the Manaka region in today’s 
Mali and reached the Azawak, progressively moving southwards and reaching the Ader. 
Also during the 18th century, other Tuareg tribes, grouped in the confederation of the 
Kel Gress (literally, ‘people of the valley’, cf. Hamani 1975:131), settled in the Adar -  
Gobir Tudu area, from where they continued leading a nomadic life engaging in 
periodic transhumance to the Air (cf. Urvoy 1936:259; Hamani 1979:394).
For the Ader, the 18th century was a peaceful interlude between Agabba’s wars 
against the Kabi and Darai, and Usman dan Fodio’s Jihad. The main source of 
information on the Ader society in this period are the writings of Ulrich Seetzen. As we 
have seen, with the supremacy of the Kel Air, a new aristocracy was superimposed over 
the old Azna chieftaincies, and the remaining Aderawa villages fell under the control of 
the Lissawan, who extracted a revenue consisting of a tenth of the local produce 
(zakka).
Society in the ADM was highly stratified. At the top of the hierarchy there was 
Sarkin Adar, residing in Bimin Adar with a circle of close relatives and the court. 
Below him, in their respective territorial sections, were the ‘groups of privilege and of 
pact’ (Hamani 1975:120), the Lissawan noble tribes of the Amattokes, the Alamtei, and 
the Amattaza. The Azna chieftaincies who managed to retain partial sovereignty over 
their regions of influence were Sarkin Magori (the most influential Azna Chief), Sarkin 
Mambe, Sarkin Folakam, Sarkin Kayasa, and Sarkin Gazaur. They exacted revenues 
from the villages, but had to send a part of it to Sarkin Adar (Hamani 1975:119). Below 
them were the village chiefs (pi. hakimai) whose contacts with the higher levels of the
23 Urvoy offers a different version, according to which, when Agabba succeeded to his father in 1721, he 
was dethroned by his brother Mohammed el-Amine. Consequently, Agabba returned to Ader, defeated his 
brother, and remained there until his death (Urvoy 1936:257).
24 According to Francis Nicolas, Kel Dinnik means ‘those of the East’, to distinguish this section of the 
Iullemden from the Kel Attaram, or Iullemden of the West, who remained in Menaka (Mali) (Nicolas 
1939:579; 1950).
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regional hierarchy were limited to the payment of tributes, and who were little more 
than primus inter pares amongst the villagers (pi. talakawa) which they headed. At the 
bottom of the social hierarchy were the slaves, who remained a prerogative of a few rich 
men and the aristocracy. The talakawa did not apparently have slaves at their disposal, 
and it was not until the 19th century that slavery became a more important phenomenon 
(cf. Hamani 1975:119).
A new distinction, based mainly on religious criteria, substituted itself to the 
previous one between Azna Mahalba and Aznan Ramu. The new categories 
distinguished between the Moslem Tuareg, or Aderawa, and the animist Azna. 
Although the Istambulawa had been Moslem for centuries, they did not engage in 
proselytism (Hamani 1979:395). The tribe of religious specialists amongst the 
Agadesawa was that of the Watsakkawa, who had followed Agabba from Air. To this 
tribe belonged Malam Jibril (Hamani 1979:395), a local precursor and teacher of Usman 
dan Fodio, the charismatic leader of the Jihad which was going to establish the primacy 
of the Muslim Caliphate of Sokoto over and beyond the ADM.
2.4 The Sokoto Jihad of Usman dan Fodyo Until the Zamani (19th Century)
By the end of the 18th century, Sarkin Adar’s power had considerably decreased. The 
degradation of his relation with the Lissawan, and the exterior conflicts with the Magori 
and the Kabi under the reign of Mohamed Damo, together with a generalised discontent 
of the villages falling in its area of influence regarding the tributes exacted on them, had 
contributed to undermine Sarkin Adar’s original power (cf. Echard 1975:91). Bimin 
Adar was abandoned and the Sarki settled first in the town of Azzau, then in Illela, 
where his name was changed to Sarkin Illela, and where his descendants are still 
established. From this moment onwards, there was a deterioration of the relationship 
with the Lissawan Amattokes, Amattaza and Alamtei. The Amattaza would move his 
residence to Mashidi (a village which used to be located to the south of Tamaske and 
does not exist anymore), then to Agouloum Tudu. Since 1893 the Amattaza and the 
Alamtei joined into a single role and in 1905 their capital moved to Keita25 (Echard 
1975:97), where the Lissawan Sarki is still established today (exerting considerable 
influence over the PDR/ADM’s decisions).
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The 19th century was characterised by the influence of the Sokoto Caliphate, 
especially on the southern areas of the Ader, and the wars between the Tuareg 
Iullemden and Kel Gress, until the final supremacy of the latter:
Throughout the 19th century, the history of Adar [sic] and the Tuareg Kel Gress and Iullemden 
was inseparable from that of Sokoto. In the first half of the century these three groups were in 
fact vassals [of Sokoto]. In the course of the second half, the political ascendancy of Sokoto 
faded without entirely disappearing, for commercial and religious ties continued to be 
strengthened down to the European occupation. (Hamani 1979:406)
Malam Jibril of the Watsakkawa had preceded Usman dan Fodio as a religious 
preacher and holy man whose influence became widely renown in the ADM. He is said 
to have been one of Usman’s teachers26, and even though Usman later criticised some 
aspects of Jibril’s doctrine, his respect for the master is attested in Usman’s writings (cf. 
Hamani 1975:141). Usman, his brother Abdullahi, and his son Mohammed Bello are 
said to have accumulated an enormous religious knowledge, placing them amongst the 
most learned Moslem savants of their times (Hamani 1975:142).
At the early stage of what he saw as a religious mission, Usman preached in 
Degel, in the Kabi, and in the Gobir. Here, around 1782/3, he met Sarkin Gobir Bawa 
Yan Gwarzo, who respected him for his piety and scholarship, and granted him 
privileges and freedom to preach his doctrine. But Usman’s relations with the Gobir’s 
Sarauta would deteriorate with the succession to power of Bawa’s brother, Yakuba, 
with whom the political power of the Gobir began to decline (cf. Hamani 1975:144).
In his preachings, Shehu Usman dan Fodio criticised the religious conduct of the 
Hausa kings (Last 1967; Hamani 1979), and exhorted the masses of believers to reach 
him in Degel and follow his teachings. With the rise in number of Usman’s proselytes, 
Gobir’s Sarki Nafata, who had succeeded Yakuba, started perceiving the growing 
influence of the Shehu as a threat to his power, and began a mild persecution of Shehu’s 
followers (Hamani 1975:144). Shehu exhorted his followers to take arms, and under the 
reign of Yunfa, son of Nafata and, according to the oral tradition, ex-pupil of Shehu
25 Bonte’s version differs from Echard’s on this point, as Bonte, without mentioning the Amattaza, argues 
that ‘After the vicissitudes suffered by the Lissawan, only the Elemtey [sic] would remain [subsistera], 
reduced to to the canton of Keita’ (1967:42).
26 ‘Usman came to visit [Jibril], sleeping at Ruggar Fake near the present village of Mullela, and coming 
each morning to Kodi [in the present village of Arewa] to talk with Jibril, returning after Ahazzar prayer’ 
(Hamani 1979:396).
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Usman, the persecution against Shehu’s movement became harsher. This led Shehu to 
move his centre to Gudu, to the north-west borders of Gobir. This displacement is 
remembered as the hijra, escape. In Gudu, Usman was given the title of Sarkin Musulmi 
(king of the Moslem) by his followers, and Yunfa declared war on Shehu and his 
followers. Shehu inflicted the final blow to Gobir in 1808, with the fall of Alkalawa, 
where Yunfa died. Now Shehu had to organise his vast empire, extending over virtually 
the whole of Hausaland, and comprising the West of Bomu, the Adamawa, Bauci, 
Nupe, and the Yoruba kingdom of Ilorin (Hamani 1975:147). Adar and Air, and the 
Tuareg Kel Gress and Iullemden were never integrated in the empire, but acquired the 
status of vassals: ‘they were not vassals paying a compulsory tribute, but in fact they 
never took action without taking account of the interests or the eventual reaction of 
Sokoto’ (Hamani 1979:400). The remaining part of this section shall focus on the events 
concerning the ADM region alone, leaving out many important facts which took place 
elsewhere within the remarkable outreach of the Sokoto Empire.
In spite of the rallying of Sarkin Abzin Muhammad al Bakri to the jihadists’ 
cause, between 1804 and 1809 Sarkin Adar Hamidin engaged in incessant wars against 
Shehu Usman. Hamidin allied with Sarkin Gobir, and the Tuareg Kel Gress (and the 
minor group of the Itesan) also chose to side with what appeared to be the strongest 
side, that of Sarkin Gobir. The Iullemden, settled to the north and farther from the 
theatre of events, initially remained neutral, but their sympathies were with the jihadist, 
as the ineslemen (Tamasheq for religious caste: see following section) were particularly 
influential amongst them (and particularly weak amongst the Kel Gress).
In 1806, Hamidin and the Tuareg coalition were defeated, after a series of 
battles, in Zurmi. The Tuareg realised Shehu’s power, even against Gobir, and the 
Amattokes deposed Hamidin, who did not want to give up the fight against Shehu. In 
1809, Sarkin Abzin Muhammad Gemma took Hamidin with him to meet Usman dan 
Fodio, and forced Hamidin to submit to the Shehu’s power, conceding certain parts of 
eastern Adar to Shehu, who now was commonly referred to as Sarkin Musulmi (Hamani 
1979:398).
From around 1813, a minor holy war (jihad) arose in the Azawak led by 
Muhammad Al Jilani of the Attawari tribe, which had profound influence on the
61
relations between Adar and Sokoto’s religious movements. Al Jilani, after having 
defeated the Amanokal Khattutu of Azawak, became the real chief of the Iullemden. He 
then defeated Sarkin Adar and the Kel Gress, who had refused to submit to his power, 
in 1817 or 1818 at Bagai (Hamani 1979:402). ‘Jelani contented himself personally with 
controlling the Tuareg [Iullemden and Kel Gress], and left Adar in the hands of the 
sultan. He established a harsh theocracy amongst the [Iullemden] Kel Dinnik’ (Hamani 
1979:402).
In the highly hierarchical ADM society, the class aspects of Al Jilani’s episode 
assume a particular interest. Al Jilani’s preachings were against class and race 
inequality, and he preached the equality of all men in front of Allah. If this granted him 
the loyalty of the ineslemen of various Tuareg confederations, it turned the noble 
(Tamasheq: imajeghen) classes against him. Despite the fact that Mohammed Bello’s 
advice to Jilani had been to moderate the social reformism of his doctrine, Jilani 
persisted on his line, and was defeated in the battle of Tudun Fama by a coalition of Kel 
Gress and Lissawan noblemen, who had allied with Mallam Ibra of the Timisgidda of 
Damergu, also son of a Moslem savant. After the victory, Ibra took Jilani’s place and 
became chief of the Tuareg, whereas Jilani sought refuge in Sokoto with his only ally, 
Sarkin Adar. (Hamani 1979:402-3). Hamani tells us that Ibra is said to have written to 
Muhammed Bello asking that Jilani be handed over to him in the following terms: ‘I do 
not wish to fight you. I was hunting and I wounded a guinea fowl. It flew off and 
entered your house. Let me have my wounded guinea fowl back’. To which Muhammed 
Bello replied ‘Your guinea fowl is in the pocket of my robe. He who tries to take it out
7 7
will tear my riga ’ (1979:404). Ibra then built a series of alliances and fought the army 
of Muhammed Bello at Beleci, but was defeated. One year later Ibra tried to seek 
revenge, but died in the battle of Gawakuke in 1836, which ‘marked the end of military 
intervention of Adar in the affairs of the [Sokoto] empire’ (Hamani 1979:405).
The term ‘Zamani’ refers to the period of direct Tuareg domination over the 
ADM, extending between 1860-1900 (cf. map VTII). Between 1836 and 1860 the 
Tuareg Kel Gress, who had remained in good relations with Sokoto, gradually extended 
their power over neighbouring petty estates (hakimai and sarakunas). Sarkin Adar, as 
we have seen, had moved to Illela, leaving the Kel Gress alone. The latter, under the
27 Hausa: man’s robe.
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leadership of a former brigand, Budal Inshilkin, extended their hegemony until all Adar 
Doutchi and Gobir Tudu fell under their supremacy. The Iullemden seized the north 
west of the country, leaving only the south west under the control of Sarkin Adar 
(Hamani 1979:405).
Tuareg supremacy was interrupted by the French conquest at the beginning of
i L
the 20 century. Until then, the Kel Gress dominated (i.e. received tributes from Hausa 
and Tuareg villages) over the east and south east; the Iullemden over the north, and 
Sarkin Adar (or Sarkin Illela: both denominations are used) over the south west of the 
Ader Doutchi Majiya (Hamani 1975:191). The political system and relations of 
production established in the ADM by Tuareg rulers are described in Chapter 3, as they 
represent the direct historical background to today’s social organisation. The following 
sections focus on the impact of colonialism on the societies of the Ader, and particularly 
on the new discourses of ‘development’ which originated during colonial rule and 
would come to be recognised as the characterising trait of the Ader Doutchi Majiya 
region (cf. Bonte 1976:1).
2.5 The ADM During French Colonialism
Niger acquired its full fledged colonial status gradually. It first appeared as a separate 
geo-political entity in 1900, when, on 20 December, a decree created the Territoire 
Militaire Autonome du Niger (Niger Autonomous Military Territory) within the Colonie 
du Haut-Senegal et Niger (Upper Senegal and Niger Colony). It was transformed into 
Territoire Militaire du Niger (Military Territory of Niger) in 1911, and in Territoire du 
Niger (Niger Territory) in 1920. Finally, in 1922, it became Colonie du Niger (Colony 
of Niger), with administrative and financial autonomy, under the direction of a 
lieutenant-gouverneur (lieutenant governor) and under the higher authority of the 
general governor of the Afrique Occidentale Frangaise, or AOF (Fench West Africa), 
resident in Dakar (cf. Chailley 1968:413; Decalo 1979:14; Fluchard 1995:18).
In 1919, the Military Territory of Niger was divided into nine administrative 
units called cercles (Agadez, Dosso, Goure, Maradi, N’Guimi, Niamey, Tahoua, 
Tillabery, Zinder), subdivided into a varying number of secteurs (sectors), later renamed 
subdivisions (subdivisions), with four at most in each cercle, administered by officers of 
lieutenant rank (cf. Fuglestad 1983:80; Fluchard 1995:18). A secteur comprised
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indigenous political entities, named provinces, tribes, cantons, or groups (groupements), 
under the authority of so-called ‘traditional chiefs’ (chefferie traditionelle). ‘Most chefs 
de secteur [...] in the south had under their authority between three and eight cantons, 
and one or two groupements of Fulani and/or Tuareg nomads or semi-nomads. 
Provinces and cantons were territorially defined entities, tribes and “groups” were 
ethnically defined entities’ (Fuglestad 1983:80).
Through this process, the colonial administrative structure superimposed itself 
onto the interethnic hierarchy of ‘overlapping’ Tuareg and Hausa chieftaincies. 
However, the conquest of the Ader Doutchi Majiya turned out to be a difficult task, as 
the Tuareg Kel Dinnik and Kel Gress opposed a strong resistance against the invasion 
by French Colonial Armies. Colonial domination gave rise to profound changes in the 
economic and political organisation of the Ader Doutchi Majiya, and indeed of Niger as 
a whole.
The confrontation with colonial forces followed a different path for the Kel 
Dinnik and the Kel Gress. The latter, located in the southern agricultural zones at the 
boundary with British territories, were in the front line to face French attacks, and the 
confrontation came early, with the military initially aiming at controlling the 
agricultural zone and at securing the boundary with areas under British control. The 
events of the Ader Doutchi Majiya are narrated by Yves Urvoy (1936), a colonial civil 
servant. In 1901:
[T]he Azna and the Lissawan surrendered themselves after the first skirmishes around Tahoua, 
as soon as they realised that they did not have to fear a victory and the reprisals of the 
Oullimidens [Kel Dinnik], The Kel Gress remained. (Urvoy 1936:301)
Initially, the Kel Gress submitted themselves by letter, probably just to take 
time. On 14 April 1901, 57 skirmishers led by captain Gouraud confronted the Kel 
Gress in Janguebe.
Forced to sacrifice themselves to save the women, the Kel Gress, fighting with an incredible 
ardour, made themselves be killed. They suffered substantial losses and drew back, but also the 
[French] column withdrew. They [the Kel Gress] sent some reconciliation gifts, but only to take 
time, because the retreat of the column had filled them with pride and confidence [...]. On 15 
June [Captain Gouraud] decided to attack the Kel Gress at the core of their domination, in Galma 
[...]. The column counted 220 rifles, on the morning of the IS*1 it reached a point where it could 
see the Tuareg (about 500 horsemen and many fighters on foot); after a half-hour fight, the 
enemy was defeated; one of the chiefs, Idiguini, killed; we took possession of 300 camels. But 
the Kel Gress did not surrender [...]. (Urvoy 1936:302)
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Another battle took place between Tamaske and Guidan Gado, and on 2 
November in Tamaske the Kel Gress officially surrendered to the French. But the treaty 
was signed with only one group of the Kel Gress, and others, who had escaped to the 
Damergou, were determined to carry on the struggle. The final confrontation with these 
Kel Gress fighters took place in December.
At the famous attack of 3 and 4 December launched by Bou-Aguila against the post of Bir-Alali, 
it was one group of Touareg [sic] fanatics who dug a trench between the post and the wells, and 
tied their leg to the trench so that escape would be impossible, and were massacred to the last 
one, in our victorious attack of 4 December. (Urvoy 1936:304)
The confrontation was definitive, and from then on, for the Kel Gress it was 
either exile or submission, as in the administrative reorganisation which followed, they 
lost all their power over their territory, but were allowed to remain and maintain their 
herding and farming practices (cf. Urvoy 1936:305).
During that time the Kel Dinnik, settled between the Ader and the Azawagh, 
refused to have contact with French parties, to receive French militaries, or to honour 
their invitations, and only blacksmiths were occasionally sent to deal with them. 
Without any direct confrontation, a submission act was signed by a blacksmith on 31 
December 1901, but this did not settle the situation, as the Kel Dinnik continued to 
organise minor incursions against the French and to sack other groups settled in the 
area. It was not until the wider revolt movement of 1916-1917 that the Kel Dinnik 
capitulated against the French:
Among the Kel Denneg [sic], there was no decisive confrontation but a series o f incidents that 
ended in the massacre of their main body of warriors, surprised and deceived by a bloodthirsty 
captain who killed them one after another without their having a chance to defend themselves 
(April 1917): this was murder without trial. From then on, resistance was broken among the Kel 
Denneg. (Bemus 1990:159)
Let us turn to the wider implications of the impact of French invasion on the 
society of the Ader Doutchi Majiya. Instead of forming a unitary front against the 
French, different Tuareg groups remained separated by internal strife and hierarchy, and 
their attacks against the French were at the same time directed against other Tuareg 
groups. Hence, the Kel Dinnik are reported to have refused to join forces with the Air 
Tuareg, led by Kaocen, whom they considered a ‘slave’, and to have staged their own 
attacks which were directed as much against the Lissawan, whom they considered 
traitors, as against the French: ‘the Tamaske-Keita region is reported to have been
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thoroughly plundered and sacked [by the Kel Dinnik], and the amattaza was killed’ 
(Fuglestad 1983:97). The internal fragmentation of the Tuareg front weakened their 
resistance.
The French took advantage of the internal tensions between Tuareg groups and, 
within groups, between the social constituencies of the Tuareg hierarchically stratified 
society. Thus, if the nobles (Tamasheq: imajeghen) refused to collaborate with the 
invaders, the religious groups (Tamasheq: ineslemen) accepted contact and submission, 
sometimes being rewarded through the allocation of separate administrative units by the 
colonial administration (cf. Bemus 1990:160; Urvoy 1936:305). But colonial power 
undermined another institution which was at the core of Tuareg society, i.e. the relations 
of dependence between nobles and slaves. The position of the French authorities toward 
slavery was ambivalent. On the one hand, the representatives of the French Republic, 
heirs to the revolution, could not but condemn slavery, which was nominally abolished 
with the Treaty of Tamaske in 1901. On the other hand, pulverising the authority of the 
noblemen and giving leadership to groups of slaves could make French control over the 
Ader Doutchi Majiya society even more difficult (cf. Bemus 1981:108). So the French 
found indirect ways to undermine the nobles’ power over lower strata of the hierarchy.
Coupled with the above-mentioned lack of internal cohesiveness among Tuareg 
groups, other factors contributed to undermine the power of Tuareg elites. First, French 
authorities imposed an annual tax in animals, which Tuareg chiefs had to pay in the 
name of the confederation; later the tax was claimed in cash, and changed from being 
for the whole of the confederation to involving each group (cf. Bemus 1990:159). In 
order to increase its control over the payment of tributes, the administration created a 
census, which allowed tighter French control and increased the security of farming (ex­
captive) villages from the incursions and exactions of Tuareg chiefs. Dependent villages 
suffered less from the claims of their original suzerains. The latter, having lost their 
suzerainty in favour of the French administration, could not compensate anymore for 
wrongs incurred by their dependents, also because they now lacked access to the 
tributes which were being paid to the new authorities.
With the abolition of the right of the elites to levy tributes (under the threat of 
punitive incursions and sacks), and their corresponding obligation to provide protection
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from external enemies, a fundamental tie between dependent and dominant sectors of 
the Ader Doutchi Majiya society was severed. The colonialists abolished the supreme 
body (Tamasheq: ettebel) of the Kel Dinnik and created the new administrative units 
(sedentary cantons), each of which was given a portion of the territory once under 
control of the dissolved central power. The cantons included farming villagers once 
dependent, along various gradations of servility (cf. Lovejoy and Baier 1977) on Tuareg 
elites, or religious groups, such as the Kel Eghlal, detached from their suzerains as a 
reward for their collaboration with the French. In order to provide ‘punishment’ or 
‘reward’, in the form of giving or taking independent access to resources, the colonial 
power restructured local ties of dependence and undermined the economic and political 
bases for control by Tuareg noblemen (imajeghen):
from previously existing relations of dependence, only relationships which were freely accepted 
survived within a new economic order that saw each tribe, each family, practising animal 
husbandry for its own profit. However, personal relationships survived, and, at the ideological 
level, the prestige of the imajeghen remained in the eyes of all categories of the population. 
(Bemus 1990:169)
Having broken the resistance of sedentary and nomadic populations, the French 
had to rule the country. Under the constraints of the two world wars, they did so with 
what has been called a ‘crush and destroy’ strategy (Fuglestad 1983:85). During the 
post-1911 period the French attempted to establish what may be described as direct rule 
(cf. Fuglestad 1983:84), imprisoning ‘at random and at will’ traditional chiefs and 
carrying out requisitions and forced labour (cf. Baier 1980:101). Several factors 
contributed to exacerbating the effects of French rule for Niger people. In 1913, the 
French set out to occupy the Tibesti, wanting to secure their control of this strategically 
important area in response to the Italian-Turkish war which involved the Tibesti and 
Fezzan. The task of occupying the western slopes of the Tibesti fell upon the French in 
Niger. Sending a sizeable column to the Tibesti and maintaining a garrison in such a 
distant and inhospitable environment required large-scale requisitions of camels, millet, 
and some men as conveyors (cf. Fuglestad 1983:90). This coincided with abnormally 
low rainfall in both 1913 and 1914, known as the Great Famine of 1913-1915. Under­
staffed and short of funds, the French used a whole range of sanctions in order to force 
hunger-stricken Niger populations to pay taxes. The hardship imposed by French 
administration in those years contributed to the mounting unrest which led to the Tuareg 
revolt of Kaocen, and, as we have seen, separate minor revolts, in 1916-1917.
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Since the 1920s colonial policy adopted a new approach, aimed at developing 
colonial production in directions useful to the French economy. This phase is 
characterised by the policy of ‘mise en valeur’, literally, ‘enhancing the value’ of local 
resources with, initially, purely extractive purposes:
[...] development [mise en valeur] is pursued, entering a new phase, in which agricultural value 
is recognised to the AOF. At the top of our colonial preoccupations was the intensification of 
industrial cultivations which would free the metropolis [i.e. Paris] from the burden of imports. 
(Chailley 1968:420)
As Charlick puts it, ‘the French economic policy was purely exploitative -  to 
keep administrative costs to a minimum by extracting resources locally. Colonial 
officers took so heavy a charge in material (taxes, grain, livestock) and human resources 
(construction labour and troops) that the population was often left hungry and 
exhausted. After World War I the French saw little of value in its Niger colony and 
pursued very limited economic goals’ (Charlick 1991:37; cf. Charlick 1991:109)
The most important economic development programme of the colonial era in 
Niger was the French policy to promote the large scale cultivation and sale of peanuts 
(cf. Charlick 1973:14). In a contribution to the journal Marches Coloniaux du Monde in 
1949, the Governor Ignace Colombani described the economic potential of Niger as 
follows:
generalised cultivation of millet and localised cultivation o f rice and com in the basins along the 
Niger river, destined to ensure food security;
cultivation of peanuts, the main export product, destined in the post-war years to satisfy the 
pressing needs in fats o f the metropolis [Paris]. The area o f peanut cultivation is situated in the 
east of Niger, in the districts bordering with British Nigeria, between Konni and Magaria. The 
outcome of the 1948-49 harvest reached the amount of 45,000 tons; 
intensification of Arabic gum production;
development of livestock, which constitutes the stable richness o f the territory, with 1,800,000 
head of cattle and 5,500,000 sheep and goats. Yearly exports are in the order of 20,000 head of 
cattle, 200,000 goats, 60 tons of leather, and 300 tons of hides, (quoted in Fluchard 1995:2)
Only the last of these points concerns the Tuareg living in the Ader Doutchi 
Majiya. Colonial activities with regard to herding were limited to acquiring a deeper 
knowledge of local races and carrying out vaccination campaigns. According to Bemus, 
the latter were so successful that, between 1954 and 1965, Nigerien cattle increased 
from 2,200,000 to 3,970,000, sheep and goats from 6,000,000 to 7,900,000 and camels 
from 250,000 to 360,000 (Bemus 1993a:248). However, there were no significant 
attempts at dealing with range management and herding systems.
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After World War II, in 1946, France established a development fund that 
dispensed development capital to the French colonial territories, called FIDES (Fonds 
d ’Investissementpour le Developpement Economique et Social des Territoires d ’Outre- 
Mer). Sources do not agree on how much money was actually spent in Niger. Decalo 
argues that about US $ 26,000 was granted to Niger between 1949 and 1960 ‘mostly for 
projects to increase food production and spur export commodities’ (Decalo 1979:103), 
while Fuglestad quotes about 4,000 million FCFA between 1947 and 1957, compared to 
105,000 million FCFA spent by FIDES in the whole of French West Africa for the same 
period (Fuglestad 1983:170). In 1959, FIDES was renamed FAC {Fonds d ’Aide et 
Cooperation), dispensing financial and technical assistance to former colonial 
territories. The FAC began carrying out large-scale projects {grandprojets), introducing 
some of the rationales which characterise Niger’s development and foreign aid 
discourse today. One of the first FAC projects, the Projet de Developpement Rural 
Integre de I ’Ader Doutchi Maggia, targeted the Ader Doutchi Majiya region between 
1964 and 1972 (cf. Martin 1995; Funel 1976; Republique du Niger 1987).
In 1946, the constitution of the Fourth Republic marked the end of France’s 
Colonial Empire. Niger was no longer a French colony, but a ‘ Territoire d ’Outre M er\ 
member of the French Union, with its own political representatives, in Niger and within 
the French Republic. The Parti Progressiste Nigerien (PPN), led by Diori Hamani, 
Djibo Bakari, and Boubou Hama, became a member of the Rassemblement 
Democratique Africaine (RDA) in 1947. In 1960, the Nigerien Constitution was 
adopted and the Republic of Niger was proclaimed independent, with Diori Hamani as 
its first president.
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2.6 The ADM in Independent Niger as a Site ‘of Common Problems and Common 
Development Possibilities’
The history of independent Niger until the end of the 1980s can be divided into two 
main periods (cf. Raynal 1991): the years in which the country was governed according 
to constitutional power (1959-1974), and the military regime of Colonel Seiny 
Kountche (1974-1989). A lot could be said about the first thirty years of Niger’s 
independence. However, here discussion will be limited to those aspects directly 
relevant to the (future) relations between the Keita Project and the societies of the Ader 
Doutchi Majiya.
The structure and modus operandi of the administration did not undergo any 
substantial modification with the PPN/RDA’s advent to power in independent Niger: ‘at 
independence (1961), a Nigerian [sic] administration was substituted for the colonial 
administration without a blow and without any dramatic change in policy’ (Bemus 
1990:161). However, new themes appeared in political thought and propaganda: since 
the first years of independence, ‘development’ appeared, both as an internal process of 
economic restructuring and popular mobilisation, and as a process requiring the 
assistance of foreign donors. At the same time, in the early colonial years, a series of 
laws was conceived which provided the legal framework for rural development 
‘intervention’ (Yacouba 2000). This section enquires into the new discourse of 
development in independent Niger and some of its constituent notions. It shows how, by 
the time the Keita Project arrived in 1984, an official discourse of ‘development’, with 
its institutional apparatus and regime of practices, had already been set, and was to 
become integrated in the Project’s approaches and practices.
The Ten-Year Perspectives (Perspectives Decennales) 1965-1974 were 
published in 1964 (cf. Funel 1976:2) by the Hamani administration, and presented a 
comprehensive programme for the development of Niger. The three main axes along 
which the country’s development objectives were organised were: ‘economic 
independence within interdependence’, ‘national unity’, and the ‘improvement of the 
life standards of the masses’. The plan of actions foreseen by the document included 
rural hydraulic management, agricultural modernisation, reforestation, and herding
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extension, and gave a key role to the ‘participation of the population in its own 
development’ (cf. Funel 1976:17).
If the application of the Ten Year programme came as a new responsibility for 
bureaucrats and extension workers at Departmental and District level in general, the 
Tahoua Department was under particular pressure, as it had to execute the above 
mentioned Projet de Developpement Rural Integre de I ’Ader Doutchi Maggia financed 
by the FAC (Fonds d ’Aide et Cooperation). A French evaluation of ‘Regional 
Development in the experience of Tahoua’ (Funel 1976) comments upon the practices 
which, through the new problematic of ‘development’, had become familiar to the 
Tahoua’s regional administrative bureaucracy:
Confiding (more or less implicitly) to the Tahoua Department the responsibility for its own 
development, which included the execution of the regional programme of the Ader Doutchi 
Maggia, led it to confront and resolve problems regarding:
the programming of investments or operations (with the corollary studies and evaluations)
the implementation of programmes and the control of such implementation
the definition or the adaptation of models of mise en valeur (enhancement of the value of
resources)
the definition of evaluation methods at different stages. (Funel 1976:19)
This passage shows that, since the first years of independence, the Department 
of Tahoua had been exposed to new discourses and practices of ‘development’. 
Development was perceived as an ‘integrated’ process which brings together specific, 
sectoral approaches. At the stage of elaborating the funding proposals and programming 
the following investments, global programmes were subdivided into sectoral actions: 
roads and buildings are the domain of the Traveau Publiques, tracks and country 
planning (amenagements) of the Genie Rural, production activities of the UNCC 
(Union Nigerienne de Credit et Cooperation) (cf. Funel 1976:34). In parallel to this 
holistic vision of ‘development’, there is an attempt to integrate all groups of society 
into the development venture. This is particularly evident with regards to participatory 
approaches aimed at including the grassroots in national development programmes. 
Commenting on Niger’s government policies throughout the 1960s, Charlick argues:
The new relationship between the governors and the mass has become a slogan in Francophone 
Africa under the title of “participation populaire au developpement”. In Niger participation has 
been considered a vital part o f the development plan and has been institutionalised in a series of 
administrative reforms creating the Human Development service (Promotion Humaine) with its 
Rural Animation Division, the Nigerien Credit and Cooperative Union (UNCC) and local level 
consultative councils (established in 1962 and strengthened in 1965). There is no doubt from the
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public statements of Nigerien politicians that the top leadership supports a policy of involving 
rural populations in development. (Charlick 1971:19)
The origins of some of the notions commonly employed in Niger’s development 
discourse must be traced back to the practices and ideology of the French public 
administration. The French colonial education policy in Niger had focused on educating 
a small number of the colonised to a fully French level, dismissing entirely mass 
education and prohibiting education in native languages (Charlick 1991:36). Thus, the 
notions which characterised Niger’s development discourse at the time of independence 
were partly inherited, via a minority of Nigerien intellectuals educated in Paris or at the 
Ecole William Ponty in Senegal, from French ideology. Hence, a preoccupation with 
‘mise en valeur’ of resources had characterised the above mentioned French extractive 
economic policies in Niger, and remained in use in Niger’s post-colonial development 
policies (cf. Territoires en recomposition). ‘Animation ‘vulgarisation ‘participation 
populaire’ and ‘sensibilisation’ belonged to a different agenda, influenced by the 
thought of French Catholic humanists via the work of political advisors and experts 
(Charlick 1971:21). The weight given to ‘popular participation’ by the first state 
administrations after independence can also be seen as a way to check the power of 
local and traditional elites, and establish a direct link to grassroots support for new 
governmental institutions.
The notion of popular participation becomes inseparable from that of 
‘development’ with the establishment of Kountche’s ‘Development Society’ (<Societe de 
Developpement). The Development Society is a totalising institution, in which the State 
coincides with a macro development apparatus incorporating, through the notion of 
‘popular participation’, all the sectors of society. ‘Development’ becomes inseparable 
from government, denying all contradictions and compelling the population, willing or 
unwilling, to ‘participate’ in the activities and rhetoric of a capillary system of 
administrative structures.
Kountche seized power in a 1974 coup d’etat and remained in office until his 
death in November 1987. The 1968-1973 drought had exacerbated the problems of 
scarcity and political corruption, which characterised the end of the Diori Hamani 
presidency. Condemning the civilian regime for its corruption and misplaced priorities, 
Kountche identified drought control and famine relief as his government’s immediate
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priorities (cf. Robinson 1992:156). His advent to power coincided with more abundant 
rainfall, an unprecedented influx of development aid, and new wealth from the 
exploitation of Niger’s uranium reserves, contributing to granting Kountche a 
generalised support at the grassroots of Niger’s society. In these favourable 
circumstances, in his 1974 message to the nation, Kountche announced the necessity for 
Niger to establish a ‘Development Society’ (Societe de Developpement), in the 
following terms:
Not a single Nigerien will die of starvation, not even if we had to devote to this aim the totality 
of our budget.[...] We will establish a rural development policy which, involving the peasant 
while at the same time operating on his environment, will make profitable our lands, our herding, 
our agricultural systems and all our surface waters wherever they exist. (Republique du Niger 
1982:8)
In Kountche’s participatory rhetoric, the Development Society figured as a 
purely Nigerien approach to society’s development, which rejected all alternative 
visions (cf. Raynal 1991:20). He identifies ‘nature’, or the environment, as both the 
origin and the potential solution to the country’s problems. In his programmatic 
statement of 3 August 1974, Niger’s priority is identified with the attainment of 
‘freedom from [the constraints imposed by] natural factors’ on Niger’s development. 
His speeches were charged with military metaphors, which characterised Niger’s 
development discourse under his power.
This combat inevitably calls for the establishment of an audacious and determined water politics. 
To the enterprise started by the rains, which this year obtained spectacular results thanks to the 
timely installation of adequate logistic means, we must add, on the field, a vast and ingenious 
programme of dams, and wells. (Republique du Niger 1974:53)
These themes acquire a particular strength in conjunction with the narratives of 
‘desertification’ of international development institutions discussed in Chapter 4, and 
they will provide a powerful ideological support to the intervention strategies of the 
Keita Project.
The participation envisaged by Kountche had to be channelled through the 
institutions of the Development Society. It expressed an encompassing vision of 
development, which engaged the population, organised though a complex 
administrative structure, in a unique national ideology.
Schematically, I would compare the Development Society to a pyramid, in which the population 
will express itself from the bottom-up and can organise itself for [development] management at 
each level. The base of the pyramid will cover the entire territory o f the country, organised into 
development cells. The scaffolding will be left up to imagination and adaptation. What will be
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essential is the assurance of effective participation for all the sons and daughters of the nation in 
the decisions that concern them, (quoted in Robinson 1992:160)
As a result of the work of the National Commission for the Establishment of the 
Development Society (Commission Nationale de la mise en place de la Societe de 
Developpement), by 1982 the structures of the Development Society, called 
Development Councils (Conseils de Developpement), had been established at each of 
the pyramidal levels of the Development Society, i.e., village, canton, sub-region 
(arrondissement administrative level), region (departement administrative level), and 
finally the National Council. The Development Councils at each level comprised 
representatives of different social constituencies. Particular emphasis was placed upon 
the ‘traditional’ village-level youth organization (Hausa: samariya), and the rural 
cooperatives, farmers organised through the institution of the mutual group (groupement 
mutualiste villageois). Representatives from these two institutions made up half of the 
Council’s members. The other half included members from other ten socio-professional 
associations, among which were the Association of Nigerien Women (Association des 
Femmes du Niger, AFN) and the Islamic Association of Niger (Association Islamique 
du Niger, AIN) (Dunbar 1991; Cooper 1995; Thenevin 1984; Raynal 1991).
By the beginning of the Keita Project in 1983, the national and regional 
administration was already imbued with notions originated during the first decade of 
independence. In the early post-independence years, these notions became the way to 
talk about projects and rural development; they circumscribed the conditions of 
possibility within which ‘intervention’ was understood and, indeed, implemented. At its 
arrival, the Keita Project’s apparatus was directly influenced by existing discourses of 
development. This is evident in its organisational structure, its ‘participatory’ 
approaches, and in the language used to describe ‘intervention’. The men and women of 
the Ader Doutchi Majiya had become used to the forms and ‘styles’ of conduct which 
characterised their encounters with rural extension agents and the practices of 
‘animation’ and ‘sensibilisation\
This section has shown that most operations later arranged by the Keita Project 
had already been experimented with since the early 1960s, and rested on an ideological 
substratum which originated at the end of French colonialism and, under Kountche’s
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power, became an encompassing way to think about institutional relations with Niger’s 
rural populations.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has shed light upon a number of elements in the history of the Ader 
Doutchi Majiya which are important to understand the events presented in following 
chapters. Two aspects deserve particular attention. First, the establishment, through a 
series of successive migrations and conquests, of a society organised into an interethnic 
hierarchy, with Tuareg nobles at the top and captive villages at the bottom. Hierarchy is 
still a very important dimension in the ADM, and plays a part in the Keita Project’s 
relations with the ‘target population’. The negotiating strategies of different categories 
of actors vary according to their status and system of production (cf. Chapter 6) and, as 
the following chapter will show, to some extent status and economic specialisation are 
correlated.
Another noteworthy feature of Niger’s 20th century history is the diffusion, 
before the arrival of the Keita Project, of a development discourse which, through the 
institutions of the Development Society, structured the activities of all levels of the 
national administration. The populist nature of this discourse, implicit in the notion of 
‘participation populaire\ ensured that all strata of the population became involved, 
willingly or unwillingly, in ‘development’ practices. In the first five years of project 
intervention, project national participatory strategy and structures coincided: the Italy- 
Niger-FAO evaluation report of 1987 claims that ‘the Integrated Rural Development 
Project of Keita has been elaborated to serve as a technical, logistical and financial 
support to the Development Society and its participatory structures in the District of 
Keita’ (PDR/ADM 1987:13; cf. Cremona 1984:37; Boubacar and Tiemogo 1994:15).
These pre-existing factors in the ADM context intertwined with the Project’s 
agenda. The next chapter builds upon the historical background outlined here, and 
outlines the ethnography of present-day ADM society, focusing on those aspects which 
are particularly relevant to the relations between local people and the Project.
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3. CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT
3.1 Introduction
The Ader, a sort of peninsula of cultivations stretching into the nomadic steppe, has played an 
inconspicuous role in the history of Hausa peoples. It has always existed apart, retired within 
itself, without a conquest spirit, depending alternatively on the Kebbi [Kabi] or Sokoto to the 
South, or on the Touareg to the North (Kel-Air, Oullimindens de l’Azaouac and Kel Gress). 
(Urvoy 1936:251)
The previous chapter has shown that the Ader has been the theatre of repeated 
conquests and invasions, and it has hosted different societies organised into a peculiar 
interethnic hierarchy. French rule set a break with the past, putting an end to the 
Iullemden and Kel Gress supremacy and political organisation and establishing new 
administrative institutions and forms of control. However, the forms of power and 
systems of production which existed before colonial invasion remain important factors 
for understanding the way in which society in the Ader Doutchi Majiya is organised 
today. This chapter begins with a section that reconstructs the situation that French 
colonialists found on their arrival in the ADM, looking at the relations of dependence 
between Tuareg suzerains and other Tuareg and Hausa social constituencies. The 
breakdown of this system gave rise to the present order, which is described in the rest of 
the chapter.
An ethnography of Ader Doutchi Majiya societies must start from two provisos. 
First, the societies living there, mostly Hausa- and Tuareg-speaking , represent a 
specific, localised facet of the ideal types ‘Hausa’ and ‘Tuareg’. Spread across Algeria, 
Libya, Niger, Mali, Nigeria and Mauritania, internally diversified into ‘confederations’ 
(Tamasheq: Kel) which have developed different ways of interacting with the 
environment and other societies around them, it is difficult to talk of a ‘Tuareg identity’ 
without qualifications (cf. Bemus 1981:6). The same holds for Hausa societies. Echard 
remarks that ‘The term Hausa refers, strictu sensu, only to the language, but its use has 
been extended to the people who speak it -  more than 20 million people -  and the facts 
that concern them. Of different origins, Hausa-speaking populations, rural and urban, 
form a complex society which presents important differences across regions’ (Echard
28 The Peul or Fulani are a minority, and are not directly dealt with here because of their limited relations 
with the Keita Project.
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1989:20). The societies discussed in this thesis are only a specific section of the larger 
constituencies to which they belong. The Ader Doutchi Majiya hosts the Tuareg Kel 
Gress, the Iullemden Kel Dinnik, and the Lissawan; and the so-called Hausa of the 
Ader. The term ‘Aderawa’ to refer to the people living in this region is often confusing, 
as it does not distinguish between Hausa and Tuareg groups, and all those groups which 
occupy socially ‘intermediate’ positions between these two.
The second proviso, directly related to the last point above, is that a 
characteristic trait of the Ader Doutchi Majiya society is the degree of mutual 
integration of Hausa and Tuareg constituencies. Historically (cf. Chapter 2), the Ader 
Doutchi Majiya has hosted successive waves of migrations resulting in a syncretic 
social system in which the traits of one group can only be explained through reference 
to another group. Tuareg suzerains relied on the work of villages organised according to 
different gradations of servility (Baier and Lovejoy 1977). Some of these villages 
consisted of Tuareg slaves, speaking the same language of their masters and relatively 
closely integrated in the political and social organisation of their masters’ society, but 
arguably of different ethnic origins (cf. Bernus and Bemus 1972) and with different 
lifestyles as a consequence of their role and position in the hierarchy. Others were 
Hausa villages conquered by war and having to pay different types of tributes to their 
Tuareg suzerains, who, in exchange, offered military protection. The internal 
organisation and production system of these groups changed as a consequence of their 
encapsulation in the Tuareg system of political control, where dependent groups had a 
specific status, certain rights and obligations, and with which they exchanged goods and 
services. Even the elites changed as they intertwined with Ader settled societies. If the 
Iullemden Kel Dinnik, who remained at the northern fringe of the Ader, maintained a 
characteristically nomadic lifestyle longer than other groups, the Kel Gress are 
characterised, amongst the Tuareg, by their diversified livelihood patterns, incorporating 
extensive rain-fed agriculture, livestock husbandry, and trade, and by their becoming 
relatively sedentary in the more productive areas where they are settled. Finally, the 
Lissawan, who belonged to the group of tribes which had followed Agabba in his 
descent from Air, have now adopted Hausa as their mother tongue. They are 
permanently settled in Keita, and have acquired many Hausa customs and habits.
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More than other ethnographic areas, the Ader Doutchi Majiya has been 
characterised by the integration of Hausa and Tuareg components into one system 
which cannot be treated, analytically, as the mere juxtaposition of separate ‘cultural 
wholes’. Its political organisation, systems of production, and cultural and symbolic 
patterns are the result of a syncretic and dynamic interaction between the societies 
which constitute it, which have been in contact for centuries (cf. Chapter 2).
The sources and ethnographic references mentioned in this chapter are as 
specific as possible to the Ader Doutchi Majiya, but also include more general Tuareg 
and Hausa ethnographies. There are no Anglophone ethnographies of the Ader Doutchi 
Majiya societies, and the majority of available comprehensive ethnographic studies of 
the societies living in this area were produced by French anthropologists working for 
the French Cooperation between the 1950s and the 1970s, and mostly published in the 
Etudes Nigeriennes series. These include the work of Nicole Echard and Henri Raulin 
(Echard and Raulin 1964, 1965; Raulin 1969; Echard 1964, 1972, 1989). Nicole Echard 
had also worked on the reconstruction of Ader Doutchi Majiya history (Echard 1975a, 
1975b) and her historical work appeared in parallel with that of Djibo Hamani (1975, 
1979). Henri Raulin had conducted comparative surveys of Niger societies which 
include material on the Tahoua Department (1961, 1963a, 1963b, 1965, 1969). The Kel 
Gress have been studied by Pierre Bonte (1967, 1975, 1976), and the organisation of the 
Kel Dinnik has been described by Nicolas (1939, 1950). Urvoy (1936) refers to both the 
Kel Gress and the Kel Dinnik in his monograph on Niger history. In their 
comprehensive and wide ranging analysis of Tuareg society, both Edmond Bemus (and 
his wife Suzanne) and Johannes Nicolaisen offer important contributions to the Kel 
Iullemden and Kel Gress ethnography. There is no specific ethnography of the Lissawan 
of Keita.
With the exception of the work of Nicole Echard on Hausa communities of the 
Ader, the most detailed and comprehensive ethnographies of the Hausa of Niger have 
been conducted in the Maradi region, for which there is a well documented continuity of 
anthropological studies by French and American scholars (Nicolas 1960, 1962, 1969, 
1975; Nicolas, Doumesche, Mouche 1968; Gregoire 1992; Rain 1999, to mention only 
some major works). While the work on Maradi provides a solid comparative reference 
to the Ader region, these two areas have followed different historical patterns and
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Maradi, which was one of the Seven Hausa states (the Hausa Bakwai) and was situated 
in a more productive area, has not been under the constant influence and domination of 
Tuareg societies. Other important sources of Hausa ethnography are Anglophone 
studies of the Hausa of Nigeria (Stams 1974; Smith 1955, 1965, 1981; Cooper 1994, 
1995a, 1995b, 1997; Dunbar 1990, 1991; Karaye 1990), but, like the Maradi 
documentation, they refer to a political, economic and social reality which differs 
considerably from the Ader context.
A more recent, if less systematic, source of information, lacking a thorough 
analytical framing, on Ader Doutchi Majiya societies is provided by studies and surveys 
carried out by various consultancies for the Keita Project (especially: Paoletti and 
Taliani 1984; Simonelli 1994; Cremona 1995, 1996; Bayard 1995; Bayard, Paoletti and 
Traore 1997). Most of these sources provide quantitative data and statistics which were 
needed by the Project to compare the situation before and after its interventions, and 
which I occasionally refer to in this chapter to give the reader a sense of the dimensions 
o f certain phenomena. However, my own enquiries and my experience following 
project surveys suggest that attempts to quantify information about productive resources 
(especially livestock and land ownership) are not welcomed by local people, who have 
always been exposed to the legalised exactions of different rulers. Hence, the few 
figures of this kind provided in this chapter should be taken more as orders of 
magnitude than as exact measurements.
I have built upon the existing sources through my own ethnographic work. The 
information I use in this thesis derives primarily from my enquiries in the Keita district, 
where the Project has carried out the majority of its activities. The districts of Bouza 
and Abalack, to which the Project expanded its operations since 1991, are situated in 
rather different ecological and social contexts, have hosted fewer project activities 
compared to the Keita district, and fall only partially in the description offered in this 
chapter.
3.2 Social Organisation in the ADM Before Colonialism
This section reconstructs the characteristics of the Kel Gress and Kel Iullemden political 
and social organisation as they existed before French colonialism (cf. Map VIII), and 
follows the process of change which led Tuareg and Hausa societies of the Ader
Doutchi Majiya to their present state. This process is characterised by the progressive 
dissolution of the hierarchical political system according to which relations of 
production were arranged. Several factors, including the impact of colonial domination 
(cf. Chapter 2), the establishment of the postcolonial state administration, the abolition 
of slavery, the impoverishment of the elites, and the effects of droughts on livelihood 
strategies, contributed to the breakdown of the pre-existing political-economic structure.
Nevertheless, many material and symbolic practices and values on which the 
political and economic order of the Ader Doutchi Majiya rested, remain alive in the 
present-day culture of the Ader Doutchi Majiya. Relations of dependency are no longer 
imposed on ADM societies, and ex-captives are free to act independently of their 
masters’ decisions. However, the position of a person’s family in the previous hierarchy 
is a marker of status in his/her present identity, influencing his/her economic, political 
and social behaviour towards others, as well as other people’s behaviour towards 
him/her. On the one hand, it is as if a ‘shadow structure’ remained intact in the minds of 
people, influencing their practices and strategies in their every day life. On the other 
hand, old structures and dynamics have been integrated in the administrative apparatus 
of contemporary Niger and, with the establishment of the Keita Project, in the wider 
field of international development discourses and practices. This section reconstructs 
the political system and relations of production that existed in the ADM under Kel 
Gress and Kel Iullemden control, which represented the substratum which, after the 
colonial episode, hosted independent Niger’s state structures and the Keita Project’s 
‘intervention’.
Tuareg society is segmented into juxtaposed ‘confederations’ (Tamasheq: Kel), 
similarly internally stratified, but exerting their influence on different territorial areas, 
and unlike in total numbers and in the relative proportions of internal social sub­
components. The general distinction between freemen (Tamasheq: illelan) and slaves 
(Tamsheck: iklan) is further internally stratified (cf. Bemus 1981). The illelan are 
divided into four groups: the imajeghen, or Tuareg aristocracy, closely associated with 
camel husbandry and war; the ineslemen, holy men or marabouts, whose numbers and 
status vary consistently across kels (they are particularly influent in the Kel Dinnik, 
while less so in the Kel Gress); the imghad, or free vassals, who used to pay a tribute to 
the imajeghen to whom they were attached; and the inadan, or artisans, who have
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retained up their unique status and gendered system of economic specialisation to these 
days (cf. Bemus and Nicolaisen 1982).
The Iklan, also known as Bella in Songhay and Bouzou in Hausa, show different 
ethnic origins from those of their Tuareg patrons (Bemus and Bemus 1975:30), and 
used to be internally stratified into different ‘gradations of servility’ (Baier and Lovejoy 
1977; Bemus 1981:92). Some lived attached to their master’s family (cf. Bemus 1974; 
Bemus 1981; Bemus and Nicolaisen 1982), the women taking care of the domestic 
chores and the men providing the labour for their masters’ productive activities, 
including herding, farming, and gathering herbs and fruits used for specific purposes 
(Bemus 1974). Others lived in semi-nomadic hamlets scattered between the edge of the 
Sahel and the Sudanic savannah. These, unlike the iklan living with their masters, had to 
provide for their own subsistence, while cultivating their patrons’ lands. They 
represented a surplus labour force the nobles could do without in prosperous times, and 
relied upon in times of drought. They could be called back to join their masters’ 
families at any time, and the masters could take with them adolescent boys and girls 
from slave hamlets to add them to their ‘tent servants’ (Bemus and Bemus 1975: 33).
It was possible for individual slaves, or also for entire slave-villages, to be 
liberated from their servile condition. Freed slaves were further distinguished in two 
categories, the ighawellan (in Tamasheq), who had enjoyed a free status for a long time, 
and the iderfan (in Tamasheq), recently freed to reward their loyalty to their patron, or 
as an act of piety (cf. Bemus 1974). Ighawellan could not (except through mixed 
marriages), be assimilated to imghad free vassals. Firstly, the status of the latter was 
irreversible (they could not be turned into slaves as the slaves could be freed). Secondly, 
slaves or ex-slaves were considered ethnically different from ‘real’ Tuareg, and denied 
full human status by high-class members: the ethnic criterion functioned so as to 
differentiate them from the ilellan, also after they had been freed (cf. Bemus and Bemus 
1975:31-32). Beyond these general traits of Tuareg social structure, in practice every 
Tuareg group differed from the others with respect to livelihood strategies, production 
arrangements and the size of its internal subdivisions. Below I focus on the social 
organisation of the Iullemden Kel Dinnik and the Kel Gress, which, as we have seen in 
Chapter 2, were the dominant Tuareg groups in the Ader Doutchi Majiya since the 
middle of the 19th century.
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Amongst the Iullemden Kel Dinnik, semi-sedentary imghad villages gravitated 
around a group of imajeghen to whom they paid a tribute in recognition of the rights of 
use they held over lands that fell within imajeghen estates. The imajeghen owned the 
greatest part of valuable resources (land and livestock), and in exchange for usufruct 
rights the dependents provided the agricultural and herding labour which allowed their 
masters to exploit these resources (cf. Nicolas 1939, 1950). This interpretation is, 
however, contested by the descendants of free dependents {imghad), who argue, against 
the imajeghen's version, that they owned the resources they exploited and only owed a 
part of the produce to their suzerains in exchange for protection against attacks of other 
tribes (cf. Bemus 1990).
The Iullemden did not practise long distance caravan trade, and their livelihood 
depended upon dairy husbandry, from which they derived the bulk of protein for their 
diet, and which they integrated with the consumption of wild seeds and cereals. 
Dependent tribes had to give part of their crops to the masters, and looked after some of 
their masters’ animals. The artisans (inadan) provided leather, wood and metal 
products, but, because Tuareg artisans do not practise weaving, cloths and clothing were 
bought in Nigeria, near Kano. Different types of goods were obtained in the course of 
incursions against villages of settled farmers or other nomadic groups. During the 
summer, camel and bovine herds were brought to the areas permanently occupied by the 
Kel Air and Kel Ahaggar (cf. map V) for the purposes of the salt cure29. Before the 
1970s, the salt cure represented a collective movement, in which every person and every 
animal took part (cf. Bemus 1990).
Amongst the Kel Gress, the imghad were almost completely absent as a group 
(cf. Bemus and Bemus 1975:29), whereas variously classified slave and ex-slave groups 
were present in huge numbers. A distinctive trait of the Kel Gress was the emphasis 
falling on the hierarchical relation between small groups of imajeghen landowners and 
variously classified dependent villages with usufructuary rights over the imajeghen's 
lands. Amongst these, three principal categories could be distinguished: (a) semi­
29 The ‘salt cure’ refers to the Summer migration of herds to areas with a high concentration of sodium 
chlorine and sodium sulphate present in the surface layers of the soil and in wells and springs. ‘The best 
areas are the clay plains near Tegidda, where the mineral salts found in the water and earth have a 
laxative effect on the herds, stimulating the elimination of intestinal parasites’ (Bemus 1990:163).
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permanent camps of slaves working for their patrons (farming and herding); (b) villages 
of iderfan or ighawellan owing their former patrons one tenth (tamasadak) of the 
agrarian produce and various kinds of extraordinary contributions30 on special occasions 
in the imajeghen's life-cycle (marriage, birth of a child, war, etc.); and (c) villages of 
Hausa or Hausa-phone peasants which had been progressively conquered and obliged to 
give a tenth of the produce and pay different kinds of tributes (haraji) to Kel Gress 
imajeghen (cf. Bonte 1976).
The Kel Gress livelihood system was more diversified than that of the 
Iullemden, and included livestock husbandry, agriculture and caravan trade. Their 
closeness to Nigeria promoted the trade of cattle with northern Nigerian cities and the 
development of important markets where the Kel Gress sold cattle, salt, and crafts, for 
money to buy cereals from the ighawellan, increasing the amount of cereals they 
received through tributes. Their herds followed a double migratory pattern, moving 
southwards during the agricultural slack season and obtaining access to grazing areas 
for manure produced by their herds, and northwards in the summer, for the salt cure. 
The rains increased the grass in the northern soils, which could support the surcharge 
due to the convergence of several Tuareg groups for the cure (cf. Bonte 1967).
Outside the area under Kel Gress and Iullemden control, many savannah towns, 
which were not in a relation of dependence from these groups, hosted communities of 
Tuareg immigrants from the North, who provided accommodation and economic 
services to Kel Gress herders. Some cities became specialised market places, where the 
desert nomads would exchange dates, salt, slaughter and transport animals, and a range 
of craft products, for grain and cloths from southern Nigerian towns (Baier 1976). Very 
little is known about the relations between Iullemden ad Kel Gress and the Lissawan 
imajeghen who had reached the Ader Doutchi at the time of Agabba’s conquest (cf. 
Chapter 2), except for the reports of some colonial administrators recording conflictual 
relations between the Lissawan and the Iullemden Kel Dinnik. However, at some point 
between the colonial invasion and today, the Lissawan became Hausaphone and 
established their political authority upon an area comprising mainly Hausa-speaking 
villages.
30 For a detailed description of these contributions, see Bemus and Nicolaisen 1982:120.
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Below, I trace the evolution of some of the different components of Ader 
Doutchi Majiya society with reference to my enquiries in a sample of 20 villages (cf. 
section 1.6.). Who are the ‘beneficiaries’ of PDR/ADM activities, and how do specific 
constituencies of this society (e.g. Tuareg nobles, ex-slaves affiliated to the Kel Gress, 
Kel Iullemden or Lissawan, Hausa farmers and ex-tributaries) relate to the Project? 
Without simplifying the diversity that characterises this region, the following section 
attempts to clarify some elements of complexity that have consequences for the 
interaction between the Project and the ‘target population’.
3.3 Contemporary Livelihood Patterns
The intervention area of the Keita Project is vast, and includes different types of villages 
which were, once, integrated in the hierarchical structure outlined above. It is possible 
to distinguish a general trend toward the adoption of similar systems of production on 
the part of Hausa and Tuareg villages faced with similar environmental and structural 
constraints. Local pastoral and agricultural societies rearranged their relations according 
to seasonal climatic fluctuations. In pre-colonial times, farming and herding systems 
functioned as ‘two sub-sectors within a larger regional economy’ (Baier 1976:1). The 
post-colonial trend has been toward the breakdown of traditional forms of interethnic 
complementarity and mutual dependency (Bemus 1974; Bourgeot 1975; Diarra 1975; 
Baier 1976; Lovejoy and Baier 1977) and, at least since the 1960s, ethnographic studies 
of Sahelian economies have documented a less clear-cut distinction between pastoral 
and farming economies: ‘Even though there are pure herders, everybody is interested in 
the agrarian economy, and multiple liaisons connect herders and peasants. Moreover, 
farmers own cattle and many nomads practise agriculture’ (Bemus 1974:138); and ‘the 
pastoral and agrarian economies entertained a relation of complementarity which we 
still find nowadays, even though, due to a process of progressive settlement and 
acculturation, a certain levelling of [pastoral and agrarian] lifestyles is taking place’ 
(Bonte 1976:31). The majority of the population has settled into villages in which both 
rain-fed agriculture and cattle husbandry are practiced. ‘The evolution of Tuareg society 
tends to favour the development of semi-nomadic farmer-herders, seeking their own 
profit and detached [detaches] from the warriors and the great nomadic tribes’ (Bemus 
1974:142).
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Since the advent of colonial rule, the history of Tuareg imajeghen is 
characterised by economic impoverishment and the progressive loss of political control. 
In the previous chapter I have shown that the colonial episode had important 
repercussions for the status of Iullemden and Kel Gress imajeghen. Colonial rule 
abolished the organs of Tuareg political control and the elites’ rights to levy tributes, 
and established new administrative structures, carrying out a census and imposing a 
system of taxation. It put an end to Tuareg incursions, it compensated dependent groups 
for their collaboration granting them rights to land, and it punished other groups which 
resisted colonial rule through military attacks, forced labour and requisitions. The 
drought of 1968-1973 significantly reduced the Tuareg herds, but it was followed by 
government restocking programmes which granted loans to herdsmen. Throughout the 
1960s, Niger pastoral politics included drilling deep wells and creating mechanical 
pumping stations in northern Tuareg territories (cf. Bemus 1990:171; Bemus 1994:46). 
Nomadic Fulani, who had been infiltrating Kel Dinnik territory since the 1940s, 
increased their pressure over the new wells during the 1968-1973 drought, 
concentrating their herds around pumping stations. As Fulani herds are always followed 
by herdsmen, whereas Tuareg herds are left to water by themselves, the Fulani cows 
formed a wall around the wells at the expense of Tuareg animals, giving rise to tensions 
over the access to water points in times of scarcity (cf. Bemus 1990:167).
The Tuareg elite has evolved in different ways. An exiguous successful minority 
has established networks of clientage and connections in centres where their status is 
recognised, maintaining larger herds than commoners, recmiting wage labourers to 
work on part of their lands, or developing the custom of ‘farming by invitation’ 
(lavishly feeding poorer peasants in exchange for their agricultural labour), and renting 
part of their lands to farmers. I have never seen a Tuareg imajeghen doing agricultural 
work in the Ader Doutchi Majiya. Some of the ex-slaves have maintained their relations 
with their former patrons, finding it more convenient than starting independent 
activities, and today they gravitate around the influence of relatively wealthy Tuareg 
imajeghen, following their patrons’ affairs and taking care of their herds. Tuareg 
artisans (enadan) have been able to expand their activities, selling their products in local 
markets and to tourists or shops in some major cities.
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The majority of Hausa and Tuareg (ex-dependent) villages are characterised by 
low internal economic differentiation, and all adult men are farmer-herders, practising 
seasonal migration every year to earn cash through wage labour in cities during the dry 
season. Many ex-dependents who had cut the ties with their impoverished masters 
began colonising the northern fringes of the agricultural area, beginning to occupy and 
cultivate lands which had not been exploited because of their low productivity, and 
entering into conflict with herders over the damage made by cattle to the crops, and 
questioning existing livestock corridors (couroirs de passage). In 1960 new legislation 
established a boundary between agricultural and pastoral zones ‘beyond which 
cultivation was forbidden and where, if the land was seeded, destruction of crops by 
herds could not be prosecuted. Despite this dissuasive and repressive law, the 
agricultural front moved forward’ (Bemus 1990:167; cf. Bemus 1994:250).
Over the last 30 years, we have witnessed a paradoxical phenomenon. Rain-fed agriculture has 
expanded more and more toward the north even though there have been successive rain deficits: 
they have progressed about fifty kilometres northwards, despite the southwards regression of the 
350 mm isohyet: in 1960 this isohyet set the northern boundary of rain-fed agriculture in Niger’s 
legislature. Between 1968 and 1977, in the Canton of Tanout, cultivated surfaces have doubled, 
entailing the diminution of forest areas, the disappearance of certain vegetal species and the 
degradation of pastures. The inhabitants, who diversify their resources and almost all become 
farmer-herders, cultivate not only the valleys, but also sandy dunes for rain-fed agriculture and 
irrigation. (Bemus 1994:57)
In the absence of a cadaster, the property of land is still regulated by ‘traditional’ 
norms, which are recognised by the State in the 1997 Principes D ’Orientation du Code 
Rural (cf. Republique du Niger, 1993, articles 8 and 9; cf. Lund 1993). In general, men 
own and control a greater proportion of valuable assets (land, livestock) and cash than 
women, who have rights of use over the products of their fathers’ and husbands’ lands. 
Adult men carry out the majority of farming tasks during the agricultural season (May- 
November), and migrate to cities where they work for wages in the off season 
(November-April). The cash they earn through their migration work is mostly used to 
buy cereals to integrate the household’s production. Women are responsible for the 
majority of so-called ‘reproductive activities’ and remain in villages with elders and 
children when the men leave.
The principal agricultural products are millet and sorghum. Neither fallow nor 
animal traction are practised (cf. Raulin 1963; Echard and Raulin 1964). Some 
households with lands in productive locations dispose of small parcels for the off­
season cultivation of vegetables and spices. In circumscribed areas (mostly on valley
lands around Toumboulana, Zangarata and Tamaske), the irrigated cultivation of onions 
constitutes a cash crop, and onion producers (who also have cereal fields) do not usually 
migrate. Farming works start in May, when men return from their seasonal migrations, 
to prepare the fields for the rains. The first rains usually fall in June, and the land is 
sown in cooperation with women and children. Sowing is the one agricultural task to 
which women tend to contribute; and their participation in agricultural work is 
otherwise minimal (cf. Echard and Raulin 1954:61; Raulin 1963:123; Echard 1989:37). 
A second sowing usually takes place with subsequent rains. Two to three weeks after 
sowing, the first weeding (noma huri) takes place; weeding is repeated two/three weeks 
later (may may), and sometimes a third weeding may be needed (cf. Raulin 1963). The 
new plants have to be supervised closely against animals and birds. The harvest is 
carried out in November, and soon afterwards men leave to work for wages in Niamey, 
Nigeria or coast cities.
Some specialised herders (mainly Fulani, but also ex Tuareg slaves, or Bouzou)
have become wage herders, usually attached to an entire village, or a village section, or
a few wealthy owners, for whom they tend livestock for a fixed rate of payment per 
1 1
head and the use of dairy products while the animals are in their custody. The 
detachment of cattle from their sedentary owners (the animals still migrate to Nigeria 
and to the northern oases) makes it difficult to evaluate the importance of animals as a 
form of saving in the local economy, as the numbers quoted in surveys are 
underestimations of the real figures. Small livestock is kept in the village, and 
supervised by children or women, or by local herders for a small cash payment (my 
evidence here differs from the situation recorded by Bemus (1974), who mentions 
payments in kind as the most common form of retribution, probably accounting for a 
progressive monetisation of the region). Before looking more closely at the interactions 
between project activities and ADM livelihood strategies, I will illustrate how the 
situation I have described is reflected in the case of a few villages falling in the 
intervention area.
Seyte is a Bouzou village, whose inhabitants speak a dialect of the Tamasheq. 
They are farmer-herders, and elders recall a time, before the droughts of the 1970s and 
1980s, when their herds were substantially larger than today. Seyte is peculiar in the
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area, as the lands cultivated by its inhabitants belong to a family of Tuareg imajeghen of 
the Kel Iullemden who live in a small nearby settlement called Ouroub. The people of 
Seyte agree with Ouroub’s imajeghen's version that those lands belong to the noble 
Tuareg, but both parties argue that Seyte’s people do not ‘give anything’ in exchange 
for the use of the land. However, my own research shows that Seyte’s villagers provide 
agricultural labour for Ouroub imajeghen. The case of Seyte and Ouroub is unusual, as 
nowadays the majority of Bouzou villages in the ADM believe that they own the lands 
they cultivate, and their ex-suzerains have moved to other areas of the country. 
Tinkirana Tounga (cf. Chapter 6) and Tinkirana Ibarogan are typical examples of ex 
servile villages that have almost severed the ties with their former patrons, the Tuareg 
Kel Eghlal of the Iullemden confederation, who are said to have definitely moved to 
Abalack. Kossongo is a small village, to the south of the District of Keita, of semi- 
sedentary Tuareg who have moved to this area recently from the region around Agadez. 
It is a good example of the contemporary situation of Tuareg imajeghen who have not 
moved to bigger cities. Kossongo hosts an imajeghen family to whom a few families of 
dependents of different ranks are attached (cf. pictures 11 and 12). The imajeghen own a 
herd of camels which they keep between Nigeria and their village. The dependents 
cultivate the lands and manage the herd for themselves and for the imajeghen. 
Kossongo is situated close to the area which, before the colonial period, used to be 
under the influence of the Kel Gress. The descendants of the original Kel Gress 
landlords are settled in the village of Mansala Kel Gress, and one of them holds the 
administrative position of Chef du Groupement Kel Gress, representing the most 
important ‘traditional authority’ in the region (cf. Chapter 6). He traces the origins of 
his lineage back to the Prophet Mohamed. He is surrounded by his court and some 
dependents, and his version is that today he has maintained only a portion of the lands 
which once belonged to his lineage, allowing the local farmers to cultivate and exploit 
the rest, asking for nothing in return. Villagers living in the area falling under his 
influence have a different version, as they claim that the land they cultivate is theirs, 
today, and no longer belongs to the Chef whose position now is only that of a 
traditional and moral authority. Mansala Sedentaire, right next to Mansala Kel Gress, 
used to be a village of liberated slaves who paid tributes to the imajeghen, but today it is 
formally independent from its former patrons. All the villages mentioned above speak 
Tamasheq as their mother tongue, but are fluent in Hausa which is a lingua franca in the
311 recorded FCFA1,000 per head of cattle a year and FCFA 200 per sheep or goat ayear plus the right to
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region. I met only a few old women and small children who could speak only 
Tamasheq. Koutki, Kourega, Laba and Garadawa, are all Hausa villages which, in the 
past, used to be tributaries of Tuareg chiefs, but are today entirely independent from 
Tuareg control. Keita, Ibohamane, Tamaske and Chadawanka are bigger villages with a 
mixed population, comprising Hausa, Tuareg, and Fulani inhabitants. These villages are 
divided into neighbourhoods which reflect the ethnic composition of the village, and 
each neighbourhood had its own village chief (hakimi). The following section looks at 
the constraints faced by Bouzou and Hausa villages in the Ader Doutchi Majiya and at 
their livelihood strategies. It introduces the interactions between the local system of 
production and project activities, which are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5.
3.4 Ecological Vulnerability, Male Migration and the Relevance of Project 
Activities for Local Livelihoods and the Sexual Division of Labour.
With the exception of a few villages situated in favourable, productive areas (on ‘valley’ 
lands which allow off-season cultivation), the majority of the villages falling in the 
project intervention area are characterised by yearly food deficits. Cremona’s in-depth 
nutrition survey (1985) in a sample of 15 villages, finds that ‘a 9-person household must 
spend approximately FCFA 45,00032 in the local markets to cover its basic nutrition 
needs’ (Cremona 1985: 103).
Despite the integration of a household’s own production with external sources of 
food, Cremona’s anthropometric measurements show medium to advanced levels of 
malnutrition, which are most acute amongst children under 2 years of age. The 
nutritional conditions of adults is not particularly better: 53% of adult men and 46% of 
adult women are considered under-nourished (Cremona 1985:93). Cremona’s survey 
may present a particularly bleak picture, as her research coincided with the 1984-85 
drought. Unfortunately, the Project did not carry out other surveys to assess the 
evolution of the nutritional status of the population in the project area. However, the 
FAO 1998 Apergu Nutrinionnel par Pays -  Niger (based on 1992 EDS33 data) breaks 
data down to the Departmental level. For Tahoua and Agadez Departments together, 
36.6% of children under 5 are underweight (insuffisance ponderale) and 13.7% are
consume the milk of the animals.
32 The survey took place before the devaluation of the FCFA. In fact, FCFA 45,000 would be FCFA 
90,000 after January1994, or approximately UK £ 90.
33 Enquete Demographique et de Sante, Care International and DHS, 1998.
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emaciated (FAO 1998:15). For the department of Tahoua alone, 17.5% of adult men 
and 23% of adult women have a bodily mass index below 18.5 kg/m2, the level under 
which they are classified as affected by ‘chronic energy deficiency’.
My informants asserted that the origin of their problems is the variability of 
rainfall levels. Lack of sufficient and well spaced rains leads to shortfalls in grain 
production which results in variously severe yearly food deficits. This problem is 
exacerbated by erosion phenomena that tend to reduce the infiltration of water in the 
soil and/or the creation of water-ponds. In these conditions, farmers have to earn cash to 
buy the extra food necessary to feed their families throughout the year (cf. Faulkingham 
1976).
In the villages falling in the project intervention area, this extra income is earned 
through three main ‘subsistence strategies’. Selling animals is mentioned as an 
emergency measure, to which one resorts only when other options have been tried. 
Moreover, in many villages, elders lament a consistent decrease in the number of 
animals since the drought-induced famine of the mid-1970s. A minority of farmers, who 
own land in productive locations where irrigation is possible, practise off-season 
cultivation (French: culture de contre-saison; Hausa: nomar rani) of onions (sing: 
albasa) and, secondarily, other vegetables. The majority of villages lack such 
favourable conditions, and adult men resort to seasonal migration (French: exode\ 
Hausa: cin rani). The men of the Ader have a reputation, in Niger, for being ‘grands 
exodants’ (great migrants), working as agricultural labourers (sing: yan barema) or 
casual manual workers elsewhere in Niger, or outside the country (cf. Nicolas et al. 
1968:14).
In the local construction of gender roles, male household heads are seen as 
responsible for the subsistence of their household’s members. Seasonal migration is 
presented, by men and women alike, as the way in which ADM men fulfil their 
‘breadwinner’ role. Migrating to cities around the months of November/December and 
returning in April/May, adult men are able to earn the cash which is needed to cover 
their land’s production deficits. Women stay behind with elders and children, and feed 
themselves and their families with the cereal reserves from their household’s harvest. If 
they own small land parcels of their own, or if they are able to access other cheap
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sources of cereals (buying them when prices are low, engaging in rotating credit, selling 
a goat which belongs to them, using some of the household’s reserves or the WFP 
ration), they prepare meals which they sell, directly or through their daughters, to 
individual members of other households. Participation in the activities of the Keita 
Project has given (mainly) women labourers another source of revenue (discussed 
below, and in Chapters 6 and 7). Selling cooked meals, together with other small-scale 
trade of goods (mainly straw mats), allows women to achieve a certain degree of 
economic independence from their husbands, which is not, however, seen as threatening 
to intra-household relations and power distribution. Women spend their earnings 
primarily to fulfil their ‘social obligations’. Almost all the women I talked to 
emphasised the importance of bringing gifts to celebrations without having to ask their 
husbands for money. In marginal villages in the project intervention area, men and 
women do not have many alternatives to these activities. In bigger centres, the social 
division of labour is more diversified, and both men and women can find various kinds 
of jobs in different sectors. Bigger centres like Keita are also internally hierarchically 
stratified, and poorer people can sell their labour to a wealthy minority.
It is against this background that the impact of the PDR/ADM should be 
assessed. For men and women alike, the main aspects of its intervention have been the 
introduction of food-for-work rations (sing, taimakon abinci, literally ‘help of food’), as 
compensation for labour on project work sites; the impact on productive resources (land 
and water) through its environmental rehabilitation interventions; and, for a limited 
period in its early stages, the reallocation of property rights in land. A noteworthy 
difference between these two project-related outcomes is their immediate (food rations) 
or long term (environmental change) visibility (cf. Chapter 6).
The importance of food-for-work is partly explained by the fact that the 
PDR/ADM has a monopsony over labour supply in the slack season. The number of 
work-sites that can be working at peak time (i.e. during the dry season) can reach 40-50 
chantiers of reforestation trenches and 10-15 roads/hydraulic infrastructure building 
sites open at the same time, for a total of up to 4000-5000 people per day working for 
the Project34. The contribution of the World Food Program (WFP) to the Keita Project 
consisted in 4,438,505 food-rations for the first phase and 3,522,428 for the second
34 There approximately 400 villages in the project intervention area, with a population of 330,000 people.
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phase of the Project. The standard ration distributed in Keita in the first two Project 
phases consisted of the following, with equivalent values in FCFA (PDR/ADM 1997):
Millet:
Sugar:
Oil:
2,250 kg. 
0,050 kg. 
0,075 kg. 
0,200 kg.
248 FCFA 
20 FCFA 
50 FCFA 
28 FCFA 
83 FCFA
Cow-peas (niebe) 
Tinned meat 1 tin
Total value: 429 FCFA (approximately U.S. $ 0,86)
Due to male migration, women form the bulk Of the labour for project 
interventions (cf. Chapters 6 and 7) and most of the WFP rations are received by 
women, as a counterpart for their work. Because of the food deficit situation in the 
project intervention area, ration cereals are used for household consumption. Relatively 
wealthy households, not vulnerable to food scarcity, would not send their members 
(men, women, or children) to work on the chantiers (work-sites). Chantier work is a 
sign of low status and poverty, and the wives of wealthy or high status men are not 
usually involved in heavy manual work, and are more likely to be secluded. Because, in 
the context in question, wealth is closely tied to a household’s agricultural production, 
the most destitute households (i.e. the households whose agricultural production is 
scarce) are the most likely to use WFP cereals for consumption purposes, as well as to 
send their members (women and children) to work on the chantiers. Women sell the 
other components of their ration and retain the profit derived thereof for their own 
economic activities, such as the preparation of cooked meals to be sold in the 
neighbourhood or livestock breeding.
Able-bodied men aged between 18-38 do not compete with women over labour 
in project work-sites, as migration is both more profitable and socially more 
‘appropriate’ for a man. Adult men say they would be ‘ashamed’ (Hausa: shame: kunya) 
to work next to women in a chantier, unless they fulfilled higher status roles, such as 
the chef de chantier or few other skilled jobs available only in a minority of sites and 
remunerated in cash. Men are able to gain more from their jobs as migrants than if they 
worked for the Project. Moreover, project work is available for a few villages at a time 
and only for a limited number of times in the same villages. Although rates of return to 
migrant labour vary consistently according to factors ranging from personal skills to the 
opportunities available at their destination, a migrant worker can save between 20.000
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to 50.000 FCFA per month (cf. Sassi 1991:33). In comparison, an unskilled manual 
labourer on project work sites earns one WFP ration per day. A chef de chantier (work­
site chief, c f  Chapter 6) op project sites, with general responsibility for the coordination 
and monitoring of workers in a chantier, earns FCFA 10,000 per month, and receives 
food-for-work daily rations (monetised, this more or less doubles his/her cash earnings). 
In the first two phases of project intervention, most chefs de chantier used to be men, 
even though the majority of chantier workers were women. This was criticised, leading 
to the establishment of a policy of preferential appointment of women to the post of chef 
de chantier. Today, most chefs de chantier are women.
The Project’s impact on productive resources is more significant for local men 
than for women, as men have greater access to and control over land than women (cf. 
Cremona 1986; Bayard 1995). In limited areas, the Project’s intervention allowed the 
development of off-season cultivation (French: culture de contre-saison; cultures de 
rente; Hausa: nomar rani), causing the permanent settlement of male migrant workers. 
The main project impact on the majority of non-valley lands consisted in the increase in 
vegetation, which could be used as fodder for livestock and cattle. The Project also 
created permanent and temporary water resources through the construction of earthfill 
dams and gabion weirs hydraulic structures, which had an important impact on the 
availability of water for human and animal consumption and agriculture. For the 
majority of villages facing water scarcity problems, this is the most profitable 
contribution that the Keita Project has made to their livelihoods (cf. Chapter 6).
The Project did not only have an impact on the productivity of natural resources, 
but, for a limited period of time, it also provided access to the ownership of new lands. 
In the first phase (1984-1991), project interventions were accompanied by the 
redistribution of property rights upon rehabilitated lands to two categories of 
beneficiaries: the original owners {‘les ayants droit'), and the labourers {'les 
necessiteux’) who participated in the rehabilitation works. In Chapter 1 ,1 illustrated the 
coincidence between project intervention strategies and the participatory policies of 
Kountche’s Societe de Developpment. The redistribution of rehabilitated lands ‘to the 
tiller’ corresponded to a national policy famously expressed in Kountche’s 1974 
message to the nation, establishing that: ‘From the present declaration, every field 
already exploited under some kind of title by a producer, remains and will stay at the
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disposition of this producer, irrespective of what was the initial title which had allowed 
the latter to acquire it [the field in the first place]’35 (quoted in Sassi 1991:43, my 
translation). The original owners had abandoned many of the areas where the project 
intervened. The rationale behind the application of Kountche’s policy to land tenure 
arrangements following project interventions was as follows: the original owners had 
abandoned their lands, therefore those local poor farmers who contributed to the land’s 
rehabilitation deserved to become the new owners (Sassi 1991:52). The redistribution of 
rehabilitated lands was arranged by the Project in cooperation with the national 
administrative authorities, in particular the Conseil Sous-Regional de Developpement 
(CSRD).
Although the vast majority of the labour force was female, the redistribution 
benefited male household heads almost entirely, giving rise to women’s remonstrations 
in some villages and to critiques of the Project at an international level (Mbnimart 1989; 
Rochette 1989; Bayard, Paoletti, Traore 1986; Bayard 1995). However, redistributions 
triggered countless litigations and conflicts, and were definitely stopped by the end of 
the first phase, making it impossible to include women amongst the beneficiaries of the 
redistribution policy. Nevertheless, the critiques had raised the issue of women’s access 
to land, leading to the conception of a new type of operation, indisputably limited in its 
extent compared to the earlier generalised policy, aimed at the acquisition of rights upon 
restored parcels on the part of women groups (cf. Chapter 7).
Another category of project intervention having particular relevance for local 
women is represented by an array of activities joined together under the vague heading 
‘volet fem m e\ such as food conservation and transformation, extension support to 
women in women’s gardens, involvement in plant production for project reforestation 
sites (Fr. pepiniere; Hausa aikin leda), health training and other forms of training aimed 
at income diversification. This type of operation had some success only where a 
demand for new goods and services which could be provided by women existed.
The impact of project activities on the distribution of power between men and 
women was limited. Through them, women were involved in activities from which they
35 ‘a partir de la presente declaration, tout champ deja exploite a un titre ou a un autre par un exploitant 
donne, reste et demeurera a la disposition dudit exploitant, quel que soit le titre initial qui avait permis a 
ce dernier de I 'acquerir ’
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derived a profit, most of which was used to compensate for the household’s food 
deficits, and a small part of which increased the scale of women’s ‘traditional’ 
economic activities without challenging men’s role as primary owners of a household’s 
productive assets and as providers of the bulk of externally earned cash through 
migration.
3.5 The Household and Food Production, Transformation, and Consumption 
Patterns
In both Hausa and Bouzou villages (sing: gari) in the ADM, the basic familial 
organisation is the gida, a term which refers at the same time to a compound (a physical 
enclosure containing one or more buildings) and to the people forming a residence 
group (the people living together in the same gida) (cf. Raulin 1963a: 15; Nicolas, 
Doumeche, Mouche 1968). A gida 's composition is variable, depending mainly upon 
the stage of a household’s life-cycle, but the commonest model includes one adult male 
(mai gida), seen as responsible for the subsistence and livelihood of his wife (uwar 
gida) or wives, and their children (yarn) (cf. Nicolas et al. 1968:27 ff). Several 
variations of this basic model occur, leading to the inclusion of different categories of 
dependent members, such as the husband’s elderly parent/s, younger and/or unmarried 
siblings or cousins, adopted children, etc.
In polygamous households, each wife has a personal dwelling, and sometimes 
also a separate cooking place or hearth (murfu) adjacent to her individual house, where 
she resides with her young children. In the majority of polygamous residences that I 
could observe, each gida had a unique hearth shared by all of the co-wives (sing: 
kishiya). Separate cooking places usually attest to tense relations between co-wives and 
unwillingness to collaborate (cf. Nicolas et al. 1968:27; Raynaut 1977:573). The 
husband spends alternate nights at each of his co-wives’ dwellings (sometimes the 
rotation is every two days), and the ‘hosting’ wife is responsible for preparing her 
husband’s evening meal, while the other wives cook only for themselves and their 
children. When a husband only has one wife, she is always responsible for all of her 
husband’s and children’s meals. The preparation of meals is done by household women, 
and young girls begin helping their mothers to accomplish their domestic chores at a 
very early age (approx. 4/5 years old).
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The husband is morally and socially responsible for ensuring his family’s 
subsistence and well being, and it is he who provides the bulk of cereals (mainly millet 
and sorghum) necessary for the preparation of meals. Today in the ADM, at harvest 
time, millet and sorghum stalks are stored in household granaries (sing, rumbu). Weekly 
or fortnightly, women are given stocks of millet with which they shall prepare their 
family’s meals. From these stocks, most women pound and process the millet necessary 
for the family meals on a daily basis.
The main meals of the local diet vary in composition across the year and with a 
household’s socio-economic status. Depending on the time of the year36 and on relative 
wealth, people eat two or three times per day. The morning and, if taken, midday meal 
is the fura , a kind of porridge composed of millet, water and milk. The evening meal is 
more nutritious, and usually includes tuwo, a thick, millet- or sorghum-based paste, 
accompanied by a sauce (miya) which, at its richest, includes abundant meat and/or 
entrails, but which, in poorer families or at times of hardship, may contain just 
vegetables, herbs, and spices. In particularly poor villages in the brousse (daji), people 
may spend part of the year eating only fura  at all meals (cf. Cremona 1985:16), and 
consuming meat maybe once or twice a week or on the occasion of ceremonies and 
feasts (sing. biki). A variety of different foodstuffs enter the household’s diet from 
extra -gida sources (cf. Raynaut 1977). These include meat (raw or cooked), cooked 
vegetables, tubers, fruits, fried snacks (beignets and ‘pan-cakes’), sweets (dates, 
bonbons, caramelised nuts, soft drinks), and stimulants such as tobacco, tea, and the 
ubiquitous kola-nuts (sing: goro). Women control an important part of the cooked 
foodstuff trade.
Women are often given small parcels of land to cultivate individually by their 
husbands, or they may own fields inherited from their natal families (cf. Cremona 
1986:2). However, because residence is virilocal, when women come from different 
villages, it is unlikely that they retain access to their part of inheritance. Women mostly 
use the product of their individual fields for trading cooked foodstuff, thereby entering a 
network of food circulation, the social and economic importance of which cannot be 
underestimated. Sometimes, organised in rotating credit groups, women ‘speculate’,
36 People tend to eat more (increasing the number of meals or the quantities eaten at each meal) during the 
rainy seasons (approximately May -  September), when agricultural work is most demanding, and in the 
‘cold season’ (approximately November -  February).
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buying cereals from the poorest farmers, who are obliged to sell at the time of the year 
when cereals are cheapest in order to pay their revenues (after the harvest).
In general, meal variety, quality, and, in poorer households, quantity, decreases 
steadily since after the harvest: in the months immediately following the harvest, meals 
are richer, whereas in the rainy season, families often struggle to complement their 
partially or entirely depleted cereal stocks with external sources of relatively expensive 
food. Hence, poorer households are often facing hardship by the end of the rainy season. 
If the previous harvest had been poor, their stocks are likely to be minimal37. 
Nevertheless, they must use them not only to feed themselves, but also to sow their 
fields . When the interval between rains, within the same season, is long, second or 
third sowings may be necessary, further depleting a household’s reserves. It is only the 
wealthiest farmers who are able to sell grains in the rainy season, and the price of 
cereals is at its peak (see Table 3).
3.6 Women’s Lives and the Sexual Division of Labour
Women are primarily responsible for ‘reproductive activities’. In the ADM, these 
include fetching water, collecting fuel-wood, preparing family meals, washing clothes, 
cleaning the interior of the gida and the utensils used for food preparation, looking after 
the children and, sometimes, taking care of poultry or small livestock kept in the gida.
Cremona (1985) estimates that, in the project intervention area, a family of 5 
consumes approximately 50 litres of water per day. This translates into a highly variable 
amount of time and effort across villages, depending on the location of the nearest water 
point and the availability of water. In certain areas, in the hot season (March-May), 
women must wait hours before water is available in wells, or go there early in the 
morning and queue, sometimes only to reach their turn when the well is empty. 
Cremona’s survey of 15 villages, shows that the minimum time spent fetching water is 1 
hour per day, in a village with a water point at 0.050 kilometers from its residential area. 
The maximum time is 6 hours, for several trips to water points 1.5 kilometers away 
from the village. Fuel wood is usually collected twice a week by women, and quantities
37 According to Cremona, ‘in September most of the food consumed is bought with cash (household 
stocks being practically depleted). In October, after the harvest, auto-consumption starts again’
(1985b: 103).
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depend upon family size. On the collection day, they spend between 2-7 hours for this 
task depending on the distance of the collection sites39. The preparation of meals takes 
between 2-5 hours per day (Cremona 1985:15).
The contribution of women to agricultural activities on their husband’s field/s 
varies substantially across villages. Their participation is almost always required at 
sowing and harvesting times, for tasks considered ‘lighter’. Otherwise, women state that 
their main task consists in preparing and bringing meals to their husbands and relatives 
(e.g. adolescent sons) in the fields, and in carrying out their standard domestic tasks, 
increased by the presence of their husbands and unmarried sons who have returned from 
their seasonal migration sites. Women may also work on their own fields. Children and 
youths contribute consistently to agricultural labour, partly accounting for the high 
value which my informants placed upon a large family. When children are too small to 
work on the fields, and if a husband cannot afford to hire agricultural labour, a woman’s 
workload is likely to increase substantially.
In the majority of villages in the intervention area, women and children are 
primarily responsible for the care of small livestock (sheep and especially goats), and 
sometimes also of cattle. However, as mentioned above, it is a common practice to 
entrust cattle and livestock to specialised herders, mostly Fulani or Bouzou, for a set 
price per head per year.
Weaving mats, pottery, and some tasks of leatherwork (in the Tuareg iron­
mongers caste or enadan) are typical activities from which women are able to earn some 
extra cash. However, the most generalised form of ‘female trade’ is the sale of certain 
cooked foodstuffs. That this is not a recent phenomenon in Niger, is attested by the 
writings of Heinrich Barth about the market of Tessaoua around 1850, and Fernand 
Foureau, about the market of Zinder, in 1899 (Barth 1965 and Foureau 1902, quoted in 
Raynaut 1977).
In the ADM, there are important exceptions to women’s ‘monopoly’ over food 
sale. Notably, male butchers (sing, rindawa) process and sell meat, both raw and
38 Although, for sowing purposes, farmers are likely to have selected the best stalks in advance.
39 In Cremona’s sample the minimum distance is 3 kilometers, and the maximum is 15 kilometers 
(Cremona 1984:49).
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cooked. Male shopkeepers also keep different types of snacks in their shops, which, in 
bigger towns like Keita, are open until late (10 pm and later), and sell their products to a 
mainly male crowd: small groups of friends, gathered to chat, to listen to the radio, or 
watch the public tv.40 Male shopkeepers sell imported foods, such as packed cookies 
and sweets, soft drinks, tea, coffee, sugar, oil, pasta, bread, rice, cigarettes, and kola 
nuts.
Women retain control over ‘traditional’ home-style foods, mainly the above 
mentioned fura , tuwo or boiled rice with sauce, and cooked vegetables, often presented 
covered by grated nuts. They are also the sole sellers of a variety of fried beignets, and, 
in the morning, some women sell omelettes and tea or coffee (cf. Raynaut 1977). This 
activity does not exclude secluded women, who sell the foods they cook at home 
through their young daughters (see Picture 15).
Although varying in scale, the circulation of cooked meals across households 
takes place in big and small villages alike, and, with the exception of the specific case of 
fried beignets sold as snacks, it is not a business restricted to a specialised group of 
women, but a common practice of most married women. Its meanings must be sought 
beyond the sphere of economic transactions alone, as part of the food is given as a gift 
to relatives, including a woman’s own husband, for whom she may reserve a portion of 
the food destined to be sold, and neighbours, who will reciprocate in the future, creating 
a network of food exchanges, whose partakers usually try to outdo one another in 
quality and quantities offered.
This system of food circulation gives rise to a number of interesting social 
phenomena. Raynaut suggested that its more general meaning lies in a tension between 
men and women in Hausa society:
each wife, throughout almost the entire year, instead of cooking food for her husband for free, 
sells what she cooks to the husbands of her neighbours, who, in turn, do the same for her 
husband. At the end of these prestations and counter-prestations, the same result is achieved as if 
each spouse had sold to her own husband the tuwo and the [galettes] that she prepared -  which 
does, in fact, sometimes happen. If one considers that women are not only producers of cooked 
meals, but that, globally, what they earn selling foodstuff to their competitors is largely evened 
out by what they spend to buy food from them, it is clear that the main benefit o f this transaction 
comes from the male clients. [...] One cannot fail to see the artifice thanks to which women are
40 This description would not apply to the great majority of villages, which are almost devoid of adult 
men between November/December and May, and which are likely to have only one ‘boutique’, if any.
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able to maximise their profit from their own stocks of cereals -  produced on their personal 
parcels -  and, on the other hand, making men pay for the job of preparing meals which they 
[women] perform. (Raynault 1977:583)
In the article’s conclusion, Raynaut poses what he sees as an underlying 
question: ‘where does the money necessary for these transactions come from?’ 
(1977:595).
While Raynaut leaves the question unanswered, his reflections can be usefully 
integrated in the framework of Project/gender relations in the ADM. Here, the answer to 
Raynaut’s question lies in the interaction between the following factors of the 
intrahousehold economy: influx of external cash from extended seasonal male 
migration; women’s ‘traditional’ domestic and economic roles; women’s massive 
employment on project work sites, compensated in food-for-work rations; and, after 
1998, women’s access to sources of cash through the initiatives of the newly established 
Division for the Promotion of Women (DPFSE).
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a selected ethnography, focusing on some traits of the Ader 
Doutchi Majiya social organisation which are relevant to its relations with the Project. It 
has highlighted the process of change undergone by the Tuareg political system, 
emphasising the continuities and discontinuities with today’s context. In particular, the 
society of the Ader Doutchi Majiya went from an interethnic hierarchy which structured 
political and economic relations between suzerains and various categories of 
dependents, to a system characterised by relatively uniform patterns of production 
across villages with different ethnic origins (Hausa and Tuareg ex-dependents). While 
ex-slaves still carry a social stigma attached to their old servile status, and the 
imajeghen embody the highest values of Tuareg culture, the system of ‘tributes against 
protection’ which tied the dependents to their suzerains in the past has been replaced by 
Niger’s administrative apparatus and national taxation.
The Keita Project interfered with this system in several ways. For about two 
years during its First Phase (1984-1991), it followed Kountche’s land policy by 
supporting the redistribution of rehabilitated lands to workers who participated in the 
rehabilitation works. However, this activity gave rise to tensions between old and new
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owners and between men and women, and was discontinued by the end of the First 
Phase. The Project had an impact on the productivity of resources (land and livestock), 
through the creation of water reserves and various activities aimed at restoring fertility 
(reforestation, anti-erosion bunds, increase in the quantity and quality of fodder). This 
category of ‘interventions’ had a greater impact on men’s economic sphere than on 
women’s. However, the Project enrolled local labour to work in its anti-desertification 
work-sites. The work-sites were open during the slack season, and the majority of 
workers were women, who did not migrate, and were remunerated with World Food 
Programme daily ‘food-for-work’ rations. Chapter 6 provides a detailed analysis of the 
impact of these operations on local livelihoods, trying to follow the different 
consequences of its activities across gender and status categories. Gradually recognising 
the importance of women’s contribution to its achievements, the Project developed a 
series of initiatives aimed at improving women’s status and income generating 
activities, which resulted in the establishment of a Division for the Promotion of the 
Role of Women. Chapter 7 looks at the gender axis across national and international 
actors, project staff and local women. Finally, the Project created a limited number of 
jobs in the city of Keita, mainly for extension workers, house and office guards, drivers, 
mechanics, electricians and domestics.
The following chapter shifts the perspective from the Ader Doutchi Majiya to 
International actors and discourses, and looks at the narratives which justified and 
sustained a certain type of ‘intervention’ in the Ader Doutchi Majiya context. Against 
the historical and ethnographic background outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, the next 
chapter reconstructs the different reading of this context provided by the ‘developers’, a 
reading which presents the Ader environment as awaiting ‘restoration’ and its society as 
having to undergo change.
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4. ‘FIGHTING AGAINST DESERTIFICATION IN THE SAHEL’: 
UNRAVELLING THE MACRO NARRATIVE AND RELATED REGIMES OF 
PRACTICES
4.1 Introduction
How did international and national development institutions understand and represent 
the Sahel and its populations, and what forms of practices did these representations give 
rise to? Starting from Foucault’s contention that ‘practices don’t exist without a certain 
regime of rationality’ (Foucault 1991a:79), this chapter explores the ‘understanding’ of 
the Ader Doutchi Majiya entertained by official development ‘macro’ actors, and the 
types of ‘intervention’ entailed and justified by it.
As argued in Chapter 1, understandings should be seen as interpretations which 
are not independent from the position of relative power of the interpreting parties. With 
reference to the question of how understanding is possible across cultural distance, it 
has been noted that actors can establish different ways of understanding each other. The 
model of dialectical reciprocity implies an openness toward the other’s beliefs and an 
awareness of the limits set upon one’s judgement by one’s own position and cultural 
and historical ‘prejudices’ (cf. Gadamer 1975). However, this form of communication 
does not accurately describe the disposition toward the other exemplified by 
development discourses. Development forms of knowledge production construct the 
other as a target for ‘intervention’. In doing so, they address the other ‘as a tool’ 
(Gadamer 1975:323), and the claim to understand the other performs the function of 
legitimising control and ‘intervention’ upon it.
This chapter unravels the process of knowledge construction by which the Sahel 
came to be seen as in need of external intervention, and describes the institutional forms 
established to implement ‘intervention’ in the Sahel region, and more specifically in the 
Ader Doutchi Majiya. It does so by analysing the discourses and forms of rationality 
apparent in a number of programmatic texts produced by ‘macro’ actors. The chapter is 
‘funnel shaped’. It begins with an analysis of the wider historical conditions which 
made rural development, its logic and ‘implementation’ strategies possible at a 
particular moment in time. It then looks at the ad hoc institutions created to deal with 
the ‘problems’ affecting the Sahel, focusing on the rationales underpinning the
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‘desertification narrative’, which constitutes the most influential background to the 
development of Integrated Rural Development Projects (IRDPs) as a ‘combat strategy 
against the advancing desert’. Here the chapter shifts the focus to the Italian context, 
situating the Italian cooperation vis a vis other international and national development 
organisations with regards to initiatives in the Sahel, and reconstructing Italian positions 
as laid out in the first Italian Initiative for the Sahel. This programme set the 
foundations for the Keita Project, whose justifications and approaches are discussed in 
the last section, through an analysis of early project documents and ad hoc studies. 
Chapter 5 follows from this, by entering ‘inside’ the Project and enquiring into the 
beliefs and practices of project staff.
4.2 Setting the Scene
The end of the 1960s were years of drought and famine in the whole of the Sahel. But 
the 1968-73 famines in the West African Sahel differed from previous similar events. 
For at least 400 years, there are documented records of recurrent droughts in the Sahel, 
which had occurred on average every 7-10 years in the 17th century and every 5 years in 
the 18th century (cf. Watts 1983; Devereux 2000:8) and which, after a relatively 
favourable 19th century, had set tragic records in the oral history of Niger’s peoples 
throughout the whole of the 20th century, alternating with periods of relatively abundant 
rainfall (cf. Laya 1975). However, the 1968-73 famines set the beginning of a new era 
in Niger’s environmental history, with Niger becoming of interest to international 
organisations and, in particular, to some institutions which had the mandate to deal with 
problems of food scarcity, poverty and/or environmental crises.
One of the reasons for this apparent burst of interest in Niger’s environmental 
problems was the fact that Niger had become independent from France in 1960. Until 
then, during the colonial period, France was mostly responsible for dealing with the 
conditions of its colonies (cf. Fuglestad 1983), and drought in Niger would not be seen 
as an international problem regarding other world powers, as well as ad hoc established 
international organisations. But by the 1960s, the configuration of world power and 
international relations had assumed a new shape which, for the purpose of the present 
analysis, was characterised by the rise of ‘development’ as an historically produced 
discourse and the problematisation of poverty in the ‘Third World’ (cf. Esteva 1992; 
Escobar 1995).
By the end of the 1950s, the Bretton Woods Institutions had shifted their focus 
from ‘reconstruction’ in post-war Europe to ‘aid’ in ‘underdeveloped’ areas. The 1960s 
were the first UN development decade, and also the decade in which the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD was established (Robertson 1984; Raffer 
and Singer 1996). Under the presidency of Robert MacNamara (1968-1981), poverty 
and the satisfaction of ‘basic needs’ became watchwords in the World Bank’s agenda 
(Robertson 1984:58). One of the principal effects of MacNamara’s warning consisted in 
the spread of so called ‘Integrated Rural Development Projects’ (IRDP). Critiques of the 
‘urban bias’ of development assistance facilitated the acceptance of the new emphasis 
on rural development (Lele 1975; Lipton 1977).
The PDR/ADM analysed here belongs to the category of Integrated Rural 
Development Projects and, because of its perceived success, it soon came to be defined 
as a ‘model’ of its kind. In order to understand how it developed a peculiar framework 
for classifying the environment, identifying ‘problems’, ordering interventions 
according to widely accepted priorities, and establishing success and failure criteria, we 
have to look at how narratives Of ‘desertification’ had laid down the premises for 
project/programme intervention in Sahel countries.
In the following analysis of ‘desertification’ narratives, it is not being contested 
that the area in question presents severe erosion and land degradation phenomena, nor 
that some human activities can be harmful to the environment. With Keeley and 
Scoones, ‘our concern is not to comment on whether soil fertility is a problem or not -  it 
clearly is in certain places and for certain people. Rather we want to trace how such 
claims are made exploring the social commitments and embedded contexts of policy 
debates’ (2000:4). And, with Swift,
An interest in understanding the received narrative about desertification does not imply a belief 
that there is no problem of land degradation in the drylands. [But] the narrative meets a need, and 
provides a useful discourse for someone [...]: national (African) governments; international aid 
bureaucracies, especially UN agencies and some major bilateral donors, and some groups of 
scientists. (1996:86)
As argued above, by 1970, drought in the Sahel was not an unprecedented event. 
What was unprecedented, instead, was the reaction it triggered amongst the 
international community. To deal with drought, a set of specialized institutions was
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created, and considerable resources were allocated to them; a consensus on the nature of 
the phenomenon of ‘desertification’ was built across donor and recipient governments; 
plans were made; and strategies to ‘fight against desertification’ were identified and 
turned into practice. The PDR/ADM was just another practice which developed from 
this way of reasoning about ‘desertification*.
The discourse of desertification set the premises for the establishment of the 
PDR/ADM in Keita. Its rationale, analysed in detail in the next section, can be 
summarised as follows: ‘Equilibrium’ between the environment and society has been 
upset by lacerating phenomena, partly induced by human action. This ‘equilibrium’ 
must be restored, or it will induce further ‘desertification’ and the destitution of the 
rapidly growing populations of the Sahel. The change from a situation of generalised 
breakdown to one of ‘new’ or ‘renewed’ balance must be induced through urgent 
external ‘intervention’ and the ‘responsabilisation’ of local producers.
Here, famine and desertification ought to be opposed through external 
‘intervention’. That external ‘intervention’ was not the only way to deal with drought in 
the Sahel is attested by the historical record of Sahelian droughts: before the 1950s, 
‘projects’ had not been identified as an option to deal with drought. These narratives are 
historically rooted and specific to a certain configuration of interests. With Foucault, 
‘things weren’t as necessary as all that: it wasn’t as a matter of course that mad people 
came to be regarded as mentally ill; it wasn’t self evident that the only thing to be done 
with a criminal was to lock him up; it wasn’t self evident that the causes of illness were 
to be sought through the individual examination of bodies’(Foucault 1991a:76)... and it 
wasn’t self evident that drought in the Sahel had to be ‘fought against’ through massive 
international planning carried out by ad hoc institutions. As soon as they were 
established, these institutions, in cooperation with national governments, elaborated a 
systematic knowledge apparatus with its related ‘truth effects’, claims of objectivity, 
forms of subjectivities and ensuing regimes of practices (cf. Foucault 199 lb :89).
Many of the actors engaged in the organisation of the PDR/ADM modelled their 
actions upon the prevailing desertification narratives. In order to make sense of the 
activities of the PDR/ADM and to interpret the actions and beliefs of the actors 
involved in it, it is necessary to analyse the regime of rationality which made the
105
presence of Integrated Rural Development Projects in the Sahel possible in the first 
place.
4.3 ‘Desertification* in the Sahel and the Establishment of Ad Hoc Institutions
Throughout the 1970s the notions of ‘rural development’ and ‘desertification’ grew in 
influence. In the Sahel region and, for the purpose of this study, in Niger, they came to 
be used together in a mutually reinforcing way. This decade saw the creation of 
specialised institutions within the UN system and the OECD body, which contributed to 
the production of forms of knowledge and relative practices which, in turn, paved the 
way to the spread of Integrated Rural Development Projects aimed at ‘fighting against 
desertification’ in the Sahel.
In 1972 the UN Conference on the Human Environment was convened in 
Stockholm. The main outcomes of the conference were a recommendation for a new 
specialised agency and a commitment of financial support from the major donor 
countries. Consequently, later the same year, the General Assembly crafted the UN 
Environment Programme (UNEP). In 1973 the Office to Combat Desertification and 
Drought, or ‘United Nations Special Sahel Office’ (UNSO) of the UNDP, was created 
in response to drought in the Sahel region. The first major international forum to discuss 
the problem of desertification was the United Nations Conference on Desertification 
(UNCOD), convened in Nairobi in 1977, which resulted in the adoption of the Plan of 
 ^ Action to Combat Desertification, and in the establishment of UNEP’s Desertification
Branch (MacDonald 1986).
The Sahelian states most directly affected by the 1968-1973 drought also reacted 
in concert, strengthening the emergence of a Sahel sub-regional perspective, with the 
creation of the CILSS (Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the 
Sahel41). The idea of creating the CILSS grew out of a meeting in January 1973 
between Mr. Antoine Dakoure, Minister of Agriculture and Livestock of ex Upper 
Volta who, at the time, had been recently appointed to the Governing Council of UNDP, 
and Mr. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the UN (de Lattre and Fell 1984). At the
41 The acronym CILSS derives from the French ‘ Comite permanent Inter Etats de Lutte Contre la 
Secheresse au Sahel
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meeting, Mr. Dakoure suggested that the UN agencies made a particular effort for the 
sub-region.
Mr. Waldheim replied by saying that such an appeal would have more force if it came from a 
regional grouping of the drought-affected countries. Mr. Dakoure immediately contacted the 
Upper Voltan President Lamizana on a visit to Senegal, who after consulting with President 
Senghor, encouraged Dakoure to organize a ministerial meeting of the drought-affected Sahel 
countries. The Ministerial meeting was held in March 1973 in Ouagadougou. The Governments 
of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta42 declared the Sahel a disaster area and 
resolved to establish the CILSS in order to promote the drought control efforts of the Sahelian 
Governments and to provide a focus for donor appeals. [...] In order to enhance coordination 
within the United Nations system and among other donors, it was decided in 1973 that FAO 
would assist Sahel countries in organising emergency relief operations. Consequently, the FAO 
established in its Rome Headquarters the Office for the Sahelian Relief Operations (OSRO). (De 
Lattre and Fell 1984:37).
The CILSS was formally established in September 1973. The principal goals of 
the Sahelian States, outlined at their conference in Bamako (Mali) in March 1974, were:
- To reduce the consequences of emergency situations in the future;
- To ensure self-sufficiency in staple foods while improving ecological conditions;
- To accelerate economic and social development
A few years afterwards, the ‘Club du SaheT was created43 as an informal 
structure for donor consultation and coordination on ‘information and discussion on 
long-term Sahel development’ (de Lattre and Fell 1984:44) which would be serviced by 
the OECD and would be opened to non-OECD countries as well. The inaugural meeting 
of the Club du Sahel took place in Dakar in March 1976. The meeting, jointly chaired 
by President Senghor and CILSS President Moktar Ould Daddah, President of 
Mauritania, was attended by representatives of the eight CILSS member States and 
twelve Western donor nations, as well as observers from numerous international 
organisations. From the outset, CILSS and the Club du Sahel operated in tandem. 
CILSS new Minister Coordinator, Mr. Boulama Manga, Minister of Rural Development 
in Niger under Kountche’s presidency, and Mr, Williams, Chairman of the 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, proposed a resolution creating the 
Club du Sahel and it was adopted at the conference. The Club’s purposes and mandate 
would be:
To support the CILSS, the principal agency for regional cooperation in the Sahel;
42 Today the CILSS includes nine countries: Burkina Faso, Cap Vert, Gambia, Guinee Bissau, Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Tchad.
43 Its original name, suggested by Mr. Jean Audibert, Director of Development of the French Ministry of 
Cooperation, was ‘Le Club des Amis du Sahel’.
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To inform and create awareness among the international community with regard to the Sahel’s 
development prospects and requirements;
To encourage cooperation between donors in order to implement projects envisaged by Sahel 
governments and facilitate the mobilisation of development resources;
To be a forum in which the Sahel states can outline their policies and priorities for medium and 
long-term development and discuss them with the donors;
To meet once a year and set up working groups to study specific problems.
The above mentioned specialised institutions are only the most salient examples 
of institution-building in reaction to the 1968-1973 drought in the Sahel, as many other 
‘joint working committees’, ‘advisory committees’, ‘coordination boards’, ‘focal 
points’, etc., were created within international agencies and across intergovernmental 
bodies in order to coordinate action. Also within donor and recipient countries, as we 
shall see, a number of structures were established, in order to plan interventions, collect 
and diffuse information, and evaluate progress.
4.4 The ‘Desertification’ Narrative
The idea of man-made desertification was widespread in UN narratives. For instance, 
the above mentioned UN Conference on Desertification held in Nairobi in 1977 
diagnosed the late 1960s -  early 1970s Sahelian crisis as follows: ‘the main threats 
came from increased intensity of land use, especially removal of the natural vegetation 
cover by farming, overgrazing, and incorrect irrigation exacerbated by drought’ 
(UNCOD quoted in Swift 1996:80). The Plan of Action to Combat Desertification 
produced at the Conference set the main goal of preventing and arresting ‘the advance 
* of desertification’ (UNCOD 1977 quoted in Swift, op.cit.:80)
The CILSS-Club du Sahel 1980 ‘Strategy for Drought Control and Development 
in the Sahel’ is a vivid example of the kind of arguments which animated the early 
phases of theorising about desertification, which we shall see reflected in PDR/ADM 
initial appraisal studies. Chapter 2 on ‘Strategy Objectives’ spells out the two key 
objectives ‘set by the Sahelians’ as the achievement of food self-sufficiency and of 
‘ecological balance’. The loss of ‘ecological balance’ is described in the following 
terms:
the advancing desert, a decrease in the yield of traditional crops linked with a deterioration of the 
soil affecting ever larger areas, a deterioration of grazing lands, and deforestation, not only 
around the capitals and larger cities, but also around the villages. This is an indication that the 
natural balance between the populations of the Sahel and the natural environment has been upset, 
and that there are no steps in the direction of an acceptable new balance; the Sahel no longer 
lives from its income alone, but is drawing on its capital in land and forests. If a strategy for food
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self sufficiency must be implemented through an increase in production resulting in still greater 
consumption of natural capital, this strategy is invalid. The Sahel’s resources in land, in grazing, 
and in wood are limited, and in one generation, the region may be on the verge of being 
completely taken over by the desert. (CILSS 1980:8-9)
This passage focuses upon a perceived ‘lack of balance’ between people and the 
natural resources of the Sahel. Rapid population growth and ‘destructive’ human 
practices are putting an already unstable ‘natural capital’ at risk, and this would result in 
tragic consequences, unless the ‘advancing desert’ is ‘fought against’. The strategies 
identified to resist this devastating trend are of two kinds: a ‘negative’ strategy, in the 
form of a ‘fight’ or ‘combat’ against desertification; and a ‘positive’ strategy, which 
consists in ‘finding a new balance between an increased Sahelian population and an 
enriched, better developed natural environment through the use of new techniques’ 
(CILSS-Club du Sahel 1980:9).
In this reading of the problems affecting the Sahel, the ‘population’ does not 
figure as an ‘other’ with whom a dialogue can be established, and whose practices on 
the ‘territory’ must be understood on their own grounds. Instead, the ‘population’ is 
presented as part of the problem and knowledge about it should be sought in order to 
induce changes in its practices: the other is represented as ‘a tool’ in an intervention 
strategy, which has to be induced to change for the strategy to be successful. In a section 
entitled ‘gradual assumption of responsibility for development by the producers’, the 
CILSS-Club du Sahel 1980 Strategy continues:
In order to pave the way for changes in the production system, and to then accompany this 
transformation, a series of outside interventions are needed to demonstrate new production 
models to the farmer or livestock producer, to motivate him [sic] to change, and to help him 
acquire the new techniques. The option for mass development precludes that the change of 
system take place solely through outside action. The objective is to make the producers capable 
of gradually assuming responsibility for the change in production methods, to meet the needs of 
the region and improve their own conditions of existence. (CILSS 1980:21)
Although it is the ‘developers* who diagnosed a certain configuration of 
problems and prescribed a set of strategies to solve them, in this passage responsibility 
for the ‘changes’ wanted by the ‘developers’ is attributed to the ‘peasants’. This implies 
that ‘peasants’ will be held responsible for interpretations and prescriptions which they 
have not conceived. The use of the notion of ‘responsibility’ is clearly rhetorical, and it 
is hard to see any coherence in its articulation with the desertification narrative. The 
CILSS-Club du Sahel Strategy seems to imply that ‘peasants’ are responsible for
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environmental damage which led to the present state of ‘breakdown’, but then it is 
denied that they are responsible for the situation of ‘their’ environment, and it is argued 
that they must ‘assume responsibility’ and change their production methods.
This interpretation of the ‘problems’ affecting the Sahel region leads to the 
following conclusion, which is, at the same time, the operationalisation of the rationale 
described above: ‘It seems clear that the integrated rural development approach is the 
only one which can effectively start a pattern of changes to traditional agriculture, 
changes which [...] must be induced before the end of the century’ (CILSS 1980:25)
4.5 The Initiative of Italian Cooperation in the Sahel (1984)
Italy had collaborated, as an OECD and Club du Sahel member country, in the 
definition of the CILSS-Club du Sahel 1980 ‘Strategy for Drought Control and 
Development in the Sahel’ whose most salient points have been discussed above. Since 
the Ottawa conference in 1977, Italy had participated in the definition of common steps 
of the CILSS-Club du Sahel and, in 1984, it produced the ‘DCS/MAE44 Iniziativa di 
Cooperazione Italiana per il Sahel' (Italian Initiative for the Sahel). The PDR/ADM 
was going to be one of the four Integrated Rural Development Projects conceived and 
implemented within the Initiative umbrella programme.
The PDR/ADM was financed within the ‘Italy/FAO Cooperation Programme’, 
through which Italy’s contribution to the FAO budget went from zero to US $ 490 
million between 1980 and 1997. With a total funding of almost US $ 55 million, the 
PDR/ADM represented ‘the most expensive Italian project in the Sahel’ (GICO 
1998:ii). However, the considerable sum invested by Italy in the Initiative should make 
us pause for a moment. How was Italy positioned amongst the institutional actors which 
manoeuvred the desertification narrative? Italy had been one of the recipients of aid 
within the post war Marshall Plan until about 30 years before the time when the 
Initiative was conceived and, compared to other European ex colonial powers, its 
experience with dealing with the conditions of overseas countries was limited.
44 Direzione Cooperazione alio Sviluppo / Ministero degli Affari Esteri (Development Cooperation 
Direction/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
In an article focusing on the Italian Initiative published in the Italian journal 
‘Africa’ (1985), Enzo Caputo, then Coordinator of the Sahel Centre of the Italy-Africa 
Institute45 in Rome, acknowledges that ‘It is often said that a culture of Cooperation is 
missing in Italy [...] this weakness can no doubt be attributed to the swift evolution [al 
maturare improwiso] of the political issue of ‘aid’ to the Third World in our country. 
[Italy] is an objective situation of delay [...]’ (Caputo 1985:370).
Caputo, who has been an active cooperator and observer in the definition of 
Italian development policy and interventions since the times of the Initiative, maintains 
that, in the early 1980s, Italy was stimulated to increase its contribution to development 
aid by the UN (interview, 4 September 2001). Without previous political or economic 
interests in the region, Italy decided to invest in the ‘fight against hunger’ almost by 
chance, as the Sahel had, at that particular time, been suffering from recurrent droughts:
At a certain point, it was said: why don’t we put a big amount of money on the hunger issue? At 
the time there was a great drought in the Sahel, so we said, ok, let’s do the Sahel Initiative. This 
infuriated the French, who were strong in the area, it surprised everybody a bit... but it is a state 
of fact that Italy found itself carrying out the Sahel Initiative, it could have done a thousand other 
things, Ethiopia, for instance... (Interview, Sept. 4, 2001)
In the 1985 article quoted above, Caputo outlines Italy’s approach toward 
‘desertification in the Sahel’ in the Initiative. Despite her relative ‘lack’ of a ‘culture of 
cooperation’, Italy adopted a framework for making sense of drought in the Sahel, and 
evolved a narrative which is consistent with those of other international actors. The 
Iniziativa was not just one programme amongst others in Italian aid policy, but the 
single most important Italian attempt to join other OECD countries in the organisation 
of overseas development programmes and policies:
[The Iniziativa] is the only programme of the Italian Cooperation which starts with explicit 
analysis and strategy references [...] proposed in bilateral and multilateral contexts [and 
offering] both elements for dialogue and poles of convergence. The Italian positions, expressed 
and elaborated between 1982 and 1984, provided a noteworthy Italian contribution to the 
definition of CILSS strategies, and, on the other hand, [the content of CILSS strategies] 
influenced a large part of the Italian debate on development cooperation. (Caputo 1985:352)
45 In the early 1980s, the Istituto Italo-Africano (IIA) functioned somewhat as the research department of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The relation between the two institutions was regulated, with reference to the Italian 
Cooperation with Sahel countries, by an ad hoc convention MAE-IIA of 9/2/1988. IIA researchers, university 
professors and international consultants working on their own account and for the MAE, had been variously involved 
in supporting Italian cooperation policies in Africa with research and publications, thereby backing intervention with 
theory. In more recent years, the Rome based IIA has lost its role in favour of the Florence based Istituto Agronomico 
d’Oltremare.
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It seems that Italy partly ‘used’ the Initiative as a point of entry into the world of other 
‘cultures of cooperation’. As it strove to establish its legitimacy to operate in the field of 
development aid, despite its relative ‘youth’ compared to other aid agencies (e.g. 
French, British, etc.), it had to highlight aspects of conformity with the practices of 
other donor countries, as well as to claim elements of originality or ‘Italian-ness’. 
Caputo identifies a communality of views and intents among CILSS and Club du Sahel 
member countries with regards to the general goals of the ‘Strategie '84 ’, which was 
itself the revised version of the strategic lines approved at the Ottawa meeting in 1977 
(1985:350). The three main options of the ‘Strategie ‘84 ' shared by CILSS and Club du 
Sahel countries (including Italy) are:
returning to the Sahelian populations the control over their own growth and space, which had 
been devastated by lacerating phenomena (demographic growth, urbanisation, occupation of 
rural space not in conformity with the resources available, social degradation both in the 
countryside and in the cities). (Caputo 1985:350)
[shaping] a new role for the rural producer: his responsabilisation [...], and the creation of 
technical, financial and market conditions favourable to this responsabilisation. (Caputo 
1985:359)
[identifying] in local collectivities the principal subjects in the search for a new ecological 
equilibrium. (Caputo 1985:351)
The desertification narrative is reproduced here in more or less the same terms 
described above. But if continuity with CILSS strategies is an important aspect of the 
Italian position in the aid policies to the Sahel of the early 1980s, Italy also attempts to 
establish an original, distinct place for itself among the donor communities. Hence, 
arguing that the Italian Initiative is ‘quasi-synonymous with Integrated Rural 
Development’ (Caputo 1985:356), Caputo moves on to the discussion of IRDPs as 
concrete examples of Italian policy, characterised by a number of ‘original elements’ in 
the ‘Italian conception of IRDP’, amongst which is: ‘the will to realise a geographic 
concentration of multi-sectoral interventions, in order to determine a strong impact with 
demonstrative [...] effects for national politics and other donors’ (1985:357). This 
‘policy of the strong impact’, realised by opting for a geographic concentration of 
interventions, rather than, for instance, for the widespread application of a particular 
approach to development with less directly visible effects, distinguishes the Italian 
positions in the Initiative.
The perceived need, on the part of the ‘young’ Italian Cooperation, to establish a 
reputation within the development field results in a pressure to carry out ‘exemplary’
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projects, to produce Italian ‘success stories’ and thereby acquire a distinctive status 
amongst other donors. The PDR/ADM would, within a few years after Caputo’s article, 
come to play this role of ‘model’ Italian Integrated Rural Development Project in the 
field of the fight against desertification. In the second half of the 1980s Keita 
represented, for the Italian Cooperation, ‘a sort of “flower in the buttonhole”46, one of 
the few, very few, flags to raise, because ministers could be brought there, because [in 
Keita] one could really see that, well, things had been done’ (Caputo, interview 4 
September 2001). The following section looks at how the ‘desertification narrative* was 
articulated in the definition of goals and ‘intervention’ strategies for the ‘model Keita’.
4.6 Italian Integrated Rural Development Projects in the Sahel.
The function of the desertification narrative in the conception and implementation of the 
Keita Project is explored in this section through the analysis of two important 
publications, authored by experts who had worked as consultants in the Keita Project, 
and published for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These publications are 
‘Integrated Rural Development Programmes in the Sahel Region’ (Candelori et al. 
1992) and ‘Territorial Reality and Development Policy: for the definition of an 
intervention programme with the cooperation of the populations of the Arrondissement 
of Keita -  Niger’ (Paoletti and Taliani 1984). Candelori et al. (1992) and Paoletti and 
Taliani (1984) refer expressly to the Keita Project, illustrating the links between the 
‘desertification’ narrative and its operationalisations in the form of project activities and 
approaches. Candelori et al. (1992) compare four Italian projects in the Sahel, one of 
which is the PDR/ADM, with the intent of extracting lessons and deriving guidelines 
for future ‘interventions’ from the comparison of these projects’ preliminary results. 
Instead, Paoletti and Taliani’s (1985) ‘Territorial Reality and Development Policy’ 
focuses only on the PDR/ADM, and is the result of the authors’ sociological study of 
the intervention area, conducted at project inception in order to identify appropriate 
modes of intervention.
In the first Chapter of ‘Integrated Rural Development Programmes in the Sahel 
Region’, Candelori et al. outline what they call an ‘objective picture’ of the ‘natural 
breakdown’ which has hit the Sahel as follows:
46 This is a literal translation of the Italian idiomatic expression 'fiore a ll’occhiello'.
A part of the poor resources of this land have vanished at the very time when a demographic 
boom without precedents was threatening the already precarious man-environment equilibrium. 
The renowned ingredients of this disequilibrium are: the disrespect of agricultural rotations and 
the quasi-total disappearance of land fallow periods with a rapid chemical-organic 
impoverishment and a severe hydric-eolian erosion, the overexploitation of pastoral areas, the 
indiscriminate destruction of trees for the collection of wood to be used as fuel and animal feed, 
the rapid exhaustion of water resources. (1992:9)
In the section dedicated specifically to the Keita Project, under the heading 
‘principal problems’ the general narrative is reproduced with a few adaptations to the 
Keita context:
The increasing aridity [inaridimento] of the climate that developed over the last 20 years and the 
high human and animal pressure on the territory have caused rapid resource degradation and a 
breakdown of the pre-existent equilibrium, paving the way to a rapid desertification process. A 
noteworthy impoverishment of the population due to the reduction o f agro-pastoral resources, the 
drying out of underground waters, the loss of the animal patrimony, as well as the disintegration 
[ disgregazione] of the social tissue due to an increasingly long and diffuse migration, have 
followed. (1992:22)
Ecological and social breakdown are seen as happening at the same time (cf. ‘the 
disintegration of the social tissue’). This is particularly clear in Paoletti and Taliani’s 
(1984) sociological study of the PDR/ADM’s intervention area. While the focus of 
Paoletti and Taliani’s book is socio-cultural rather than environmental, the structure of 
the ‘desertification’ narrative is highly consistent with the one we have seen in the 
policy documents quoted above. Here, the local society (rather than the environment) is 
seen as having lost its equilibrium in a ‘degeneration process at all levels of the social 
organisation’ (Paoletti and Taliani 1984:15). Society and the environment are presented 
as ‘parts of a whole’: ‘there are interdependencies between the various parts of a whole, 
and [...], in socio-ecologic terms, these interdependencies should aim at the equilibrium 
- or at re-establishing the equilibrium - of the man-production-environment relation’ 
(Paoletti and Taliani 1984:45). Despite Paoletti and Taliani book’s title, which refers to 
‘cooperation* with the ‘populations of Keita’, this image presents the latter as one term 
in an equilibrium relation, which, arguably, the ‘developers’ will have to act upon or 
‘fix’. Rather than parties to an inter-subjective dialogue, the people of the Ader Doutchi 
figure as objects, whose position vis a vis the environment must be ‘re-adjusted’ from 
the outside, as they are unable to ‘re-establish equilibrium with their own means’:
Keita’s village communities endure, maybe since always, conditionings [condizionamenti] 
imposed from nature without being capable, with their own means, to re-establish a socio- 
ecologic equilibrium greatly compromised. Therefore, in our wide meaning, to ‘live in 
symbiosis’ means resisting to environmental adversities -  mainly the effect of an irrational use 
of human and environmental resources -  in order to operate constructively within a project [...] 
(Paoletti and Taliani 1982:18).
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The process of ‘degeneration’ that is supposedly taking place in the Ader 
Doutchi Majiya society is seen as a potentially fatal menace. Paoletti and Taliani’s 
‘hopelessness’ (of society) and Candelori et al.’s ‘degradation’ (of the environment) are 
presented as threats which must be addressed without delay, and therefore, in different 
fields, fulfil the same function in the narratives of the authors.
At least from our experience of study and research in ‘marginal realities’ in Third world 
countries, one derives the suggestion to intervene before it is too late. Once the physical- 
environmental equilibrium is compromised, conditions of unfeasibility [inagibilita] are created 
so that no stimulus whatsoever, be it social or economic, can remove the populations from their 
positions: hopelessness becomes a crucial element of their way of being and reflecting about the 
world around them. (Paoletti and Taliani 1983:16, footnote)
The scientific language (e.g. the use of terms such as chemical-organic, hydric- 
eolic, agro-pastoral, socio-ecologic, the man-production-environment relation, to ‘live 
in symbiosis’) used in these versions of the desertification narrative lends authority to 
the authors, making their description of the situation in the Sahel, and in Keita, look less 
like an interpretation and more like an ‘objective’ value-neutral description of the 
conditions of the Sahel region. The plea for ‘intervention’ is supported by the claim that 
at stake are values relevant to ‘the whole of humanity’: ‘the planet’s environmental 
degradation’ and ‘the survival of the peoples living [in the Sahel]’:
Besides the strictly ecological problems raised by desertification in the Sahel as a priority and 
worrying element of the planet’s environmental degradation, whose solution is relevant to the 
whole of humanity, there is a yet more direct and immediate effect which ties closely the 
environmental rehabilitation of these areas to the survival of the peoples living there. In this 
sense, the intervention must aim at bringing back the vegetation cover, managed in harmony 
with soil and climatic potentials, and, moreover, at allowing the re-equilibrium of the man- 
environment relation specific to those areas and at ensuring the food security of those 
populations. (Candelori et al. 1992:11)
The use of terms which marshal solidarity (cf. Apthorpe and Gasper 1996), 
coupled with a scientific language which presents itself as ‘objective’, produce a highly 
compelling story. The way in which the narrative is ‘framed’ rules out the possibility 
that drought in the Sahel may call for anything but external ‘intervention’. The area in 
question is constructed as awaiting ‘intervention’, it is as if the need for intervention 
were already there, together with the drought, the population, and the scarce resources. 
These elements are, indeed, there, but they should not necessarily be seen as 
‘preliminary conditions’ for ‘intervention’. This is suggested in a section which argues 
that any area should satisfy a number of ‘preliminary conditions’ in order to be 
considered suitable for hosting an Integrated Rural Development Project. These are:
(a) the presence of unexploited or deteriorated resources that can potentially be valorised (risorse 
valorizzabili) or recuperated;
(b) the availability of economically suitable technologies or solutions in order to obtain the 
increase of value or rehabilitation of the resources and the elimination of obstacles;
(c) a population which can benefit from the resources and is receptive to the adoption of the 
suggested technologies or solutions. (Candelori et al. 1992:31)
These preliminary conditions are summarised graphically in a diagram 
(Candelori etal. 1992:32):
COUNTRY
population that 
* * would benefit 
from the improved 
resources
territory
Resources to 
improve
This representation exemplifies what, paraphrasing Gadamer (1975), I have 
defined as the claim to understand the other in order to ‘intervene’ upon it. It is hard to 
think of any region lacking ‘a population which would benefit from improved 
resources’ and ‘resources to be improved’. What is less obvious is why these elements 
should be seen as ‘preliminary conditions’ for a development project. The knowledge of 
the world produced by development narratives is a self-fulfilling prophecy, by which 
the ‘project’ comes to be seen as already there in the world, in the form of ‘appropriate 
technologies to improve resources and remove obstacles’, an external fix which ought to
Appropriate technologies to 
improve resources and 
remove obstacles
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act upon (the arrow) a crisis situation in which universally recognised values (human 
life, the planet) are at stake47. The following section contrasts this narrative with that 
produced by Niger’s official authorities.
4.7 ‘Desertification’ in Niger’s Development Society
Chapter 2 has reconstructed the historical process which led to the establishment of the 
‘development society’ in Kountche’s regime and has explored the ideological 
foundations for its structure and objectives in Niger’s post-colonial history. Here I will 
briefly illustrate the ways in which the desertification narrative figured in the 
Development Society’s rural development policies. In the early 1980s, the organs of the 
Development Society produced two programmatic documents, as a result of meetings in 
which participated representatives of all ministries, all of the country’s Departments, 
and national and international development organisations and donors. These were the 
Zinder Seminar on Rural Development Intervention Strategies (Seminaire National sur 
les Strategies d ’Intervention en Milieu Rural, Zinder 15-22 November 1982), and the 
Maradi Engagement for the Fight Against Desertification (Engagement de Maradi sur 
la Lutte contre la Desertification, Maradi 21-28 May 1984). These documents appeared 
at the beginning of the Keita Project’s ‘intervention’ in the Tahoua Department and 
provided the policy guidelines for the orientation of the Project’s activities.
The Zinder Seminar incorporates many of the themes characteristic of the 
* desertification narrative (Republique du Niger 1982). However, the emphasis falls on
the ‘peasant’s role’ rather than on the breakdown of the supposed equilibrium between 
society and the environment. It is argued repeatedly (1982:13-15) that the peasant must 
‘take conscience’ {prise de conscience) of the necessity to change his/her lifestyle, 
production methods and social organisation. The ‘politics of the fight against 
desertification’ (1982:15) must be founded upon the ‘conscious and responsible 
participation [participation consciente et responsible]’ (1982:14), or the ‘conscious and 
effective participation [participation consciente et effective] of the populations’ 
(1982:15).
47 According to Roe (1989), development narratives have a structure comparable to the archetypal 
folktale, in which a problem (‘crisis’, ‘breakdown’) is encountered, and will be solved by a hero (the 
project/policy), who faces a series of trials (constraints).
117
In the opening discourse of the seminar, the Minister of Rural Development first 
listed Niger’s manifold problems, and then argued that the Supreme Military Council 
and the government had ‘accepted the challenge to satisfy the fundamental needs of the 
Nigerien man [s/c]’ (1982:8). Calling upon the representatives of donors and 
international development organisations, the Minister quoted President Seiny 
Kountche’s statement at the United Nations in New York, inciting the world powers to 
‘proceed together to a reassessment of North-South relations and operate in solidarity, 
with a unitary view of the world’s development and the well being of humanity’ 
(Republique du Niger 1982:10).
The Maradi Engagement was introduced by the President of the National 
Development Council, who announced, in the opening statement:
The “Maradi Engagement” is the symbol of the oath of an entire People, the Nigerien People, 
who has taken conscience (a prise conscience) of its historical responsibility in the task of 
national construction, with the aim of preserving its future and guaranteeing to its children a 
better existence. The “Maradi Engagement” is equally the symbol of the determination of an 
entire Nation, the Nigerien Nation, which has decided to go beyond all fatalisms and 
resignations, in order to fight the battle of development and gain the bet of the future. [...] We 
also believe that international organisations of the United Nations family and of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation, governmental and non-governmental, will be, as they stated in Maradi, 
standing next to the Nigeriens, to ensure to the combat against desertification the means of its 
victory. However, it is primarily on the Nigerien citizen that rests the responsibility for the 
success of the fight against desertification. (Republique du Niger 1984:5)
The document argues that the ‘politics of the fight against desertification’ will 
follow multiple strategies, including ‘sensitising and mobilising the populations in view 
of their voluntary and responsible participation in the struggle against 
desertification’(Republique du Niger 1984:9). This is repeated in the long list of 
‘recommendations’ which concludes the document: ‘the implementation, under the 
supervision of the Development Society, of actions to fight against desertification, 
involving the voluntary and conscious participation of the populations’ (1984:24).
Niger’s statements reproduce the international narrative, while at the same time 
calling for donor support and popular legitimation. Official documents emphasise the 
role of the population, inciting it to ‘take conscience’ of the necessity for change, and to 
‘assume responsibility’ for the impact of its practices upon the environment. The tropes 
‘taking conscience’ [prise de conscience] and ‘assuming responsibility’ 
[responsibilisation] figure pre-eminently in Niger’s populist rhetoric and, as illustrated 
in Chapter 5 and Chapter 8, are also used frequently in the constructions of peasant
identity entertained by project staff. Their main function is to induce compliance with 
macro narratives and goals amongst the population, thereby legitimating ‘intervention’ 
on the grounds of popular consensus. Being the actors most directly affected by 
‘desertification’, Niger men and women are clearly ‘conscious’ of what these 
phenomena imply, and their strategies to cope with rain scarcity and food deficit 
suggest that they consider themselves ‘responsible’ for managing the natural resources 
they exploit. What is really meant by the use of these expressions, is that Niger’s men 
and women must begin to become aware of the problems they face as they are 
expressed by the desertification narrative and they must consider take responsibility for 
the introduction of new practices wanted by the ‘developers’.
4.8 The PDR/ADM Original Project Document
Projects are ‘the essential active ingredients of plans’ (Robertson 1984:121). Through 
‘projects’, the knowledge present in development discourses is operationalised, turning, 
to paraphrase Bourdieu, the model of reality into the reality of the model (1990:39). In 
this section we see how, in the original Project Document, the ‘desertification’ narrative 
unravelled above ‘materialised’ in the Keita Project’s programme for action in the Ader 
Doutchi Majiya. In the PDR/ADM original project document the two principal 
problems affecting the area of project intervention are described as follows:
Increasing vulnerability of the territory, due to erosion, land degradation, imbalance of the 
ecosystem, and threat of a remarkable increase in the alimentary deficit of the arrondissement; 
Difficulty of checking the pressure of livestock upon resources, due to the overexploitation of 
grazing lands, causing progressive soil degradation and loss of natural pasture (PDR/ADM 
1984B).
As a result of these two main problems, four further phenomena contribute to creating a 
‘general process’ of environmental breakdown:
Wind erosion caused by sand particles covering fertile valley lands and forming dunes;
Creation and deepening of koris48 beds with a progressive reduction of the water spreading 
phenomenon [epandage], which makes cultivation possible outside the rainy season, deepening 
of the superficial groundwater supply and water erosion of the soil’s thin clay particles; 
Reduction of arable lands potential, both in terms of surface and of quality. With regards to the 
fadama49-lands only, it is estimated that cultivable lands have decreased by one third from 1963 
to today, from 22,000 hectares to 15,000 hectares;
Finally, demographic and education constraints should also be taken into consideration 
(PDR/ADM 1984B).
48 Violent temporary rivers created in the rainy season.
49 Hausa term for fertile valley lands.
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Intervention is necessary, as these problems, if unchecked by project intervention, 
will lead to the total unavoidable ‘loss’ of the area affected by them:
‘the actions for the protection of the territory (anti-erosion fight, reforestation, regulation of the 
hydric system, etc.), which represent the most important project components from a financial 
perspective, are aimed at avoiding, tout court, the certain loss in the short and medium run of the 
project area’ (PDR/ADM 1984B).
In line with the way of reasoning which we have seen already, which presents 
ecological and human breakdown as occurring together, the Project Document argues 
that ‘human realities’ in the Keita district are characterised by:
Profound imbalance in the use and organisation of resources and production;
High dependency of the arrondissement upon other regions for coping with food deficit;
A situation of stagnation and isolation caused by the migration o f the most active forces 
(PDR/ADM 1984B).
The last point above is controversial, as it may be argued that seasonal migration 
reduces both stagnation, by increasing the cash flow in the area, and isolation, by 
establishing cyclical contacts with cities both inside and outside Niger. Three types of 
resources are presented as having ‘the potential’ of being improved, namely, the ‘human 
potential’; ‘cultivable lands’, particularly of the 'fadama* kind; and ‘livestock’. Each of 
these ‘potentially positive resources’ are described as constrained by problems which 
the Project should attempt to solve.
The Project’s long term objectives correspond to those set out in Niger’s Five 
Year Government Plan 1979-1983:
Food Self Sufficiency;
The establishment of a ‘Societe de Developpement’;
Economic independence (PDR/ADM 1984B).
The short term objectives of the PDR/ADM are:
Promoting agricultural production in all its aspects, with the aim of reaching self sufficiency or 
reducing the area’s alimentary deficit;
Strengthening the production and the commercialisation of horticultural produce;
Preserving water and soil resources and ameliorating the environment [ 'ameliorer 
I’environnement’]
Increasing the livelihood of local populations;
Reinforcing peasant institutions at the village level (PDR/ADM 1984B).
The Project’s operational strategy will focus on the following activities:
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A qualitative and quantitative growth of horticultural and other productions;
The amelioration of the living conditions of the populations concerned;
An equitable distribution of the means of production and of the benefits;
The intensification of interested individuals’ participation;
The return to ecological equilibrium (PDR/ADM 1984B).
However, it is noted that
‘The last point should serve as a precondition for the achievement of the other points: the return 
to ecological equilibrium through the halting of erosion and of soils destruction in the glacis and 
in the fadamas. [...] The project should provide the necessary support and the means that the 
populations concerned are unable to gather by themselves to reach the above mentioned 
objectives at the decision making and execution level, so as to stimulate their potentials, still 
latent in terms of initiative and creativity, in the respect of great traditional values’ (PDR/ADM 
1984B).
Assistance must follow two parallel, but integrated, lines:
A territorial approach aimed at defending and protecting soils as well as endowing village 
communities with material infrastructures and with stimuli [instruments de promotion], allowing 
them to increase their efficiency;
A promotional approach relying upon the rearrangement and reinforcement of local economies 
and the human resources available within the communities through many small punctual 
interventions (PDR/ADM 1984B).
Here, for the first time in project documents, a net distinction is perceived 
between ‘territorial interventions’ and other types of activities. This distinction will be 
an important element in future perceptions of the PDR/ADM, which would come to be 
recognised as ‘a model’ for its territorial approach, whereas opinions differ, and in 
general tend to be negative, with regard to its ‘promotional’, ‘social’, etc. approach. It is 
argued that the ‘common denominator of interventions’ is going to be ‘the responsible 
it participation of the interested village communities’ (PDR/ADM 1984B).
In the original plan, project action was going to cover primarily three catchment 
areas (Haute Vallee de Keita; Vallee de Laba; et Vallee de Tamaske) in the Keita 
District, with a total area of 79,000 hectares, even though the majority of actions would 
gradually involve the entire District, i.e. 207 villages and 156,000 inhabitants50.
The division of project operations into ‘project components’ anticipates the 
following division of the Project’s structure into operative units called ‘Divisions’. For 
each ‘component’, planned activities and expected results for the Project’s first phase 
are briefly described. The ‘components’ identified in the original document are seven,
50 In the Second Phase, the PDR/ADM would extend its intervention area to the Districts of Bouza and 
Abalack.
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namely: Forestry; Public W orks; Agriculture and Herding; Cooperation,
Commercialisation and Credit; Training and Extension, Promotion of women’s role in 
rural development (crafts, herding, crafts); Health and Nutrition51.
Three phases, the first two lasting for two years each and the third one for one 
year, are hypothesised. Again, we find the claim that the Keita Project shall serve as a 
model and a template for future similar interventions. The Project is expected to become 
‘an example of methods and organisation which could be applied in other regions in 
order to increase agricultural production’ (PDR/ADM 1984B).
Institutional arrangements foresee that the Project will be under the direct 
responsibility (tutelle) of the Ministry of Rural Development, and that it enjoy financial 
and operational independence. Activities will be undertaken on the basis of yearly 
programmes agreed upon by the Comite sous-regional de la Societe de Developpement 
de Keita, headed by the Sous-Prefet. These programmes will have been conceived 
beforehand in consultation with the villages and in cooperation with the departmental 
administration (services techniques departementaux).
The Project will be directed by a full time National Coordinator, nominated by 
the government and selected on the basis of his human qualities, his professional 
competences, and his hierarchical level. The National Coordinator will share project 
management with a Primary Technical Coordinator (conseiller technique principal), 
appointed by FAO.
4.9 Conclusion
The Sahelian sub-region had known famine and drought for centuries, but previous 
environmental crises had failed to generate the massive forms of ‘intervention’ which 
followed the 1968-1973 famine. However, the discursive fields of ‘desertification’ and 
‘rural development’ were not singular events in post 1950s international relations. They 
belonged to a complex interdiscursive play, described by Escobar (1995) as the
51 Forets; Genie Rural; Agriculture et Elevage; Cooperation, Commercialisation, Credit; 
Animation et Formation; Renforcement du role de la femme dans le developpement rural (agriculture, 
elevage, artisanat); Sante et Nutrition.
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historically grounded discourse of ‘development*. One of the principal contributions of 
Foucault’s theory to the analysis of development has consisted in highlighting the 
inextricability between the constitution of fields of knowledge and the exercise of power 
(Foucault 1995; Rabinow 1984). Two main effects of the knowledge produced by the 
desertification narrative have been highlighted in this chapter. First, it treats the other, in 
this case the people living in the Ader Doutchi Majiya, as a tool, and, despite the 
rhetoric of ‘aid’, understandings of the other are used as a way to dominate it, rather 
than to establish a dialogue in which knowledge about environmental problems and 
potential solutions are mutually constituted.
Second, it functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy, and naturalises ‘intervention’, 
making it appear as the only possible solution for the problems affecting the area in 
question. Hence, in the diagram of Candelori et al. (1992:32), ‘technologies to improve 
resources and remove obstacles’ figure as one of the preliminary conditions for the 
establishment of an integrated rural development project, along with ‘resources that can 
be improved’ and ‘a population which will benefit from the improved resources’. 
Douglas has argued that ‘most established institutions, if challenged, are able to rest 
their claims to legitimacy on their fit with the nature of the universe’ (1987:46). IRDPs 
and the development apparatus sustaining them are presented as trying to prevent the 
planet’s environmental breakdown and to protect human life, thereby rooting their 
function in values which are universally recognised and arguably beyond challenge.
The desertification narrative has direct implications for at least two categories of 
actors: the ‘target population’, which represents a ‘cultural other’ as it does not, and 
could not52, participate in the constitution of the discourse, but is given a place and a 
role within it; and those actors who belong, in different ways and at different levels, to 
development institutions, and therefore have to reproduce and operationalise the 
narrative as they carry out their institutional roles. The narrative has consequences for 
both of these categories (the population ‘acted upon’ by the narrative, and the 
institutional actors ‘acting out’ the narrative).
It is claimed that the men and women of the Ader Doutchi Majiya must ‘take 
conscience’ and ‘assume responsibility’ for their relation with the environment. Their
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‘voluntary participation’, which is actually unconditional as it is channelled through the 
capillary administrative structure of the Development Society (cf. Chapter 2, § 2.6), has 
to conform to the representations produced by macro narratives. They must comply to 
the role of ‘beneficiaries’ bestowed upon them, and at least pretend to address the 
problems as they are presented by the desertification narrative, and collaborate to 
meeting its objectives by engaging in the ‘fight against desertification’. In other terms, 
because they have a role in the game of development, they must learn the rules of the 
game. However, because these rules are produced by culturally, socially and 
geographically ‘distant’ institutions, ‘learning them’ requires specialised operations, of 
which ‘sensitisation’ [sensibilisation], which is discussed in the following chapter, is a 
case in point.
Project staff are responsible for operationalising desertification narratives. This 
entails implementing a set of activities in relation to the environment and ‘converting’ 
local men and women to the fight against desertification. This second task is referred to 
as ‘sensitising the peasants’. The following chapter looks at how the different categories 
of actors working in the Project relate to the forms of knowledge described above, what 
they understand their task to be, and how they conceptualise Ader Doutchi Majiya 
people and relate to them.
52 Almost no-one can speak French in the villages falling in the ‘intervention area’, and the rural 
population is almost entirely illiterate.
5. THE PROJECT
5.1 Introduction
The international desertification narratives unravelled in Chapter 4 argue that, in the 
Sahel, equilibrium between the environment and the population has been lost through 
the process of desertification, and that change from a generalised breakdown to a new or 
renewed balance must be induced through external intervention in the form of IRDPs 
and the ‘responsibilisation’ of local producers. Projects are specialised institutions 
which operationalise development narratives, and project staff are the actor category 
charged with implementing project activities within the intervention area. Project staff 
have to translate narratives into action and carry out concrete strategies to ‘fight against 
desertification’. This Chapter enquires into the perceptions of development of this 
particular group and examines its various roles at the interface (Long 1996) between 
official development organisations and local arenas.
The Keita Project is not an ordinary project. Italy and the FAO contended with 
each other for the ‘paternity’ of the Project, as each wanted the ‘success’ of Keita to be 
associated with its own name. Italian Ministers, UN Directors, and Niger Heads of State 
praised the Project as an example of its kind; there have been times when project staff 
worked without salary for months because they believed in ‘Keita’; villages in the 
intervention area compete against each other over project interventions, and men and 
women, poorer and richer villagers, insist that the Project remains and does not 
‘abandon’ them (cf. Chapter 8). A question addressed in this chapter is, therefore, what 
made the Keita Project special, vis a vis the norm of development failures. There are 
few success stories in anthropological studies of development to which I could look for 
comparative evidence and from which I could generalise some conclusions. However, 
in his study of successful South Asian NGOs, Hailey (2001) argues that a common trait 
of his examples is that ‘highly personalised interaction has clearly shaped their 
programmes and created a bond of trust between key staff and the communities with 
whom they work’ (2001:89). The Keita case confirms Hailey’s suggestion to focus on 
the importance of ‘informal, non-formulaic and highly personal modes of interaction’ 
(2001:89) as factors which explain the results of development ‘interventions’.
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The personal nature of Keita’s achievements is commonly underlined by 
different categories of informants when I ask them what, in their own view, ‘made a 
difference’ in Keita. Almost unanimously, they mention the role played by Keita’s first 
Programme Manager, Dr. Renato Carotti. Carotti, an experienced agronomist and a 
charismatic leader, turned project staff into a team of proselytes, and motivated them to 
put all their energies in the Project’s success. And when the disillusioned inhabitants of 
the Keita District, who had been the targets of ‘development interventions’ since the 
1960s (cf. Chapter 2), realised that the Keita Project was really having an impact on 
their lives, they ‘joined the fight’. ‘The charismatic leader dominates others because 
through his person a mission has become manifest, which very often revolutionises the 
established order’ (Bendix 1967:301). For 17 years in Keita Carotti to some extent 
revolutionised the established order in development. People were still seeking to 
maximise their interests, but they did so with, rather than in spite of or against, ‘the 
Project’. The first part of this chapter looks at the personality of its two main managers, 
Carotti and Oumarou, because management style has played an important part in 
shaping the approach of the Keita Project and in giving it its distinctive status.
The second part of the chapter focuses on the perceptions of development of 
other categories of staff, who were responsible for executing the Project’s programmes 
and who were in daily contact with men and women in the intervention area. National 
staff at the PDR/ADM portrays Niger as an ‘underdeveloped’ country, a country which 
needs foreign assistance to solve its problems, mostly due to the impacts of 
‘desertification’. According to them, these problems can be solved through the 
establishment of projects. However, for projects to achieve their goals, the ‘peasant’s 
mentality’ must be induced to accept change. This is achieved through ‘sensitisation’ 
[,sensibilisation], a specialised notion which refers to the ‘developers’ task of making 
‘peasants’ aware of their problems and willing to accept change (cf. Bierschenk 1988; 
Tidjani-Alou 2000). As argued in Chapter 4, development projects formally operate 
with, not against, so called project beneficiaries, and it is therefore essential to convert 
the latter, at least superficially, to the desertification narrative. Through ‘sensitisation’, 
project staff act as specialised operators, turning local people into ‘project beneficiaries’ 
as a preliminary step for ‘intervention’. But this process is not carried out, as it were, 
behind the backs and against the wills of local people. Project staff can be seen as 
‘development brokers’ (Bierschenk et al. 2000) making possible what both ‘the
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developers’ and ‘the developed’ want: a project (cf. Neubert 2000). As I shall show in 
the following chapter, far from resenting project interventions, Ader Doutchi Majiya 
villages compete against each other over project activities.
I have gathered the information provided here in the course of semi-structured 
interviews, at meetings, while working with members of staff, and in the course of 
informal conversations. Staff members would normally use French with me, as well as 
with all the ‘whites’ (nassaru), to talk about development. Not only because they 
assume that we will be more at ease and that the conversation will thus be smoother, but 
also because they themselves have learned development terminology in French. Thus, 
for example, they would normally greet me in Hausa, but they would automatically 
change to French when discussing their work. Amongst themselves, they would usually 
interject French technical jargon into Hausa speech.
5.2 Project Management
The PDR/ADM has an office in Niamey, where administrative matters are dealt with, 
but its headquarters are in Keita, the chef lieu of the homonymous district in the 
department of Tahoua. Keita is a medium-size Sahelian town of about 6,000 inhabitants, 
which owes much of its present ‘cosmopolitan’ appearance and flourishing boutiques to 
the presence of the PDR/ADM. It is composed of four neighbourhoods, which are called 
‘villages’ (gari), each of which has its respective village chief (hakimi), and which were 
\  originally distinguished along ethnic and status criteria.
The PDR/ADM is a rectangular building located at the eastern end of Keita (cf. 
pictures 3 and 4). Today, the Project comprises eight ‘Divisions’, namely: 
Administration (Administration); Monitoring and Evaluation (Suivi et Evaluation); 
Public works (Genie Rural or GR)\ Environment (Environnement or Forets et Faune); 
Agronomy (Agronomic); Women and Development (Femmes et Developpement); and 
the recently established (March 2000) Communication Division (Communication) in 
charge, inter alia, of installing a radio system in the intervention area. The Garage is not 
a ‘real’ division: it has a hybrid status and is under the control of the GR Division, but it 
is commonly referred to as a ‘division’ (cf. table 1, where the ‘Communication Divison’ 
is missing).
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The PDR/ADM has approximately 100 employees, including guards, drivers, 
mechanics and electricians (cf. PDR/ADM 2000a). Each division occupies two or three 
locales in the project building, and, in general, comprises a division chief (Chef de 
Division), his/her vice {Adjoint), and other staff members whose number and functions 
vary substantially across divisions.
Since 1998, the PDR/ADM has been coordinated by a national Programme 
Manager {Coordinateur National). However, during the first fifteen years of project 
activity, management was distributed between two figures: a National Coordinator and 
an expatriate Primary Technical Coordinator {Conseiller Technique Principal or CTP). 
The first and only CTP of the Project between 1983 and 1998 was Dr. Renato Carotti, 
an Italian agronomist at the end of his long career with the FAO. Carotti left an indelible 
mark on the PDR/ADM and it is impossible to talk of the Project without mentioning its 
CTP, who devised the Project’s widely celebrated intervention strategy.
5.2.1 Carotti, the sarkin aiki
Carotti has a degree in Agronomy from the University of Camerino (Province of Pesaro, 
Marche Region, Italy) and has always remained very attached to his Marchigian roots. 
International development ‘expert’ and highly praised agronomist, Carotti is primarily a 
‘farmer’: in his Italian hometown, he grows grapes to produce wine and tills his own 
land. By the time he was assigned to Keita, he had five adult children, and had been 
working extensively in Africa and Latin America for the previous 30 years of his 
successful career with the FAO in international development projects. Keita had to be 
his final destination before retirement. For Carotti, Keita was his last bet, and he wanted 
it to be a winning one.
When he arrived in Keita, Carotti was no longer in his youth, but age increased 
his charismatic aura, particularly in Niger where an elder man is perceived as the 
appropriate holder of authority. Never without his pipe in wood and stainless steel, his 
presence was often introduced by a distinctive scent of Dutch tobacco. His penetrating 
gaze was framed by thick and rebellious eyebrows. His nose was rather big and his lips 
thin. Indeed, I would imagine Carotti’s caricature as dominated by a disproportionately 
huge pair of eyebrows on top of a nose and a pipe. His hair was grey and his face 
covered with wrinkles. He was not tall and his Stomach protruded (showing his
penchant for good wine and whisky) from his otherwise muscular figure. His hands 
were big and calloused, something he was proud of, as a sign of strenuous physical 
work, mostly on the land.
Carotti loved the land. He shared the Hausa peasants’ attachment to their 
relatively sterile plots with a mixture of compassion and solidarity. He was a wonderful 
storyteller. In his repertoire, anecdotes were classified according to morale and hero- 
type. The hard-headed farmer was one of his heroes, characterised by ‘tigna’, an Italian 
term which I have only heard from Carotti, by which he meant a strenuous, tenacious, 
stubborn behaviour primarily referring to a farmer’s attachment to his land, but evident, 
in a diluted form, in all of a farmer’s acts. Carotti displayed the traits of all his hero 
types, and vice-versa, his hero types incarnated and magnified the values which 
informed Carotti’s lifestyle and beliefs. He described the hope of the Keita farmer 
sowing the land, the farmer’s tranquillity and satisfaction in front of his full granaries: 
‘a full granary, is the farmer’s dream, an empty granary his nightmare*. He noticed the 
air of feast in villages after abundant harvests, the tension when rains were scarce. The 
Keita farmer and Carotti loved each other, because they both thought that they 
understood each other deeply. And maybe they really did.
Carotti took the PDR/ADM seriously. FAO and Italian ‘experts’ I interviewed 
never failed to comment on the relation between the PDR/ADM and its CTP. The 
PDR/ADM was often characterised as Carotti’s ‘last child’. Different people who talked 
to me about Carotti characterised him as ‘outstanding’, ‘of great value’, ‘seductive and 
capable’, and attributed the success of the Project in great part to him. ‘Carotti, a person 
of great energy and great skills, wanted to conclude his career with a personal 
experience of exceptional standing. He dedicated himself entirely to Keita, with a 
commitment that is extremely rare’ (Caputo, Interview). One of the persons responsible 
for allocating funds to the PDR/ADM at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued 
‘When Carotti was there, we used to sign blank cheques for him. He was our guarantee 
that the Project would function’. Some members of project staff called Carotti a ‘father’ 
(il etait un pere), and the villagers often referred to him as ‘the chief of the work’53 
(sarkin aiki).
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Carotti defined ‘development’ as ‘diminishing the distance between us and 
them’ [diminuire il divario che c ’e tra noi e loro]. When he saw me struggling to write 
this definition in my notebook in the jeep running across the dunes of Keita, he asked 
me to repeat what he had just said. I told him. ‘Yes, that’s what development is... and 
don’t call me ‘ethnocentric’ and all these stupid ideas of nowadays: if you had a sick 
child and no food to feed it, no water, no hospital, no doctors, you would want all these 
things which make your life less miserable, and what right have you to deny these poor 
people some relief?’. He then explained his theory of the ‘pace factor’. ‘We can think of 
our world and their world as travelling at different speeds: if we are going at 80 km/h, 
they are going at 5 km/h. To help them reach 10 km/h is ridiculous, the distance 
between us would keep increasing. We go at 80? They must go at 90 at least, otherwise 
they’ll never catch up with us... otherwise there’s no game... I am against the micro­
development approach!’ The Project was there to reverse a process of severe erosion 
which hit the intervention area over the last 20 years, and make agriculture and herding 
more productive. It did it employing only local labour and training local people in most 
of the activities carried out by the Project. But it also did it with bulldozers and 
machines: the PDR/ADM fought against the desert at 90 km/h, and at approximately 4 
million dollars per year.
Carotti conceived the Project’s approach and intervention strategy. He tested it 
and perfected it throughout 15 years of work in Keita. He talked of Keita (by which he 
meant the entire project area) as a ‘testing ground’ or ‘laboratory’, meaning a place 
where a new approach to fight against the desert’s advance would be developed. He 
didn’t fight alone. Carotti had ‘his men’ in the Project, and a special relation with local 
people, men and women alike.
He had selected his key collaborators carefully, one by one, and gave each of 
them a key position in the Project. His success was based to some extent upon the 
loyalty of a team of capable individuals. Nasser, his closest assistant, whom he trained 
personally and treated as a son, said of him:
Carotti... Carotti was a real father. He was a father. I had come to the Keita Project for a test of 
two months, and it went well. Then I left and they took another person, but Carotti said... no, 
there, really, I need Nasser. So he sent for me... I had to remain 15 days and...[laughs, meaning
53 As we shall see in the following chapter, local people referred to the project simply as 'aiki ’, work, so 
‘sarkin aiki' could be more freely translated as ‘project chief.
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that he never left]... Carotti taught me everything... and if I did something he disagreed with, he 
wouldn’t say anything... he would let you do, to show you where you had gone wrong. When I 
told my mother that Carotti was going to leave and return to Italy, really she thought... she was 
even sure that I was going to leave with him. Really, if  it wasn’t Italy, if it was anywhere in 
Africa, I would have followed him!
Carotti invested in project staff, defended them from external attacks, and 
delegated a considerable amount of power to Division Chiefs. In the words of the Genie 
Rural Division Chief:
I worked with Carotti since 1985. He is not an engineer, but his experience directing projects is 
such that sometime I have no choice but to follow his advice in technical matters, because he has 
a sense of observation and critique, he knows a bit of everything,
Carotti gave members of staff a sense of dedication and involvement in the 
Project’s goals. He once recollected, at a meeting, how they (the staff and himself) had 
defied a consultant’s prediction, at project inception, that any money spent on the 
Loudou Valley (an area falling in PDR/ADM intervention) was being thrown away. The 
consultant argued that places like Loudou were the ‘gangrene’ of the Sahel, a ‘lunar 
environment’ which could never be rehabilitated and would never sustain human 
settlements anymore. Loudou had been, instead, one of the success stories of the 
PDR/ADM, and today it hosts three flourishing villages and a local weekly market of 
increasing importance. On another occasion, often proudly remembered by project staff, 
another development project had planned an expansion which would set its borders very 
close to the limits of the PDR/ADM’s intervention area. Having heard about this, 
Carotti called the project staff to his office and exhorted them to send tractors and 
machines to the area where the PDR/ADM bordered with the incoming project in order 
to ‘mark the limits’ of what he saw as the ‘PDR/ADM’s domain’.
Once he had won a person’s allegiance, and had been conquered in turn by this 
person’s value, he would strenuously ‘defend his men’, even against all evidence. He 
might criticise or even scold one of ‘his men’ in private, but would never attack him in 
front of other people. He once told me of how, when he was about 7 years old, he used 
to play with a boy of about 14 years old, a lot stronger than him. The boy used to 
humiliate him and beat him up, until one day, at the beach, an accident provoked his 
anger to the point that he could not control himself. Little Carotti, enraged, hit the boy 
as hard as he could with a wooden stick which happened to be on the shore. The big boy 
who had been hit started bleeding and screaming. When his mother learned about the
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fact, she was ashamed, she, ‘the mother of Renato, who attacked the so and so boy, who 
behaved as a criminal’. When he returned home, that evening, he feared what his father 
would say and do to him. But when he was brought in front of his father, who had been 
a high ranking fascist military, the father gave him a coin and congratulated him saying 
‘I am really proud of you who were not scared of a boy so much stronger than yourself. 
But remember, never, never attack someone weaker, for only cowards do so’. He saw 
Keita staff, or most of them, as a team of ‘combatants’ of which he was the leader, and 
he felt responsible for ‘his men’, by which he meant both men and women. The 
‘combatant’ was another ideal type in Carotti’s repertoire, inspired by Kurosawa’s ‘The 
Seven Samurai’. However, he never mentioned violence as an effective way to win 
battles; he had ‘strategies’, made ‘plans’, and unfolded them slowly and subtly, 
‘circumventing’ the enemy and defeating him with ‘facts’, which ‘spoke for 
themselves’. He used to say that critics had only to visit Keita, he didn’t need to answer 
their critiques. Keita defended itself on its own grounds.
He carefully observed farmers behaviour, and expressed his respect for their 
knowledge by testing ideas for future interventions in collaboration with local farmers 
known to him. He disliked office work, and spent as much time as he could in the field, 
following the Project’s interventions and interacting with local people. In almost every 
village within the project intervention area, he knew some men and women personally. 
He couldn’t speak Hausa, but his loyal driver, Sambo, a thin and tall old Peul, would 
interpret for him.
Whenever new appointments did not meet Carotti’s expectations, he skilfully 
managed to get rid of unwanted ‘experts’. He identified, trained, and selected his 
successor, the actual Coordinateur National He met the latter as a young man, when he 
was working for the government in Tahoua and had come to Keita on official visits. 
Carotti liked him, and was able to help him obtain a scholarship at the Agronomy 
Department in the University of Camerino. Oumarou went to Italy, learned Italian and 
obtained a degree in exactly the same place and same field as Carotti. When he returned 
to Niger, the time for Carotti to retire had come, and a vacancy for Carotti’s 
replacement was put out by FAO. After the application and interview processes, 
Oumarou Moussa was appointed first National Coordinator of the PDR/ADM.
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Carotti and Oumarou had similar political tastes. Oumarou had been inspired by 
Seyni Kountche. Carotti had been a balilla54 in his childhood and strongly believed in 
Mussolini’s achievements and in many Fascist values. However, it would be unfair to 
portray him as the stereotypical fascist, because Carotti was certainly not a racist. He 
grew up in Northern Africa and once told me that for him black and white people were 
exactly the same. Many of his childhood friends had been Africans and he could not 
classify people according to skin colour. He had spoken thus to encourage me to do the 
same. Carotti enjoyed challenging people, and often tried to provoke reactions 
launching verbal attacks and engaging in verbal battles. In this vein, one day as we were 
returning to Keita from a site which he wanted to show me upon my first stay at the 
Project, he accused me of being a racist. He had noticed my behaviour towards a group 
of women we met, and found it exceedingly kind. He said that my face ‘glowed’ 
whenever I spoke with local villagers, and warned me not to idealize them, because they 
were just like us. I should treat them as I treated him, and jokingly added that he would 
get jealous seeing how much nicer I was to them than to him.
Nevertheless, Carotti personified a great deal of the fascist ethos. He was 
impregnated with the values, images, expressions, and behaviours characteristic of 
fascist culture and writings. He was a populist, and as such fitted very well the 
expectations of local villagers. He fitted into their ideal of ‘leader’, and was referred to 
as ‘sarkin aiki’: 'Gaskiya mun gode Allah, mun gode Carotti, Carotti sarkin aiki ne, ya 
zo ya ghiara kasa5 5 local people would say. He had all the prerogatives of the 
charismatic leader, and was able to attract proselytes and followers. When he described 
important meetings he had held, he would consistently define a won battle as an 
occasion in which people had ‘made his idea theirs’. He would engage in rhetorical 
fights with the aim of imbuing the listeners with his thoughts.
Carotti had many enemies. Some people, e.g. international consultants coming to 
visit the PDR/ADM, would approach him with diffidence and scepticism. Many 
consultants would arrive in Keita with pre-conceived critiques about the Project, some
54 Fascist children/youths military unit.
55 ‘Really, we thank Allah, we thank Carotti (i.e. Carotti), Carotti is the chief of the works, he came and 
restored the land’. Note that ‘Sarki’ is the term for highest ranking traditional authority, who belongs to 
the original group having a landlordly status over the area (for Keita, the Lissawan Group) and holding a 
hereditary chiefly position over groups of villages today falling in his ‘sphere of influence1. His control 
overlaps almost exactly with the ‘District’ level administrative boundaries.
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may have already criticised it without having been there. Nothing would infuriate 
Carotti more than critiques. He would never accept them. When visitors would come to 
see the Project, he would bring them ‘to the field’, either for the ‘grand tour’ or for the 
‘petit tour’, depending on the visitor’s importance.
Even in the FAO, not everyone approved of his management strategy. Some said 
that his relation with the Project was far too ‘personal’ and that he should not have been 
allowed to keep his place for such a long time, even against FAO regulations on the 
matter. Others said that Carotti had made it impossible for the FAO to follow the 
Project and contribute to its unfolding by opposing all interference in management, and 
blamed on his centralising behaviour the problems which characterised FAO-Italy 
relations upon Carotti’s departure.
Carotti liked Mishima’s writing, and had some of his books in his house in 
Keita. The last time he was in Keita, he had already retired from his CTP position, and 
had returned to ‘his’ Keita after some months of absence for a one-month consultancy. 
One day, I walked back home with him after work. He told me about his first thoughts 
coming back to Keita. When he stepped into his home after it had been locked for a few 
months, everything was covered with dust and spider webs, everything was abandoned 
and dirty, his orchard was dry, and his white horse looked old, in the garden. Also the 
Project’s activities had slowed down. It reminded him of the last chapters of Mishima’s 
‘The Decay of the Angel’. He said: ‘I can smell a scent of sunset’ (sento odore di 
crepuscolo).
5.2.2 Oumarou, the Coordinateur National
Oumarou Moussa’s advent to project management in 1998 was not simply a change in 
person, but coincided with a substantial change in the way management had been 
conceived and intra-project hierarchies structured. With Oumarou, the dual structure of 
Conseiller Technique Principal and Directeur National gave way to a centralisation of 
power in the hands of a sole Coordinateur National. The number of international 
consultants residing permanently in Keita was also considerably reduced, and FAO- 
Italy relations began to deteriorate. Officially, these changes were commented upon as 
part of a general strategy to ‘responsabilise’ (responsabilisation) Niger, which went
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hand in hand with the parallel intent to ‘build ownership* of project results among the 
‘beneficiaries’.
Oumarou was an extremely skilled orator, and it was always difficult to discern 
how much of his speech was aimed at convincing the listener and how much of it really 
convinced him. Since his arrival he seemed to understand the overall context and related 
discourses, and effectively used the latter instrumentally. Most of his initial speeches 
with the project staff and, to a lesser extent, with the local population on the occasion of 
his sporadic field-trips, focused on the weight which Carotti’s inheritance had left upon 
him.
Oumarou justified his initial slowness in assuming his responsibilities and taking 
the lead over project activities with various arguments. With the project staff, he 
underlined how difficult it was to continue where ‘a Carotti’ had left off, particularly at 
a moment when ‘everybody’ was expecting Niger to show ‘maturity* and take 
‘responsibility’ toward the project’s concluding phases.
With international consultants, however, he did not hesitate to criticise Carotti, 
particularly the ‘impulsive’ decision making which characterised Carotti’s management 
style and which made it difficult for his successor to have a clear idea of how 
interventions had been planned in different sites. He ‘felt lost in a sea of messy papers’ 
and struggled to find some sense and put order in the massive documentation produced 
in 15 years of project life.
When, at the end of 1999, FAO’s departure became an imminent and much 
debated event at the PDR/ADM, Oumarou tried to stir feelings of nationalistic pride 
amongst project staff, arguing that once FAO had definitely gone, ‘the whole world’ 
would have looked at Niger. Failing to ensure the durability and sustainability of project 
interventions would amount to admitting their own backwardness and lack of capacity, 
and it fell upon him, as the Project’s National Coordinator, to bring the Project to its 
‘successful’ conclusion.
Clearly, the relatively new talk of ‘responsabilisation’ did not target Oumarou 
directly, but primarily addressed national authorities and administration. But his
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manipulation of new themes in the development agenda represented a tactic by which 
he appropriated idioms and discourses perceived as emanating from ‘international’ 
arenas, hoping to gain prestige and following as a result of being associated with 
international power centres. But his speech did a lot more. As a newcomer in the 
management position, Oumarou had to come to terms with the difficult task of gaining 
credibility amongst ‘Carotti’s team’: he needed them to sanction his power or he would 
never be able to exercise his leadership. Presenting himself as being held accountable 
for project success by powerful agents such as Governments and FAO, he, first, implied 
that these agents sanctioned his position as project coordinator; and, second, played 
with a rhetoric of unity and division in order to establish hierarchical distance and 
national proximity between himself and project staff. They had to recognise him as 
‘chief because, his talk suggested, it was him who would eventually be held 
accountable for the Project’s outcome. He and the project staff did not carry the same 
burden of responsibility and, as an implicit consequence, they held different amounts of 
symbolic capital. Nevertheless, they were all Nigeriens, all equally compelled to prove 
wrong international expectations of failure by their part and to bring the Project to a 
successful finale.
Often Oumarou’s discourses followed a ‘carrot and stick’ strategy: he would 
start a speech with arguments that stirred feelings of compassion and allegiance in the 
listener by depicting himself in a vulnerable position (under the burden of 
responsibility) needing the maximum help and cooperation from project staff. He would 
then move on to using the ‘responsibility’ bestowed upon him as a moral obligation for 
him to be inflexible toward project staff. He was ‘not prepared’ to ‘accept’ ‘disengaged 
behaviour’, he was ‘not interested’ in people’s ‘personal resentments’: ‘on the job, 
everyone is expected to carry out his/her tasks’, or he would ‘not tolerate him/her in the 
Project anymore’. Oumarou’s command was maintained by making people feel 
vulnerable, to the point of threatening them. Not long after he had assumed office, fears 
of being fired or admonished became widespread, particularly for staff working in 
divisions which had played a crucial role under Carotti’s coordination.
Oumarou’s strategy resembled Carotti’s authoritarian approach only 
superficially. At first sight, both Carotti and Oumarou were using their charisma and 
personal skills to gain people’s trust and attract proselytes. But if for Carotti the main
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objective was to imbue ‘his men’ with a fervour for achieving their task, defying the 
challenge set by a sterile, unproductive land, Oumarou was more interested in building 
personal prestige.
Oumarou thought that ‘underdevelopment’ was ‘not only a question of material 
poverty, but primarily a question of mentality’. He took the example of the twinning of 
Keita with the Italian town of Pesaro, as a result of which many items had been offered 
by Pesaro for the development of the city of Keita, but some corrupt people had taken 
all they could and the aims of the operation had failed (cf. Chapter 7). When he was 
younger, he said, he once had to conduct a survey to find out the development priorities 
of the people of a region. With his colleagues, they had prepared a list of possible 
‘priorities’, but it turned out that they had failed to include the real priority in the list: 
the television. He said it was like the poor Peul nomad, who chews tobacco to appease 
his hunger as he walks in the arid plateaux with a small herd of cattle he doesn’t own, 
and carries an enormous radio on his shoulder. Poverty in Niger is a question of 
mentality, people refuse to work hard to help themselves.
Oumarou undermined the authority and credibility of Division Chiefs while 
retaining the ultimate power over even small scale decisions. Manual workers, drivers, 
mechanics, and project employees at lower levels who found themselves opposed to 
division chiefs, started to bypass division chiefs and go directly to Oumarou who, in the 
majority of cases, initially complied with their demands and took measures against the 
plans and activities of division chiefs, only in order to obtain people’s support, in a way 
reminiscent of what most Niger politicians do as a part of their campaign. By doing so, 
however, Oumarou undermined the credibility of division chiefs vis a vis their 
subordinates and, in the medium run, the Project was lacerated by interpersonal 
resentments of various sorts.
After the first two years of Oumarou’s management, an air of secrecy dominated 
all relations within the PDR/ADM. I sometimes found myself dragged into an office 
and, while someone would stand outside to make sure no one would listen to the 
conversation, the division chief or assistant would explain to me all the problems 
encountered with the management.
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Oumarou also had enemies, outside and inside the Project. The Nigerien 
coordinator of a project as important as the PDR/ADM is likely to be under enormous 
pressures for all sorts of favours. Someone in Oumarou’s position would receive calls 
from Ministers asking to place a nephew at the Project, to house a relative living in 
Keita in a project building, to divert project resources to other purposes, etc. It is 
difficult to resist such demands without consequently putting yourself and your family 
at risk, ‘risk’ meaning, in the best case, lack of useful networks and powerful 
connections when ‘things go wrong’. It is difficult to please some without offending 
others, and once the resentment of the unemployed people of Keita erupted against 
Oumarou, as they informed authorities that he was employing more people from his 
natal village in a distant region of Niger than from Keita itself, even though skilled 
Keita workers were available and in need of jobs. For a Nigerien, to be the only 
coordinator of a project like Keita is like sitting on burning coals, because, as Oumarou 
once argued: ‘in the minds of the authorities projects are lucrative opportunities’.
5.3 The Divisions and the Personnel: Discourses of Development among the 
PDR/ADM Staff
I have described the character and beliefs of the most influential managers of the 
PDR/ADM at length, because, as argued in the first section of this chapter, the personal 
disposition of key members of staff toward their work and other people have 
consequences for project functioning and relations within it (cf. Uphoff 1992; Hailey 
2001). Project management plays an intermediary role between the international 
discourses of development, presented in the previous chapter, and the micropolitics of 
development at project and village level. The ways in which a manager absolves this 
function is influenced by how a manager interprets the Project’s activities and his role 
within. With reference to the two figures presented above, Carotti saw Keita as his last 
professional challenge, and he had a real respect and compassion for farmers, with 
whom he shared a love for the land and a stubborn determination to increase its 
production. Oumarou, on the other hand, was a politically minded man, and many 
people who worked with him thought that he used the Project as a path to a political 
career. Whatever weight one chooses to give to these assumptions, his position as a 
‘national’ manager made him more vulnerable to different kinds of pressures, and he 
inevitably found himself involved in the inherently political game of carrying out his 
tasks without disappointing different categories of actors. While he was culturally
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‘closer’ than Carotti to local actors, he seemed to be less open toward them, as he 
identified peasant ‘mentality’ as one of the main obstacles to Niger’s ‘development’. 
This view was also widespread amongst national members of staff. The particular view 
of ‘peasant mentality’ entertained by project staff legitimises their task to induce the 
‘beneficiaries’ to accept change. This is done through the practice of ‘sensitisation’. The 
group I refer to as ‘project staff includes seven division chiefs, four assistants, and a 
few field agents (cf. PDR/ADM 2000a). All of them are Nigerien. Below I illustrate the 
staffs conceptualisations o f ‘desertification’ and ‘sensitisation’, and I look at how these 
notions are operationalised in the Keita Project.
5.3.1 ‘Niger is an underdeveloped country the project sta ffs view o f the 
desertification narrative and o f Niger’s problems.
The Agronomy division chief is Mr. Ibrahim. The division also counts two Adjoints and 
three field agents. Ibrahim is a high-class Hausa ‘aristocrat’, whose class and studies 
situate him in a position of prestige within the Project. He is more of an ‘intellectual’ 
than a ‘fieldworker*, and he carries the role of ‘Directeur Technique’ of the Project, 
which says a lot more than it implies in practice. Ibrahim worked at the Project since its 
very early stages. One of his daughters married the Administration Division Chief and 
one of his nephews, Soumaila Mati, is employed as a fieldworker in his own Division. 
The scarcity of hair on Ibrahim’s face and arms, as well as his plump solemn figure, 
made him look like a gigantic eunuch, dexterously orchestrating all project PR. He has 
ball-shaped eyes which he rotates, widens, shuts and moves a great deal in his 
expressive facial mimicry. His hands are soft and his fingers tapered. Since I’ve known 
him, he wears distinctive pea-hued glossy leather slippers from which his heel is left 
slightly hanging out.
Ibrahim is certainly not renowned for his technical ingenuity, but plays a vital 
role in maintaining the Project’s ‘ceremonial apparatus’ efficient, fine tuning intra- and 
inter-project social relations, and presenting different images of the Project to different 
categories of actors, from international consultants to peasants. His social respectability 
is useful to the management, as well as his skills as a Hausa-French interpreter, as he is 
proficient in both. I have always seen him supporting project management.
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At reunions with external consultants and project staff, Ibrahim would invariably 
support Oumarou’s point of view, not only through separate interventions, but also by 
volunteering an intermittent background of supporting comments and evocative 
repetitions of Oumarou’s salient words within a discourse. One day, Oumarou was 
giving a presentation of the Project’s activities to the newly formed ‘groupemenf of 
Keita Youths. He talked without interruption for an hour and a half. He began his 
discourse apologising for his imperfect Hausa, but, he added, Mr. Ibrahim was there and 
would help him with the language. Although Oumarou really isn’t a native Hausa 
speaker, but a Djerma, his Hausa is almost perfect, and his standard initial apologies 
seemed to serve as a way to introduce Ibrahim and sanction his following interventions 
throughout the talk. But Ibrahim never had to translate parts of Oumarou’s discourse. 
His role became immediately evident in the first section of Oumarou’s presentation. 
Oumarou began his speech with a devastating image of drought and famine: before 
project intervention, he argued, a disproportionate drought had hit the area, drying the 
wells to the point that not only animals would die, but people too were lacking food and 
water to drink. As Oumarou was providing a dramatic representation of villages struck 
by drought and famine, Ibrahim distraught, passed his hands over his face, his eyes 
showing grief and desolation, and echoed repeatedly, as Oumarou went on with his 
account: ‘No water to drink’... ‘No food to eat’... ‘The animals died, all! They all 
died!’ ( ‘Babu ruwa na sha’... 'Babu abinci na c i’... ‘Dabobbi, su mutu, duka! Duka su 
mutu! *).
I often heard the desertification narrative reproduced in heightened dramatic 
tones in the historiques du projet given by project staff or management. Recalling (real 
or imaginary -  as not all villages in the Project’s area had been hit equally severely by 
the drought) images of famine is used as a rhetorical device to present the local situation 
before the Project’s intervention. These images of devastation are mainly used in this 
specific way, as the Project’s ‘origin myth’ and to justify its necessity. Face to face 
discussions with project staff reveal different perspectives, characterised by the 
perception of being ‘underdeveloped’.
Commenting upon the killing of a President of Niger, Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, 
the Chief of the Environment Division exploded:
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Niger is underdeveloped: when we look at the problems that characterise our underdevelopment, 
they are enormous! They kill a president like a donkey because he was hard-headed, students are 
unemployed, professors spend months without a salary, state officials have got nothing, nothing 
is done to help the population... it is underdevelopment that creates this. In developed countries 
parents have the means to pay for the studies of their children. Here, we are obliged to find a job 
in the public sector alone, as the private sector is not developed!
Soumaila was a quick and smart man. Probably in his late fifties, he was 
experienced not only in the technical aspects of his job, but he was a fine connoisseur of 
human nature. It was difficult to fool Soumaila. When he visited villages to check if the 
reforestation trenches had been ‘sabotaged’ by villagers looking for fuel-wood, he 
would easily discover ‘the culprits’. He always knew why some activity had failed, or 
why it had succeeded in a village. He knew the people there, and knew who could be an 
obstacle, and who could be an ally in his activities. Indeed, everybody recognised that 
‘he had lived’. According to others and to himself, his past had been rather dissolute: he 
had enjoyed alcohol, women, smoking, and gambling. Not tall, thin, with one eye half 
closed as if to penetrate deeper the thoughts of his interlocutors, and a sarcastic smile 
cast on his thin lips, Soumaila was an intriguing character. His speech was throbbing 
with indecent jokes and bad words, which he used to underline his point of view in 
lively debates, often about local and national politics. Having heard his quote mentioned 
above, I didn’t hesitate to ask him what he thought were the causes of the deplorable 
state he was describing.
As a Forestier, I think the greatest problem of Niger is desertification. Until the ecologic 
environment is reconstituted, any other development action is destined to failure. Because, going 
back in history, man destroyed the forest before developing agriculture. With the demographic 
push, soils have been overexploited, they were totally impoverished, they became sterile, trees 
have disappeared. The owner of the land abandoned, facing water and wind erosion! It is 
necessary, then, to fight against this desertification, to reconstitute the ecology and recuperate the 
lands, to plant trees that will protect the soils against hydric erosion, and allow local people to 
have access to cultivable land and develop agrarian techniques which increase agricultural 
productivity.
Despite his joking character, Soumaila was very dedicated to his job, and could 
count upon two skilled assistants: Ali, the fishery expert of the Project and a firm 
Moslem believer, and Ali, a Forestier like Soumaila, half Tuareg and half Arab.
Ali agreed with his Chief: ‘The first problem of Niger is desertification’. 
Soumaila Mati, one of the field agents of the Agriculture Division, also expressed 
himself in similar terms: ‘Underdevelopment is extreme poverty caused by scarce rains:
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Niger depends 95% on exterior aid*. Ali of the Monitoring and Evaluation Division 
argued, in similar terms:
Underdevelopment is dependency on other countries. In the case of Niger, you know, due to 
climatic conditions there are recurrent famines, and we haven’t got enough cultivable lands. The 
more the population grows, the more the need grows, and there is not enough land to adopt the 
system of agricultural rotation. The lands become impoverished, and the poorer they are, the 
more we lack agrarian production. For a country to be independent, it must have alimentary self 
sufficiency: when the belly is full, even if there are no money, the spirit is appeased.
This view was very close to that expressed by Idi, the literacy expert: ‘The main 
reason why we need development projects in Niger is alimentary self-sufficiency: the 
belly first! [le ventre d ’abord]. Even if a project tries to solve other problems, people 
will not collaborate when they are hungry!’. Nasser, the assistant of the GR Division, 
argued that
Underdevelopment is the incapacity, material or intellectual, to solve problems. If we have 
intelligence, we haven’t got the means: we are underdeveloped. In particular, Niger’s greatest 
problem is the rapid advance of the desert... maybe, it is also a lack of political will... however, 
poverty is due to the food deficit created by the bad distribution of rains in space and in time. 
Rains are often insufficient... I can see that when the Nigerien peasant has two consecutive years 
of good rains, the whole situation is calm. But after two or three years of drought, everything is 
tense, people go away and animals die.
Aboubacar, working for the Monitoring and Evaluation Division, thought that 
‘Niger’s fundamental problem is that of agrarian production, which is linked to climatic 
factors which worsen year after year!’ Yacouba, responsible for the Project’s 
Administration, linked the question of ‘desertification’ to Niger’s dependence upon 
foreign assistance:
The State hasn’t got the means! If you take the phenomena of water erosion and land 
degradation... if you take the glacis of this region... it isn’t with handcarts that you can 
transform that! You need technological means, because today we are at a point at which nature 
menaces us up to our necks! This can only happen through foreign aid.
Some perspectives were different. Elhadji Abdou, the chief of the GR division, 
emphasised the corruption of Niger’s government. Two other members of staff 
identified underdevelopment with a ‘disposition’, characterised by the induced 
awareness of lacking something. Rahmatou of the Monitoring and Evaluation Division 
had a subtle position:
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Underdevelopment is a disposition [un etat d ’ame]. It is a way of perceiving things that pushes 
me to say that you are underdeveloped, but, inside you, you know that you are not: it’s a question 
of habits. You are used to eating pasta, you will continue to eat pasta, but I... today I eat pasta, 
tomorrow I eat rice, the day after something else. [...] To make you realise that you are 
underdeveloped, I should invite you at my place and offer you pasta today, rice tomorrow, meat 
on the following day. So when you’ll go back at your place, you’ll tell a third person: you know, 
there is the possibility of not eating pasta everyday, and you will explore this path of change.
In Rahmatou’s opinion, then, the process by which an individual or a country is 
made underdeveloped by being made aware of alternative possibilities is induced from 
the outside. If we take the desertification narrative as something ‘exported’ from 
Northern Development agencies to Southern governments and countries, it is possible to 
see the perspectives presented above as ‘offer driven’. The actors ‘offering’ anti- 
desertification remedies are creating a demand for their services by inducing in the 
recipient country an awareness of its own ‘underdevelopment’. This interpretation is 
supported by the way in which the Unitecl Nations were characterised by some members 
of staff. Thus, Aboubacar, working for the Monitoring and Evaluation Division, argued
The UNDP and the World Bank, for instance, make periodical macro-economic studies, to be 
able to say... Africa, or Niger: here are the indicators, here is the level of poverty, here is the 
level of revenues, here is the sanitary coverage... they tell politicians and development actors: 
this is the level you are at, this is the rank you occupy... and they stimulate them to move 
forward, to improve.
Boureima, who ran the food-for-work logistics said: ‘In general, various UN 
agencies in different sectors will tell a country: here is your indicator... really, you are 
in the red... this is what you have to do’.
Three factors are evident in project staff self-reflexive perceptions of 
underdevelopment: Niger’s underdevelopment is commonly related to desertification, or 
connected factors (rain scarcity, soil impoverishment, agrarian deficit, etc). This 
perspective is parallel to the macro narrative of desertification discussed in the previous 
chapter, and has been adopted by project actors through exposure, at professional 
institutes, in various ministerial and governmental offices, or in their work, to the 
sources of the macro narrative (the national project staff is almost entirely composed of 
Nigerien public servants, ‘detached’ from their public functions and allocated to the 
PDR/ADM). Secondly, the condition of underdevelopment puts Niger in a situation of 
dependency from foreign aid, needed because neither the government nor the population 
have the means necessary to ‘fight against the desert’. Thirdly, some actors expressed 
the idea that underdevelopment is an induced notion, a state of being which you must be
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made aware of. In front of the problems which, according to project staff, characterise 
Niger’s ‘underdevelopment’, the main solution identified are projects.
‘A project is the fight against famine to reach alimentary self sufficiency’, said 
Soumaila Mati, an extension agent of the Agronomy Division. While Abdourrahman, 
responsible for hardware purchasing and inventories of project resources found that a 
project
is something ideal for the rural population, there can be no alternatives. The ideal that I know is 
projects like Keita. For instance, before the Project there were no boutiques, trade was less 
lively, the dwellings were smaller and poorer... there was nothing! But with the Project, even the 
poorest rural areas have advanced!
The basic literacy expert described a development project as ‘an action aimed at 
improving the living conditions in a particular area’. Most definitions were similar to 
this one, in that they emphasised the impact on the living standards of local people: ‘An 
action which contributes to improve the quality of life of the population’ (Hassan of the 
Monitoring and Evaluation Division); ‘A project must satisfy the wishes of a population 
to improve the living conditions of this population’ (Soumaila, chief of the Environment 
Division); ‘A service which has to be established to solve the problems of the rural 
world... it has to provide the means that either the government or the populations lack, 
in order to improve the living conditions of the population, particularly in the rural areas 
which are the most impoverished’ (Nasser, Assistant of the GR Division); ‘it has the 
objective of improving the conditions of the entity where it finds itself (Yacouba, Chief 
of the Administration Division); ‘It’s to advance the situation: there are initial 
conditions which... well... are not fine, and one must try to improve, advance’ (Ali, 
Assistant of the Monitoring and Evaluation Division).
Another set of perspectives highlighted the fact that a project depends on 
external funds. This perspective is evident in the following definitions of a ‘project*: ‘A 
series of operations implemented through foreign financial means provided in order to 
solve serious problems’ (Ibrahim, Chief of the Agronomy Division); ‘A series of 
development actions characterised as an investment... intellectuals can make their 
theories, but there has to be an investment’ (Rano, Public Servant charged with some 
monitoring tasks for the WFP rations); ‘A concentration of activities that brings revenue 
(rendement) to the peasants of a region, an area, or a country’ (Ali, Fishery Expert of
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the Environment Division) ‘An action through which one tries to solve a particular 
problem, with a certain amount of resources, in a certain period of time’(Yacouba, 
Monitoring and Evaluation Division).
The function of external funds was also apparent in comments about the role of 
international development workers. Most of the members of staff referred to persons 
they knew and respected (such as the first project manager or the hydraulic engineer), 
emphasising their technical knowledge and contribution. But often the participation of 
international staff was related to the availability of funds from international donors: 
‘The role of the international staff (des cooperants) is financial support and technical 
control’, argued Soumaila Mati. And Yacouba, the Project Accountant, explained:
The internationals have great knowledge and, in general, a global perspective... and then, they 
are in the shadow of wealth (ils sont a Vombre de la richesse). For instance, today, if you take 
Niger’s technical officers (les cadres techniques), no matter their degree of instruction, they 
haven’t got the kind of knowledge which allows them to be in the shadow of wealth.
The above mentioned statements suggest that, for project agents, a development 
project is essentially an injection of external funds to improve the living standards of the 
local people. No one, in formal or informal settings, ever contested the potential 
efficacy of projects. I heard many debates on why a certain project financed by a 
particular donor did not work or why a certain operation should have been done 
differently, but everybody believed in the type of solutions that a project could offer. 
Given the economic situation of Niger, I was unanimously told that there could be ‘no 
alternatives’ to projects. Moreover, from the perspective of what, in Niger, constitutes 
an elite minority of people, who achieved the kind of education which allows them to 
work as the staff of an international project, projects are the safest form of employment. 
As mentioned above by Soumaila, the Chief of the Environment Division, in Niger ‘the 
private sector is not developed’. Employees in the public sector can never be sure that 
they will be paid their monthly salary, and this is the cause of frequent strikes organised 
by indebted public officials and school teachers. It should come as no surprise that, in 
this context, project staff see foreign projects as the only safe source of funds, able to 
‘provide the means that either the government or the populations lack, in order to 
improve the living conditions of the population, particularly in the rural areas which are 
the most impoverished’ (cf. Nasser, above).
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This leads to the question of how to make the ‘target population’ accept the 
activities implemented by projects and convince it to cooperate with project staff. The 
following section shows that project staff believe that local people are initially reticent 
to adopt innovations, and that they conceive of their task as turning peasants into 
‘beneficiaries’, namely to make the inhabitants of a village or an organised group 
eligible as recipients of aid. In carrying out this ‘brokerage’ function (Bierschenk et al. 
2000) between international development rationalities and what they refer to as ‘peasant 
mentalities’, they render a double service: to the agency they work for, as it facilitates 
the cooperation of local people who are presented, then, as expressing the right ‘needs’ 
and ‘demands’ for their services; and to the villagers, who are thereby granted access to 
the ‘development revenue’. In the PDR/ADM, project agents have a specialised name 
for this function: sensitisation (sensibilisation). Sensitisation consists in making local 
villages aware that the type of activities carried out by the PDR/ADM are in their 
interest, and that they should accept the changes introduced by the project for their own 
good.
5.3.2 ‘The peasant ’ and 'sensitisation ’ : staffperceptions o f the ‘target population ’
One of the factors most commonly mentioned as a problem for Niger, or an obstacle to 
its ‘development’, was the ‘mentality’ [,mentalite] of ‘the peasant’ [le paysan]. The 
belief that ‘the problem of Nigeriens is purely a problem of mentality [mentalite]’ 
(Rahmatou) was very common amongst project staff and, as mentioned already, it was 
the National Coordinator’s perspective.
But how is ‘peasant identity’ represented, and what are the consequences of 
portraying a particular image of ‘the peasant’? Representations of identity are not 
neutral: the work of the project staff is evaluated against the degree to which project 
goals have been achieved. The success of the project staff depends upon the ‘peasant’s’ 
willingness to maintain the project works and to exploit them in a correct way. On the 
other hand, it would be the project’s staff failure, if ‘the peasant’ dismissed project 
initiatives and activities. It is therefore not hard to understand why project staff should 
be so preoccupied with ‘peasant mentality’ and willingness to change.
Here, views differ slightly with respect to how ‘the peasant’ is expected to think. 
However, the main points expressed by project staff in this respect can be summarised
as follows: ‘the peasant’ has a peculiar disposition toward ‘change’; this is often 
characterised by a reticence to promptly adopt changes and innovations. ‘Development’, 
conceived as a move toward a better condition and better living standards, implies 
change. To motivate ‘the peasant’ to accept innovations, he/she has to be ‘sensitised’ 
[sensibilisation]; the aim of ‘sensitisation’ is for ‘the peasant’ to become aware [prise de 
conscience] of his/her own status and ‘assume responsibility’ [responsabilisation] for 
his/her own decision to follow a behaviour that will facilitate his/her ‘development’.
I decided to enquire further into the staff understanding of local people’s identity 
and role. How did they conceptualise so called ‘beneficiaries’? Soumaila Mati of the 
Agronomy Division claimed, ‘Certain peasants are hard headed and don’t understand 
things easily’. Or, as the Commandant of the Environment Division said, ‘The peasant 
is not good -  you go there, you need information, he is going to give you false 
information... it is because his mentality is diffident, you must know them well and 
they must trust you, before they will listen to what you have to say’.
Rahmatou, who worked both in the Women and Development Division and in 
the Monitoring and Evaluation Division, expressed the staff view of peasant identity in 
a clear and articulate way:
Now, the world today requires people to change, things to change: one shouldn’t remain static 
[Or, le monde aujourd 'hui il veut mieux que les gens changent, les choses changent: il faut pas 
rester stationnaire]. The problem ofNigeriens is purely a problem of mentality [mentalite]: there 
is a blockage which makes him not want to change... I can tell myself: if I exit this office and go 
into the other office, what will I find? Isn’t it that I might die in that office? Ah, if I put this in 
my head, it’s the end! I am never going to get out of my office... sometimes peasants are reticent 
even with regards to using fertilisers or improved seeds. It is because they don’t know what will 
be the result... I am going to sow this millet because I know what it is going to give me: I do 
what I am used to do, and I know that if it rains it will give, while the other, I’ve never seen it... 
And then, there is also the fact that here the population is not very mature, there is the level of 
illiteracy which plays a role, which makes people believe that at a certain point the project will 
have to end, and therefore they should just share the resources available and that’s it... that’s the 
difference between those countries where there is enough awareness [prise de conscience] and 
those countries where there is no awareness yet. I am Nigerien, but I know that in Niger, in the 
political field and in the development field, people lack a certain maturity... I am desolated, but I 
am ready to defend my ideas in front of anyone!
Hassan, working at the Monitoring and Evaluation Division, emphasised the 
importance of field agents’ approach to deal with the peasants’ diffidence:
Often peasants are hostile to all change [souvent les paysans, ils sont hostiles aux mutations]. For 
instance, if you take an illiterate peasant... he cannot rapidly perceive the utility of an
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intervention: you will have to create the conditions to be able to advance with him. First, you 
will have to make the peasant understand what will be the result [of the change], what is the aim, 
what interest there is in doing so... it’s sensitisation [c ’est ga la sensibilisation]. [...] You will 
have to adapt the process so that he can understand the objective. I am telling you... the peasant 
is very diffident, but his diffidence is justified: if you have certain habits, it will be hard for you 
to change them, especially if the person who wants to change them does not have well adapted 
methods... since always, those who come to teach them something, come with a system which 
they impose...
Ali, the Project’s Fishery expert and an experienced fieldworker, deeply trusted 
by villagers, provided an example from his own field to clarify the notion of 
‘sensitisation’:
Someone who is older than 50 or even 60 years old, who has never seen a fish before... his 
ancestral habits are inculcated in his head [son habitudes ancestrales sont inculquees dans son 
crane] and it is very difficult to convince him ... even if eventually he might accept, a real 
combat is required! What sort of combat? For example, you are a peasant [paysan] and I am a 
technician [technicien] of this matter... to make you accept a novelty, what can I do? I myself, I 
can go fishing... a demonstration... I can go fishing, return, prepare my fish, eat it... every day I 
will manage so that you are always next to me. You will observe me eating: has anything bad 
happened to me because I was eating fish? I have to repeat this day after day... you will observe 
and reflect. For me, sensitisation [la sensibilisation] is a practical approach to convince the 
individual: you must do it yourself, you who are an officer [un cadre], because theory... with the 
peasant... it really doesn’t work! [...] You know, our Nigerien world... it’s not only the water 
problem! If I take the social group ‘peasant’ [paysan]... ‘backward peasant’[paysan recule]... 
there is a great diffidence on the part of these peasants with regards to all innovation. This is 
what justifies the practical approach. If he reaches the point where he accepts [change], he will 
find himself in the same conditions I am in. Why is the peasant afraid? It is death he is afraid of, 
as a result of contact with anything new. With any new thing, one has to adopt a practical 
approach to demonstrate that it costs nothing [to adopt it].
The opinion of Nasser, the Assistant of the GR Division and one of the 
extensionists most respected by local people, is in agreement with that of Ali. It is 
noteworthy that Nasser and Ali are among the staff members who spend most time with 
local people, and their facilitating skills are renown in the Project. They have ‘the pulse 
of the field’ at all times, and in some villages their opinion is sought on different matters 
not directly related to project activities. Nasser thought that
populations are available... what they lack is the approach and the sensitisation [la 
sensibilisation]. They know the nature of the problem already, but they must be sensitised to be 
led to fight against this problem. [...] Sensitisation must also be accompanied by application. 
When you explain something to people at the beginning, it enters [their ears] and it goes: they 
will say “one day a gentleman has come to explain us -  voila, voila, voila . ..”, but people will 
not believe you unless you pass to action. Sensitisation is important, but there is also the 
approach: the peasant... he knows well... he has his ancient method which he conserves, which 
he has received from the elders. For him, all modem technique is a risk, it isn’t safe. Technicians 
and fieldworkers must have a good approach, they have to support, never abandon... here, we 
have managed to convince these people that what we do, we do for their good.
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Nasser emphasised that ‘peasants’ are not ignorant: they ‘know the nature of the 
problem’; they ‘have their method’. According to him, a lot depends on how they are 
approached. This perspective, which places responsibility for the results of the 
interaction between the local reality and the forces of change represented by 
development professionals on the latter, rather than on ‘the peasant’, was often put forth 
to me at the Project. Alhadji Abdou, the Chief of the GR Division, was also a strenuous 
defendant of the peasant’s position, and, like Nasser, he thought that it was the 
extensionist’s task, through ‘sensitisation’, to convince the ‘peasant’ to cooperate with 
projects for the peasant’s own interest:
The peasant is very receptive, he has a real will to change, but everything depends on the way in 
which he is approached: if you are the administrative type, you come once, you tell him a few 
words... [shakes his head]... what they want is someone ready to mix with them. It is normal 
that he will appear a bit reticent: The peasant, he has all the problems! No solution is ever found 
for him. Year one he pays taxes, year two he pays taxes, year three he pays taxes... and then he 
sees that in his village there is not even a school, not even a well, an infirmary... but why? 
Necessarily, he will lose trust in those who are supposed to make his interest. The majority of the 
times that they look for the peasant, it is because they need something from him: it’s for his 
porridge [boule], for his kilo of peas, his kola-nuts, this and that... this is a real shame! [...] 
Sensitisation is to make someone understand the causes of the situation in which he finds himself 
and how to remedy to it.
With Nasser, Alhadji justifies the peasants’ hesitation, not as an aversion toward 
change per se, but as an attitude developed out of their negative experience with 
technocrats, or as the natural reaction of someone who has been used for his/her entire 
life to different habits and different ways to interact with the world. As Alhadji 
mentioned and as I often noticed on visits to local fields, some of the Project’s 
techniques to ‘fight against desertification’ were known to local villagers, who practised 
them in more rudimentary forms in their own fields. Hassan argued:
Even before we started making anti-erosion bunds [banquettes], peasants had started to line-up 
stones to save their fields, but they stopped: there is no collective awareness... they do it for their 
own field, it’s not durable, it’s transient... but if there is a sensitisation that convinces him that it 
is an interest... peasants are not afraid of what one brings to them, they are afraid that it will not 
last: they must be sensitised to make them understand that it’s up to them to save their territory 
[...]. But unfortunately, when projects arrive they never make the peasant understand that they 
can help the Project... but it’s the peasant who has to continue afterwards! And peasants haven’t 
got a tendency to look for new solutions : they think that one has what was sent by God, and 
there’s nothing to do about it... but this isn’t a religious problem, because religion has never said 
this: fatalism is tied to the climate, to the dependency from the rains...
The Colonel, the counterpart of Alhadji Abdou in the local Administration, 
thought that
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Peasants are open... but they don’t have the same level of reasoning. They have their lifestyle, 
which is really different from ours: the peasant has his livestock, he has his field, his 
environment, the well... for him, the world ends there! We, we can see the long term... but they, 
if they see that there are some trees already, and they don’t need more trees for any particular 
reason, they will not plant more trees [for reforestation purposes]. But they are not closed, really: 
if they see that an operation is profitable, they have no reason not to accept. A good sensitisation 
is needed to bring the peasant to accept a certain number of notions.
Ali, working in the Monitoring and Evaluation Department, expanded on the 
notion of sensitisation: ‘Sensitisation, then, means to go to someone and try to make 
him reason, to involve him, to attract his attention on a number of points... people are 
the engine: If you want to make durable development, you have to start at the base, from 
the real problems’. In the first part of this quote, Ali is emphasising the agency of the 
development worker in ‘making the peasant reason’ according to development 
rationalities. This operation is seen as primordial, because, as he underlines, people are 
‘the engine’, the ‘basis’ of development interventions and, for development to 
legitimate its interventions, the claim that the region in question is affected by problems 
and that change is needed must originate from the supposed ‘victims’, the ‘peasants’. 
However, this is an offer-driven process (Neubert 2000:255), which relies on 
‘sensitisation’ to make reality appear as if the problem was expressed at the local level 
in the first place, and as if the entire process which will follow was ‘bottom-up’. This 
interpretation is confirmed by Yacouba, of the Monitoring and Evaluation Division:
through sensitisation one has to bring information where it is needed, to bring someone to 
awareness of what is really happening [amener quelqu’un a prendre conscience de ce qui se 
passe en realite]. Peasants have a peculiar comprehension, which is not always obvious, not 
always logic... certain phenomena, people live them, but they don’t know exactly where they 
come from, what is at the origin, and what has to be done to fight them: it is sensitisation and 
demonstration actions that can lead them to adopt other behaviours, to acquire new competences.
And Soumaila, working in the same Division :
Sensitisation means to inform people, to make them become aware of their problems [la 
sensibilisation c ’est informer les gens, c 'est leur faire prendre conscience de leur problemes]: 
they know what they suffer from, but it is most often the solution to these problems that they 
ignore, and often these are entirely technical things.
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5.4 Conclusion
You are a peasant. One day some people arrive and start digging reforestation trenches 
around your village. You may have witnessed erosion, you may have lost some animals, 
and maybe some relatives in the last drought, but you’ve never heard nor read about the 
narrative of desertification (besides, you are illiterate). Somehow, you must be ‘made 
aware’ that you ‘need’ the reforestation trenches that are being dug behind your hut. 
Someone must ‘explain’ to you what’s going on and why. ‘Sensitisation’ induces a 
‘form of reasoning’ which will make people accept change, a project, ‘development’. 
The Hausa term for sensitisation is lkaiya waye’ (or ‘waye kaV): literally, ‘the head has 
been enlightened’, and now you reason in accord with development rationality.
Shift perspective for a moment. You are a member of staff of an IRDP, the 
peasant who ‘doesn’t understand desertification’ appears to you as someone with a 
‘different mentality’. You know that ‘things must be changed’, but s/he doesn’t: her/his 
mentality is ‘resistant to change’. Your task, then, is to help the peasant open her/his 
mind, so that her/his lot might improve. You have to ‘sensitise’ the peasant for his/her 
own good and because it’s your job to do so. It’s your job to carry out project activities 
in and around local villages, with local people. You, in turn, have been sensitised 
through exposure to the development narrative.
The following chapter argues that local people are not victims, instrumentally 
used to justify a process which is orchestrated against their wills and behind their 
shoulders. They too have an interest in taking advantage of the resources made available 
by a development project. ‘Development’ is a valued source of revenue in a context 
characterised by few alternative ways to make a living and scarcity of income 
opportunities. In the majority of villages falling in the PDR/ADM’s intervention area, 
people’s livelihood depends almost entirely upon subsistence agriculture and the 
remittances of male seasonal migration. The presence of the Project makes available a 
third form of income, a ‘development revenue’, which has a significant impact on local 
living conditions.
As will become clear in the following chapter, men and women in the villages of 
Keita trusted the Project because they appreciated its impacts on their land. It is 
undeniable that the PDR/ADM brought lakes where there had never been water, it
151
brought fish to the diet of herders, it covered barren hills with trees and fodder, it 
reversed a severe process of erosion. Keita farmers, trained as mechanics and tractor 
drivers, and thousands of women, alone with their children in the dry season, felt they 
contributed to what they saw as a ‘success’. And so did President Kountche, so did FAO 
bureaucrats, so did Italian officers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the 
PDR/ADM’s staff. During its first three phases, the Keita Project accommodated the 
‘projects in the Project’ of various categories of actors involved in it.
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6. THE PEOPLE
6.1 Introduction
Most of the 400 villages falling in the PDR/ADM’s intervention area know the Project 
through its ‘fight against desertification’ worksites (chantiers de lutte contre la 
desertification). The chantier, therefore, is an important interface between the Project 
and the people of the Ader Doutchi Majiya (Long 1996). People working on the 
Project’s chantiers are remunerated in food-for-work rations. Because almost all adult 
men (between 18 and 35 years) migrate seasonally to find manual jobs in Niamey, or in 
cities in Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, the Project’s labour-force consists mainly of 
women and children. The elders remain in the villages (cf. Chapter 3).
Project works are normally stopped, or substantially decreased, in the rainy
i
season, when the men come back from abroad to work in their fields. They leave again 
after the harvest, around October. The harvest varies consistently from year to year, and 
in good years it might be just enough for some wealthier farmers to provide food for the 
household, while in average years subsistence production is in deficit, and migrants’ 
earnings and food rations, when available, are used to complement consumption (cf. 
Cremona 1986:103).
The Ader Doutchi Majiya is a vast region, and there are variations to this 
pattern. In the southern reaches of the project area (i.e. the northern Majiya valley) the 
rains tend to be more abundant and the lands are more fertile. In a few major centres, 
like the villages of Keita, Tamaske, and Ibohamane, the economy is more diversified, 
and agriculture and herding are not the only sources of income. Some small villages are 
located in limited productive areas, such as the villages of Toumboulana and Zangarata, 
where the production of onions (mainly), or other irrigated crops, is possible, and can 
represent an important source of revenue.
As we have seen in the first two chapters, class is another important axis of 
diversification. ADM society is highly stratified, and higher classes are wealthier, 
possess more and better lands, and have a larger web of social connections to rely upon 
in times of scarcity. The lowest social class is represented by the ex-slaves of the 
Tuareg, called Bouzou. Bouzou people can be found both in ethnically mixed villages
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and in homogeneous Bouzou settlements, often installed on marginal lands. Better off 
Tuareg and Hausa people will do chantier work only if in real need, as the work is 
characterised as low status and is physically demanding. In this sense, food-for-work is 
‘self targeting’, in that only those people who do not have enough means to fulfil their 
food needs will be willing to work for the Project.
Since 199756, with the establishment of the Division for the Promotion of 
Women, another institution connecting local villages and the Project became 
widespread, namely the ‘groupemenf (organised group, local association). The majority 
of groups are ‘women’s groups’, which today are almost 200. From local people’s 
perspective, a noteworthy distinction between the chantier and the groupement is that 
the former is active for limited periods of time and in a few villages at a time: once a 
particular task has been accomplished, old chantiers will close and new ones will open 
elsewhere. Instead, the groupement is a group of individuals who chose to organise 
themselves around some income generating activities. Their official title is 
Groupements d Interet Economique (GIE) and their legal recognition in Niger is a 
rather straightforward process (Yacouba 2000:16). Groupements rely on the support of 
the Project to form, obtain legal recognition, and carry out activities promoted by the 
PDR/ADM, mainly the Women and Development Division, and the Agronomy 
Division. Their activities include the production of seedlings, micro-credit, the 
management of mills, and various training courses (relating to literacy, hygiene, credit, 
etc) for women only, and testing improved seeds and inputs for men. While this is not a 
complete list of the groupemenf s activities, it gives an idea of their functions and 
relations with the Project.
This chapter looks at different axes along which the people of the ADM have 
experienced their relations with the Project. It begins by describing the historical and 
social context of a socially marginal Bouzou village, Tinkirana Tounga. It then looks at 
the livelihood and subsistence strategies of different village households, giving 
examples of intra-household resource allocation and division of tasks, and focusing on 
the impact of project activities and food-for-work on local production and consumption
56 There had always been local institutions like the ‘groupement’ working with the project: in the first two 
phases, these were represented by the participatory institutions of Kountche’s Societe de Developpement, 
but it is only with the establishment of the Women and Development Division that these organised groups 
of local people grew in number and carried out activities arranged by the PDR/ADM.
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patterns. Moving from the household to project worksites, the chapter describes how 
different categories of workers carry out their tasks in a reforestation chantier. It then 
asks what is the significance for local labour of working for the PDR/ADM, and 
highlights gender variations in local perceptions of the Project. While women 
emphasise the food-for-work component, men are more likely to mention the 
environmental impacts of project activities. Both men and women are consistent in 
wanting to attract project intervention to their villages, as it provides a form of 
‘development revenue’ in addition to the limited sources of income available. Finally, 
the chapter analyses the phenomenon of inter-village competition over project 
interventions and describes the various ways in which villages of different status, in this 
highly stratified context, attempt to ‘capture’ project works at the expense of their 
neighbours.
6.2 Tinkirana Tounga
Tinkirana Tounga is a relatively recent settlement, founded between 60 and 70 years 
ago by Boulla Atessa, its first village chief, who came from the nearby village of 
Tinkirana Thinkakatan (Tiemogo 1994; Paoletti and Taliani 1984; PDR/ADM, fiche du 
village; my interviews with Boulla Atessa and Idrissa Ichigu, 28 July 1995). Its 
inhabitants speak Tamas Agalal, a dialect of Tamasheq spoken by the Kel Agalal, the 
Tuareg group of origin of the people who today inhabit Tinkirana Tounga. The Kel 
Agalal57 is a vassal ‘tribe’58 of the Kel Gress, one of the two major Tuareg 
 ^ constituencies present in the Ader Doutchi Region. The Kel Gress established their
sovereignty on the Ader Doutchi Region in the first quarter of the 19th century (Hamani 
1975:132). The four noble tribes (imajeghen) of the Kel Gress were the Tatmakkarat, 
the Ighayawan, the Kel Unwar, and the Tagayyis. With these noble tribes were 
associated tribes of free vassals (imghad): the Illabakan, the Inamagrawan, and the Kel 
Agalal. The Kel Agalal was attached to the noble Tagayyis Tribe (Hamani 1975:133). 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, tribes of imghad status could have (freed) groups of slave 
origin (ighawallan) as dependants, who lived in autonomous settlements where they 
practised small scale herding and agriculture, retaining weak ties of subordination to 
their patrons (ibid: 134). Tinkirana Tounga is one of these settlements.
57 According to Raulin, the term ‘Kel Agalal’ means ‘people of the South’ in Tamashek (1963a:33).
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According to Tiemogo (1994), approximately 60 years ago the Kel Agalal noble 
men moved to Chadawanka, where they are now established, definitely leaving land and 
part of the animals to some of their dependants who remained behind and founded the 
village of Tinkiranai Tounga, designating Boulla Atessa as their first village chief in 
1956. Today, the livelihood standards of Tinkirana Tounga households are all relatively 
homogenous, and wealth and status differences are minimal internally. Even the village 
chief is a primus inter pares, selected, as I was told by other elders, because of his 
‘ilimi’, wisdom. From a regional perspective, Tinkirana Tounga’s people are of low 
rank, and are commonly referred to as ‘Bouzou* (a category designating the ex-slave 
castes of the Tuareg) by outsiders (cf. Tidjani-Alou 2000).
The UTE59 o f Tinkirana, comprises 6 village groups (3 administrative villages), 
for a total of about 1500 persons (881 in 1985), of whom approximately 650 live in the 
village of Tinkirana Tounga (Tiemogo 1994). The population is growing at an annual 
rate of 3.9% (ibid: 14). The total area of the UTE is 81,4 km2, only 9-10% of which was 
cultivable before project interventions, following which this cultivable area has 
increased by 50% (Malam Manzo 1994).
Tiemogo’s 1994 survey suggests that the UTE comprised 412.9 UBT, or 1,263 
sheep and goats, 273 head of cattle, 35 camels, 16 horses, and 62 donkeys (1994:20). 
However, these figures are likely to be affected by the disastrous impact of the 1984/5 
famine on local cattle and by epidemics which killed about half of the population of 
sheep and goats in 1992/93 (Tiemogo 1994:39). In general, villagers complain that, 
while in the past they used to have many animals, after the 1984/5 drought they were 
never able to reconstitute their original stock, because they had to sell their animals 
every year in order to buy cereals to feed their families (cf. Paoletti and Taliani 
1984:164).
Before 1994, the UTE did not have a primary school, and none of its 250 
children of school age had attended a ‘modem’ school. Accordingly, most of the
58 The term ‘tribus’ is generally used in francophone literature on the Tuareg, designating a subdivision of 
the ‘confederation’, or larger Tuareg constituency. The definition of these social units (confederations and 
tribus) follow agnatic classificatory criteria.
59 UTE : Unite Territoriale Elementaire (Basic Territorial Unit), geo-morphological units used by the 
project to classify the local territory for the purposes of its environmental interventions.
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population was illiterate, with the exception of a few men who had learned how to read 
and write as migrant workers. In 1994-5 the PDR/ADM built a school in Tinkirana 
Tounga, attended, at present, by some 90 students aged between 7 and 14. The biggest 
nearby village is Ibohamane (8 kilometers from Tinkirana Tounga), which hosts the 
most important market in Tinkirana Tounga’s vicinities and the nearest health centre.
6.2.1 Perceptions o f environmental crisis in Tinkirana Tounga
Tinkirana elders say that the hills surrounding their village used to be covered with a 
savannah-type forest where wild game could be hunted. The soil could not be seen 
through the dense shrubs, bush, and vegetation which covered the area. When the 
project arrived, the UTE of Tinkirana was severely affected by erosion. It did not 
contain any fertile valley lands (fadama), and three temporary water courses which form 
during the rainy season ‘scraped away’ organic residues, rendering the village of 
Tinkirana Tounga inaccessible for weeks, impoverishing the soil, and endangering 
village dwellings, only to disappear in one month or two, leaving almost no trace of 
water on site. In 1995 Tinkirana Tounga’s water problem was rendered less acute by a 
small detention dam built by the PDR/ADM, which, in years with average rainfall 
levels, can hold water for about eight months after the rains.
The statements of Tinkirana Tounga’s men, collected by Paoletti and Taliani in 
1984, capture evocatively the sense of anxiety toward erosion phenomena and the fall in 
agricultural productivity: ‘we can cultivate millet, but harvests are always more meagre 
because water does not ‘stay’ on our lands anymore’ (Paoletti and Taliani 1984:168); 
‘in some places erosion has impoverished lands to the extent that they are now totally 
sterile’; ‘having fields is not a problem, the problem is to have a harvest’ (1984:163); 
‘water is the only medicine for our land’ (1984:168); ‘some of us have sold our animals 
to buy millet last year: what will we be able to sell this year?’ (1984:168). Comparing 
the responses of the people of Tinkirana to those collected in other villages, Paoletti and 
Taliani conclude that ‘the clarity and the accuracy of the technical terminology used by 
[Tinkirana’s] men, who live in person an ecologic catastrophe of extreme magnitude, is 
certainly very surprising’ (1984:164). The behaviour of Tinkirana Tounga’s women also 
differed from what was observed in other villages. Paoletti and Taliani’s (1984) 
research took place at a time when Kountche’s propaganda had promoted the spread of 
women-groups and collective enterprises in the form of ‘Associations Feminines’.
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Nevertheless, Tinkirana Tounga’s women had not started any common initiative, 
justifying their atypical situation to the researchers in the following terms: ‘We help 
each other as we can, but we do not engage in common works because each one of us 
has to help solve the problems of her family’ (quoted in Paoletti and Taliani 1984:178).
The above suggests that the consequences of the 1968-73 and 1984-85 droughts 
were acute in Tinkirana Tounga, with a considerable impact on the livelihood of its 
inhabitants who are able to recall a time when the local production was not only enough 
to feed their families, but part of which could also be sold at the market. Today, the 
great majority of households do not produce enough food to meet its members’ 
subsistence needs over the year, and seasonal migration is universal amongst young and 
adult men (Paoletti and Taliani 1984; Simonelli 1994).
Because of the severe conditions in which it found itself during drought years, 
the UTE of Tinkirana has received a particularly high concentration of project 
interventions. It is possible to classify different UTEs according to intervention 
‘intensity’ by comparing the relative cost of rehabilitation works. Compared to the 
average expense per UTE of FCFA 167,239,411, by April 2000, the UTE of Tinkirana 
had ‘absorbed’ FCFA 426,870,800. If one takes into account the relative population 
density of different UTEs, while the average cost/inhabitant of project interventions in 
the entire intervention area is FCFA 55,927, the cost per inhabitant in the UTE of 
Tinkirana amounts to FCFA 325,856. In the difficult situation described above, the 
availability of WFP food-for-work rations was highly valued by men and women 
equally.
Due to the high incidence of male out-migration, in the first years of project 
intervention in the UTE, women comprised 90% of the local labour force on the 
Project’s rehabilitation sites. Hence, the women of Tinkirana soon became a good 
example of the ‘Femme de Keita’ model (cf. Chapter 7), and their efforts on project 
work sites gained them official recognition in the press. One of them, Hajiya, was 
symbolically decorated by the Head of State, President Kountche. At the same time, the 
acute food deficit and the lack of alternative income sources due to the village’s 
marginal geographic location, made food-for-work a highly valued resource.
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Paoletti and Taliani suggest that the extreme vulnerability of Tinkirana Tounga’s 
livelihoods plays a crucial role in reducing intrahousehold and other social tensions: ‘in 
the case of Tinkirana, the incumbent threat of famine and the reduction of cultivable 
lands appeases all [potential] social conflicts’ (1984:183). This may, at least partly, 
account for the ‘cooperative behaviour’ between genders which characterises the 
relations between Tinkirana Tounga’s men and women and the PDR/ADM until 1999. 
In other terms, in a context where different members have hardly any choice but to pool 
their incomes and resources so as to meet the household’s subsistence needs, project 
activities with women, including women’s work on the environmental work sites 
remunerated in WFP rations, are, really, benefiting the household as a whole (rather 
than individual women workers). In this sense, high vulnerability to food deficit tends to 
contain potential intrahousehold conflicts over individual control of resources (cf. Sen 
1990). The following section analyses the function of WFP rations in Tinkirana 
Tounga’s household livelihood strategies and intrahousehold resource allocation.
6.3 Livelihood of Bouzou Households in Tinkirana Tounga and Impact of Food- 
for-work.
On one of the first occasions I went to Tinkirana Tounga I was introduced to Hajiya. 
Hajiya must have been in her fifties and, after President Kountche’s visit to the 
PDR/ADM, she had been decorated for her valuable efforts in the Project work sites, 
and she was awarded a ticket to visit Mecca. As soon as we were introduced, she took 
me by the hand and brought me to her compound. Inside the enclosure, she disappeared 
into the hut, and came back with a piece of cloth in her hands. She opened it and 
showed me a medal. Then she gave me some papers in French, attesting her 
contribution to the rehabilitation of Niger’s environment. Her name was handwritten on 
the certificate, and she told me with evident pride that the medal had been given to her 
for her work on the project work sites. The President himself had allowed her to travel 
to Mecca by airplane. She showed me her hands. Her palms were as hard as wood. She 
said women had worked hard in the Project {mata su yi add tukuru tare da proje Keita). 
Another woman, somewhat younger than Hajiya, showed me the hills surrounding 
Tinkirana, where project anti-erosion bunds could be seen; then she also showed me her 
calloused hands, worn out by heavy manual work, and told me ‘it is us, women, who 
did that job’ {mu, mata, mun yi aikin can). Soon, most of the women present were 
showing me their hands, wanting me to feel their coarseness.
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6.3.1 Issoufs household
Salamatou is 32, and she worked on the PDR/ADM chantiers on every occasion the 
project recruited labour in Tinkirana Tounga. During the last two project interventions, 
she used to work on the intervention sites 4 days a week, obtaining her daily food 
ration. In her household, Salamatou shares the burden of domestic chores and childcare 
with her co-wife; she participates in all agricultural activities; and is responsible for 
looking after three goats, which she does not own.
She is the first wife of Issouf, who has taken a second wife after 10 years of 
marriage with Salamatou. Their household is composed of 9 members, 6 of whom are 
children under 15 (three of them are less than 6 years old). Salamatou has four children, 
and the younger wife, Fatimata, has recently given birth to a girl. Salamatou and 
Fatimata lost one child at childbirth and one child at 8 months, respectively. A 10-year- 
old niece of their husband lives with them.
Their lifestyle is modest, but my own surveys suggest that Issoufs household 
falls in Tinkirana Tounga’s average. They rely on the production of 6 fields, with a total 
area of 3.5 hectares, on which they cultivate millet (approximate yearly production: 
0.800 tons) and sorghum (approximate yearly production: 0.500 tons). Of these 3.5 
hectares, a field of 0.25 hectares belongs to Fatimata, who has inherited it from her 
father and on which spices and vegetables are grown; and they obtained another field of 
0.75 hectares from the PDR/ADM’s redistribution of locally rehabilitated lands. A field 
of 2.5 hectares belongs to Issouf and the remaining 1 hectare (divided into two separate 
0.5 hectares fields) belongs to Issoufs classificatory brothers who no longer reside in 
Tinkirana. Issouf and his family cultivate it and consume its produce without paying 
anything to the owners, but I was told that were they to return to Tinkirana they would 
take their fields back. Issouf used to own 20 sheep, 10 goats, and 2 horses, but all the 
sheep died of disease in 1990-1993. Today, he retains 2 horses and 6 goats.
Salamatou says that the production of their lands is not sufficient to nourish 
them throughout the whole year, and they consume all the cereals of the food-for-work 
rations and use the earnings derived from Issoufs work as a migrant in Nigeria almost 
entirely to complement food production on their fields. She sells the other components
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of the WFP rations, and gets involved in a small scale foodstuff sale. Issouf works in 
Nigeria every year for 2 to 4 months, eaminga total of approximately FCFA 80,000. 
They do not use agricultural inputs on their fields, nor do they employ paid labour, but 
all children above 5 contribute to agricultural tasks and livestock. None of them goes to 
school.
If we take 250 kilograms per annum as the average cereal consumption needs 
per person (Sassi 1991:17), the quantity of cereals which Issoufs household should 
dispose of in order to feed its 13 members over the year would amount to 2,250 kg. The 
total production of Issoufs fields amounts to approximately 1,300 kg, and the 
household’s food deficit is about 1,000 kg. As the average cost of one kilogram of 
millet at Ibohamane’s market is approximately FCFA 100 (see Table 3), Issoufs 
household should earn about FCFA 100,000 in order to become self sufficient. Issoufs 
migration revenue is about FCFA 80,000. The cash value of WFP rations is about 
FCFA 20,000 per worker per month. These rough calculations show that Issoufs 
household has to spend almost its entire income on consumption60.
I first met Salamatou on a project work site, and then went to visit her on other 
occasions at her place in Tinkirana. One day I walked back from the chantier to 
Tinkirana with her. Food-for-work had been distributed and one of her sons, who had 
joined her at the distribution, was accompanying her carrying the ration. At the outskirts 
of Tinkirana, she and other women returning from the chantier stopped at a communal 
pounding site, emptied their FFW millet into mortars, and began preparing the dinner 
with the help of children. I asked her if she didn’t sell the cereals, as I had seen her and 
others sell other components of the WFP ration. In Tinkirana, she answered, everybody 
‘eats’ the ration (mutane suna ci taimakon abinci). Other women agreed, one of them 
mimicking the act of eating the grains from her mortar, causing the others to laugh. 
People are too poor to sell cereals (mostly millet), but they often sell the tinned meat, 
and sometimes even the oil and sugar, to buy more grain and some meat for the sauce. 
The profits made from the sale tend to be used for women’s independent food-sales 
business, rather than for domestic consumption. The Project is really ‘a help’ (taimako),
60 A more accurate analysis should take into account several factors, e.g. not all family members are 
present in Tinkirana throughout the entire year; children are breastfed until they are 2 years old and young 
children’s cereal requirements are less than those of adults; livestock is likely to play a more important 
economic role than what is claimed at the interviews; women’s profits through their economic activities; 
etc.
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and she wished there were chantiers every year. All the village women I heard were 
consistent on this point.
I heard women asking project staff to open chantiers in their villages endless 
times. Women’s preferred project interventions were the chantiers and the literacy 
courses, as these were the only interventions for which food-for-work was distributed. 
Although it is mostly women who would work in the chantiers, men and women alike 
wanted chantier work in their village.
6.3.2 Mohamed’s household: a wealthy household
Mohamed is considered to be amongst the most active and successful men in Tinkirana 
Tounga. His household is probably the wealthiest in the village. Today he is in his mid­
forties and does not migrate anymore, but as a younger man he used to be considered a 
‘grand exodant’. Mohamed is the classificatory brother (FBS or parallel cousin) of the 
village chief, but due to his personal charisma and personal achievements, his influence 
in Tinkirana is not inferior to the Chiefs, and when issues related to project intervention 
are discussed in the village, Mohamed is an unquestioned authority. Mohamed has 
always been the chef de chantier of Tinkirana’s intervention sites.
In all project initiatives, Mohamed was always involved. He has three wives and 
13 children, two of which are adopted (four children died in the past). All his children 
attend, have attended, or will attend, Tinkirana’s ‘modem school’ built in 1994 by the 
PDR/ADM. Mohamed’s household has 5 fields, a total of almost 5 hectares. The total 
production of his fields is about 1.5 tons of millet and 1.2 tons of sorghum per annum. 
On four fields he cultivates millet and sorghum, on the fifth one, of approximately 1 
hectare, situated in the immediate surroundings of the water detention dam built by the 
project, Mohamed has planted all sorts of vegetables and fruit trees, and even some 
sugar cane, and he has dug an elaborate system of irrigation canals throughout it. He is 
solely responsible for working on this field, whereas work on the other fields is carried 
out by all household members, and rarely employs some waged labourers. Mohamed 
owns 2-3 head of cattle and about 20 sheep and goats. He gives his cattle to a village 
herder over the dry months of the year, whereas his wives and children guard the small 
ruminants and poultry. Mohamed is a marabout: he reads some Arabic and teaches 
some Islamic verses. He is also a part-time tailor, a skill which he has learned in the
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West African Coast, and he earns FCFA 10,000 (UK£10) per month when he works for 
the Project as a chef de chantier.
Although Mohamed’s fields produce about 2,700 kg of cereals per annum, his 
17-member household would need 4,250 kg per annum to reach subsistence levels. A 
deficit of 1,550 kg (equivalent to approximately FCFA 155,000) must be covered 
through other income-generating activities (the product of Mohamed’s off-season field; 
Mohamed’s job as tailor and marabout; the activities of other family members; 
livestock). Revenues from cattle are likely to be substantially more important than what 
I recorded at interviews: in Tinkirana, as in many villages in the ADM, herding used to 
be more important than farming as a source of income. Mohamed’s sons will soon be 
old enough to start practising seasonal migration, but they will have to save part of their 
revenue for future marriage expenses. Today, his 9-year-old son is the best student of 
Tinkirana’s modem school, and Mohamed hopes he will find a well remunerated job in 
the capital and send some money back home.
Mohamed’s wives are responsible for domestic chores and do limited work on 
the household fields (they participated in sowing). Each one of them has received a 
small parcel of about 0.2 hectares from Mohamed, where they cultivate sorghum, niebe, 
gombo and a few spices. Not simultaneously, each of Mohamed’s wives has worked on 
the project work sites, for about one day per week. The oldest wife, Fatchima, weaves 
about 5 mats per month, some of which she sells when she or one of her co-wives visit 
local markets. The most experienced in project work is Geshtu. She had been married to 
a poorer, now deceased, man, before marrying Mohamed (the two ‘adoptive’ children 
are her children from her first union) and used to work on project sites 3 or 4 days a 
week. Today, she says, she is able to retain a part of what she earns by selling tinned 
meat. She makes a small profit from this sale, and she uses it to make gifts to friends 
and relatives on special occasions. In her first marriage, however, she could not keep 
anything for herself and used to be ashamed of her poverty, which obliged her to ask for 
help from relatives and generous neighbours.
It is only relatively wealthy village women who are able to retain part of the 
returns from their project-related activities. They invest part of this income in small 
scale foodstuff sale amongst neighbours. Sometimes, they buy goats, make them breed,
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and sell a goat when they need cash to pursue other economic activities or buy gifts. 
Some women told me that a woman may save money secretly and buy goats which she 
would give her family or trusted friends to keep for her, in order to retain some personal 
possession and buy herself what she may need without having to ask her husband. But 
only women with ‘bad husbands’ would do this. Poorer women say that if they needed 
money for small gifts, their husbands would give it to them. Otherwise, women could 
use their earnings from selling mats or foodstuff at local markets or at neighbours’ 
houses.
6.4 Working for the Project on the Chantiers {Aikin Gandari)
6.4.1 Work organisation on project worksites
There are four main different ways to organise worksites, according to the type of 
project activity carried out. There are the reforestation trenches (trenchees) and dune- 
fixing (fixation de dunes) worksites, under the control of the Environment Division; and 
the hydraulic work ('gabions *) and the anti-desertification bunds (banquettes) worksites 
under the control of the Genie Rural Division. The labour force comprises volunteers 
from the villages in which the works take place, remunerated by World Food Program 
(WFP or PAM) food-for-work rations. Worksites are called 4chantiers’, in French, or 
'(aikin) gandari’ in Hausa.
Local villagers refer to different types of chantiers with different terms. Hausa 
names identify chantiers with the types of soil or with the geographic areas where they 
are carried out: hence, reforestation trenches, usually dug on the slopes, are the works 
carried out on the 4tsakonV (hill, slope), and sometimes they are called 'aikin ramu\ 
The fixing of moving dunes is the work carried out on the 'tudunV (dune) or 'tudunin 
kasa’ (dune-soil). The hydraulic works can either be called 'darmun ghiabbu \  meaning 
‘fixing the water-course’, or according to the specific task carried out within the 
chantier: 'aikin doutchi\ literally ‘stones work’, refers to the task of assembling stones 
and filling gabion weirs with them (pictures 27, 29, 30, 31); and 'aikin waya \  or ‘wire 
work’, refers to tasks related to the positioning of gabion weirs (pictures 20, 21). 
Finally, anti-erosion bunds are built both on glacis lands (fakonkoni), and on plateaux 
(<dabbuga), although their dimension varies on glacis and plateaux. In general, work 
carried out on the plateaux can be termed 'aikin dabbuga or dabagV and on the glacis,
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'aikin fakonkonV. Also here, stones are assembled to strengthen the bunds, and the 
stone carrying can be called 'aikin doutchi\ ‘stones work’.
Activities are decided on the basis of the PDR/ADM’s methodology, which 
conducts works of environmental rehabilitation organised from upstream to downstream 
sub-catchment systems. Moreover, the PDR/ADM continuously receives demands of 
intervention from villages in the intervention area (see figure 2), which it catalogues and 
which influence the selection of intervention sites, provided that they conform with the 
project’s methodology.
At the opening of a chantier, an agreement, written in French and Hausa, 
(Takardar Yarjejeniyar Shirin Ayyukan Gyaran Karkara) is signed between the 
PDR/ADM, the village chief and an Administrative Authority (usually the Vice-Prefect 
or Sous-Prefet). Food rations are also managed according to an agreement between the 
PDR/ADM and the village, signed by the village chief (hakimi). Two books are kept, a 
participation book (takardar sunan m a’aikata) and a storehouse book (takardar 
ma ’ajiya). The equipment (kayan aiki) for the conduct of project-related activities is 
provided by the Project for the duration of the chantier.
On the chantiers, there is a minimal differentiation of tasks, which varies 
slightly with the type of chantier. There is always a worksite chief (chef de chantier or 
shugaban gandari), who ideally should be a man if the majority of workers are men, or 
a woman if most labourers are women. During the First Phase of the Project, the 
worksite chief was almost always a man, but the policy changes in favour of female 
chantier chiefs when it was realized that the vast majority of labourers were women (cf. 
Chapter 7). There may be a respected elder (lattizo) who supervises the works and 
advises the chantier chief if any problem occurs. There is usually also an assistant to the 
chantier chief who can read and write and takes note of the participation. On the 
hydraulic works chantiers, there are a few workers who have received some extra 
training to coordinate the filling (remplissage) of the gabion weirs. And on the 
reforestation worksites, some workers (called ‘traceurs’) have to define the positioning 
and shape of the trenches. The workers should be between 13 and 50 years of age.
6.4.2 ‘Aikin gandari ’ (chantier work)
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Reforestation trench chantiers (see pictures 25 and 26) are organised by the 
Environment Division. The policy is that each worker has to build one trench, and once 
his/her work is accomplished, he/she can go home. However, in practice the rules are 
often altered to fit the needs of the participants.
On the chantier of Tinkirana, two older women were working in pairs, one was 
digging for some time, while the other sat next to her, crouching on the earth, with her 
chin against the back of her hand, and her elbow on her knee. The silence was broken 
by a joke: the one who was working in the trench, started removing earth from the 
trench with her hands, and pretended to throw it at the other one, telling her that all she 
did was watch her work, and that she worked a lot less, she just sat around. They 
laughed. The other woman answered that when she was digging she did a lot more in a 
shorter time, because she was stronger. Then they switched roles. No one had a watch, 
so they didn’t time each other. I noticed that the one who made the joke, who seemed 
somewhat younger than the other, worked a bit more, but it didn’t cause resentment 
between them. I found out afterwards that one of them was the sister, and the other, the 
elder wife of Aghali, who was not migrating anymore, he was just staying at home, 
while his wife went to work on the Project worksite. The sister was married to another 
man in the same village, and after the distribution of the food-for-work they shared the 
ration. Their husbands were engaged in other activities. One of them went to local 
markets twice a week and tried to sell small livestock; he sometimes sold other people’s 
livestock too, for a small part of the price. He was not a specialised dealer, he was just 
‘doing a favour’ for his relatives and neighbours. He had never worked on the Project’s 
chantiers. When I asked him why, he answered: ‘Why should I do so, if I can have my 
wife go?’. It was a ‘project rule’ that only one person per household could work in the 
same chantier at a time. It seemed to be a ‘local rule’ that that person had to be a 
woman or a youth.
In another trench, a young woman was digging with her baby of only a few 
months tied to her back. At around noon, she was half inside the trench. Her name was 
Fati and she was the only wife of a migrant worker in Nigeria. She had almost 
completed her task, which she had begun around 7 am. Under her skirt, appeared thin, 
stick-like legs, which contrasted with her bare large feet. She had no shoes, and the skin 
of her feet was thick, rough, and covered with red earth. The baby cried, under the heat
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of the midday sun, and she stopped her work to turn him to the front of her body and 
breastfeed him for a while. Then, she adjusted him on her back again, tying him firmly 
with a cloth knotted above her breasts, trying to keep his head covered from the sun and 
protected from the dust. I asked her if she couldn’t leave the baby at home with 
someone. She said her older girl was still too little to take care of her brother. She had 
left her daughter, of about three years old, with the neighbours. She was still 
breastfeeding this baby, and could keep him with her while working. Besides, she 
argued, the boy was still tiny and not too heavy on her back: she wished he’d grow 
fatter and bigger, then she would leave him with his sister who was a big girl, thank 
God. She thought she would do so by the time the boy would be about two. The boy 
was not an obstacle to her work: look, she showed me the trench, she would be one of 
the first to finish her work and go home.
An old woman had brought her grandson to help her. In reality, the boy was 
doing all the work, and she was just standing there, looking at him. He must have been 
eight or nine. At his age, it was normal for him to share almost the same workload and 
responsibilities of an adult in all types of tasks, and he dug the trench energetically, 
despite the Project’s regulations. The grandmother would give him suggestions and 
show him where to dig. She helped a bit with taking the earth out from the trench and 
spreading it around the hole. I asked her why didn’t she send the boy on his own. She 
said that she was the worker here, and he was simply helping her. He didn’t know how 
to work, he was learning the job. But next time there would be a chantier, perhaps he’d 
do the work alone. She was the one who would collect the food ration, but they’d use it 
together as they all lived in the household of the boy’s father, who was in Nigeria at 
present. His mother was pregnant, and was at home preparing food.
While the majority of the labourers were young women, about one fifth of the 
trenches were being dug by boys, who must have been between eight and sixteen. The 
oldest boys were working in the same area and they were joking frequently amongst 
themselves, throwing a bit of earth back in the trench of their peers and stealing their 
tools while they were emptying the trench. The chantier chief rarely brought them back 
to order, as their work proceeded steadfastly. There was no pressure on the workers, all 
they had to do was to finish their task, and each could go at the pace adequate to his/her 
age and strength. Some people made an effort to complete the work early, others did not
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seem to care. It was mostly young women who strove to get the work done quickly, as 
they had to go back to their domestic tasks, especially if they had no co-wives or 
daughters.
Women had some work-songs and at times one of them would start singing, 
followed by others who sang and clapped their hands. They often sang while going to or 
coming back from the worksite, or for the arrival of an unexpected guest, such as 
Carotti, coming to follow the works. Carotti was often warmly welcomed on his visits 
to the field, and women sang for him and greeted him repeating his name, smiling and 
waving at him. They surrounded him, stretching out their arms and pulling each other to 
shake his hand and say a few words to him. At the end of the work, most workers would 
walk back home, usually not more than two kilometers away from the worksite. If 
tractors and bulldozers had been working on the site and were returning to the garage at 
night, all the young girls would try to get a lift from the driver, who would load the 
machine with young and good looking women and joke with them on the way.
In the chantiers for the construction of hydraulic structures there was a certain 
division of labour by gender. Almost only women (and a few boys) carried the stones 
needed to fill the gabion weirs, holding red stones of various sizes on their head as they 
walked. These worksites required a greater use of machines, and all the drivers and 
mechanics were men.
The drivers formed a cohesive group of about 60 people; they had all been 
recruited locally, and they displayed a certain partisan solidarity and pride. Sometimes 
they would spend some weeks, or months in a village near the worksite. There was 
plenty of gossip and stories about their stay in guest villages, where they established a 
network of social relations, that often involved flirting with local women which 
sometimes ended up in marriages and (legitimate or illegitimate) births. Machine 
drivers were aged about 30, and they tended to specialise in operating specific 
machines: graders, bull-dozers, and tractors. They relied on a small group of 
experienced electricians and mechanics who worked at Keita’s garage. The garage 
contained spare parts to the value of US$ 1.5 million, making it one of the first, if not 
the first, garage in the country. The Project had about 40 tractors, 40 trucks, and 30 
machines to move the earth. It also had 30 jeeps. When I did my fieldwork, only about
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60% of these machines were in good condition, and about 10-20% were broken. All the 
machines were Fiat, and some of the local mechanics, about 30 people, had been trained 
in Turin (Italy, Fiat headquarters).
6.5 Significance of Aikin Gandari and Food-for-work (Taimakon Abinci): the 
Gender Factor
6.5.1 'Muna son aiki ’ (we want work): women’s perspectives on project interventions
Many of the workers in the chantiers referred to the Project as ia iki\ ‘work*. In villages 
where chantiers had not been opened for two or three consecutive years, the women 
repeated again and again 'muna son aiki\ we want work, ‘because it is useful’ (shina da 
amfani), ‘because it makes us happy’ (muna jin  dadi), ‘because it brings us rations’ (an 
banmu taimako).
Rahamatou was a woman in her thirties. She had worked in project chantiers 
and was a member of the women’s group of her village, Tinkirana Ibarogan. Ibarogan is 
geographically close to Tinkirana Tounga, and belongs to the same conglomerate of 
villages carrying the name ‘Tinkirana’, but the two villages have different historical 
origins, and relations between them are tense. Rahamatou is an active and determined 
woman. When she talks, the tone of her voice is loud, and she is always ready to defend 
her perspective vehemently, as I’ve seen her do in front of other women as well as men. 
She is a widow with two children, and hasn’t remarried yet. Her husband died of disease 
three years ago, and she lives with his family. One of her children, both boys, is seven, 
the other five.
Rahamatou works hard to support four dependants. Her sons can work on the 
fields which used to be their father’s, but she invites the neighbours’ unmarried sons to 
do communal work on her field in the rainy season. In return, she offers them free food 
(a form of gay a). For four years, she has worked on the Project’s chantiers, but when I 
was there, it had been a while since there had been an opened worksite in Tinkirana 
Ibarogan. ‘We want work!’ (muna son aiki!), said Rahmatou, when I asked her what she 
thought about working with the Project.
We want work, we are always ready to work, tell them to come to Ibarogan! The women’s group
(kungiyar mata) is active in our village. We have a committee of hygiene (tsabta), we have a
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small and a big fund (karama da babban asusun). With the small one we help each other in the 
village (karami nan shi ke, sabo da matsalar gari), with the big one, we take credit on turn (sai 
mu bashi). When the Project worked here, they brought us millet [food rations], they brought us 
machines, they brought tools {an banmu hatsi, an banmu inji, and banmu kaya), and we did our 
work and these things were helpful to us (su y i amfani da mu). But now all the other villages 
have had new chantiers, except for us. Many works {ayukka) have been carried out in Tounga, 
has the Project forgotten Ibarogan? {Furogeya mance Ibarogan?) If I could, I would go to work 
in other chantiers.
Would she work without food rations, I asked. ‘No, I wouldn’t, I need them to 
feed my family (iiyalina). The Project gives rations for the work, why should I work 
without them?’ She followed the literacy course (yaki da jahilici), I said, would she 
continue the course if there were no rations with it? No, she wouldn’t.
No woman I met was willing to work in the worksites without the rations. As 
some of them put it: ‘would you work for nothing?’. Rahmatou’s words, 'muna son 
aiki’: we want to work, were a refrain in every village I visited. Because nobody, 
however, was willing to work without rations, it was clear that the main reason why 
women wanted the Project to open worksites in their villages was to have access to the 
rations. There were a few exceptions with regards to literacy courses. In general, a few 
young and ambitious women argued that they would follow literacy training with or 
without the rations. In one case, the woman who said so was a white Tuareg noble 
woman, the wife of a relatively wealthy Tuareg. In the other it was the president of the 
women’s group of Tinkirana Tounga, Rakiata. Both women had young children who 
would soon be of school age and they intended to send them to school. The exceptions, 
therefore, included women motivated by the perspective of being able one day to put 
literacy skills to some use (working as the women group’s president, belonging to an 
elite, helping their children to study). For other women, especially older women, who 
could not reatain anything from adult literacy courses, food rations were the main, or 
only, stimulus to participate in courses and work in the chantiers.
6.5.2 Men and the Project’s impact on productive resources
Men’s position with regards to project interventions was different. The Project’s 
impact on productive resources was more significant for local men than for women, as 
men have greater access to, and control over, land and cattle than women (cf. above, 
Chapter 3; Cremona 1986; Bayard 1995). As described in Chapter 3, migration for men 
is not only a financially more profitable option, but also an ideologically sanctioned
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‘rite of passage* which, in the Ader Doutchi, turns adolescents into adult men ready for 
marriage. Being recognised as a ‘grand exodant\ i.e. a man who has acquired 
substantial experience of living and working abroad, is a sign of status. Despite 
husbands’ long periods of absence from their villages, and the responsibility accrued to 
wives while the men are migrants, the household’s productive resources belong to the 
male household head. Women control and own a considerably smaller proportion of 
resources than men. As a consequence, men displayed a greater awareness of the 
Project’s environmental impacts. When asked to comment upon the Project works, they 
would almost invariably mention the creation of new water resources and the increase in 
vegetation.
Houssa was Mohamed’s father (see above, ‘Mohamed’s Household’), a 
respected old man in Tinkirana. His brothers, Boulla and Idrissa, were, respectively, 
Tinkirana’s village chief and the marabout, or religious leader. He was a jovial, 
eloquent, elderly man. Through his white beard, his lips could always be seen smiling 
calmly, and his eyes had an amused and penetrating look. He was considered a man of 
great experience. He had been away for many years, travelling and working in Nigeria 
and sending money back to his family. When he came back, as a mature man, and 
settled in Tinkirana, his son Mohamed had already started following his steps as a 
‘grand exodanf.
One afternoon toward the end of my stay in Tinkirana, I was visiting Houssa in 
his compound. A neighbour was also there, and women (Houssa’s wife, the neighbour’s 
wife and some daughters) were preparing food in the ‘cooking comer’. Houssa and the 
neighbour were eating some kola nuts which I had brought to thank them for their 
hospitality and assistance during my fieldwork in their village. The neighbour’s child of 
about three wanted to play with a young chicken in Houssa’s courtyard, but the chicken 
kept running away while the child chased it angrily. After a while, the child lost his 
patience and broke into tears. Houssa laughed at the exasperation of his young guest, 
threw some grains on the earthen floor, and gave a fistful of grains to the child. The 
chicken went to peck them, and the child amused himself feeding it for a while. I was 
watching the scene sitting next to Houssa in the shade of a tree. I asked Houssa if he 
could tell me the story of the Project.
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The neighbour, who had been sitting quietly, amused by the child’s struggle with 
the chicken, exclaimed: ‘The works the Project did for us are many: it built the dam for 
us, the trenches, the [anti-erosion] bunds, the school, the store-house... what has it not 
done for us? (an yi muku barrage, an yi muku tranche, an yi banquette, an yi lacole, and 
yi magaze, mi ya ba yi muku ba?)' The woman grinding millet said ‘Alhamdulillahi/’ 
(praise be to God), as a sign of agreement. Then Houssa began talking.
In the past there were many trees in Tinkirana (Itace a zamanin da suna da yawa) and people 
used to hunt wild animals who hid in them. The hills were covered with thick bush. But then 
many problems were brought by the drought (matsalolin da ranin ya taho): the people suffered 
for lack of food (rishin abinci), the desertification reduced the fodder (hamada ta kawo ragewar 
cimakar dabbobi) and then followed the death of the animals (mutuwar dabbobi). The trees 
which covered the hills decreased (itatuwa suna ragewa) and the (temporary) river course 
became deeper (ghiabbu suna kara girma). Many men migrated (exode: dandi). And the village 
people couldn’t prevent the destruction of the soil (mutanen gari ban iya kiyayewa tabarbarewar 
kaza ba).
Thank God, the Project (Furoje) came and restored the land (Mun gode Allah, Furoje ya zo ya 
gyara kaza). It did many different things. It planted trees in the hills (dashen icce bias tsakoni), 
and it planted trees on the dunes (dashen icce bias tuduni): it planted so as to stop the wind’s 
erosion (gakuwar iska), and it fixed the [temporary] river (darmun ghiabbu) so that the water 
would stay for the people and the animals.
The Project opened a chantier (a buda aikin gandari) in [Tinkirana] Tounga, and distributed 
food rations (rabon taimako). In the chantier, people worked for the preparation of anti-erosion 
bunds (tahanyar darmun fakonkoni), for which machines are needed for subsoiling and for 
carrying the stones (sai an y i aiki da injuna don su daddabe kasa da kuma daukan duwatsu). 
Many women (mata) worked in the land rehabilitation activities (aiki raya kasa) and got food 
rations (taimakon abinci) to bring home. Also Hama did a lot of work with the Project! [Hama 
Houssa, his son, who coordinated chantier work for several years in Tinkirana Tounga].
The work of village people was to gather stones (daukan duwatsu) on the hills and load them on 
the trucks (su zuba su cikin manyan motoci) and then cover the anti-erosion bunds with them (the 
stones) to make them resistant. In a chantier they also built the dam (tabki) using stones 
(duwatsu) and trucks (babban motoci). The Project build a road (hanya) and a school 
(makaranta) for the children of our village.
Trees started growing again on the plateaux and the hills (cikin fakonkoni da dabbuga itace suyi 
ta girma). Harvests of sorghum and millet on the barren glacis gave confidence to the people 
(girbi na hatsi da dawa bias fakonkoni ya kawo jindadi dayarda cikin zucciyar manoma).'
He stopped. During his talk the neighbour and the woman interjected 
expressions of agreement many times, saying ‘gaskiya ne’ (that’s true), ‘alhamdulillahV 
(praise be to God), or simply clicking their tongues against their throats.
Houssa’s presentation of the Project’s activities resembled the accounts I 
recorded in other villages; it was perhaps somewhat more precise, more technical in its 
descriptions. I thanked him warmly for letting me record this and other accounts. He 
replied that he ‘wouldn’t be like the chicken’ (ba zan yi kaman kaji ba). I was puzzled,
172
and asked him what he meant. He explained, pointing at the sandy ground where the 
chicken had been pecking the grains fed to him by the neighbour’s child, that after they 
peck, chicken cover up the signs left by their pecking rubbing their heads against the 
sand. Chicken are not grateful, as they hide the evidence that they received the grains 
from someone. Houssa wanted to say that he welcomed the questions of an Italian 
researcher, as Italy had helped their village, and his willingness to help me was a sign of 
gratitude toward the Project.
6.5.3 Men and women’s attempts to attract the Project to their villages
Men had more formalised procedures than women to try to attract project activities to 
their villages. The village chief and the elders wrote official demands (demandi) for new 
project activities addressed to the project manager. Although after the spread of the 
groupement institution some women-groups started addressing letters to the Chief of the 
Women and Development Division (cf. figure 2), in general women seemed to prefer 
informal lines of communication (personal contacts, meetings, verbal demands).
Members of project staff would visit villages to follow up the state of 
infrastructures built in previous years, or to survey the situation, or to respond to the 
villagers’ demands. Their visits were important occasions in the village. When the 
village had been informed about the visit in advance, the chief might convene a small 
party of elders and present active men. Sometimes, the Women’s Group Committee 
would also participate, and some old women, but women would mainly mobilise on the 
occasion of visits of members of the Women and Development Division. Also these 
visits were sought as occasions to try to persuade ‘project people’ (mutanen na projet) 
to carry out works around the village.
Gender variations in the reasons why project works were appreciated and desired 
eventually converged in a common attempt to attract project activities to a village. In 
this regard, men and women shared the same interest, whereas there was a competition 
between villages over project interventions. This explains a sort of rivalry between 
villages characterised by the adoption of different stratagems to ‘capture’ the Project’s 
attention. Official demands, signed by the village chief and often written by the teacher 
of the nearest school or one of the few literate community members were the most 
common action.
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In some exceptional cases, some villages tried to express the urgency of the 
problems they were facing by volunteering to work without food rations, or by 
beginning to perform the initial tasks of an hydraulic structure chantier, such as 
accumulating stones in scattered piles, as a sign of their need for project interventions:
there is the example of a village which worked the entire year but didn’t want the food rations. In 
Boussa Rague, they asked for technical support and materials (gabion weirs, etc.), but they said 
that they were even willing to pay money for the project work. Of course Elhadji Abdou said that 
it was not necessary, but they are really willing to work because they understood the utility of the 
work.
commented Nasser, an experienced project agent.
Entertaining project staff on occasional follow up visits was another device, 
which varied according to the hierarchical status of the village. Below I give two 
examples of the attempts to induce the PDR/ADM to carry out specific activities in the 
village of Mansala Kel Gress and Tinkirana Tounga. In the former, the initiative was led 
by the high-ranking Tuareg Regional Chief, and in the latter it was a communal effort 
on the part of both men and women in Tinkirana to quite literally ‘direct* the Project’s 
selection of place and activity. Tinkirana’s people accepted the Project’s initial wish to 
test an operation to promote women’s status in their village, but then tried to turn it into 
an operation which they deemed more suitable to their needs.
6.6 The Hierarchy Factor in Inter-village Competition Over the ‘Development 
Revenue*
Villagers do their best to convince project staff to intervene in their villages. 
Sometimes, they offer food, and thank the Project for its previous interventions, 
expressing satisfaction over the results. They may also present a list of problems 
afflicting their village. Sometimes they complain about damage to project 
infrastructures, and ask for assistance to repair an earthfill dam, or to strengthen some 
anti-erosion bunds. At the project delegation’s departure, they usually insist project 
agents accept one or two chickens, or a woven mat, or some gift as a sign of gratitude. 
Project visits offer an occasion to try to attract the Project’s attention to the problems of 
one’s village, with the aim of obtaining new interventions. These are sought for the 
benefits that accrue to the village, such as new infrastructures, impacts on the
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environment’s productivity, and access to food-for-work (food rations being particularly 
appreciated by women). I refer to these benefits as ‘development revenue’ (cf. 
Bierschenk et al. 2000:34), as they are made available locally due to the presence of a 
development project. To the people of the ADM, who are not exposed to macro-level 
development narratives, ‘development’ comes down to those concrete facets of its 
activities that influence their lives directly. It is at this level that local agency is most 
apparent, mainly in their attempts to secure a portion of the ‘development revenue’ for 
their village.
6.6.1 The Chef du Groupement Kel Gress ’ requests to the Project
An example of this type of attempt is the speech of the Chief of the Groupement61 of 
Mansala Kel Gress, of the Kel Unwar noble tribe of the Kel Gress confederation. This 
old white Tuareg, thin and physically fragile, claims descent from the Prophet 
Mohamed, and his ancestors were powerful landlords in the region, which is now 
characterised by the presence of many hamlets of freed slaves (cf. Chapters 2 and 3). In 
his court, he listens to the voice of his son who works for the Project’s radio station, and 
remembers the past glory of the nomadic Tuareg warriors. His mother tongue is 
Tamasheq, but he can speak French fluently. Nevertheless, due to a speech problem his 
words are like a continuous nasal sound, and his speech is hard to decipher. One of his 
courtiers seems to have learned his master’s way of expressing himself, and helps 
during conversations. On the occasion of a visit of a project delegation, he had once 
prepared a written speech, which he read aloud, and then gave the text to project agents.
He welcomed his guests with a small banquet featuring dishes, cutlery, and 
noodles, showing that he knew how to entertain a party which included some 
Europeans, and he offered bottled drinks, to avoid his European guests the 
embarrassment of refusing to drink local water. After the meal and the preliminary 
courtesy exchanges, he read his speech (cf. figure 3):
Sirs, your great institution the Keita Project has enormously contributed to the general
development of my region, and in particular to the considerable decrease of the sufferings of my
populations. Your actions, such as the reforestation trenches chantiers, the adult courses, the
61 Here the term ‘Groupement’ does not refer to a participatory institution, but to an administrative 
category to distinguish regions traditionally inhabited by settled populations (called ‘cantons’), and 
regions characterised by nomadic lifestyle (called ‘groupements ’).
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construction of buildings, etc., are highly profitable to the populations. For this, please accept all 
my sincere and grateful thanks. May God the all-powerful, the merciful, bless you.
With regards to the requests, they are as follows:
Repair of the doors and windows of the school of Mansala Kel Gress;
Construction of a toilet cabinet and installation of a rural pump;
Completion of the well (gift of Saudi Arabia);
Construction of a block of classes in Gabassa Kel Gress (creation of a school);
Repair of the small car route connecting the royal palace to the lateritis route with heavy car 
traffic.
Please do accept, sirs responsible [for the Project], the expression of my most grateful feelings.
The approach of the Tuareg Chief was one of someone confident in his power 
and authority. He addressed the Project’s coordinator as an equal, and expressed both 
his appreciation for previous project interventions in ‘his region’, and his requests for 
further services. He was treating the Project as a service provider. The works he asked 
for did not include chantiers, but were mainly construction works which would improve 
the infrastructures of the area under his control.
The approach of the people of Tinkirana Tounga, a village of freed slaves with 
little hierarchical stratification within it, was strikingly different. The men and women 
of Tinkirana resorted to various stratagems to keep the Project focused upon their 
village. In the following case, they accepted an intervention for which they had no 
interest, mainly to maintain frequent contacts with project staff. In the course of these 
contacts, they strove to obtain the type of activity which benefited them most, a chantier 
for the building of a second dam.
6.6.2 The women‘s field operation in Tinkirana Tounga
The ‘Women’s field’ operation in Tinkirana Tounga started in July 1995, at a time when 
the Women and Development Division had not yet been established. The operation was 
aimed at giving the women of Tinkirana Tounga exclusive and inalienable control over 
a rehabilitated perimeter situated at the outskirts of their village. In the Project’s First 
Phase, once a perimeter had been ‘rehabilitated’, property rights upon parcels contained 
within the perimeter would be redistributed amongst men who originally owned land 
within the perimeter, and those who had participated in the rehabilitation work (cf. 
Chapter 2). Even though women had done most of the work, the following 
redistribution had benefited only (male) household heads. This fact gave rise to a wave
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of criticism against the Project’s approach toward women, which is discussed in 
Chapter 7.
As a partial remedy, the PDR/ADM gave groups of women informal access to 
rehabilitated parcels of land in a number of villages, encouraging them to produce and 
sell vegetables and spices with the Agronomy Division’s support (training, seeds, 
inputs, etc.). But sometimes original owners of these informally assigned ‘women’s 
plots’ returned and claimed rights over their lands. These unsuccessful experiences 
convinced the PDR/ADM that if women were to gain secure rights upon land, they 
should instead have taken out a collective loan and purchased the parcel which they 
would exploit, rather than simply use a (temporarily) abandoned parcel.
In the PDR/ADM there were considerable expectations about the ‘revolutionary’ 
potential of this type of operation with regard to women’s status and empowerment. 
Tinkirana Tounga had always been a ‘testing site* for project interventions, and in 1995 
it was suggested that the women of Tinkirana buy a rehabilitated parcel on the outskirts 
of the village. Women were consulted to see if they might have been interested in the 
operation and they were informed about all the transaction’s conditions and details. 
Undeniably, the operation’s approach was highly ‘top-down’. After a number of 
consultations with small groups of women, the women came to the conclusion that they 
were interested in the opportunity which was being offered to them. However, that the 
issue was not a priority to them was clear by the considerable delay with which the 
women reached the meeting that had been arranged to discuss the operation with them, 
and by the scarce enthusiasm which they displayed in the course of preliminary 
arrangements. Men had also been contacted, and after some lively discussions had 
declared themselves in favour of the operation.
In the discussions between the land’s owners and Nasser, the ‘gendered nature’ 
of the operation was never mentioned. However, the whole point of the transaction, at 
least in the PDR/ADM’s intention, was to target women. The PDR/ADM justified it as 
a transfer from men to women, i.e. the actors least likely to ‘buy land with money’. But 
at the meeting between the owners and the project agent, as well as in the actual degree 
of mobilisation of women themselves, the question of ‘women’s empowerment’ 
appeared to be marginal to everyone’s interests. The transaction, which would shift
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property in land from men to women, was described as ‘passing property from one 
pocket to the other’ in the negotiations which preceded it. Dealing with the owners’ 
reticence to sell their plot, Nasser commented: ‘once rehabilitated, [this land] will return 
to you anyway: one parcel will also go to a member of your family’. The fact that the 
member would be a wife or a daughter did not seem to be relevant. Also for women, the 
intended beneficiaries of the operation, the transaction would not make a great 
difference. Single women would end up having a parcel smaller than 20x20 meters, 
which, as we shall see, on a glacis land, is not even worth the effort of cultivating it.
Nevertheless, in July 1995, the women of Tinkirana Tounga bought five hectares 
of rehabilitated land from the owners, and redistributed the perimeter amongst 
themselves in sub-parcels of equal extension. Women were asked to repay the Project 
loan in two years, but the project manager’s idea was that the money they would return 
could be made available to the same women in the form of a social fund.
It soon became clear that the operation failed to give the expected results. The 
women of Tinkirana Tounga cultivated the fields they had acquired only in the first 
year, immediately after the Project’s sub-soiling. Since then, rainy season after rainy 
season, project staff were sent to Tinkirana to check whether the groupement's women 
members were taking advantage of their private ‘women’s plots’, but every season new 
excuses were provided by the villagers, men and women alike, for not having done so.
In 1997, upon project staff enquiries, Rakiata, the president of the women’s 
group, said that a few men had cultivated their fields before women could do so, and 
that women were late because they were busy after their domestic chores and, more 
importantly, because they had to work on their household’s fields. She had tried to 
summon the groupement's women, but the majority had not agreed to come. Later, I 
asked Agaishatu, a woman who owned a parcel, if in fact women had reaped any benefit 
from their parcels even though men had cultivated them. But she looked at me with a 
puzzled look and told me that the field’s production had been really negligible: the land 
was as hard as a stone, and men had used low quality seeds and no manure. I enquired 
whether it had been all the husbands of the women owners who had sown the field, but 
she said that only four or five men had sown some areas of the field ‘to be kind to
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project people’ (sabo da kirki wajen mutanen na proje). That land, she reiterated, was 
not good and animals crossed the field all the time.
I decided to go to see Hajiya. I found her in her compound, preparing the meal 
with some neighbours. Hajiya was now almost an ‘honorary’ member of the 
groupement'. I hardly ever saw her at the meetings, and she was not amongst the women 
who had taken a loan to acquire a parcel, because she was ‘old’, and her daughters were 
married outside Tinkirana. When I asked her if she knew why women had not cultivated 
the land, she answered that women were busy at that time of the year, and the field was 
not going to yield a good harvest. But why, then, did women acquire it in the first 
place? Because ‘Carotti’ had given that field to the women of Tinkirana to thank them 
for their hard work on the chantiers.
In 1999, the fourth year since the acquisition of the field, a gender consultancy 
came to visit the Project, and organised a reunion with Tinkirana women’s groupement 
to assess the results of the operation. This time, the unanimous explanation provided by 
Tinkirana Tounga women was that they had not cultivated their fields because there was 
no enclosure, and animals could enter the parcels and destroy the young plants. They 
therefore wanted the Project to provide them with iron wire to build the enclosure (sai 
waya sabo da dabbobi, suna shiga suna karye hita: we need wire because of the 
animals: they enter and destroy the new plants). Some men supported the women’s 
account. Iron wire is very expensive in the area and can be put to many uses more 
profitable than enclosing fields, for which the traditional method consists in using 
locally available thorny shrubs. Project representatives suggested that they resort to 
‘traditional methods’, or that they pay for the wire: the Project could have assisted them 
to obtain it at a wholesale price.
At this point, the village chief stated that men would have supported their 
women in dealing with the enclosure problem, eventually even paying for wire, but 
what the village really needed from the Project was to deal with the water problem. 
Swiftly, other influential men began explaining that the first retention dam built by the 
Project for their village had been vital, but that they needed another one as there was not 
enough water to satisfy their needs over the whole year. Another problem was that now 
village houses were menaced by waters in the rainy season, and they wanted the Project
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to do something about it. Women added without hesitation that water was a priority 
problem for the whole village. One woman said that when the dam (tabki) dried up, in 
the dry season, she would have to walk all the way to a distant well. Other women 
agreed. Some women said that transhumant herders used a lot of their dam’s waters, and 
did not leave enough water for their own goats.
Tinkirana Tounga’s men and women subscribed to the operation first and 
foremost to strengthen the village ties with the PDR/ADM and thereby to invest in a 
social relation which would bring potential benefits to Tinkirana Tounga. Villages 
falling within the PDR/ADM intervention area are competing with one another over 
project interventions. There is always something to gain from project interventions, and 
usually one operation calls for other activities to complement, refine, or supplement it. 
The entire village would have strengthened its liaison with the Project, as the creation of 
a ‘women’s plot’ was likely to attract other interventions and to increase the chances of 
contacts with project staff. These occasions are sought mainly in the hope that new 
chantiers will be opened, possibly to deal with what is Tinkirana Tounga’s crucial 
problem, water, but also because chantiers involve the creation of slack season ‘jobs’ 
and the availability of food-for-work.
Even though, from the Project’s point of view the operation fell in the ‘gender’ 
agenda, it is not for its impact on gender relations that it came to be relevant to 
Tinkirana Tounga men and women (cf. Razavi and Miller 1995:27). Their behaviour at 
various reunions suggests that they were taking this chance (which happens to be 
presented in ‘gendered terms’) in order to invest in their relations with the Project and 
obtain benefits that do not involve a reallocation of power between men and women.
6.7 Conclusion
The PDR/ADM represents a source of revenue in a context characterised by few income 
opportunities and little income diversification. Although members of Bouzou 
households tend to pool their individual incomes to achieve household subsistence, 
some distinctions can be made along gender lines. Project food rations are a short-term 
contribution to the household’s livelihood, with a particular impact on women’s status 
and income. In the medium term, the works carried out by the Project increase the 
productivity of the means of production (water availability, land productivity, fodder for
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the cattle) controlled mostly by men. Project works, therefore, are equivalent to slack- 
season income for women (who remain in the village while the men migrate), and to a 
medium/long term investment in the means of production for men. However, local 
perceptions of working with the Project are not strictly economic, but are also 
characterised by a sense of pride for the results of project activities.
This accounts for the perception of project activities as a sort of development 
revenue. Women often referred to the Project as ‘aiki’, literally ‘work’, and in their 
accounts men emphasised the ‘interest’ component of project activities: ‘akoi riba’ 
(literally, there is an interest). Both men and women argued that the Project ‘benefited’, 
or ‘was useful’ to their villages (shina da amfani, akoi amfani), and employed different 
strategies to attract new project activities to their villages. This situation is similar to 
that described by Mongbo on the occasion of an NGO’s visit to the village of Gliten in 
Benin. The NGO had never worked in Gliten before, and the villagers orchestrated a 
performance to convince it to intervene (2000:236-239). In his example, he mentions a 
‘real hunt of NGOs and political parties’ (2000:235), motivated, on some occasions, 
‘primarily by the perspective of obtaining WFP rations’ (2000:221).
We have seen in Chapter 5 that project staff narratives portray local ‘peasants’ as 
resistant to change and needing ‘sensitisation’. Local people, across gender and class, 
attribute meanings to project activities which make them fit into their world. This 
chapter has explored the ‘view from the bottom’, showing how the Project fits into the 
lives of local people, opening spaces where the ‘projects in the Project’ of different 
categories of actors can be unfolded. To turn these opportunities into concrete resources, 
various forms of agency are exercised at multiple interface sites: the chantiers, the 
groupements, meetings and correspondence with project staff.
The next Chapter brings together the different ‘levels’ analysed separately in the 
last three chapters: the development narratives, the project staff, and the people, and 
traces the question of ‘women’s status’ across these levels. It enquires into the relative 
bargaining power and strategies of struggle of agents situated at different levels, and 
examines the ways in which the issue of ‘women’s status’ changes its meaning and is 
operationalised in different ways as it is transferred across levels.
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7. THE FEMME DE KEITA, THE FEMMES DU SAHEL AND THE WOMEN OF 
THE ADER DOUTCHIMAJIYA: INTERFACES BETWEEN ‘WOMEN’ AND 
PLANNED DEVELOPMENT
7.1 Introduction
The PDR/ADM’s approach to gender issues and the nature of its relations with local 
women have changed throughout its long life-span. As we have seen in previous 
chapters, despite its supposedly ‘integrated* approach, the PDR/ADM’s primary focus 
was environmental, its main goal, the ‘fight against desertification’, and both the Italian 
and the Nigerien project coordinators were experts in sub-Saharan agriculture and 
related disciplines (PDR/ADM 1984b:20; GICO 1998:24). The Project began its 
activities at the end of a series of repeated droughts in the Ader Doutchi Majiya, and its 
first year of intervention, 1984, was characterised by extremely low rainfall levels. 
Reacting to the ‘emergency’ situation found, the original operation plan was modified 
so as to prioritise interventions in the CES/DRS62 sector, at the expense of ‘related 
activities (such as hydrological and environmental studies and observations, and the 
equipment of village wells), and activities programmed within other project intervention 
sectors’ (PDR/ADM 1987:7). CES/DRS interventions were labour intensive, and it was 
established that the local labour force would be remunerated in WFP food-for-work 
rations.
However, when recruitment began, it was soon realized that, in the majority of 
local villages, almost all able-bodied men had migrated to places where they could find 
an occupation from which to support themselves and their families. Old people, 
children, and women had remained in the villages. The Project had no choice but to 
employ mostly women in the environmental rehabilitation work-sites. The massive 
participation of women in the first years of project intervention had not been foreseen:
In the original [project] hypothesis [...] the role of women in activities different from the ones 
included in the volet femme had not been expected. Initially, the constraints in the availability of 
male labour force had been underestimated in the [planned] distribution of tasks to local 
populations (PDR/ADM 1987:9).
The period 1983-1987 is characterised by the initial ‘wonder’ at the ‘fact* of 
women’s massive participation in project activities, and the subsequent elaboration of
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such a ‘fact’ into a much publicised image, that of the ‘Femme de Keita’ (the ‘Woman 
of Keita’). The ‘Femme de Keita ’ became the protagonist of existing international 
development narratives and national populist propaganda, embodying the notion of 
women’s ‘participation’ in development interventions and national reconstruction, 
respectively.
The popularity of the ‘Femme de Keita ’ stirred the attention of international 
development actors active in the field of gender, wishing to understand the ‘Keita 
phenomenon’ and to look at the measures taken by the Project to deal with women’s 
participation. But, as mentioned already, the Project had not expected women to play 
such an important role in its environmental rehabilitation interventions, and its initial 
approach toward them was soon found unsatisfactory by variously positioned observers 
(cf. PDR/ADM 1987; Monimart 1989; Rochette 1989; Bayard 1995; Bayard, Paoletti, 
Traore 1997).
A second phase in the PDR/ADM’s approach to gender issues is therefore 
characterised by growing external critiques and internal project attempts to come to 
terms with the question of ‘doing something about women’. The publication, in 1989, of 
the OECD book ‘Femmes du Sahel’ (Monimart 1989), containing an analysis of 
women’s participation in the PDR/ADM and of the shortcomings of the Project’s 
gender approach, represents a ‘landmark’, which compelled Italy and the FAO to take 
the issue on board as a major concern. A series of ad hoc consultancies were arranged, 
eventually leading to the establishment of a Division for the promotion of women’s role 
in 1997.
Since 1997, project relations with local women have been coordinated by the 
Division for the Promotion of the Role of Women and of Socio-Economic Activities 
(DPFSE). The long interval between the reception of critiques and the installation of a 
project division aimed at targeting women as particular stakeholders is explained, inter 
alia, by a considerable discrepancy between expected and actual donor funding during 
the Second Phase (1991-1996) of the PDR/ADM, and the consequent limitations set 
upon the opening of new activities (GICO 1998:56).
62 Conservation des Eaux et de Sols /Defense et Restauration des Sols : Soil and Water Conservation /
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This chapter focuses on the interfaces between categories of actors with different 
perceptions and practices in relation to the issue of ‘women’s status’ in planned 
development. It highlights the relative room for manoeuvre available to these groups 
and the strategies to which different groups resorted, manipulating the notion of 
‘women’s role in development’ to make it fit their respective agendas. Soon after the 
beginning of the Project’s activities, women’s role and status became a political matter 
for national (Kountche’s populist regime) and international (the FAO, the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) actors, whose positions are evident in their construction 
and use of the ‘femme de Keita ' trope. However, international and national consultants 
influenced by the ‘Gender and Development’ (GAD) framework criticised the Project’s 
approaches toward women in the influential book Femmes du Sahel (Monimart/OECD) 
and in ad hoc consultancy reports. These critiques were operationalised into the new 
Division for the promotion of women. Within the spaces opened by the new Division, 
female members of staff and local women carried out their own ‘projects in the Project’, 
using the opportunities made available by the Project to win battles on various fronts 
and in various fields of their lives. As noted in Chapter 1, the geographic, cultural and 
social distance that characterises the positions of the actors analysed in this chapter 
amplifies their respective room for manoeuvre and allows for their semi-independent 
strategising.
7.2 WID Narratives and National Participatory Ideology: Partial Overlaps
* By 1984, when the PDR/ADM became operative, the idea that women represent an
important stakeholder in development interventions was not only broadly accepted, but 
had already undergone a number of interpretative changes at ad hoc international fora. 
In the 1970s the term Women in Development (WID) was coined in reaction to the 
failure of development to address women’s needs and, more generally, to include them 
in the activities and ensuing benefits of interventions. Its meanings and applications 
informed the debate of the First UN Conference for Women in Mexico, in 1975.
The primary concern of the WID agenda in relation to development in the South 
was the integration of women in projects and programmes, not only as wives and 
mothers, but also as producers. WID advocates argued that dismissing the potential
Soil Defence and Restoration.
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contributions of women to economic development undervalued the potential role of 
women as an economic resource to the development process itself (Tinker 1990:31). By 
emphasising women’s productive labour, they claimed that ‘women as a social group 
[should be] targeted by planners as a means through which prioritised development 
goals can be realized’ (Razavi and Miller 1995:10).
Early women-focused consultancies in the PDR/ADM were influenced by a 
WID approach. Lucia Cremona’s 1986 ‘Apergu sur les activitivites socio-economiques 
des femmes de Varrondissement de Keita ' makes no mention of gender roles. The 
document deals with women’s productive activities, and men are referred to only 
marginally. The report recommends that women be fully incorporated into promotional 
socio-economic activities also because of their role as a source of manual labour on 
project rehabilitation sites. In other terms, women deserved to be targeted by 
productivity enhancing interventions (credit, agricultural inputs, access to land, etc.) 
because they had proved to represent an efficient source of labour on the project work 
sites at a time when men were not available on site. This argument is the logical 
extension of WID attempts to integrate women in development in an instrumental 
capacity.
But women’s participation was also instrumental to Niger’s political forces as a 
source of legitimacy: ‘women’s and youth associations have served as a means of 
mobilizing and making visible the power bases of the various political parties in Niger’s 
post-war history’ (Cooper 1995:860). Reflecting upon the relation between Kountche’s 
regime and the ‘Development of Women’ in Niger, Roberta Dunbar notes that
the ultimate goal [of the Development Society] was to provide a framework for the participation 
of Nigerien citizens in their own government. [...] That Colonel [...] Kountche hoped that this 
project would provide institutions uniquely suited to Niger is apparent in his statements along the 
way. (1991:77)
On 16 May 1975, only one year after his seizure of power, Kountche gave a 
speech on the occasion of the UN International Women’s Year. In his speech, President 
Kountche expressed his desire to see ‘the zeal of all the women and the young girls of 
Niger have a tangible and continuous impact on the construction of a new Niger’ {Rep. 
du Niger, Discours et Messages du Lieutenant-Colonel Seiny Kountche 1976: 90). On 
this occasion, he foresaw ‘a new awareness [prise de conscience] fully linking all the
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women of Niger to all the phases of our irreversible march toward development’ 
(1976:92). This ‘linking’ was to take place through the structures of the Development 
Society, which also functioned as the institutional interface between the PDR/ADM and 
the local society in the Project’s First Phase (1984-1991). Until the establishment of the 
Division for the Promotion of the Role of Women, which came after the official 
dissolution of the structures of the Development Society in Niger, project and national 
participatory strategies and structures coincided. This coincidence was reflected in the 
narrative trope of the ‘Femme de Keita’, who embodies and merges in herself the 
woman of WID international development narratives and the woman of national 
participatory populism.
7.3 The ‘Femme de Keita’: Women Working in the Chantiers Become the Icon of 
National and International Propaganda
In 15 years of intervention, the PDR/ADM evolved into a myth within the wider ‘fight 
against desertification in the Sahel’ narrative. Like all myths, the PDR/ADM had its 
heroes and its heroines. The undisputed ‘hero’ of the PDR/ADM was, and remained 
after his retirement in 1998, the first Italian Project Manager. In contrast, its ‘heroine* 
was not a concrete person, but an ideal type, ‘la femme de Keita ', which was mentioned 
as an example in national newspaper articles and in political rhetoric and propaganda. 
Below, I briefly review some of the main statements in the national press, responsible 
for the spread of the image of the ‘ femme de Keita
In 1985, the magazine Le Sahel/Nation published an article on the broader theme 
of Niger’s efforts in the ‘fight against desertification’. For the first time, the PDR/ADM 
is mentioned in the press, in the article section reviewing national efforts at a 
departmental level. When it comes to the Tahoua Department, a long parenthesis is 
opened to introduce the stated goals and strategies of ‘a huge integrated rural 
development project financed by Italy and the FAO’ (Le Sahel/Nation, Vendredi- 
Samedi-Dimanche 22-23-24 Novembre 1985, p. 5). A picture shows a girl holding a 
reforestation seedling, but ‘women’ are not mentioned as special actors.
In 1986, the first results of the PDR/ADM activities started to be visible, and the 
President Seyni Kountche paid an official visit to the Project. The presidential visit was
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followed by a series of propagandist newspaper articles in which women are recognized 
as key stakeholders in development.
‘Le Sahel’ of 13-14-15 June 1986 reports the results of the President’s visit to 
Keita, and quotes the speech given by the President on the occasion:
what has moved me most and encouraged me to persist in our philosophical concept of the 
Societe de Developpement’ has been the participation of women. Carrying a child on their 
backs, with a shovel in their hands, working with rudimentary instruments built for drawing the 
outline of reforestation trenches on the ground, they work for the soil’s recuperation and 
rehabilitation. (Le Sahel 1986:3)
In the same issue, another article describes the engagement of the people of 
Keita with the Project in the following terms: ‘The region’s inhabitants prefer to engage 
themselves in a war against a hostile nature. They took the lead, women on the front 
line. It is people’s participation that most impresses the visitor of the project 
intervention sites’ (Le Sahel 1986:4). Another article, entitled ‘Hope is Allowed’, of the 
same issue of Le Sahel, which immediately followed the President’s visit, begins as 
follows:
plunged to mid-thigh in the trenches, holding shovels or spades, [women] were excavating and 
ceaselessly clearing that rocky, arid, burning, and pitiless earth. Far from distracting them, the 
arrival of the presidential delegation, made them double their efforts. Under their strenuous hits, 
half-moon shaped holes were taking shape little by little. And it will be these holes that will 
catch the water at each rain, it will be in these holes that trees will be planted and that, in some 
years, the site of Tinkirana, one of the sites of the integrated project of Keita, will turn green 
again. Perhaps, it will return to be a forest like in the ‘good old days’, when the arid desert had 
not yet swallowed the vegetation of that part of the Ader. (Le Sahel 1986:5)
On 3 August 1986, the newspaper Sahel Dimanche published an article titled 
‘Thanks to God and to... the Project’. The article begins with a description of the 
Project intervention area as seen by the reporter in a tour in the Project’s Fiat 
Campagnola, which had become the Project’s ‘emblem’ in the area, as they were 
immediately recognized by villagers as the vehicles of the ‘Projet Keita’: ‘After 15 
kilometers we reach the Plateau of Laba. Only a few months ago, this plateau was the 
exclusive domain of bulldozers, tractors, camions, and, obviously, of the famous 
umama-courage, les femmes de Keita”' (Sahel Dimanche 1986:7).
An  article of 10 August 1986, in the Magazine ‘Afrique-Asie’, no. 379, entitled 
‘Keita saved from the Sands’, presents the narrative that would become ubiquitous in 
explanations of the Project’s association with women:
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In Keita, over the last two years, lands which were once agricultural, but that have been 
abandoned for about half a century, have turned into gigantic work sites [chantiers]. Will [la 
volonte] is certainly not lacking. But the major part of men migrated to Nigeria, Benin, the Ivory 
Coast, or elsewhere, chased by the drought. Some of them came back last year thanks to the 
exceptional rainy season, others are beginning to follow their example. [...] But, then, only 
women and children had remained: there was no alternative but to work with them. They are of 
all ages, and their destiny can be measured, today, against the 2,500 Sq. km of land to 
rehabilitate. (Afrique-Asie 1986:16)
The article continues:
President Kountche has visited the ‘model’ Keita at the beginning of the month of June. Back in 
Niamey, he sent hundreds of metres of fabric produced by the Sonitextil (State Society) to the 
women of Keita. Since then, the women used it as their working uniform. The president’s choice 
is in fact symbolic: vegetables on a green background are printed on the fabric almost to exorcise 
the nightmare of drought. (Afrique-Asie 1986:17)
In that same year, President Kountche also decorated three women who had 
distinguished themselves for the quality of their work or for their catalytic role in 
motivating other women on the PDR/ADM work-sites. One of these three women, 
‘Hajiya’63 of Tinkirana Tounga, also received a ticket for a trip to Mecca as recognition 
of her outstanding contribution to the country’s fight against desertification (cf. Chapter 
5 and Chapter 6).
Another 1986 article is entitled ‘Niger: captured waters’. The sub-title is: 
'Women, artisans and machines: a lived participation\  The text quotes the Italian 
Project Manager, Dr. Carotti:
In the village of Waddey only 80 people had remained: some children, some elderly, and the fool 
of the village. The men had left. I refused, explaining that the work was too hard. The women 
remained silent, in a comer. But then they discussed amongst themselves, and declared that they 
would take charge o f the affair [elles prennaient les choses en main]. They created the first 
[work] groups. The battle was won.
In 1996 another article appears on Le Sahel of February 29, claiming that the 
Keita Project had anticipated the major principles adopted at the Rio Conference. It 
argues that
the population’s contribution has been incredibly important. Approximately 3000 people, mainly 
women, have been working in groups every day on tens of the Project’s work sites [chantiers]. 
Almost 6 million working days have been contributed in one decade. People’s participation
63 ‘Elhaji’ or ‘Alhaji’ (masc.) and ‘Hajiya’ (fern.) are the epithets given to believers who have visited the 
Mecca.
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reached almost 10 million work days in 1996, thanks to the support of the World Food 
Programme’s family food rations. [...] The male labour force, which constituted only 5% at the 
Project’s beginning, has actually reached 35% despite out migration. (Le Sahel 1996:6)
Finally, on 30 July 1999 an article on the Keita Project entitled ‘The Keita 
Miracle* appeared on Le Sahel Dimanche, in concomitance with the 9th Quadripartite 
Reunion Italy/ FAO/PAM/Niger, which took place in Niamey on 27-28 July. Here, we 
find perhaps the most positive, yet also the most stereotypical, ‘celebration’ of the 
‘Keita Project myth*. With reference to the participation of women, we read:
In the absence of able-bodied men, the Project employs women. The integrated project becomes 
the object of curiosity. People come from afar to see those women who, despite the extenuating 
task, the lack of water and the heat, have retained their graceful movements and elegant 
silhouettes. Nevertheless, the work proposed by the Project is not a woman’s work, not by far: 
building anti-erosion bunds covered with stones around the fields to fix the earth, planting trees 
on the banks of the koris (temporary water courses) to reinforce them, fixing the dunes with. 
windbreak fences made of millet stalks, constructing dams across water courses to regulate the 
water run-off, excavating reforestation trenches on slopes to gather water and grow plants and 
trees. A real forced labour that, despite everything, women realize at 95%! Entire days under the 
sun, they gather the stones left on the subsoiled earth by the Project’s tractors. [...] Thousands of 
villagers received agricultural inputs, credit and training: today, 10,000 women are organised in 
148 [this must be a print error, as the correct number was 184 then] groupements d ’interet 
economique and a credit and saving structure has just been established in Keita for them. (Le 
Sahel Dimanche 1999:6-7)
In another section of the article, a statement attributed to Renato Carotti, reads:
At the Project’s inception, the recruitment of the labour force had not been easy due to the out­
migration of able-bodied men. There were but 90 men, children and elderly people. We said that 
it would not be possible. We were discouraged. But, in the evening, four women came to see me 
at home. Amongst them, one could speak French. She told me, Sir, we know what you want to 
do, we can do this work. Three days later, there were 300 women on Waddey’s chantier. They 
created the first groups; the battle was won. Fifteen years later, the challenge has been met, the 
results are there to attest it. (Le Sahel Dimanche 1999:7)
Perhaps even more influential than words, evocative pictures of Keita’s women 
carrying rocks on their heads, digging trenches, working hard, alone and in group, are 
ubiquitous in publications and articles, even when these do not make explicit reference 
to women’s participation.
In this rapid review of the national press commentaries on the ‘femme de Keita* 
phenomenon, the years between 1986 and 1996 are ‘blank’. In fact, in this period, the 
‘femme de Keita' is mentioned in documents produced by interested parties (e.g. 
Monimart 1989; PDR/ADM 1993), but does not figure as prominently as it did until 
1986 in the national press. The relative silence in the press is partly accounted for by the
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nature of Niger’s relatively unstable and short-lived regimes which, since Kountche’s 
death of cerebral tumor in late 1987, did not set the bases for an ideology of national 
development until the election of President Tandja Mahamane in 1999, who put the 
PDR/ADM at the core of his campaign. But the absence of the ‘femme de Keita’ from 
magazines and newspapers signals a widespread discomfort in dealing with what had 
become a controversial issue. In fact, the PDR/ADM’s approach toward women had 
received severe criticism, which the Project initially tried to appease by conceiving a 
few small-scale interventions for women, and eventually had to address fully by the end 
of the second phase.
7.4 The ‘Femmes du Sahel*: Gender and Development (GAD) as a Discursive 
Template for a Gender Critique of the PDR/ADM
The ubiquity of the ' femme de Keita’ stimulated international interest in the PDR/ADM 
approach toward women and gender. It was assumed that a project famous, inter alia, 
for massive female participation in its activities, would have elaborated cutting edge 
approaches for dealing with women. But the ‘GAD-minded’ observers who visited 
Keita between the end of the 1980s and mid-1990s were bitterly disappointed.
Activities directed toward women were not entirely absent, as the Project had 
devised interventions aimed at benefiting women since its first years in Keita. As early 
as 1987, the Report of the First Tripartite Evaluation mission argued that the original 
project document had underestimated the phenomenon of male out-migration, 
heightened by subsequent droughts in the early eighties, and consequently had been 
unprepared to deal with the crucial role assumed by women in project activities 
(PDR/ADM 1987:9). Although women had represented primary beneficiaries in the 
field of health, they should have been integrated in the ‘productive activities’ supported 
by the Project and they should have benefited from ad hoc training on the effects of 
project interventions (PDR/ADM 1987: 8,9). Several consultancies focused upon the 
roles and status of women had been arranged and a nutrition expert carried out a 
detailed survey on local diet and nutrition/malnutrition levels, which were to be 
reflected in the promotion of food transformation and commercialisation facilities for 
women (Cremona 1986).
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In the Project’s Second Phase (1991-1996) ‘women’s organisation’ was 
nominally added to the competences of the Cooperatives Division, which coordinated a 
number of activities seen as directly pertinent to women’s productive sphere (GICO 
1998). These consisted mainly in women’s horticultural gardens, training for the 
transformation of horticultural products; and women’s manioc fields. However, 
consistently throughout the second phase, the Project’s approach toward women was 
harshly criticised. These critiques came from a GAD perspective.
During the First UN Decade for Women, the WID approach was found lacking 
in many respects (Moser 1993; Razavi and Miller 1995; Kyte 1996). The economic 
crisis of the 1980s stimulated reflections on the ‘feminisation of poverty’, highlighting 
that women had suffered more than proportionately, compared to other social groups, 
from the consequences of recession and, paradoxically, from the supposed remedies for 
recession, in particular structural adjustment programmes (Elson 1991; Jackson and 
Pearson 1998). The 1980s were also marked by a considerable growth of women's 
movements in the developing countries (Snyder and Tadesse 1995; Kyte 1996).
The 1985 Third UN Conference for Women in Nairobi focused on approaches 
which would not aim at incorporating women in development programmes and projects 
in an instrumental way, but which examined the relative positions of men and women in 
society trying to target women as a particularly vulnerable group with multiple roles and 
needs. The new approach, Gender and Development (GAD), sought to empower women 
and to transform unequal gender relations (Braidotti et al. 1994). GAD thinking exposed 
some problematic consequences of WID emphasis on women’s productive labour. In 
particular, a preoccupation with the consequences of increased workloads for the health 
and well being of women; dissatisfaction with reform policies which redistributed assets 
(especially land) between households rather than within households; and a growing 
concern with the (symbolic and cultural as well as practical) relations between 
production and reproduction in sustaining unequal gender relations, would represent 
salient arguments in many critiques of the Project’s early approaches toward rural 
women.
The key actors (representing Italy, the FAO, and influential ‘outside observers’ 
such as the OECD) who were going to influence the PDR/ADM’s approach toward
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women in the early nineties all had access to the same discourses on 
women/development. Having ‘internalised’ these discourses (Long 1989), they 
operationalised them with reference to the PDR/ADM specific policies toward women 
through ‘regularized patterns of interaction’ (Keeley and Scoones 1999:18), involving 
ad-hoc meetings, publications, and joint consultancies.
In 1989 Marie Monimart authored an OECD/Club du Sahel book on Sahelian 
Women (.Femmes du Sahel: La Desertification au Quotidien). The book represents an 
important link between the ‘Fight against Desertification’ narrative and the ‘Women in 
Development’ narrative. Chapter 3, entitled ‘Sur les Chantiers Ardents’ (On the 
Burning Worksites) discusses in depth the Integrated Rural Development Project of 
Keita. Here, Monimart’s comments on the Project’s gender approach are far from 
flattering:
[Women’s] participation is mainly voluntary, and their labour is exploited without substantial 
advantages to them. If food aid in the “food-for-work” form is an immediate answer to acute 
food scarcity, it does not lack perverse effects. Due to men’s migration, women find themselves 
deprived of all resources and in charge of the family; in fact, they have no other choice but to 
work on the work-sites. But, then, is it really possible to talk o f “voluntary participation”? Isn’t it 
rather mobilization for recruiting temporary work at reduced price (...)? Women execute most 
manual tasks, as stones and water carriage. They are the ones who carry out the most demanding 
{penibles] and least qualified jobs. These tasks result in an increment o f work which might 
prejudice the health of the mother and of the child. [...] The tenure problem is often made more 
acute by land rehabilitation operations in which women participate, but which, in most cases, 
exclude them from the redistribution of land parcels. Women have no access whatsoever to the 
benefits of [development] activities: [their] access to water, to the means of agrarian production, 
and to trees remains limited. (Monimart 1989:106)
On 10 March 1986, the Italy-Africa Institute held a Round Table on ‘Women’s 
Participation to the Planning and the Implementation of Development Initiatives in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, with Particular Reference to Alimentary Self-sufficiency Problems.’ 
Patrizia Paoletti, who gave the keynote speech at the Verona Round Table, was perhaps 
the actor who had the greatest influence on the PDR/ADM’s ‘gender affairs’. In 1984 
Paoletti and Taliani had published the book ‘Territorial Reality and Development 
Policy’, the main Italian socio-anthropological background study for the PDR/ADM 
intervention (cf. Chapter 4). In 1986 Paoletti was in the Italy-Africa Institute’s 
Commission for ‘Women and Development’ (Atti della Tavola Rotonda Italo Africana 
1987). Between 1983 and 1996 she conducted several consultancies in Keita for the 
FAO, and in 1996 she coordinated the mission for the establishment of the Division for 
the Promotion of Women’s Role. This mission also included two Nigerien consultants: 
Mariama Bayard and Halimata Traore (Bayard-Paoletti-Traore 1997).
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Traore was to become the Chief of the Women’s Division in 1997. Bayard, a 
Nigerien feminist active on Niger’s political scene, already knew the Project from 
previous consultancies. In the first half of the 1990s, Bayard was the President of the 
Rassemblement Democratique des Femmes du Niger, and Traore was the secretary of 
the same national organisation, which had been created through a schism within the 
Association des Femmes du Niger (AFN), wanted by a group of Nigerien ‘intellectual 
feminists’ (this is the definition given by my informants in Niamey and Keita).
The report of Bayard’s individual consultancy in 1995 is a tough critique of the 
Project’s approach toward women. Along lines similar to Monimart’s critique quoted 
above, Bayard argued that
Environmental rehabilitation did not have any consequence for [women’s] agricultural 
productive activities. [...] Moreover, [women] had to cumulate their work on the project sites 
with their eternal domestic tasks. The result is an incredible work overload for women (chantier 
work, domestic work, traditional productive work, reproductive responsibilities) which is not 
accompanied by a parallel qualitative change in their living and working conditions. [...] Food- 
for-work rations represent a partial salary [...]. Partial because, according to the Project, Keita’s 
inhabitants are the primary beneficiaries of the interventions. This argument is totally irrelevant 
when referred to women, because they have almost no access to the means of production. 
(1995:20)
Despite [women’s] efforts to accomplish a ‘man’s work’ [...] it has been carefully avoided to 
give them access to reserved domains which lead to an increase in monetary revenues and to the 
promotion of their economic state. For instance, female chefs de chantier are non existent, and 
women too should have benefited of support in the form of credit for the commercialisation of 
their agricultural products. (1995:22)
V
In 1994, the recommendations of various internal reports and the critiques of 
external observers64 belatedly materialized upon the PDR/ADM’s implementation 
board. Hence, Tiemogo and Boubacar’s65 May 1994 ‘internal’ Report on ‘The 
Participatory Approach of the Keita Integrated Project’, argues for the first time that
in order to facilitate [women’s role in rural development] it would be necessary to consider the 
establishment of a unit [cellule] for the promotion of female activities, or otherwise, of a 
committee for the reflection upon and coordination of [women’s activities], which should gather 
periodically and include representatives of the women interested, (ibid:3 6-37)
64 Other critiques of the PDR/ADM’s approach toward women were made in the CILSS/PAC/GTZ book 
‘Le Sahel en Lutte contre la Desertification: Lemons d ‘E xperiencesauthored by Rene Marceau Rochette, 
(1989: 321), and in the in-depth external consultancy for the evaluation of the PDR/ADM’s first two 
Phases (GICO 1998:27).
65 Dr. Boubakar was Carotti’s homologue in the PDR/ADM, i.e. the National Project Manager.
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In 1997 the Division for the Promotion of the Role of Women and Socio 
Economic Activities (DPFSE) was established in the PDR/ADM, with Traore at its 
head.
7.5 The Division for the Promotion of Women’s Role
In April 1997, the DPFSE took over all the women-focused operations that had already 
been started by the PDR/ADM, and commenced new ones. Its activity, in September 
1997, had reached the following state:
86 groupements feminins had been constituted, involving a total number of 6,254 women ;
Eight land parcels had been bought by women through a project credit and redistributed amongst 
the groupement's members, thus giving to 551 women individual ownership of a parcel;
27 groupements (653 women) were engaged in the production of reforestation seedlings 
(pepinieres), contributing to the Project’s reforestation activities, and gaining a total revenue of 
25,000 FCFA (approx. US $ 50) in 6 months of business ;
49 groupements had developed an economic activity linked to cereal processing at Project- 
supervised m ills;
25 groupements were selling sunflower o i l ;
27 groupements had formed a ‘committee of hygiene’, and 
19 groupements hosted a women-run ‘ village-pharmacy ’.
All of the existing groupements either had benefited or were benefiting from ‘functional 
alphabetization courses’, run by an ad hoc service within the PDR/ADM, aimed at instructing at 
least two members of the groupement’s management committee [‘comite de gestion'] on how to 
fill in the forms illustrating the state of a groupement's activities at any time.
By April 2000 the groupements were almost 200. By November 2000, Assusun 
Keita, the micro-credit structure supported by the DPFSE, counted 266 members (189 
groupements feminins, 32 groupements masculins, and 45 individual persons who could 
not take loans) and had disposed of almost FCFA 40 million in deposit (approximately 
$60,000), of which more than 36 million came from the women’s groupements, 2.5 
millions came from men’s groupements, and about 0.5 million were individuals’ 
savings. Loans had already been issued for FCFA 65 million, almost 60 million of 
which to women’s groupements. This relatively abrupt change in project relations 
toward the local society generated the discontent of those actors who felt they were 
‘losing out’ from this new order. The most embittered were ex (male) chefs de chantier 
who had lost their job to the advantage of women.
The Project management’s reply to their remonstrations highlighted that the 
principal beneficiaries of the bulk of PDR/ADM operations were male landowners and 
farmers. Once rehabilitated, the Ader Doutchi Majiya lands would sustain an increased
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agricultural production and cattle raising, and it would be the men who, individually or 
united in state-recognized co-operatives, would gain the greatest benefits from a 
‘restored environment’. According to the project manager, the Italian Monitoring and 
Evaluation expert, and the Nigerien Chief of the Division for the Promotion of 
Women’s role, Keita’s men did not need the extra support required by women to 
organise themselves into producer-groups and to gain access to exclusive property of 
land and ‘landed resources’ (Riddel 1988). In 1997, project management’s view’ on this 
subject was that men relied on a pre-existing ideological substratum ideologically and 
practically supporting male entrepreneurial activities. Such a substratum was non­
existent for women, and this is why women should receive extra support by the 
‘Division for the Promotion of Women and of Socio-Economic Activities’ (DPFSE).
However, the installation of the DPFSE coincided in time with a major ‘life 
crisis’ in the PDR/ADM’s evolution. In fact, Carotti retired from the position of project 
manager and was replaced by Oumarou shortly after the newly established Division had 
become operative. The passing over of project management to a Nigerien expert was in 
line with the new orientation of the Project’s Third Phase, which foresaw increasing 
responsibility over project interventions to be passed to representatives of the recipient 
country. The incoming project manager graduated from the same Italian University as 
the previous project director. However, if there were elements of continuity in the 
‘technical’ understanding of the PDR/ADM’s intervention strategy on the territory, its 
‘social approach’ had inevitably taken a new course, as old and new management came 
from different social and cultural backgrounds.
Within the DPFSE itself, some tensions emerged with a new appointment to the 
position of vice-responsible of the Division. Before beginning to work for the 
PDR/ADM, the actual responsible, Halima, had been an active member of the RDFN 
(Ressemblement Democratique des Femmes du Niger). The RDFN comprised the most 
anti-conformist tendencies of the AFN, and its policies were open to some ‘Western’ 
feminist issues still rather unpopular amongst feminist lobbying groups in Niger. The 
activities of the newly established division, under Halima’s supervision, had been 
primarily focused towards ‘women’s empowerment’, reaching the results presented 
above.
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The vice-responsible, Rahmatou, a recently graduated socio-economist 
specialised in agricultural management, arrived at a time when men’s disappointment 
with the ‘skewed tendency’ of the DPFSE was at its climax. The relations between 
Halima and Rahmatou were tense from the beginning: the two women had different 
characters and approaches to their work, and Rahmatou, also due to her relatively high 
social class, had a hard time accepting to take orders from Halima. Interpreting the 
denomination of the division as suggesting that the latter should support not ‘women 
only’ but ‘women’ and all local ‘socio-economic activities’, the Rahmatou started 
replicating in the villages the successful structure of the groupement feminin, with the 
only difference that this time the actors involved were men.
That the new institution should be a ‘men only’ prerogative was not explicitly 
stated, but it seemed obvious, women being already active and organised in the 
groupements feminins, presented as open strictly to women only, and because of the 
widespread local refusal, with a few exceptions, to form mixed groupements. Women 
resented such an initiative on the grounds that if they were to work together with men, 
the latter would take all decisions leaving them in a subordinate position. Men, on the 
other hand, emphasized a feeling of inappropriateness and ‘shame’ to work, and to be 
seen working next to women. The Hausa term used is kunia, but such a feeling is also 
expressed by Tamasheq-speaking villagers, who would use the terms uksad (‘to fear’), 
or takrakit (‘shame’), often associated with rules of sexual behaviour (cf. Nicolaisen and 
Nicolaisen 1997:706).
This situation gave rise to tensions and misunderstandings within the Division, 
heightened by the fact that Halima and Rahmatou had separate working schedules and 
extension teams. This started to be perceived, at a village level, as a ‘two party 
structure’ within the PDR/ADM, with ‘Halima’s party’ advocating women’s rights, and 
‘Rahmatou’s party’ supporting men’s initiatives. Several factors contributed to reinforce 
such a vision, three of which are particularly relevant.
First, in December 1998, men’s fears of seeing their position weakened were not 
entirely unjustified, as, at that time, they were also facing the dissolution of the USRC 
{Union Sous-Regional de Cooperatives). A local-level branch of the UNC {Union 
National de Cooperatives), the USRC had been in charge of following the evolution of
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the cooperatives of producers, entirely constituted by men, which had been at first 
supported by the PDR/ADM, and then passed on to the UNC public structure. Keita’s 
producers had invested a considerable subscription-fee in joining the USRC, and were 
justly preoccupied not merely with the sudden lack of support its dissolution would 
engender for their activities, but also with the likelihood that they would not be able to 
recover any money entrusted to the USRC. Therefore, while their women were gaining 
new forms of support thanks to the intervention of the DPFSE, men could see the 
supporting structures on which they had relied until then crumble to pieces.
Secondly, and adding to their feeling of increased vulnerability, following the 
recommendations of the above mentioned Bayard-Paoletti-Traore 1996 Report, which 
had laid down the premises for the constitution of the DPFSE, the PDR/ADM was 
considering the opening of a Guichet de Credit aux Femmes. Initially, arrangements 
were being made for the Guichet's organisation to be entrusted to the RDFN, and, 
apparently, the majority of micro-credit operations would be carried out in favour of 
women only.
Thirdly, the new project manager appeared to be sensitive to men’s 
preoccupations, and interpreted the signs of gender turmoil as a ‘healthy* reaction of 
local society to excessive demands on the part of women, likely to undermine what he 
saw as the basis of Nigerien social structure, i.e. ‘familial solidarity’.
On my departure from Keita in 1997, the scenario I left behind me could have 
developed in two directions. On the one hand, the clash within the DPFSE was being 
steadfastly amended, changing its denomination into ‘Division pour la Promotion 
Feminine’ (DFD), in line with its original orientation. Moreover, after only a few 
months of cooperation, the clash between Halima and Rahmatou appeared to be 
irreparable, so the latter was moved to the Monitoring and Evaluation Division.
On the other hand, in the Project, the ‘promotion of the role of women’ formula 
was given a new ‘favoured interpretation’, which emphasized the ‘traditional’ role of 
women in the household, and as household members. The vagueness of the term 
‘traditional’, however, makes it a formula which can be easily used instrumentally to
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limit, rather than promote, women’s chances to improve their own independence and 
self-respect.
These two immediate developments made the newly created Division appear to 
be moving one step forward and two steps back, in the sense that if the new 
denomination’s focus on women only seemed to favour women’s cause, the new 
management’s approach toward the ‘promotion of the role of women’ formula was 
clearly conservative compared to the tone of the original Division document and the 
initial steps taken by Halima.
Leaving this situation behind me in April 1997, I thought that soon Halima 
would have found herself in conflict with the new management, maybe having to leave 
the Project, and being substituted by a more moderate and ‘malleable’ division chief 
who would have rendered women-focused interventions commensurate to the interests 
of locally more powerful actors, namely men and the new management. But, to my 
surprise, when I returned to the Project in 1999, I found Halima married to the new 
project manager, and, if anything, her power looked considerably strengthened. 
Rahmatou, instead, had eloped with the Responsible of the Monitoring and Evaluation 
Division, and both had found another job at the FAO headquarters in Niamey.
In the process of the Women’s Division establishment, Halima emerges as a 
Janus-faced actor. As a Nigerien consultant and feminist activist, she was exposed to 
international GAD discourses and contributed, with Paoletti and Bayard, to the 
elaboration of a strategy to reshape the PDR/ADM’s relation with local women. She 
then found herself at the head of the Division, having to bargain and negotiate with 
other project staff over the interpretation of the ‘promotion of women’ formula. She was 
able to make her perspective prevail over Rahmatou’s interpretation, and the latter was 
moved to a different project division leaving Halima alone to manage the DFD. But, in 
the disagreements with the new program manager, her position was definitely weak, and 
she risked to see her own ‘project in the Project’ fail. But her marriage with the project 
manager strengthened her bargaining position in the Project. Her strategy was relational, 
and entailed cooperation, rather than conflict, with powerful men. Halima’s action 
started in her consultancy with Paoletti and Bayard which laid the premises for the 
creation of the new Division. It continued in the form of ‘intervention’ in the Project
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area, and Halima proved to be highly efficient in gaining local women’s confidence and, 
in a short time, developing a whole range of initiatives in favour of local women. When 
her strategy was threatened, her marriage with the project manager at the same time 
transformed her private and public life and allowed her to maintain and expand her 
‘room for manoeuvre’.
7.6 The Women of the Ader Doutchi Majiya
This section explores local women’s patterns of agency in relation to the DFD’s 
activities. It focuses on the interface between the lives of elite and non-elite Keita 
women and the PDR/ADM, looking at how differently positioned local women took 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the PDR/ADM to pursue their own goals 
within their households and their local network of social relationships. Below, the case 
study of the Foyer Feminin de Keita shows how Keita’s women took up Project 
activities in order to unfold strategies which would be useful in fields closer to them 
than the field of Project intervention, formally structured by international GAD 
approaches.
7.6.1 Aminatou: a 'project woman ’
Aminatou’s status is unusual by Keita’s standards. Although she is now 28 years old, 
she lives at her parental home, surrounded by her younger siblings. With her, live her 
old father, a respected Keita elder, and his two wives. Aminatou’s mother, who comes 
from a village renown as an animist stronghold, is the household’s first Wife and 
therefore holds a higher status, and she is the mother of four girls and two younger sons, 
Aminatou’s brothers and sisters. The new wife, disliked and referred to in a derogatory 
way as a ‘village woman’ by the offspring of the first wife, gave birth to two children. 
Aminatou is the second oldest daughter in the family, and the only one with an 
unmarried status. Nevertheless, she has two children, a boy of six and a one-year old 
girl.
Aminatou’s destiny was considerably influenced by the PDR/ADM. When she 
was about 16 years old, the Project had opened a training centre for Keita’s young
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women, the ‘Foyer Feminin de Keita ' (FFK)66, which Aminatou had attended for more 
than two years achieving outstanding results. Aminatou still refers to the Italian tailor 
who had trained her group as her master, and to herself as ‘une eleve de Giovanna \  In 
Keita there are four professional Hausa tailors. Aminatou is one of them, maybe 
considered the least skilled, but she is the youngest one and the only woman, as well as 
the only one who learned her job thanks to project training. At completion of her first 
course, she followed a special course on the maintenance and repair of sewing 
machines, also organised by the PDR/ADM but open to few professionals only, for 
which she holds a certificate and which has made her a popular ‘sewing machines 
technician’ in Keita. Today she has many clients, which allows her to earn a living 
thanks to her own job.
Aminatou has resisted conforming to the prevailing stereotypes of female 
identity. As a girl, when she was attending the Project’s training, she had been the 
fiancee of a young man, who has become an electrician at the PDR/ADM after having 
received ad hoc training sponsored by the Project. However, their love was frustrated by 
his parents pressures on him to marry a girl whom, due to family alliances, they 
perceived as the most appropriate first wife for their son67. This event had a profound 
impact upon Aminatou’s life. Some years later, Aminatou’s parents arranged her 
marriage with a wealthy man from Keita, considerably older than her. Aminatou did not 
love him and refused to meet him until the day of the marriage ceremony, when, as she 
put it, they were ‘forced to sit next to each other’. When the ceremony was over, 
Aminatou packed up her belongings and left for Niamey with her sewing machine.
Aminatou felt strongly about women’s status in her society. Although she had 
never been enrolled in any ‘women’s organisations’, such as the AFN and the RDFN, 
she often voiced her dislike for many Hausa institutions which she saw as relegating 
women to an inferior role. To some extent, she was a ‘project creature’, and her picture 
as a young girl learning how to sew in the Foyer Feminin de Keita figured on the cover 
of the widely spread project brochure, exemplifying to Western readers the local young 
woman benefiting from project training.
66 Foyer Feminin de Keita could be translated ‘Keita Women’s Community Centre’.
67 In Keita, I could observe that the choice of a person’s first marriage partner is the object of lengthy and 
precise arrangements, whereas the second and further marriages tend to be one’s individual choice (Cf. 
Dunbar 1991:73).
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I had first met Aminatou in 1995 and we became friends, spending time together 
every day. In 1997, when I returned to Keita, I was hoping to find her there, but she was 
in Niamey. I felt bad, as I had come from Niamey and missed the chance to meet her 
there. Not knowing the circumstances under which Aminatou had left for Niamey, I 
paid a visit to her mother asking her if I could have Aminatou’s address in the Capital, 
and was surprised to learn that she did not know where her daughter resided. However, 
the mother asked me to bring Aminatou a letter, were I to meet her on my trip back. I 
was wondering what all this could be about, and how I was supposed to find Aminatou 
in Niamey. It did not take long before I learned more about Aminatou’s marriage from 
her sister and friends.
At the end of my stay, I returned to the Capital, and at the PDR/ADM’s office in 
Niamey I found a letter from Aminatou. The letter contained her address, and I rushed 
to see her. I found Aminatou working as a femme de menage at somebody’s place. The 
competition for jobs was tough in Niamey, and she could not get the work permit which 
would allow her to practise her profession, so she was doing domestic chores in 
exchange for a place to stay and some food. She looked thin and untidy. Although she 
was visibly glad to see me, she seemed embarrassed about her appearance and received 
me in a small room with only a bed in it. I gave her her mother’s letter and brought her 
news from Keita. That same night, I had to leave from Niger. When I returned to Keita 
for my long term fieldwork, Aminatou had gone back home, and was practising her job 
successfully. Everybody seemed to have forgotten about her unsuccessful marriage.
7.6.2 Keita‘s elite women: elections at the FFK
The Foyer Feminin de Keita (FFK) is a large building which had been built by the 
PDR/ADM for the promotion of the women of the town of Keita, and which had been 
fully equipped with dressmaking equipment and cooking utensils thanks to the twinning 
between Keita and the Italian town of Pesaro. Pesaro had also provided training 
modules and personnel. However, by the time of my first visit in 1995, the FFK had 
already assumed its present aspect. Today, its spacious rooms are empty, a thick layer of 
dust covering all surfaces and worthless leftover items of damaged furniture and 
equipment.
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Everybody in Keita knows the story of the FFK, even though nobody talks about 
it. When the FFK became operational, an ad hoc ‘comite de gestion ' (management 
committee) was established to coordinate its activities. The Committee’s president was 
Tambara, the sister of Keita’s Sarki and one of the most influential women in Keita68. 
After about 2-3 years of normal functioning, the FFK ceased its activities, and almost 
all the goods it contained ‘disappeared’. Some of them reappeared later in the homes of 
the committee’s members. At the Project, these happenings are usually referred to as 
‘un probleme de gestion’ (a management problem).
‘Tambara’ is not just a name. The term refers to a woman’s status. Nicolas 
(1975) tells us that it derives from the Tamasheq term tambari, which means ‘chief, 
and it is an honorary title, acquired in the course of the kan kwarya, a ceremony at 
which the aspiring ‘Tambara’ lavishly distributes gifts to the participants in a sort of 
female potlatch. On this occasion, all the present tambara dance, celebrating the glory of 
the tambara and the shame of their ‘bugaje’ [slaves]. ‘The tambara regards other women 
like the noble Targui regards the members of servile castes (Bugaje, sing. Bouzou) 
within his society* (Nicolas 1975:190). I have never witnessed a kan kwarya in the 
course of my fieldwork, and my informants said that while gift-giving is a common way 
to establish patron-client relations and assert oneself as a powerful person, such 
ceremonies are not held in Keita anymore at least since the times of Kountche. 
However, Nicolas suggests that the two core values expressed by this institution are 
female ambition, competition and status. Both of these values were evident in the 
relation between Tambara and women in Keita. Although my evidence suggests that 
Tambara was probably the most powerful woman in town, there were other influential 
women in Keita, who could count on a large network of social relationships. Tambara 
was the sister of the most powerful traditional political authority in the Canton of Keita, 
and, as I soon realized, this made her untouchable.
The FFK was a constant source of shame for the PDR/ADM. There it stood, on 
Keita’s main road, abandoned, at 100 metres from the headquarters of one of the most 
important projects in the country. Visiting consultants would never omit to ask about it, 
and write in their reports that the FFK situation ought to be redressed. Also Pesaro’s 
people wanted to see it function, as it had represented a considerable investment for
68 The Sarki also happened to hold a honorary position in the Comite de Jumelage, set up to deal with
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them. Several attempts to give it a new start had proved unsuccessful. However, when, 
in 1997, the Division for the Promotion of Women’s Role was established, it seemed 
obvious that it would address the FFK’s situation.
In November 1999, Pesaro sent the materials for making up t-shirts and other 
clothes, with the aim of providing employment opportunities to young women in Keita, 
and requesting that the FFK’s structures be used for the purpose of this operation. The 
newly established division took the operation under its control, and gave informal 
permission to a group of 12 Keita girls to work in the FFK, under Aminatou’s 
supervision. Aminatou’s choice was obvious, as she was the only female tailor in Keita, 
and had been trained at the Project.
The FFK re-opened. Without changing anything inside it, nor cleaning it up, the 
small group began working with the three functioning sewing machines that remained. 
Aminatou allocated different tasks to her supervisees, according to skill level, and she 
cut the cloths and performed the most difficult tasks, in addition to giving informal 
training, demonstrating sewing methods, and monitoring the others’ work. One could 
hardly notice the re-opening of FFK activities from the outside. The women were 
worked quietly in one room only, their younger siblings bringing them meals at midday. 
The only change visible to a careful observer would be the opened shutters. The women 
worked from 7 am to 5 pm, when light became too feeble for sewing. Electricity and 
water had been cut a long time before at the FFK, as bills were not being paid.
Despite her responsibility, Aminatou was not being paid more than the other 
women, as the deal with Pesaro was that women would be paid per-piece, even though 
this did not reflect the way the work had been organised. Nevertheless Aminatou 
seemed to welcome her new role, which increased her prestige, while providing an 
unexpected source of revenue. Perhaps more importantly by local standards, two of the 
girls working with her were her sisters, most of the others were her friends, and through 
this opportunity Aminatou was ‘investing’ in social relationships. When the operation 
was concluded, Aminatou was asked to keep the FFK open, for a very small 
remuneration (FCFA 10,000 or UK £ 10 per month),‘just in case more work would
everything relevant to the twinning with Pesaro.
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come in’. And more work did come in, this time for the confection of skirts to be 
‘exported’ to Italy.
As there seemed to be no reaction on the part of the old committee, a plan to 
expand the FFK activities to include the preparation of cooked foodstuff to be sold 
locally was developed by the DFD. But before this could be implemented, it would be 
necessary to obtain the nihil obstat of the Comite de Jumellage [Twinning Committee of 
Keita and Pesaro], i.e. to visit the Sarki at his court. The delegation comprised 
Aminatou, other young women, and a representative of the DFD. The plan was exposed 
to the Sarki, who listened carefully to the ideas and goals being presented. At the end of 
the women’s speech, he said: ‘Pesaro has given the FFK to us and the Project has got 
nothing to do with it. We are not going to put the structure to any use, if we don’t want 
to, but if anyone tries to use it without our agreement and benefit, we will prevent them 
to do so’. The delegation left, frustrated but powerless. Aminatou’s comment, with 
which everyone agreed, was ‘that thing [the FFK] is a problem-thing’ [Wannan abu, 
tana da matsalalolin], meaning that whatever one tried to do with it, it would cause 
him/her problems. However, this was not the last attempt to ‘resuscitate’ the FFK.
A few weeks later, the DFD opted for an ‘official’ way to change things, and a 
reunion with all ‘interested’ women in Keita was convened at the FFK to elect a new 
committee, after what was presented as the de facto dissolution, due to inactivity, of the 
old one. The reunion would culminate in popular ‘democratic elections’ of the FFK’s 
new committee. As the DFD was responsible for women’s activities in the area of 
project intervention, no one could object that this did not fall into its competences. The 
members of the old committee and a few other directly interested persons were 
expressly informed; otherwise the notice was spread in town through the public cryer.
At 4 pm on 4 December 1999, about 50 women gathered on the FFK’s veranda. 
Halima, as chief of the DFD, made an introductory speech, clarifying the history and the 
purposes of the FFK structure. Tambara and most of the members of the old committee 
were present, but no mention was made of the consequences of their management. 
Before the elections, it was suggested that a committee including mostly young women 
would have been more active and consonant to the spirit of the operation. The standing 
candidates for the posts of president, treasurer and secretary were asked to present
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themselves. The old committee stood there, motionless, and did not put itself forward. 
There were 7 candidates for the three posts, 4 of whom stood for the presidency. 
Aminatou was one of them, even though she did not present herself personally, but her 
name had been added to the list, as she was the one person currently most active in the 
FFK.
The women were asked to vote raising their hands. At this point a woman in her 
40s spoke with energy from the crowd: ‘I suggest that we re-elect Tambara as president 
of the FFK’. Everybody agreed and raised their hand. Then the other members were 
elected. The secretary belonged to the old committee, too, whereas the treasurer was a 
new member. When we left the place, Aminatou told me ‘On ne pouvait rien fa ire ’ 
(there was nothing we could do). Later, I heard the same comment from the DFD Chief.
Although Aminatou had been active in the Project since she was a girl and, on 
this occasion, she was supported by the Project Division, and although Keita’s women 
knew about the ex-committee’s previous behaviour, status differential was determinant 
in re-confirming power and control to those at the top. Aminatou’s achievements within 
the development project and her status as a ‘project creature’ did not change the 
outcome of the elections. Women’s choice can be seen as an ‘investment’ in social 
capital: they gained more from their alliance with Tambara than from allying with 
Aminatou. On this occasion, also the PDR/ADM people could not challenge Tambara’s 
influence, because they could not afford not to have her support: ‘elle est trop 
puissante', I was told, ‘c ’est la soeur du Sarki' (‘She is too powerful: she is the Sarki’s 
sister’).
As in the Tinkirana case discussed in Chapter 6, despite project intentions to 
alter gender relations in favour of women through this operation, it is not for its impact 
on gender relations that it came to be relevant in Keita. Actors involved in the FFK case 
were ‘playing status’ within spaces opened in the name of ‘gender’. It is as the sister of 
the highest ranking (male) traditional authority in the Canton that Tambara was able to 
reassert her position in Keita, and women’s criterion in re-electing her was more an 
investment in social relations than an attempt to improve the status of women vis a vis 
that of men.
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7.7 Conclusion
The peculiar spatial, structural, and cultural characteristics of the field of development 
intervention allow different categories of actors to find room for manoeuvre for their 
respective projects along the PDR/ADM gender axis. With Long and Villarreal, this is 
because ‘different categories of actors accord different social meanings and visualize 
different trajectories for the project’ (Long and Villarreal 1989:103).
The wider implications of this chapter for the relations between different actor 
categories within the field of development are that the relations between different sets of 
actors engaged in the Keita Project are not characterised by openness and an effort to 
achieve mutual understanding. Development ‘macro’ actors ‘construct’ knowledge 
about the women of Keita and use the ‘femme de Keita ’ and the ‘femmes du Sahel' 
instrumentally to carry out their respective agendas (knowledge of the other ‘as a tool’). 
Thq femme de Keita and femmes du Sahel are tropes which tell us something about the 
values, interests and goals of their sources or authors, respectively, the WED approach 
and Koutche’s regime; and the GAD approach. On the other hand, Keita’s women try to 
manipulate the situations made available by the new emphasis on women’s role to 
unfold their own projects. These projects, even in the case of project staff in the Women 
Division, are influenced more by forces close to the everyday life of local actors than by 
the Project’s explicit objectives.
The femme de Keita, i.e. the poor woman who, despite the harsh working 
conditions, in cooperation with the national government and an international project, 
took the challenge of fighting against the adverse odds of a hostile nature symbolizes 
popular participation; women’s involvement in development; and trust in the leading 
forces of change. This trope partly reflects the undeniable efforts of thousands of poor 
women in the Project intervention area, but it is also useful to many actors, such as the 
FAO, donors, and Niger’s government, as it displays their success in achieving their 
respective agendas. Massive popular participation sanctions their policy choices and 
actions.
The Femmes du Sahel symbolise a different type of women, victimised workers 
under the burden of productive and reproductive chores, forced by their own destitution
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and lack of alternatives to accept a deal (chantier work) which increases the demands on 
their health and bodies. However, this image calls for more ‘intervention’, and is 
therefore instrumental to GAD objectives, leading to the creation of the DPFSE. The 
DPFSE was the outcome of the strategies of an actor network of policy elite women 
(Monimart, Paoletti, Bayard, Halima Traore), who operationalised GAD narratives into 
the ‘intervention’ of the new women’s Division.
Village women in the project intervention area had no direct access to macro­
level narratives. However, international and national approaches to rural women’s 
participation in development actions provided new spaces for strategic action for 
different categories of rural women who found themselves willingly or unwillingly 
exposed to them. Their strategies did not coincide with explicit development 
approaches. The strategy of women like Tambara and Halima was to rely upon 
networks of allegiance with powerful local actors, in most cases men, from which they 
derived prestige. Tambara’s power is clearly ‘relational’, in that it is rooted in her 
kinship ‘positioning’ within a hierarchical social structure (she is the sister of the Sarki). 
Halima has achieved a considerable control over resources and people, and relative 
security within the Project, thanks to her marriage with the project manager. The 
assembly of Keita women who elected Tambara was more concerned to ‘invest’ in a 
relation from which they could derive support and benefits in the future, than to sustain 
the Project’s initiative of the Foyer Feminin de Keita, aimed supposedly at benefiting 
them in the first place. Aminatou has tried to maintain control over her labour, returns to 
labour, and body, by rejecting the ‘married’ status and ‘repositioning’ herself within the 
local gender system. Partly, it has been the economic independence achieved through 
her own job, an external opportunity, which allowed her to remain independent. Her 
choice maximizes her autonomy, but decreases her security: indeed, Aminatou’s 
conditions in Niamey were harsh, and things could have turned badly for her.
This chapter also contributes to our understanding of the dynamics between 
development projects and local gender relations, complementing the conclusions 
reached by other anthropologists. In her ethnography of the bee-keepers of Ayuquila 
(Mexico), Villarreal (cf. Long and Villarreal 1989; Arce, Villarreal and de Vries 1994), 
documents different women’s strategies to enhance their room for manoeuvre within the 
spaces opened by a project. Villarreal notes that, in her example, ‘autonomy can be a
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misleading concept [...]. We have found the women of Ayuquila renewing their bonds 
with their menfolk, not breaking them unless it is really necessary, while at the same 
time working to build their other networks and creating new ones’ (Arce, Villarreal and 
De Vries 1994:169). Making room for manoeuvre may in fact involve consent with 
established gender hierarchies and a degree of dependence on others, including men. 
With Aminatou’s exception, all the examples provided above confirm this 
interpretation, which is also suggested by Tinkirana women’s choice to side with their 
men at the meeting organised by the gender consultancy, in order to put pressure on the 
Project for the construction of a new dam (cf. Chapter 6). However, this seems to 
happen because, in Villarreal’s example as well as in the cases illustrated in this chapter, 
project activities did not create acute tensions between men and women or within 
households.
The bee-keeping initiative started by Ayuquila women did not threaten men’s 
role and status, and Ayuquila women expressly adopted strategies to minimize potential 
conflicts with men. In Keita, the outbreak of gender conflicts was contained by the 
interruption of the Project’s land redistribution policy as soon as it became evident that 
this initiative was creating tensions which the Project was not going to be able to 
control, and by the fact that, due to male seasonal migration, men and women did not 
compete over labour opportunities offered by the Project. In these cases, women have 
only to gain from obtaining men’s support, and men have nothing to lose from women’s 
participation in project activities. When these conditions do not obtain, conflicts over 
control of time, labour and property is likely to arise between genders and within 
households (see Chapter 9).
Carney and Watts’ description of gender dynamics in the Jahaly Pacharr 
Irrigation Project in the Gambia illustrates a different situation (Carney and Watts 1990; 
Watts 1993). In Jahaly Pacharr, the Project interfered with land and labour relations 
within the household, animating struggles between men and women over access to land. 
These struggles were primarily ‘over meaning’ (Carney and Watts 1990:211), i.e. over 
re-defining gender identities and thereby granting or denying access to resources to men 
and women. In the case illustrated by Carney and Watts, the Jahaly Pacharr Project 
upset the norms regulating men and women’s relative access to and control over 
resources. On several occasions, the Keita Project risked giving rise to similar tensions.
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We have seen that the newly opened Division for the promotion of Women’s Role in 
Keita initially stirred external tensions between women and men (especially ex chefs de 
chantier), and internal conflicts over the interpretation of women’s role within the 
Project. These conflicts were partly solved through the Division Chiefs marriage with 
the project manager and by a partial redefinition of the Division’s objectives. Also in 
the Project’s first phase, as mentioned in Chapter 3 and above, the redistribution of 
rights upon lands to male household heads provoked the remonstrations of groups of 
women who had been providing the labour for the rehabilitation, but did not benefit 
from the redistribution. In this case, the end of the redistribution policy concluded the 
potential conflict between men and women. This suggests that the main opportunities 
which were made available by the Keita Project to local women, such as working on the 
chantiers for food rations, or participating in groupement activities and the Foyer 
Feminin de Keita did not constitute real challenges to local gender relations, but that 
otherwise conflict may have risen.
The following chapter compares the practices and perceptions of different 
categories of actors (planners, consultants, local authorities, men and women) vis a vis 
the application of new participatory approaches to the Keita Project. In contrast to the 
introduction of gender/development rationales to the PDR/ADM’s programme, new 
participatory trends involved a thorough restructuring of the Project’s intervention 
strategies, giving rise to interest conflicts between ‘macro’, ‘meso’ and ‘micro’ actors in 
the field of project intervention.
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8. THE PARADOX OF PARTICIPATION: DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
MAKING AND PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES IN KEITA
8.1 Introduction
In the 2000, seventeen years since the beginning of PDR/ADM upon the bases set by 
the Italian Initiative to Fight against Desertification in the Sahel, Italy prepared a new 
umbrella ‘Programme to Fight against Desertification for the Reduction of Poverty in 
the Sahel’. The new Programme was inspired by the international modishness of 
‘participatory’, and ‘bottom-up’ development and, through it, Italy aimed at inserting 
itself in the World Bank-led Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.
The New Programme was inspired by wider trends in international development, 
and its approach was unsurprisingly different from the approach which had 
characterised the Keita Project over the previous sebenteen years. The Keita Project’s 
management style had been centralised and relatively ‘top-down’, especially in the 
Project’s main component, that of environmental rehabilitation and the fight against 
desertification.
But Italian actors in the development aid Department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs felt that change in Italian development policy in the Sahel had to be reflected in 
Italy’s most famous Project in that region, Keita. It would not make sense, according to 
 ^ Italian officials responsible for the coordination of the New Programme, for the most
important Italian Project in the area to run counter to new Italian approaches in 
development. Accordingly, a ‘mission’ was sent to Keita to rearrange the project’s 
approach in line with the New Programme in April 2000. Keita was then entering its 
Fourth and final phase. The same Mission had to identify the main strategic axes along 
which the Project was going to function during its last five years of work in the region.
The coordinators of Italy’s New Programme wanted the Keita Project to become 
an example of the New Programme’s approaches and asked the mission to consider 
ways to operate this ‘adaptation’. However, in Niger it became evident that various 
parties involved in the Project were anxious to see the Project take other problems on 
board in its Final Phase.
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Nigerien State authorities, and Niger’s President himself, wanted the Project to 
focus on environmental rehabilitation and common property resource management. 
Project Staff emphasised that, in its final stage the Project had to direct its efforts 
toward ensuring the ‘sustainability’ of the Project’s past interventions and the 
‘responsabilisation’ of ‘the peasant’. Keita’s traditional authorities, village chiefs, and 
local inhabitants all wanted the Project to complete and/or continue its environmental 
rehabilitation activities.
The priorities of all these different categories of actors, and primarily of the men 
and women living in the Project intervention area, were reflected in the report prepared 
by the Mission at completion of its stay in Keita. The report also argued that the 
Project’s adaptation to Italy’s New Programme had to be gradual and to take into 
account the Project’s history and the delicate stage at which it found itself. A few 
months later, a New Mission was organised, this time led by the technical coordinator 
of Italy’s New Programme, which enforced the New Programme’s priorities onto 
Keita’s approach. Paradoxically, this highly ‘top-down’ change was implemented in the 
name of ‘bottom-up’ participatory approaches, which, by the 2000, had become 
ubiquitous in the field of planned development.
This chapter discusses an extended case study of the negotiations which 
characterised the introduction of Italy’s New Programme in the Keita Project. It took 
five ‘missions’, composed by interdisciplinary groups of Italian and Nigerien 
consultants, to come up with a project for the Fourth Phase, which, in the Italian 
planners’ intentions, should lead to the ‘rebirth’ of the Keita Project upon ‘participatory’ 
premises. It was likely that the Fourth Phase would be the final phase of the Project, and 
different categories of actors held strong views about priority problems which the 
Project would have to unravel before its completion. Most of the evidence presented in 
this chapter derives from happenings which took place in the third of the five 
‘missions’, in which I participated as the anthropology consultant.
The case study shows that ‘distant’ categories of actors had different priorities 
for the Project’s final phase. However, some actors have a greater influence upon the 
course taken by events (or upon the configuration of the field at any given time) and,
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with Scoones and Holmes, ‘the construction of [development]69 policy is, to a large 
extent, dominated by the decisions of elite groups of policy makers’ (Holmes and 
Scoones 2000:7). Ultimately, as argued in Chapter 1, the room for manoeuvre available 
to meso and micro actors (Mouzelis 1995) can be limited considerably by the decisions 
of macro actors. These decisions are based more on political pressures to conform to 
international development trends, than on an attempt to ‘see the justification for the 
other’s point of view’ (Gadamer 1986:152), and make informed choices to improve the 
living conditions of the ‘target population’.
8.2 The New ‘Programme to Fight against Desertification for the Reduction of 
Poverty in the Sahel’
The New Programme represented a ‘manifesto’ of Italian policy in the Sahel, and the 
planners responsible for implementation of the Programme in the Ministry were under 
pressure to make existing Italian Projects in the area conform to the new standards. 
According to the ‘expert’ who had taken care of the redaction of the Programme (Dr.70 
Corsi), the main difference between the Italian Initiative and the New Programme was 
the greater emphasis which the latter put on the notion of participation. Dr. Corsi 
explained the original idea of starting the New Programme in the following terms:
‘They said, beyond all the ruins that exist in the Italian Cooperation, we have a positive 
experience in this domain: we have Aghrymet, we have Keita, we have done a few things... 
from all this we can find a way to insert ourselves in the international debate of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers’.
Because the Keita Project is highly visible and stands as an example of its kind, 
according to Italian officials it could not be allowed to run counter to the new 
approaches. As the main coordinator (Dr. Parini) for the Programme’s implementation 
argued,
‘Keita should now become a reference point for a forthcoming series of new experiences in the 
Sahel along the lines of the new Programme’.
This was easier said than done. Fitting Keita into the guidelines set by the New 
Programme would have entailed drastic transformations to a project which had been
69 The original sentence reads: ‘the construction of environmental policy is, to a large extent, dominated 
by the decisions of elite groups of policy makers’ (Holmes and Scoones 2000:7).
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working for almost 20 years upon entirely different premises. Keita’s management style 
had been characterised by the dirigiste approach of its first manager, Dr. Carotti, who 
energetically ‘ran’ the Project since its beginnings in 1983 until 1998, when the national 
project manager replaced him. Commenting on the ‘Keita phenomenon’, Dr. Corsi said:
‘Carotti took the Project in his hands and began working [comincia a realizzare], overcoming 
enormous difficulties: the bureaucracy, the garage, machines, contracts... it was he, with 
incredible sacrifices and organisational skill, who surmounted all difficulties, but at the same 
time, he became, as it often happens, a kind of satrap of the Project. There was a dialogue 
between Carotti and the prefect, who at the time was the number two of [Kountchd’s dictatorial] 
regime, and probably [Carotti] was in contact with Kountche himself. All decisions passed from 
the authoritarian channel which had the prefect at the top’.
Keita had always been a project in which decision making was highly 
centralised. Activities were planned at the top and, even though they were undeniably 
influenced by continuous formal and informal consultations with representatives of the 
local population, the criteria for intervention were based upon ‘scientific’ observations 
and ‘technical’ objectives. This was especially so in the Project’s main component, that 
of environmental rehabilitation of sub-catchment areas.
Keita had represented an example in the field of anti-desertification projects for almost 
20 years. Now, the ‘example Keita’ had to change clothes, because it had become 
unfashionable on the international development scene, and could not be proudly 
displayed to the public unless it underwent an effective ‘lifting’. This change was not 
compelled by observations of problems risen ‘on the field’ in Keita, but rather by the 
necessity to show that Italy’s interventions were up to date and coherent with 
international development trends. Ironically, this highly ‘top-down’ change was 
operated in the name of ‘bottom-up’ and ‘participatory’ ideals.
8.3 In Rome: the Briefing with the Italian Coordinator of the Programme to Fight 
Desertification for the Reduction of Poverty in the Sahel.
A briefing with Dr. Parini, the main coordinator of the New Programme and a homo 
novus in the Ministry (the only one not familiar with Keita), was organised for the 
consultants before their departure to Niger. In the meeting, he supported the view that 
the Project had to change from a project that managed preconceived activities to one
70 In Italy, the title ‘Dr.’ (.Dottore) is attributed to anyone who has achieved the first (undergraduate) 
degree (Laurea).
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that aimed at providing services to the local community, for activities selected by the 
community itself. Dr. Parini wanted the Project to put an end to its top-down approach:
we are not going to define a list of specified activities, we are not going to set aside 100 millions 
for papaya and 150 millions for ant-breeding! Local people will have the opportunity to obtain 
loans, getting a chance to realize their objectives. They are the ones who know best what is the 
most profitable investment in their context. This way, it will be the people of Keita who will 
decide what is the best way to make use of the Project.
One consultant who had been working in Keita for almost 15 years, residing 
there for 8 years, and myself, aware of the importance attached to hydraulic and 
rehabilitation works by Keita’s villagers, anticipated some of the problems that they 
would have faced once in Keita at the reunion with Dr. Parini. But he argued:
if we start with this attitude we’U never end. I understand that it is important for the Project to 
‘make works’, but now the priority is to change the Project’s approach and methodology. In this 
phase, even if not a single work was realised, I would not worry. The only works that should be 
done are with the aim of testing the new approach.
It was clear from the meeting that for the Italian actors involved in the New 
Programme’s coordination, the absolute priority was to make the Keita Project suit the 
approach presented in the new Programme. The Project had to stop its work 
programme, redefine its strategies, rearrange its structure, renew its methodology and 
approach, and then, perhaps, it could go back to its normal functioning. It is noteworthy 
that the strongest supporter of Keita’s changes, Dr. Parini, had never been to Keita, and 
knew little, if anything, of the local reality. However, in this circumstance, he happened 
to be the most influential actor in relation to Keita’s destiny. He was coordinating a 
Programme which could reposition Italy within the international development scenario. 
He was part of an elite network in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs which pushed 
for Italian projects to be consistent with the New Programme. Had it been otherwise, 
Italy’s image would have suffered vis a vis other donor countries.
8.4 In Niamey: Meetings with the Minister and with the Pilot Committee.
Once in Niger, the ‘mission’ was accompanied for the first five days by Mr. Fini, a 
representative of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Fini had followed closely 
the activities of Keita since its inception and had been to Keita on several occasions. 
The main reason for his presence at the beginning of the ‘Mission’, was to meet the
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Nigerien Minister of Agriculture and to make the opening speech at the Project’s Pilot 
Committee [Comite de Pilotage] meeting.
The Minister delivered a message from Niger’s Head of State to the ‘Mission’. 
The message outlined Niger’s priorities for the Project’s future agenda, and it expressed 
the President’s wish to
see the experience of the PDR/ADM extended to other districts.
He expressed Niger’s goal in the field of ‘environmental development’ as ‘the 
control [maitrise] of surface waters’, in which, in his words, ‘Keita stood as an 
unparalleled example’. The Minister noted that focusing on the management of surface 
waters was a more logical option than spending a lot of money on agricultural inputs. 
The President also wished the tenure question and the management of common property 
resources in the Project area to be taken into serious consideration.
The President of Niger, Tandja Mahamane, had been closely connected to the 
Project and its manager in the mid 1980s, when he held the post of Tahoua’s Prefect. 
The Project’s methodology in the ‘environmental rehabilitation’ field was well known 
to him, as he had followed the Project’s activities and results for some years. A 
replication of Keita’s environmental approach in other regions of Niger had been one of 
Tandja’s objectives in his presidential campaign.
Mr. Fini did not fail to mention the connection between Keita and the President 
at the Pilot Group meeting, which was held the day following the Mission’s visit to the 
Minister. Mr. Fini began his speech acknowledging that the Fourth Phase of the Project 
had an ambitious objective, namely, the transfer of competences and responsibilities to 
local populations who, at the Project’s end, would have to manage the resources created 
and improved by the Project. But, he added, ‘decision power is associated with 
responsibility’. This meant that Keita’s ‘beneficiaries’ had to endorse responsibility for 
the management of structures installed by the Project. According to Mr. Fini, the Project 
had identified methods appropriate to Sahel’s problems. The Keita Project had 
demonstrated that it was not profitable to stock waters downstream catchment areas 
without carrying out preliminary protective actions upstream.
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Two great persons: your President of the Republic and Dr. Carotti, against all experts and trends, 
decided to intervene [amenager\ from upstream to downstream. Today, no one would dare 
saying that a different method should be adopted. Now, strategic resource management options 
must be found. The Mission will consider this issue in detail.
When it was the national project manager’s turn to speak, he reminded the 
audience that project Staff had already started preparing for the Fourth Phase, 
sometimes referred to as ‘disengagement phase’. To the Manager, ‘disengagement’ 
entailed
progressively remitting responsibility toward the management of natural resources and 
infrastructures to the local inhabitants.
He went on to describe the options taken by project staff in order to achieve this 
goal, which he saw as the fundamental objective of the Project at this advanced stage. It 
is noteworthy that persons better acquainted with Keita focused on concrete problems 
which they could envisage taking place in the PDR/ADM in the future, rather than on 
abstract ‘approaches’. At the meeting with the Pilot Committee, Italy’s New Programme 
was not even mentioned. Having completed their ‘official’ meetings in the capital, the 
consultants moved to Keita, where they were to remain for about three weeks.
8.5 In Keita: iKaman An Fara Gine, Sai an Karye Shi* (It Is Like When You Start 
Constructing a Building: You Have to Complete It).
project staff had started introducing the idea of the Project’s potential conclusion to the 
people of various villages. This was done in order to prepare local villagers to take 
charge of the infrastructures and resources which had been continuously supervised by 
the Project.
At a meeting including the representatives of approximately 15 women’s groups 
from different villages and the respective village chiefs, the project manager announced: 
‘The Project is like a boy. It has reached the age of 17 now, and it is ready to get 
married’. The people were disappointed, and openly expressed the wish that the Project 
would stay. One village chief reacted worriedly:
The village of MKG has been waiting for the Project to take its water problems into 
consideration for years and years. Is the Project going to leave without completing its task?
Another chief argued:
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For the women, the groups are very important, and they confide only in the Keita Project. Other
projects have tried to contact them, and the women themselves have chased them away. They
said that if it was not the Keita Project, they wouldn’t collaborate with any other structure.
One woman stood up and expanded on the event mentioned by the Chief. The 
field-agents of an international project had reached their village in a moto-cross, and 
presented to a group of women casually assembled what cooperation with their project 
could offer them. But the village women had chased them away, and the agents ran so 
fast that they forgot some files in their village! This comment made the people at the 
meeting laugh. Soon the meeting was concluded.
I remained in the village to visit some people while the rest of the party made its 
way back to Keita. I went to greet Salifou, a man in his mid forties, who had worked as 
a site leader on project intervention sites. I related to Salifou the discussion which had 
taken place at the meeting. He thought that there was still a lot to do for the Project in 
the region, and commented evocatively:
Kaman an fara gine: sai an karye shi
(it is like when you start constructing a building: you have to complete it)
Also Malam Issouf Kombo, a Keita elder, commented in a concerned way:
If the Project were to leave for good it would be the catastrophe here, (original in French)
In the course of my stay in Keita, I visited many villages. I wanted to find out 
different local groups’ understanding of the Project’s intervention strategies and 
methods. After the Project’s departure, the region’s inhabitants would be fully 
responsible for the maintenance of the infrastructures built by the Project. I prioritised 
meeting those people who had worked for the Project on the intervention sites near their 
villages. My sample included many women, as they represented the bulk of the 
Project’s labour force. The majority of women I met could describe very accurately 
several categories of project intervention. They all insisted that the Project should stay 
and carry out more works close to their village. Some of them explicitly said that they 
wanted to work for the Project in order to obtain food-for-work rations. A woman in 
Garadawa said that it had been two years now that the Project had not come to do some 
work in her village: no new trenches had been made, and old trenches had not been
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maintained. ‘We want work’ (muna son aiki), she said. ‘What kind of work?’ I asked.
‘Aikin doutchi' (stones work) she replied. Fewer women mentioned the impact of the 
activities on the environment, mainly for granting them access to water. Some women 
argued they had thought the Project would never leave and said that if the Project was 
going to leave, no one would help their villages anymore.
The environmental impact of project activities was more appreciated by village 
elders and men in general (cf. Chapter 6). In every village, the elders and the chiefs had 
a list of ‘desiderata’ which they wanted the project to assist them with. They 
consistently argued that the Project should have stayed as long as possible. In more than 
20 villages, the villagers, coordinated by village chiefs, had piled up heaps of stones. 
This was one of the first steps required for building hydraulic structures. The Project 
normally distributed food rations to workers who engaged in stone carrying. But some 
villages had done so spontaneously to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate, and as 
a way to attract the Project’s attention to the acuteness of their problems.
8.6 The Official Visit to the Sarki: Finish What You Have Started or Go Away
Also in Keita, the Mission had a number of ‘official visits’ on its agenda. Perhaps the 
most important one was with the Sarki, the most influential traditional authority in the 
District of Keita. Keita’s Chef du Canton has a strong personality and has always 
claimed his right to have a say on the Project’s activities in the region falling under his 
influence. Carotti used to consult him before starting a new type of activity, and, in 
general, it was customary for official missions to pay him a visit and report upon the 
mission’s objectives. The Sarki addressed the consultants with a severe tone. Having 
listened carefully to the mission’s reasons for being in Keita, he replied:
Finish what you have started, or go away. All other donors have abandoned us because of your 
presence here. Because we hosted the famous Project Keita, we haven’t got an NGO either. 
Now, you tell us that you might leave. You go away without even completing here. And in the 
last years of your stay here you want to concentrate on some little game with the population. 
Many villages in Keita’s Valley are not self sufficient [for food production]: you must complete 
your work. If what has been done in Loudou had been done everywhere! The village chiefs come 
in reunion with the Sarki [i.e. himself]: here are our villagers, they wait and wait... Now, if you 
want to stay here doing some little activity, then go away directly, because you are just impeding 
others to come.
His speech, delivered publicly in front of his ‘court’, stimulated a choir of 
agreement from the village chiefs, elders, and dignitaries present. There was no doubt
that different categories of villagers in the project intervention area not only wanted the 
Project to stay, but wanted it primarily to continue its standard ‘land rehabilitation’ 
interventions without, as they put it, ‘losing time’ adopting new approaches. As Hajiya, 
an old woman with a long standing association with the Project for her participation on 
the working sites commented:
what new approaches can there be? The people here always communicated with the Project! 
(Mutane kullum suna yi magana da Projel) That’s why you know what people want: we want 
dams, we want work, right? We want food-for-work (muna son tabki, muna son aiki, korrei, 
muna son taimakon abinci!)
8.7 The Meeting with the Project Staff and the World Food Programme Expert: ‘a 
Problem of Mentality [Mentalite]1
Even though local people appeared to know the technical details of project 
infrastructures, as well as the function of different intervention types, the majority of 
people did not seem to have understood the relation between various types of 
interventions at a subcatchment level. The Project’s appraised method had emphasised 
the necessity to ‘treat’ subcatchment areas as an integrated whole: the functioning of a 
dam downstream depended upon the series of hydraulic structures built upstream.
Maintenance of this system of interrelated works at the subcatchment level 
required cooperation between villages having a common interest in the subcatchment as 
a whole. However, it appeared from my own inquiries and project staff meetings in 
various villages that cooperation between neighbouring villages would have been 
difficult to achieve when these had a past history of antagonism and conflict. The 
management of common property resources at a subcatchment level was going to be a 
problematic issue. Many villages were clearly unwilling to cooperate with their 
historical enemies. Whether they lived in the same subcatchment or not, did not seem to 
be a sufficient stimulus to induce a pooling of efforts for the maintenance of 
infrastructures from which they derived a collective benefit.
This question was what most preoccupied the project staff. They felt that it was 
already too Tate’ to start worrying about how the local population would deal with the 
Project’s inheritance, and they were clearly alarmed by the difficulties they could 
foresee. At a reunion organised by the mission nearing the conclusion of its stay, these
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preoccupations were brought to the fore. One member of staff argued that the Project’s 
primary task now consisted in
transforming the mentality [mentalite] of the populations and making villagers responsible 
[responsabiliser] for the management of their own territory.
Another staff member agreed:
we have to focalise all our energies on changing mentalities. In this zone mentalities are hard, 
we’ll have to sensitize [sensibiliser], If the Project closes today, there are going to be problems: 
the villager [paysan] has not understood the sense of the interventions [realisations].
Another staff member argued that in Burkina ‘mentalities’ were different; people 
were ready to accept considerable sacrifices because they had a sense of common 
interest. On the same lines, the Project Manager argued that at this stage one single 
resource management committee (comite de gestion du terroir villageois) was worth ten 
dams. The main problem in the area was
a problem of mentality: people are still talking of the ‘project dam’, the ‘project trees’... they 
have not realised that everything returns to them... they have to assume responsibility for the 
management of their resources, it is necessary for local villagers to become aware (prise de 
conscience) of their own role.
During the last week of work in Keita, the Mission had been joined by a World 
Food Programme ‘expert’ (Dr. Samer), who had to assess the food-for-work situation 
within the Project’s activities. The WFP expert was also worried by what he believed to 
be a serious ‘dependency syndrome’ developed by local inhabitants with regards to food 
rations. He was struck by the finding that,
after 17 years of project intervention, some women I have met on my visits are still asking for 
food rations.
He believed that the Project should have stopped this ‘distribution’ policy, and 
asked local people not only to volunteer on the work sites, but to contribute financially 
to the interventions. According to Dr. Samer, this was the only way in which the 
‘beneficiaries’ would have ‘built ownership’ of the infrastructures and resources. He 
believed that urgent measures ought to be taken to ensure the ‘sustainability’ of project 
interventions:
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Send armies of sociologists’, he argued lLe genie rural est plus facile que le genie social!
Even in this short exposition of the views of different actor categories we can 
see that the actor’s status and position with respect to the Project influenced his/her 
expectations from project activities in the Fourth Phase. Niger’s State authorities 
focused on how the Project might contribute to the National ‘anti-desertification’ 
strategies; project staff worried about the so-called ‘sustainability’ of project 
infrastructures: would local people follow up and maintain the resources improved by 
the Project? Local men and women of different status wanted the Project to carry on its 
activities for different reasons. Some were mainly interested in the potential 
environmental impact upon the lands surrounding their villages; others, mainly women, 
wanted more opportunities to obtain food rations; the Sarki and the chiefs of villages 
severely hit by erosion and drought, wanted the Project to complete its work in areas, 
within the project intervention area, where it had not carried out substantial 
interventions so far.
8.8 Back in Rome: The Mission’s Conclusion and the Programme’s Coordinator’s 
Comments
The conclusion reached at the end of the mission was that the Project should 
have focused on three main axes:
Finalisation of interventions in the environmental domain according to defined criteria.
Income generating activities mainly in the field of agriculture and horticulture.
Other measures, which included the organisation of local resource management institutions
responsible, inter alia, for the maintenance of hydraulic structures and for the supervision of
reforestation sites.
In emphasising these objectives in their reports, the consultants believed they 
were reflecting the priorities of different categories of stakeholders, which had become 
evident in the course of their mission. Instead, they had found it difficult, in the light of 
the sets of problems which had become evident during their stay, to introduce the 
changes required to make the Project fit into the New Italian Programme. Keita’s past 
could not be brushed away, and the Mission’s Report argued that adaptation to the new 
Programme should have taken place in a gradual way.
However, the report’s conclusions were not particularly welcomed by the Italian 
Official responsible for the New Programme’s organisation (Dr. Parini). At a meeting
organised to discuss the report’s findings and recommendations, he told myself and 
other consultants in an altered tone:
You say we have to build dams. Fine. We can hang your plans on the wall. But what do the 
people want? What if they wanted a PVC firm? The Project has to be participatory. I don’t care 
if Keita stops making dams altogether.
His preconceived association of ‘dam building’ with ‘hard’, top-down 
development, and of other ‘participatory approaches’ with ‘soft’, ‘pro-people’ 
development, made it almost inconceivable to him that what local people in fact wanted 
were ‘dams’. But he was also disappointed to see that his own priority, transforming 
Keita into an example of Italy’s new Programme, did not figure as an urgent measure in 
the consultants’ report. He argued that the problem with sending experts who are 
familiar with a project is that they are conditioned by their previous knowledge of the 
Project. According to Dr. Parini, it would have been better to send new people, people 
with no emotional involvement in the Project. In other terms, people who, having no 
familiarity with local men and women, would have been more efficient at executing 
tasks emanating from the top. A few months later, when the New Programme had 
reached a more advanced stage, the technical coordinator of the New Programme was 
sent to Keita, to re-arrange the Project’s formula according to the New Programme’s 
priorities. And the Project interrupted its activities for some months. I don’t know, at 
present, if they have re-started.
\  8.9 Conclusion: Some Personal Remarks
In the example presented above, the New Programme Coordinators appropriated 
international discourses of ‘participation’ and imposed them on the Project’s 
programme, despite the different view expressed in the Mission’s report, and against the 
priorities articulated by various Nigerien actors. The hierarchical nature of bargaining 
and negotiations over development discourses is well recognised by persons differently 
situated within the development apparatus. Commenting upon Italy’s adoption of 
participatory approaches, Dr. Corsi (see section 8.2) explained:
This is how bureaucracies work: first they check if you are wearing the uniform and then they
listen to you. That’s why there is such a tendency for everyone to say the same things in the 
same way. Because otherwise you are excluded from this hierarchy that is supported by 
bureaucracies: these aren’t universities... this is a clash of perspectives at work, these are
hierarchies that give you, or do not give you, the imprimatur.
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From a different perspective, a mechanic at the Keita Project made a similar
point:
We, the small-ones, there’s nothing we can do. The internationals [referring to the consultants] 
who are in the shadow of wealth should tell the great patrons up there not to close down the 
Project. [Nous, lespetits, on nepeut rien. II faut que les internationaux qui sont a Vombre de la 
richesse disent aux grands patrons la-bas de ne pas fermer le Projet!]
The views of Dr. Corsi and of Keita’s mechanic seem to agree that the 
construction of development policy is dominated by the decisions of elite groups of 
policy makers (cf. Holmes and Scoones 2000:7). The above mentioned ‘mission’ was 
the last occasion I had to visit Keita. Soon after this consultancy, an old time Keita 
‘expert’ and myself decided to put an end to our collaboration with the Ministry, finding 
it useless and professionally compromising. Those who choose to remain are willing to 
accept the compromises and, in turn, conform to development discourses. Maybe in the 
future the Keita Project will decrease its ‘anti-desertification’ activities and re-direct 
funds to PRAs (‘send armies of sociologists!’) and ‘sensitisation’, and local labour may 
be asked to work for free, as a step toward ‘building ownership of the interventions’ and 
‘making them responsible for their own development’. Resistance, or retaliation, may 
be the reaction of men and women in the Project intervention area, maybe hoping that 
another, more useful project may follow Keita (‘finish what you have started or go 
away’). Or they may pretend to comply while trying to reap some benefit from 
‘intervention’ for their own purposes.
Despite its ‘bottom-up’ rhetoric, Italy’s New Programme was parachuted on 
Keita from the top. Rather than trying to understand what, in Keita, had achieved the 
support of the ‘target population’, Italy responded to pressures to conform to 
international trends. In Dr. Corsi’s words, ‘first they check if you are wearing the 
uniform, then they listen to you’. This is not because bureaucrats are incompetent, but 
because this is how the system to which they belong works, because the pressure to 
conform is ‘closer’ to them than the pressure of geographically, culturally, and socially 
‘distant’ villages in the Ader Doutchi Majiya. Indeed, many Italian officers were 
passionate about Keita, and had done all they could to obtain funds to keep it alive. But, 
in the year 2000, keeping Keita going was possible only if Keita conformed to the ‘new 
[participatory] orthodoxy in the world of development that is shared by a majority of
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practitioners involved in the bilateral, multilateral or non-governmental sectors of the 
development industry’ (Stirrat and Henkel 2001:168). In the following chapter, I try to 
draw some reflections on what can be learned about ‘development’ from Keita’s case.
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9. CONCLUSION
This conclusion summarises the main findings of the thesis and discusses their 
implications for development practice and anthropological involvement in it. As this 
study is an analysis of the different perspectives of the actors involved in the Keita 
Project, the first section below is a review of the interpretations of the Project advanced 
by different categories of actors by virtue of their role and position in it. This leads me 
to a discussion of what constitutes ‘success’ and ‘failure’ in development, first with 
reference to the ideas of various parties about the pros and contras of the Keita Project, 
and then by comparing Keita to other studies and ethnographies of development 
projects (Carney and Watts 1990; Porter Allen and Thompson 1991; Uphoff 1992; 
Watts 1993; Akrich 1993; Harrison 1995; Ferguson 1996; Crewe and Harrison 1998). I 
conclude the thesis by positioning myself with respect to a question raised by Ferguson 
(1996), namely, ‘what is to be done about all the poverty, sickness and hunger in the 
Third World?’ I should state at the outset that I do not, I could not, have an answer to 
this question, but I advance some working hypotheses on what, on the basis of the 
findings of this thesis, I believe to be a constructive approach to address this question 
from an anthropological perspective. This approach challenges both ‘development’s’ 
self perpetrating strategy to look for ever better projects and new trends to replace 
countless failures; and some anthropologists’ populist refusal to include the State in 
their visions of what should be done about poverty in the South. It follows Robertson’s 
V insight (Robertson 1984) to pay more attention than anthropologists have been prepared
to do to the role of the State, its external relations with other states, and its internal 
relations with different categories of citizens.
9.1 Interpretations of the Keita Project
A particular interpretation of the Keita Project’s ‘intervention’ depends on the position 
of the actors in question in the Project itself, and is related to an (individual or 
collective) actor’s specific ‘projects in the Project’. The forms of intersubjectivity 
established between actors reflect the negotiations carried out in order to advance the 
chances of one’s project’s success, including attempts to manipulate or ‘enrol’ others in 
one’s project (cf. Long 1992:23). Strategies are unfolded in the multi-sited structure of 
the field of project intervention, in which some categories of actors (‘macro’ actors)
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have greater influence than others. Below I summarise the ways in which this 
framework applies to the story told in this thesis, looking at how different sets of actors 
interpreted the Keita Project and ‘used’ it to advance their strategies.
Confronted with drought in the Sahel, international ‘desertification’ narratives 
called for external intervention in the form of integrated rural development projects. 
Arguing that ‘equilibrium’ between society and the environment had been ‘lost’, they 
prescribed ‘change’ for Sahelian producers, and ‘fighting against desertification’ 
through Integrated Rural Development Projects (cf. Chapter 4). The Italian Cooperation, 
which for many reasons perceived itself as ‘young’ and lacking a ‘culture of 
cooperation’, needed to legitimise its role in the donors’ community. Urged by Roman 
based UN agencies to increase its financial support to their functioning, and under 
pressure to distinguish itself in the CELSS-Club du Sahel institutions, it conceived the 
First Italian Initiative, which set the premises for the Keita Project. The Project began 
under Kountche’s populist regime, which placed the ‘fight against desertification’ at the 
top of the Development Society’s agenda. Kountche’s view of a ‘Nigerien’ path to 
development required the will of the people of Niger to merge with the will of the 
Nation, legitimising his power and dispersing the divisive forces characteristic of a 
stratified and multi-ethnic newly independent nation.
The ‘projects within the Project’ of international development institutions, the 
Italian Cooperation, and Niger’s authorities converged to a remarkable extent, as they 
all needed a (development) Project which ‘worked’, showing that the desert could be 
fought against in the ways prescribed by their respective programmatic statements. At 
the same time, they had to ‘enrol’ the ‘target population’, without whose participation 
and (at least nominal) support, their ‘intervention’ could not be justified. The femme de 
Keita, digging the earth under the sun, enthusiastically supporting the Keita Project, was 
the icon of this ‘enrolment’. The Keita Project’s impressive results, boasting more than 
40 water retinues in the arid rocks of the Ader Doutchi Majiya, were displayed in 
expensive project brochures and proudly presented at meetings and seminars. It is often 
the case in development, that the interests of ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ actors are at odds. 
This was not the case in Keita, where the Project accommodated the ‘projects’ of the 
men and women of the Ader Doutchi Majiya at the same time as it satisfied more 
powerful actors.
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In the ADM, the Keita Project contributed to various patterns of trajectories 
envisaged by different categories of actors. The project increased the productivity of 
natural resources (agricultural lands, fodder, wood, trees) and created new water 
resources in an area characterised by severe water scarcity. The benefits resulting from 
its environmental activities were recognised by farmers and herders alike, and more so 
by men than by women, as the former controlled a greater stake of local valuable 
productive resources (cf. Chapter 6). Women welcomed particularly slack season 
employment opportunities in the form of food-for-work, as a compensation for their 
work on the work-sites. Food-for-work rations contributed to the household’s 
consumption needs, but the components which could be sold also provided a minimal 
revenue to women. Women’s involvement in food transactions was culturally accepted, 
and this new ‘project revenue’ did not create any remarkable gender and/or 
intrahousehold tension. Chantier work represented a unique slack season employment 
opportunity for the poorest people in the most marginal villages and had no externalities 
on the local ‘job market’, as dry season occupations were sought almost exclusively by 
men and mostly outside the ADM. In its first phase, the Project made available land 
titles to impoverished people who were willing to work in the Project’s rehabilitation 
schemes. This was done in support to Kountche’s ‘land to the tiller’ policy, and hence it 
was backed by Niger’s state apparatus. When it became evident that this operation was 
creating potential conflicts, and that the actors responsible for dealing with these 
problems (i.e. the local administrative authorities) were not, for many reasons, going to 
deal with them effectively, the operation was stopped. Finally, the PDR/ADM created 
what, by local standards, are well remunerated jobs in the village of Keita, providing 
advanced training for some professional categories (e.g. mechanics, electricians).
In different ways, men and women, elites and common people, found the above 
mentioned project activities mostly beneficial to them, and implemented diverse 
strategies to attract new operations to their villages. These included written requests to 
the Project for new ‘interventions’ (cf. figures 2 and 3), and stratagems to ‘enrol’ project 
staff in their own projects in the Project. Hence, the reunion in Tinkirana Tounga 
described in Chapter 6 shows that, when the villagers couldn’t convince project staff 
and consultants to build a second dam near their village, they accepted to become 
involved in another type of operation, only because they hoped that it would increase
their chances to obtain what they really wanted, a dam. In the case of the Foyer Feminin 
de Keita (FFK) discussed in Chapter 7, the women who elected Tambara ‘used’ the 
Project to strengthen their alliance with Tambara, in spite of the Women’s Division plan 
to re-launch the Foyer upon new premises, and frustrating Aminatou’s chances to 
expand her business and increase her status.
The project staffs role is to operationalise development discourses and ‘enrol’ 
the ‘beneficiaries’ in the Project’s activities and rationales. They occupy an interface 
position between the planners and the ‘target population’, and function as ‘brokers’ 
between these groups. We have seen some examples of how the Keita Project allowed 
some of these specialised development workers to operationalise their individual 
‘projects’. Carotti wanted to conclude his career with an experience which would ‘seal’ 
years of work in tropical agriculture and development. To him, Keita was a professional 
and human challenge. He interpreted what different actors expected from the Project 
and orchestrated the ‘intervention’ in a rather arbitrary, yet flexible, way, conceiving of 
the Project as an ongoing experiment. His successor was also challenged by Keita, but 
was confronted with a different set of factors. He had the difficult task to prove that his 
management was as efficient as Carotti’s and that the ‘nationalisation’ of the Project 
would not coincide with its failure. At the same time, as a national project director, he 
was vulnerable to the pressures of powerful compatriots, who could represent useful 
allies, or dangerous enemies, in his future career. The Women Division’s chief, 
managed to ‘enrol’ thousands of women in her Nigerien feminist project, and, through 
marriage, also the project manager, achieving considerable room for manoeuvre and 
getting rid of others who posed obstacles to her ‘project’.
Anthropologists and consultants, like everyone else, occupy a position in the 
field of project intervention. The Keita Project offered me a chance to develop my own 
unfinished project, of which this thesis is one result, to study the phenomenon of ‘aid’ to 
Africa, and to enquire into the policy relevant question of equity between North and 
South. I am guilty of my own version of populism. Attempting to support what I 
understood to be Keita’s men and women’s priorities, which had become anachronistic 
in contemporary development trends, I tried to negotiate with the planners a solution 
which would incorporate those aspects of project intervention that seemed to make a 
positive difference to the conditions of the Ader Doutchi Majiya and its inhabitants.
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Macro actors could easily dismiss the arguments of micro and ‘meso’ actors, including 
myself, and conform to the new participatory policies as a condition to participate in 
new international development policy, of which the World Bank Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers are a case in point. One can adopt an actor-oriented perspective, and 
focus on the negotiations between actors, arguing that Italian planners accepted to be 
enrolled by International development institutions, and refused to be enrolled by a 
disparate set of actors, including the Sarki, the women of the Ader Doutchi Majiya, 
myself and some other consultants. Or one can see the field of project intervention as 
dominated by the decisions of ‘macro’ actors, who are responsible, to a greater extent 
than less powerful actors, for the configuration of the structure of this field: the forms of 
rationality which prevail and the regimes of practices which are implemented, with 
important consequences for the so-called ‘target population’. The following section 
considers the most influential arguments in favour and against the Keita Project.
9.2 Different Perspectives on the Pros and Cons of the Keita Project
Above I have summarised the strategies and the ‘projects in the Project’ of various 
actors in relation to the Keita Project’s ‘intervention’. In this section I will present the 
most influential arguments in favour and against the Project as they figured at meetings 
and in evaluation reports. Arguments in favour and against must also be understood as 
part of the strategies of their supporters: seeing Keita as a ‘success’ implies an interest 
in the continuation of a certain type of activities and structure of the Project, whereas 
V most of the critiques were raised in order to introduce changes and adapt the Project to
new ‘development trends’.
The Keita Project was criticised on various grounds. The most persistent and 
recurrent critique, raised by development workers, portrays the Project as ‘top-down’, 
and ‘unsustainable’. A minimalist definition of the Keita Project represents it as a 
‘technological fix’, as the activities which granted Keita its fame relied on the use of 
heavy machines (tractors, graders, etc). Local villagers would never be able to raise the 
funds needed to carry out the same works by themselves (and they may find it hard to 
maintain them) and the selection of sites and strategies for ‘intervention’ was based 
more on ‘technical’ criteria and ‘expert knowledge’ than on consultation with the 
‘beneficiaries’ and ‘local knowledge’.
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A related critique holds that local people have become ‘dependent’ upon food- 
for-work, and did not develop a sense of ownership of the infrastructures built by the 
Project. The supporters of this argument argue in favour of the interruption of food-for- 
work and the transition to voluntary work. Some believe that the ‘beneficiaries’ ought to 
contribute financially to the works which were done for them, as an ‘ownership 
building’ strategy. The project staffs self critique also expresses the worry that ‘the 
peasant has not been ‘responsibilised” or ‘has not achieved consciousness’, meaning 
that the local population is not ready to ‘assume responsibility’ for the management of 
natural resources and infrastructures at the Project’s conclusion.
The last order of critiques claims that the funds invested in Keita are not justified 
by the potential results which even the most successful project could achieve in a 
context like the Ader Doutchi Majiya. The same amount of money, invested in a more 
productive and more densely populated area could have achieved a greater social and 
environmental impact and long lasting results. But, this argument goes, why spend 
money in a region which is always under the Damocles’ sword of impending droughts 
and famines (which could regress the Project’s results back to the situation found at 
project inception) and whose relatively few inhabitants had themselves resorted to 
cyclical migration rather than investing in local resources? I will address this last type 
of criticism, namely, the argument that the Keita Project should have been done 
‘elsewhere’ or should not have been done at all, later in this conclusion, and below I 
will discuss the arguments of Keita’s supporters with respect to the critiques mentioned 
above.
As we have seen, the first strand of critiques (the Keita Project as top-down and 
unsustainable) was perhaps the most influential, underpinning the ‘participatory’ 
arguments of Italy’s New Programme. As there is no systematic ideology underlying the 
participatory orthodoxy (cf. Stirrat and Henkel 2001:169), different people use its 
arguments differently and it is often unclear what they imply in practice. With reference 
to the Keita case, the arguments of various supporters of the ‘participatory critique’ can 
be summarised as follows: project activities should be the result of initiatives expressed 
by local people, not of the management’s planning and criteria. The most effective way 
to stimulate local initiative may be through the introduction of credit schemes. The 
Project’s structure should consist not of compartmentalised sectors of technicians
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(Divisions: public works; environment; agronomy; etc.), but of a flexible managerial 
team who administers binding and support for local initiatives. It is not important 
‘what’ the Project does (building dams, ‘papaya or ant breeding’ -  cf. Chapter 8), but 
how things are done. It is important to know more about local people’s ideas and needs 
(e.g. through PRAs) and local people have to be stimulated (e.g. by sociologists or 
NGOs) to cooperate among themselves and find arrangements to make their 
management of resources and infrastructure sustainable in the future (‘send armies of 
sociologists!’). Supporters of this critique in the Italian Cooperation argued that the 
Project ought to conform to new international participatory policies. The pressure to 
conform was explained clearly by Dr. Corsi in his account of why Italy ‘had to’ adapt 
Keita to new development trends: ‘This is how bureaucracies work: first they check if 
you are wearing the uniform and then they listen to you. That’s why there is such a 
tendency for everyone to say the same things in the same way. Because otherwise you 
are excluded from this hierarchy that is supported by bureaucracies.’
Other actors perceived the original Keita approaches as a ‘success’. The 
President of Niger, Tandja Mahamane, supported the replication of the ‘Keita model’ in 
other regions of the country during his election campaign, and villages which had not 
been targeted by project activities within and outside the intervention area insisted that 
the Project did not leave without dealing with their problems. The ‘recipient 
government’ and the ‘target population’ expressed their appreciation primarily for the 
system of water retinues and its impact on local livelihoods. The presence of the Project 
also created employment opportunities in Niamey, in the village of Keita, and, through 
food-for-work, in the villages of the intervention area. Keita’s Sarki explicitly invited 
the Project to leave, if it was going to stop implementing those activities which he, and 
the people who recognised his authority, perceived as ‘successful.’
Against those who saw the Project as a ‘non-participatory’ and ‘unsustainable* 
‘technological fix’, its supporters mentioned the massive contribution of the local 
population. ADM men and women had been involved in all project operations -  
weaving and installing the gabion weirs for the hydraulic structures, and constructing all 
the anti-desertification works. The Project had created, among the ‘beneficiaries’ of 
anti-desertification operations, a real expertise about how these infrastructures worked 
and how they had to be built and eventually repaired. In this sense, the ‘intervention’
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was ‘sustainable’. On the other hand, Keita’s supporters would argue, ‘total 
sustainability’ is a myth. In all ‘rich’ countries, the construction and maintenance of 
public infrastructures is financed by governments, who dispose of the funds necessary 
for these works though taxation. One cannot expect the citizens of one of the poorest 
countries in the world to work for free for the construction of a public good (e.g. a 
dam). Nor could the ADM villagers be expected to replace engineers and specialists 
who had the training and the instruments needed to specify the right site and the right 
dimensions and technical characteristics of infrastructures like dams and roads.
According to the Italian hydraulic engineer who adapted and followed up Keita’s 
water retinue system, Keita’s dikes and dams had been built so as to maximise their 
resistance to stress. The experience achieved working for the Project would allow ‘the 
people of Keita’, in an eventual future without the Project, to carry out ordinary 
maintenance tasks (e.g. fixing a broken gabion, re-planting dead trees in reforestation 
trenches, etc.). Extraordinary maintenance works represented a more dangerous threat to 
the longevity of the Project’s results. In the unlikely event of a dam’s breakdown, 
extraordinary maintenance works would entail the purchase of the right type of wire 
(available in the District centre of Tahoua) and, in some villages, carrying stones from 
distant sites. Following Carotti’s ‘pace theory’ (cf. Chapter 5), the Project had used 
bull-dozers and machines in order to achieve meaningful results in a relatively short 
time. It is likely that Carotti was right when he argued that ‘the dam of Seyte’ (one of 
the biggest dams built by the PDR/ADM) could not have been built with donkeys and 
charts, and maybe even important maintenance works would be hard to carry out 
without access to machines, fuel, expert drivers, wire, and the funds necessary to obtain 
all this.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty, identified by members of project staff who 
worked in close contact with the population and by myself, consisted in achieving 
collaboration between the villages belonging to the same ‘UTE’ {Unite Territoriale 
Elementaire) for the management and maintenance of the infrastructure falling in the 
UTE, what is usually referred to as the question of the management of common 
property resources. The Project’s strategy had consisted in treating sub-catchment 
systems (UTEs) as integrated wholes, whose parts are interdependent from the 
perspective of environmental rehabilitation. However, in many instances, at least some
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of the villages ‘tied together’ by the Project criterion of belonging to the same UTE, had 
a history of mutual strife and hostility. They may have formed upon the splitting of an 
original village due to internal fights between sections, or they may be involved in 
ongoing disputes over the exploitation of resources. For many reasons, project 
extensionists’ enquiries and my own data demonstrated that at least some villages in 
almost each UTE were not willing to collaborate, even when they understood that 
maintenance of infrastructures upstream was vital to the functioning of infrastructures 
downstream and that there were many interdependencies between single project works. 
Paradoxically, this issue did not seem to preoccupy the supporters of Keita’s 
‘participatory turn’ too much. But it did preoccupy project staff, who had carried out the 
activities which risked being criticised as ‘unsustainable’. The perceived ‘need’ for the 
‘target population’ to ‘assume responsibility’ and develop a sense of ‘ownership’ of the 
resources and infrastructures created by the Project corresponds to a strategy to shift 
responsibility for the medium- and long-term consequences of the Project unto the 
‘beneficiaries’. By attributing responsibility to local people, this position avoids taking 
into consideration the political issue of Niger’s incapacity to provide the means 
necessary for the maintenance of public infrastructures. The argument that local people 
did not develop ownership and responsibility with regards to the Project’s 
‘interventions’ calls for more ‘sensitisation’, and ‘armies of sociologists’, functioning as 
one of development’s self-reproducing strategies.
In this section I have discussed the rationales behind arguments in favour and 
against the Project. Arguments in favour and against should be seen as part of a struggle 
over the interpretation of project activities between actors who occupy different 
positions in the project intervention field (cf. Carney and Watts 1990). However, I will 
argue below that this type of analysis does not necessarily lead to moral relativism. 
Understanding the rationales behind competing arguments exposes their relative 
coherence with regards to the stated objectives of an operation, in this case a 
development project supposedly aimed at improving the living conditions of the ‘target 
population.’ The following section examines a number of comparative examples of 
development projects, trying to situate the Keita Project in the wider field of 
development ‘interventions’ and to consider its outcomes with respect to external 
standards.
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9.3 Comparative Examples
Every development project is unique, the result of unrepeatable historical and cultural 
circumstances. However, in this section I will generalize from the analysis of a few 
cases, which I believe to be representative of the possible outcomes of development 
‘interventions’, in order to situate Keita within a selection of situations that can be 
generated by the workings of development projects. In the light of what we have seen 
about ‘internal’ perspectives on Keita, this comparative analysis contextualises Keita’s 
outcomes, and perceptions thereof, within the broader range of what ‘development can 
do’ and of how it can be experienced.
9.3.1 The development-centric project
The Jahaly Pacharr Project studied by Carney and Watts (Carney and Watts 
1990; Watts 1993) started in 1984, and was funded primarily by the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the Gambian government. The Project 
involved over 2,000 rural households from 70 villages in a largely Mandinka region of 
the Gambia, and its main objective consisted in increasing the productivity of the 
intervention area while securing the access of local households to productive resources. 
The Project ‘absorbed’ previous (‘traditional’) tenancy arrangements, centralising the 
control of land through a 30 years state appropriation and subsequently redistributing 
use rights to the growers in the form of long-term tenancies through sharecropping 
contracts stipulated by the Project (cf. Carney and Watts 1990:215). Carney and Watts 
focus on the consequences of the Project (mostly unacknowledged or misunderstood by 
the planners) for local gender relations, in particular intrahousehold contests over 
property and labour.
The Gambia is an ex-colonial export enclave in which groundnuts account for 
95% of export revenues. Among the Mandinka, groundnuts are exclusively a male crop, 
whereas women dominate rice production (cf. Carney and Watts 1990:209). Men and 
women gain access to land through membership in a patrilineal extended family group. 
There are two main types of land rights: maruo rights, over communal family land, and 
kamanyango usufructuary individual rights. Consumption and/or sale of crops from 
‘maruo lands’ are dominated by male household heads, whereas kamanyango property 
rights provide discretionary income to family members. Despite the donor’s intention
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that women be primary beneficiaries of the Project, when the Project began, less than 
one third of the plots were registered in women’s names because men opposed women’s 
ownership on the grounds that divorce would alienate land from household control (cf. 
Carney and Watts 1990:224). During the first cropping season under the production 
regime introduced by the Project, all the pumped plots were considered maruo. Women 
provided most of the labour, but household heads refused to grant them customary 
kamanyango rights (cf. Watts 1993:180). Absorption of pre-existing individual and 
household fields into the scheme meant that women’s entitlement to their crop 
depended upon their access to project plots. ‘Unless their property rights were protected, 
Mandinka women had no alternative income-earning plots in the area and no protection 
from household claims on their labour* (Carney and Watts 1990:224). Confronted with 
this situation, IFAD sent a mission to the Gambia, which succeeded in re-registering 
project plots in women’s names. In practice, however, men had already achieved de 
facto control over the plots reallocated by the Project, and project management and land 
committees concurred with the men that the (male dominated) household had final 
rights on project plots. Because the Project’s and the government’s principal interest 
was increasing productivity, and maruo provided the classificatory category to make 
claims on the intensification of family labour, the issue of women’s individual rights 
was not pursued further by IFAD. In the end, women lost rights on their swamp fields 
and did not gain new rights over irrigated fields, but their workload increased. Overall, 
the Project exacerbated gender relations and harmed women’s interests. Both men and 
women strategically negotiated to maintain control over valuable resources and labour 
(their own and/or their household members’). This negotiation consisted in bargaining 
for project plots to be classified as governed by ‘maruo’ (men’s project) or 
‘kamanyango’ rights (women’s project). Men’s higher status and the partial 
coincidence, in this respect, of their interests with the planners’ goal to maximise 
productivity ultimately worked against women’s interests. The Jahaly Pacharr Project 
initiated a process that the ‘developers’ could not control, and were largely unaware of, 
disrupting pre-existent dynamics, and worsening, rather than improving, the lot of 
Mandinka women, whom it had originally set out to support.
The Thaba Tseka Project (Ferguson 1996), funded chiefly by the World Bank 
and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), was a ‘mountain area 
development project’ centred on agriculture and livestock development and supporting
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‘decentralisation* of Lesotho’s administration. The Project included many components 
(cf. Ferguson 1996:88-100), but here I shall only discuss its activities concerning 
livestock development, focusing on how these activities contrasted with Basotho 
practices and beliefs concerning livestock. Ferguson refers to Basotho livestock 
ideology as the ‘Bovine mystique’, i.e. a system of thought in which ‘livestock is 
constituted as a special domain of property in Lesotho by cultural rules, the most 
important of which establishes a “one way barrier” between the domains of money and 
livestock’ (1996:146). The Bovine Mystique functions so as to differentiate livestock 
from money, which are a ‘contested resource’ subject to the claims of all household 
members. Livestock is divided into men’s animals (the grazing animals) and women’s 
animals (pigs and fowl). Men’s animals are also classed, liked money, as ‘household 
property’, but they do not constitute a ‘domain of contestation’ in the way ‘household 
money’ does. Men’s animals are kept out from the domain of contestation through a 
barrier that restricts their conversion to cash: ‘if a man comes home with M71 300 in his 
pocket, the money will be set upon by his dependents; his wife may present him with a 
demand to buy her a new dress or furniture for the house, the children may need new 
blankets. If, on the other hand, he comes home with an ox purchased with that M 300, 
the question will not arise’ (1996:151). Livestock plays several functions in the sphere 
of men’s status and livelihood strategies. By loaning their animals, livestock owners can 
take advantage of distant pastures and establish relations of clientage with the recipients 
of the loaned animals. A man wealthy in livestock, called ‘morui’, becomes a ‘big man’ 
through the establishment of patron-client relations and the display of his animal wealth 
in the village and beyond. Hence, livestock is both a social and economic resource for 
men (cf. 1996:152). It is used as a form of investment, in what Ferguson calls the 
‘livestock-migrant labour complex’, referring to the purchase of animals with funds 
from migrant labour (cf. 1996:155); it serves as an ‘insurance’, as it is purchased in 
good times and can be sold in bad times (cf. 1996:154); and, being less subject to 
familial claims than other resources, it works as a male ‘retirement fund’. Finally, cattle 
is a preferred currency for bridewealth, and the bridewealth-receiving generation has an 
interest in valorising the domain of livestock, because they have strong claims on their 
in-laws’ wealth in cattle, stronger than the claims they can set on cash (cf. 1996:163).
71 M stando for Maloti, Lesotho’s currency.
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The livestock development component of the Thaba Tseka Project failed to take 
into consideration the role played by livestock in the Basotho society, planning and 
implementing initiatives which were in contrast with the productive and prestige 
strategies of local livestock owners. The Project promoted the establishment of a 
Grazing Association for owners of small stock on 1,500 hectares near the town of Thaba 
Tseka, which was aimed at ‘restricting grazing within an allocated area to the stock of 
progressive, commercially minded farmers who would be willing to keep fewer but 
better quality animals on well managed rangeland’ (1996:172). The conditions for 
membership would oblige the owners to sell off poor animals to buy improved ones, 
ending up perhaps with half as many animals. The Grazing Association, prescribing the 
exclusion of non-members from good and abundant pastures, was in contrast with the 
value placed on the generosity of a morui. Monthly auctions were organised as part of a 
livestock marketing operation, on the assumption that local owners did not sell animals 
because they were marginalized from the cash economy. Not only was this assumption 
wrong, but, in line with the Bovine Mystique, the sale of stock represented the 
admission of a man’s destitution, and was perceived as a humiliating necessity rather 
than an advantageous economic opportunity. Finally, improved stock and fodder 
production were part of the Project’s objective to introduce a commercial, businesslike 
attitude into livestock keeping practices. This implied the adoption of improved stock, 
which needed to be fed with good quality, home-grown fodder. Also this activity met 
with resistance by the part of stock owners, who argued that improved animals were less 
hardy than local animals: they got sick and died more easily, and were vulnerable when 
fodder got scarce. Fodder had to be grown at the expense of badly needed food, as there 
was no surplus arable land (cf. 1996:185). In the context in question ‘quantity’ mattered 
more than ‘quality’ -  more poor animals were better than few good ones, when it came 
to establishing prestige, paying bridewealth, or forming ploughing teams. The type of 
animals that the Project tried to introduce were animals ‘for selling’, animals from 
which it would be easier to obtain a cash return, and this ran against the above 
mentioned barrier between livestock and money which underpinned men’s prestige and 
long-term security. If men were opposed to the Project interpretation of what animals 
are for, women sided with the Project for their own agendas:
‘women often attempted to break down the barrier that kept livestock, as men’s property, distinct 
and not freely interconvertible with money and the “domain o f contestation” within the 
household. The arguments of the Thaba Tseka experts were seized upon by women as proof that
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men who insisted on the Mystique were foolish and old-fashioned, as they had argued all along’
(1990:187).
Also in this case, the Project unknowingly functioned as a catalyst for gender 
conflicts over the interpretation of the role and uses of livestock. Its operations failed to 
achieve the expected results, and the developers’ ‘project’ did not overlap with livestock 
owners’ strategies. It did overlap, to some extent, with women’s attempt to increase 
their control over valuable resources, which were not accessible to them as long as they 
were not converted in cash. But women’s ‘project in the Project’ and the developers’ 
objective coincided only superficially, and in fact both parties were ‘using’ each other 
‘as a tool’ to advance their strategies, rather than trying to understand their respective 
arguments from the other’s point of view.
A characteristic trait of both Jahaly Pacharr and Thaba Tseka is their 
‘development-centric’ bias, i.e. they dismiss the forces and dynamics at play in the 
context where they ‘intervene’, and impose their rationalities, supposedly ‘in the interest 
of the beneficiaries’. While these projects recurrently fail to achieve their explicit 
objectives, because they are ‘sabotaged’ and put to other uses by different groups of the 
‘target population’, they are not without consequences. In fact, they ‘tinker’ with the 
interests of various groups, often creating or exacerbating tensions which, once released, 
they cannot control. ‘Development-centric’ projects are usually only marginally useful 
(if at all) to the ‘target population’, because of their failure to ‘understand’ its system of 
production, cultural values and functioning rules. Keita differs from these examples 
because it did not attempt to change the local system of production, nor did it interfere 
in any meaningful way with the sexual division of labour and the Ader Doutchi 
Majiya’s social organisation. The majority of its interventions made resources and 
infrastructures available without altering in a substantial way local livelihood strategies. 
The type of infrastructures it established in the intervention area were positively valued 
by different groups of ‘beneficiaries’, because they increased the productivity of local 
resources and made water available close to the villages. In other cases, the results of a 
project’s activities may have negative consequences for the intended ‘beneficiaries’, or 
may be irrelevant to them.
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9.3.2 The perceived "failure ’
The Magarini Settlement Project, financed mainly by the Australian 
Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB), began in 1974 (Porter, Allen and Thompson 
1991) and was to become Australia’s largest aid project to Africa.
‘The Project aimed to settle 4,000 families on 13-ha plots within an initial acquisition area of 
60,000 hectares To support settlement, an extensive road network was to be provided, with 
groundwater reticulation taking water to within 500 m of every plot. Agricultural assistance [...] 
was to replace the bush fallowing practices with a sedentary mix of subsistence and cash crops 
and livestock’. (1991:1)
‘Resettlement’ on land they believed they already owned had a number of 
adverse effects for the Giriama people, and when the first signs of problems became 
manifest, the ‘doers were over-optimistic’ (1991:60). The Magarini Project failed to 
produce sufficient groundwater to meet the needs of the settlers. Only 76 families had 
been settled by 1980 and by September 1983 only 1,075 families out of a target of 4000 
had been allocated plots (cf. 1991:68). ‘A proportion of Giriama allocated plots either 
never moved to their plots, or having moved for a period, moved off again’ (1991:68). 
Giriama farmers, who previously took advantage of different soil qualities by living in 
one place and cultivating in two or three other places, were now restricted to 13 ha 
plots. Scrub clearing was largely unsuccessful, roots remained in the ground after 
having been chopped by project machines, increased in number, and retained their 
ability to regenerate (cf. 1991:73). Moreover, machine-cleared areas lost much of the 
fertile topsoil in the clearing process (cf. 1991:77). Project agronomic research could 
not find a crop rotation pattern which would maintain soil fertility (cf. 1991:75). By 
1983, the 1,075 families of settlers faced severe falls in yields and severe food shortages 
were experienced as a consequence of drought (cf. 1991:77). The ‘beneficiaries’ 
perception of the Project is clearly conveyed by the comment of one settler:
‘Long ago here there was rice, sorghum, cowpeas, greengrams, much food. I had two fields and 
many goats. If people were hungry they came here. Now we have to leave here to seek food 
elsewhere. [...] The Project destroyed all my 40 hives. They were in the trees. Now there are no 
trees left. They came with the bulldozers and knocked them all down. It is just grass here now. 
No trees, not even for shade. It is terrible’ (1991:123).
Porter, Allen and Thompson claim that their analysis reveals that ‘many of the 
interventions worked against the real interests of the intended beneficiaries’ (1991:197), 
a statement that can be summarised with the formula ‘anti-people project’. The Giriama
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did not have the power to oppose the ‘projects’ of ‘macro’ actors: ‘Magarini initially 
existed only as a desire of a the Australian Whitlam Labour Government for a “project 
somewhere in Africa’” (1991:4); and ‘[t]he definition of Magarini as a settlement project 
denotes its relationship to the compelling political force in Kenya, control over land’ 
(1991:4). Somehow, the combination of macro actors’ ‘projects’ and of badly conceived 
‘intervention strategies’ ensued catastrophic consequences for the Giriama’s capacity to 
manage their livelihoods. The Project was not simply ‘irrelevant’ or ‘mistargeted’ with 
respect to Giriama strategies, but it compromised their system of production, and 
proved largely impossible to manipulate.
The Buena Vista Project was part of a long-term programme of cooperation 
between France, through the AFME (Agence Frangaise pour la Maitrise de I 'Energie), 
and Central American countries (Akrich 1993). The OAS (Organization of American 
States) was responsible for liaison between the programme’s various host countries. The 
regional Programme had two aims:
‘to enable information pooling between various Central American countries by establishing 
channels for exchange such as by organizing joint seminars, [and] to find a wide audience for the 
pilot projects carried out in a particular country, since this would facilitate their transfer to 
neighbouring countries and make it easier to obtain funding from international banks’ 
(1993:291).
Akrich looks at one specific pilot project within this scheme, implemented in the 
village of Buena Vista in Costa Rica with the aim of experimenting with a gazogene in 
the context of rural electrification. In March 1985 the gazogene bought for Buena Vista 
by the AFME was sent to Costa Rica. The parties involved in this project were the 
AFME, the OAS, the Buena Vista villagers represented by a local ‘Association for 
Integral Development’ (AID), the gazogene manufacturer, and the members of a 
commission set up to monitor the Project, including the Costa Rican Electricity Institute 
(CREI), the Forestry Commission (FC), and the Regional Energy Secretariat (RES). In 
short, the gazogene never functioned correctly, and the article is a reconstruction of the 
interpretations of the parties to this project, and their arguments to discharge 
responsibility for the Project’s failure. The two main possible interpretations consisted 
in blaming the technology (‘the gazogene itself could not work at all or was not fit to 
work in Buena Vista’), or blaming the people (‘various parties were unable or unwilling 
to make the gazogene work’). Interpretations of the gazogene’s failure varied according 
to the position of the interpreting actors. The village wanted to keep the exchange
process going despite the failure of the gazogene. The manufacturer ‘wanted to 
withdraw his name from the annals of Buena Vista’s history’ (cf. Akrich 1993:326) and 
accused all the other parties for failing to make his machine work. AFME blamed (its 
own) choice of this manufacturer. The CREI denounced village passivity and blamed 
the lack of theoretical tools which other parties should have put at its disposition. AID 
blamed the CREI, which had to carry out the heavy maintenance of the plant, whereas 
average everyday tasks related to the gazogene normal functioning had to be carried out 
by an AID agent.
Buena Vista and Magarini are comparable for the common ‘failure’ to reach 
their intended objectives. However, Buena Vista’s field of intervention was 
circumscribed and did not act upon existing practices of the intended ‘beneficiaries’, but 
only tried (unsuccessfully) to make a new resource available. Had the gazogene worked 
efficiently, it could have proved useful to all or some of Buena Vista’s population. But 
its failure to work did not do much harm. The villagers’ willingness to maintain the 
exchange process going despite the malfunctioning of the gazogene suggests that some 
groups envisaged potential ‘side effects’ of the Project’s presence in their village. But 
the Project turned out to be ‘largely irrelevant’, and perhaps its most concrete result 
consisted in providing salaries and various forms of remuneration to all the ‘experts’ 
and parties involved in it, an outcome which, it may be argued, does not justify the 
Project’s (unknown) budget.
A similar example is provided by Harrison’s study of a project promoting fish 
farming in the Luapula Province of Zambia, as part of a regional FAO programme 
called ‘Aquaculture for Local Community Development’ - ALCOM (cf. Harrison 1995; 
Harrison and Crewe 1998). ALCOM’s focus was on research and the establishment of 
pilot projects throughout the Africa region, through which the Project would assist 
governments to test methods for aquaculture development (cf. Crewe and Harrison 
1998:9). The Project approach was ‘participatory’ and ‘bottom-up’. Within ALCOM, 
the emphasis of the Luapula Project fell on small holders food security and rural income 
increase, and the strengthening of the local Department of Fisheries (DoF). The authors 
note that ‘the programme as a whole is an example of the expenditure of large amounts 
of money with little evidence that the supposed beneficiaries were benefiting’ (Crewe 
and Harrison 1998:10), and a review of the Luapula Pilot Project concluded that the
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Project’s main objectives had not been achieved: ‘the impact on farming practices had 
been minimal and pre-existing weaknesses in the department had not been improved’ 
(1998:10). If anything, Harrison suggests that relations between the Project and the DoF 
had been tense. The DoF’s main objective was the ‘maximisation of fish production 
through rational exploitation of fish stocking’ (1998:80), and Luapula’s Provincial 
Fisheries Development Officer (PFDO) expressed frustration for the Project’s ‘small 
scale’ orientation, its failure to contribute to the functioning of the resource poor 
Luapula DoF, and its unwillingness to support and give loans to a few richer, semi 
urban fish-farmers. The PFDO perspective was that there was no reason for a project 
that did not seem to ‘deliver goods’, nor to have a measurable impact on the fish 
production of Luapula fish farmers or on the efficiency of the DoF (e.g. through 
providing vehicles or per diem for DoF extensionists).
The Project does not seem to have played an important role in the economy of 
the so-called ‘beneficiaries’ (cf. Crewe and Harrison 1998:114). Although fish farming 
had the potential to fulfil seasonal relish gaps, the role of fish in household food 
consumption was relatively minor (cf. 1998:122). Farmers mentioned ‘business’ as one 
of the reasons which induced them to dig ponds. However, the authors suggest that most 
farmers did not have a clear idea of the likely gains they could derive from this 
‘business’; that they often entertained unrealistic expectations (cf. 1998:120); and that 
farmers who spoke of business did so in order to identify themselves as part of a 
supposedly ‘progressive development culture’ (cf. 1998:122). Despite the Project’s 
‘failure’ to achieve its stated objectives, some ‘side-effects’ of the activities promoted 
by the Project seemed to be valued by fish farmers. As rules of access to wetlands were 
unclear, digging fish ponds on an area was a way to secure one’s rights upon it, marking 
it for present and future ‘exploitation’ against potential contestations (cf. 1998:124). 
Fish ponds provided a source of water for irrigating vegetable fields, in which case fish 
production was only an accidental benefit; and they contributed to security, as they 
could be emptied in the case of emergencies or unexpected expenses, such as a funeral, 
or buying school uniforms for children (cf. 1998:125).
Like the Buena Vista Project, the Luapula Project did not make a remarkable 
difference to the life of the intended beneficiaries, but, on the other hand, it 
accommodated a greater number of local ‘projects in the Project’. In the authors’ words,
242
its impact on fish farming practices was ‘minimal’ (1998:10), it may have provided 
insights for research purposes, and it accommodated ‘lateral projects’ of several 
categories of actors involved in it. It was, maybe, somewhat ‘less irrelevant’ than the 
gazogene ‘operation’, but the authors suggest that its results did not justify the amounts 
of money spent on it (cf. 1998:10). The main difference between these three projects 
and Keita is the appreciation of the intended ‘beneficiaries’ for their respective results. 
In contrast to these examples, men and women in Keita’s ‘intervention area’ valued 
project results, mostly not for their side-effects, but for the intended purposes of the 
‘interventions’ (cf. Chapter 6).
9.3.3 The perceived ‘success'
The last case discussed here is that of Gal Oya (Uphoff 1992). The Gal Oya 
Project, financed by USAID, and executed in cooperation with Sri Lanka’s Agrarian 
Research and Training Institute (ARTI) and Cornell University, was aimed at the 
physical and social rehabilitation of ‘the largest and most complex’ irrigation system in 
the country, covering 125,000 acres (cf. 1992:5). It had been Sri Lanka’s government 
policy in the 1950s to bring large families in Gal Oya for settlement, thereby creating 
population pressures which made managing the system more difficult (cf. 1992:5). 
Conflicts among farmers over the scarce supply of water contributed to lack of 
maintenance and the breakdown of structures (cf. 1992:10). These conflicts had an 
ethnic dimension, as upstream areas were controlled by Sinhala speaking families and 
downstream allotments were controlled by Tamil speaking families. Despite these 
difficult premises, the author notes that ‘what looked as an impossible task at the start 
became [...] a promising process praised by practically everyone who visited Gal Oya 
in the following years. More important, farmers and officials themselves spoke highly 
of the programme’s benefits’ (1992:8). Uphoff provides a very detailed chronographic 
ethnography of project events, but does not discuss the position of different categories 
of actors with regards to the Project, nor does he describe the ‘target population’s’ 
livelihood strategies and social organisation. However, it can be evinced from his 
description that irrigated rice (and other crops) cultivation had been the most important 
aspect of the local system of production for centuries. Within five years of project 
intervention, water use efficiency had almost doubled in the Left Bank system (cf. 
1992:9), and collaboration increased between Sinhalese and Tamil farmers, and between 
farmers and government officials. For farmers, more reliable and adequate supply of
water translated into greater production and income, and contributed to a better quality 
of life. Satisfaction with the Project’s results was also expressed by project staff, 
especially agents working with the farmers. An Institutional Organizer’s answer to the 
question ‘how long would she like to do such work?’, was ‘as long as we are here’ 
(1992:115). From Uphoff s description, it seems that the Gal Oya Project was able to 
achieve concrete results in domains crucial to the local production system, without 
attempting to revolutionise the way the system worked (cf. 1992:10). Different groups 
of farmers appear to have been willing to become involved in a project which dealt 
efficiently with some of their means of production and could make a difference to their 
livelihoods. Uphoff interprets the ‘Project’s success’ as a consequence of the ‘learning 
process approach’ (1992:11) which characterised project management style and of the 
importance accorded to ‘human potential’ with respect to the involvement of different 
stakeholders in the Project. According to Uphoff, the Project stimulated a ‘catalytic 
process in which people brought out the best in each other and in themselves’ 
(1992:12).
Uphoff was directly involved in Gal Oya’s conception and organisation, and it is 
difficult to distinguish, in his account, the personal dimension of his experience from 
the ways in which the Project intertwined with pre-existing local and national dynamics. 
But the evidence provided in the form of detailed reports of everyday events and 
meetings within the spaces opened by the Project suggest that Gal Oya can be seen as a 
good example of ‘relevant’ project. I think also Keita falls in this category.
9.3.4 Learning from Keita
It has been argued that different categories of actors have distinct interpretations 
of what constitutes a ‘success’ or a ‘failure’ in development (cf. Crewe and Harrison 
1998:10); and that these interpretations depend, to a large extent, upon their position 
within the ‘field of project intervention’ and upon the extent to which a project 
contributes to the advance of their own ‘projects in the Project’. While the approach of 
this thesis has emphasised the positioned perspectives of different actors vis a vis 
development ‘intervention’, it does not take an extreme relativist stance with regards to 
the question: ‘what is to be done about all the poverty, sickness and hunger in the Third 
World?’ (Ferguson 1996:297). I do not think that this question should simply be 
answered ‘different people will want to do different things’, because I believe, and
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Keita and Gal Oya’s experiences confirm, that there are measures that can be taken to 
improve the living conditions of those who, like many people in the Ader Doutchi 
Majiya, recurrently suffer from hunger and disease, and see their children and relatives 
die because they haven’t got the (material, cultural, and symbolic) means to help them.
We can compare policies and practices which attempt to provide answers to the 
question ‘what is to be done about all the poverty, sickness and hunger in the Third 
World?’ in respect to at least three main factors: the ‘relevance’ of their objectives to 
the life of the ‘target group’; their efficacy in achieving the objectives they set out to 
reach; and the coherence of the means and strategies adopted to deal with contextual 
facets of ‘poverty, sickness and hunger’. It seems to me that ‘success* is attributed to 
Keita and Gal Oya by different groups of people on the grounds that they dealt with 
problems (e.g. management of irrigation canals in Gal Oya, reduction of the erosion 
process and availability of water in Keita) which were extremely ‘relevant’ to the 
system of production and livelihoods of the ‘target population’. This was manifest in the 
support achieved by these projects among the intended ‘beneficiaries’, the latter’s 
availability to collaborate with the Project, and their requests to the Project to address 
their problems. This support followed from the recognition, by the part of various 
categories of ‘beneficiaries’, that, for different reasons, project activities were more 
effective than other attempts (including their own) to cope with their problems.
Keita and Gal Oya were ‘relevant’ because official project objectives and 
strategies overlapped with those of different categories of the population, and did not 
stimulate tensions and conflicts within it. They were effective because, on the practical 
count, their strategies ‘worked’. On the other hand, Magarini may have been ‘relevant’ 
to the political concerns of Australia and Kenya, but was irrelevant to the Giriama, who 
never wished to be ‘resettled’ on lands they believed they owned. Its operations harmed, 
rather than improved, the Giriama’s system of production. The Buena Vista Project may 
have been relevant, but the gazogene never worked. The ALCOM Project in Luapula 
was ‘largely irrelevant’ to the fish farming activities of the ‘target population’, but 
opened spaces for the unfolding of different ‘projects in the Project’ which reflected the 
room for manoeuvre of some people in Luapula. Thaba Tseka and Jahaly Pacharr 
‘misunderstood’ or dismissed the forces at play in the social contexts upon which they 
‘encroached’, and followed their ‘development-centric’ objectives in spite o f  the
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perspectives of some groups within the ‘target population’. ‘Livestock’ and ‘rice 
production’ were relevant to, respectively, Jahaly Pacharr and Thaba Tseka societies, 
but not in the ways and for the reasons envisaged by the ‘developers’. As a 
consequence, project ‘intervention’ resulted into a complex interplay of mutual 
misunderstanding and manipulation, and, at least in Thaba Tseka, the Project ultimately 
failed to achieve the stated objectives of its livestock component, because of the 
resistance of livestock owners. The question that remains to be considered is if, in the 
light of this analysis, development projects should be seen as a coherent measure to deal 
with contextual facets of poverty, sickness and hunger, and if few perceived 
development ‘successes’ justify the deployment of ‘projects’ as a strategy to address 
these conditions.
The following section challenges the entrenched idea that the failure of ‘bad 
development projects’ can be solved by introducing ‘good development projects’. This 
way of thinking has characterised the history of ‘aid’, which is marked by a sequence of 
‘fashions’ of which participatory and bottom-up approaches represent, at the time of 
writing, the latest trend. This thesis documents the replacement of the ‘fight against 
desertification’ paradigm (Chapter 4) with the new emphasis on poverty and 
participation (Chapter 8). However, as shown in Chapter 8, these ‘fashions’ are not 
developed from an analysis of the relevance of certain measures to the ‘target 
population’ in specific local, national and regional contexts. They are, instead, 
conceived at the top for reasons relevant to the planners’ political concerns and 
prescribed indiscriminately as cures to all diseases and remedies to all evils. This is 
particularly paradoxical in the case of ‘participatory’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches, 
which end up being parachuted from above. The following section draws upon the 
‘lessons learned’ from Keita to consider their implications for development practice.
9.4 Implications for Development Practice and Anthropological Involvement in It
Ferguson is correct in highlighting that
‘in development [...] “problems” and calls for reform are necessary to the functioning of the 
machine. Pointing out errors and suggesting improvements is an integral part of the process of 
justifying and legitimating “development” interventions. Such an activity may indeed have 
beneficial or mitigating effects, but it does not change the fundamental character of those 
interventions. ’(1996:285)
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It is with this proviso in mind that I shall suggest, here, that ‘learning from 
Keita’ does not mean reproducing a myriad of other Keitas -  or the aspects of it which 
were perceived as successful - in the ‘developing world’. Instead, I will suggest that 
what Keita, and to some extent Gal Oya, have to teach, is that the answer to poverty, 
hunger and sickness, should be sought outside the ‘bad development leads to good 
development’ cycle. Good ‘development’, in the original sense of the word, can only be 
the one that leads to its own demise, bringing about changes sought by the actors who 
manifest a wish to ‘develop’ in a particular direction. These actors are different 
categories of people who are already ‘participating’ to change, in ways appropriate to 
their circumstances, through a continuous process of negotiations aimed, inter alia, at 
improving their living conditions. In Keita, the Project opened spaces within which 
different categories of actors could unfold their strategies to improve their life chances. 
This should not lead us to the conclusion that the Keita Project was the most coherent 
measure to deal with the problems which affected the society of the Ader Doutchi 
Majiya without first considering the viability of alternative solutions, which are not 
necessarily other types of ‘projects’ or international development initiatives.
Today, one of the most influential and widespread ways to deal with the 
question of hunger, sickness and poverty is through the kind of institutions discussed in 
this thesis. A plethora of uncoordinated development projects and programmes, some 
relevant to the lives of their intended ‘beneficiaries’, some irrelevant, some effective at 
the activities they carry out, some ineffective, constitute the self reproducing 
mechanism in place to deal, supposedly, with the destitution, disease and starvation of 
large numbers of people concentrated in some countries of the world. Most international 
development projects are conceived by ‘distant’ planners worried more by factors close 
to their everyday work constraints than about understanding the dynamics at play 
among the ‘target population’, and producing knowledge about this population that 
legitimises ‘intervention’. In turn, the ‘target population’ uses its knowledge of the 
‘developers’ language and rationales’ as a tool to manipulate ‘intervention’ and make it 
serve other purposes. Although the ‘intervention’s’ objectives and approaches are 
largely determined by the donors, in most cases responsibility for the outcomes of 
‘intervention’ falls upon the so-called ‘beneficiaries’ and the recipient governments. 
This tendency is strengthened by ‘participatory’ and ‘ownership building’ approaches: 
‘one of the attractions of the participatory approach to the development industry is that
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it shifts responsibility for the consequences of these projects away from the agencies 
and the development workers onto the participating people* (Stirrat and Henkel 
2001:183).
I am not the first anthropologist to highlight the shortcomings of ‘development*. 
As remarked by Robertson, the position of anthropologists has often consisted in taking 
an anti-state populist stance (Robertson 1984). This is the case of some anthropologists 
who have chosen to express their position vis a vis development practice (Galjart 1981; 
Pottier 1992; Ferguson 1996). Ferguson, asking who should do something about the 
question of poverty, sickness and hunger in the Third World, rules out the state in the 
following terms: ‘there is little point in asking what [governmental elites] should do to 
empower the poor. Their own structural position makes it clear that they would be the 
last ones to undertake such a project. If the governing classes ask the advice of experts, 
it is for their own purposes, and these normally have little to do with advancing the 
interests of the famous downtrodden masses’ (1996:281). Galjart’s ‘counter­
development’ is the clearest statement of this position. ‘Counterdevelopment’ entails the 
mobilization of disadvantaged people in a locality by the part of an ‘outside actor or 
change agency’ which should moderate ‘small scale enterprises* [the example provided 
is ‘small technical improvements o f available tools and machinery’ (1981:90)] 
supported through internal financing (cf. 1981:84). The main function of the external 
change agency is to support local counter-tendencies opposed to governmental policies 
and mechanisms which affect local groups adversely (cf. Galjart 1981:88). ‘Less state’ 
tends to come together with ‘small scale enterprises’, ‘locally governed and financed 
initiatives’ and ‘more anthropology/sociology.’ (cf. Clastres 1977; Pottier 1992)
But the origins of anthropology’s populism are to be traced in the cultural and 
social backgrounds of the anthropologists themselves (cf. Robertson 1984; Stirrat and 
Henkel 2001; Stone 1999) and should not be confused with the priorities of the 
‘developed’. What Keita teaches us is that the people of the Ader Doutchi Majiya did 
not ask for small scale improvements of existing technology; nor did they ask for more 
‘participation’ (cf. Chapter 8); nor for more anthropologists and sociologists. They 
asked for infrastructures and services which, in the countries from which most 
anthropologists come from, are provided by the State.
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The context in which the people of the Ader Doutchi Majiya live, is 
characterised by the lack of local employment opportunities; food deficit and the need 
to integrate local cereal production through external revenues; acute problems raised by 
water scarcity for herders or farmer-herders who are becoming increasingly sedentary 
and whose possibility for movement are always more limited due to the expansion of 
agriculture (cf. Chapter 5). In these circumstances, it should come as no surprise that 
Keita’s men and women wanted chantier ‘jobs’ and dams, and engineers who could 
make these work, much more than they wanted sociologists and anthropologists to do 
an ethnography of the project, or PRA in their villages, or ‘sensitization’ (cf. Chapter 8). 
In countries wealthier than Niger, the services and opportunities demanded by the Ader 
Doutchi Majiya people are provided by the state. Works to create employment and 
make available services and infrastructures which may improve the lot of the population 
are financed through taxation, like the maintenance of so called public goods. Keita and 
Gal Oya ‘worked’ because they provided services and infrastructures which are 
recognised as key to the well being of the citizens of all countries, which are claimed by 
the citizens of all countries, and which wealthier countries provide, more or less justly 
and efficiently, to their citizens through taxation systems and ad hoc institutions.
‘Solutions’ to widespread poverty in the ‘Third World’ which do not take into 
account the role of the State are shifting the attention away from where, in my opinion, 
lies the root of the issues being analysed (cf. Robertson 1984). Undoubtedly, with 
Galjart and Ferguson, most Third World governments are afflicted by many problems. 
Indeed, they are a substantial part of the problem. But this is not a reason to dismiss the 
state as an actor in the process of finding an answer to the question of poverty, hunger 
and disease in the ‘Third World’. The ‘success’ of Keita and Gal Oya poses a set of 
questions in which the role of the state is central: were Keita and Gal Oya, as 
international development projects, better suited than Niger’s and Sri Lanka’s 
governments to deal with the problems they addressed through their ‘intervention’? 
What are the problems posed by the fact that these ‘external interventions’ would one 
day leave, and states and ‘beneficiaries’ would inherit the resources left behind by these 
projects? Why did Niger’s and Sri Lanka’s governments depend on these external 
projects for activities that would normally pertain to them? What conditions would lead 
states like Niger and Sri Lanka to programme and implement their own ‘development’ 
and assume responsibility for the poverty, hunger, and sickness of their citizens? Rather
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than dismissing the state as an actor, it has to be seen both as part of the problem and of 
the solutions. This perspective is not incompatible with the initiatives of benevolent 
scholars, technocrates, volunteers, and missionaries willing to give useful suggestions 
on how to solve minor (or major) problems and to ‘put the last first*. It does not rule out 
the possibility, and indeed the utility, of self financed small scale projects which 
mobilise some sectors of society and help them to improve their living conditions. But 
these strategies have to be seen as circumscribed experiments and/or acts of good will, 
that will not have a significant impact on the increasing gap between living standards in 
the North and in the South.
The argument here is that, because the state in Niger could not, with its own 
resources, provide the services and infrastructures which would contribute to the well 
being of its society, the Keita Project was perceived as a ‘success* by its intended 
‘beneficiaries’ in its first three phases. I am not suggesting that the complex 
phenomenon of ‘poverty’ can be ‘fixed’ with a few dams or the management of some 
irrigation channels. But only that Keita’s ‘success’ cannot be distinguished from Niger’s 
‘failure*. It is to the dynamics involved in this ‘failure’ that it may be worth dedicating 
our attention, rather than dismissing the state, as if ‘the people of the Ader Doutchi 
Majiya’, differently from the anthropologists themselves, existed in an institutional and 
historical vacuum. It is on the dynamics involved in this ‘failure’ that policy elites 
engaged in ‘international cooperation’ should focus, rather than continuing to produce 
development projects that function as uncoordinated islands of fortune (or, in the 
majority of cases, misfortune), controlled by outside actors which refuse to be held 
accountable for their decisions. Of course, these observations run against deeply 
entrenched interests, in the North, in maintaining the development apparatus and its 
present way of functioning (cf. Raffer and Singer 1996). But making explicit these 
interests and the workings of the order of discourse which they contribute to maintain is 
one of the challenges that an anthropology of development has to face.
The proposition resulting from this argument is that a worthwhile path to 
contribute to finding an answer to Ferguson’s question ‘what is to be done about all the 
poverty, sickness and hunger in the Third World?’ may involve both a breach of self 
evidence in the self perpetuating mechanisms of the ‘development machine’, and a close 
examination of (rather than a refusal to deal with) the role of the state. This examination
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could follow two broad lines of enquiry, namely: (1) the relations between rich and poor 
states, and (2) the relations between states and different categories of citizens. Attempts 
to address this order of questions should be the fruit of an interdisciplinary effort, as the 
interlocking dynamics that account for the lack of equity which characterises today’s 
North-South relations cannot be analysed by one disciplinary or analytical framework 
alone.
In the first chapter of this thesis I have quoted Gadamer’s insight that dialogue 
does not stem from assertiveness and self-certainty, but from questioning one’s own 
assumptions, and trying to comprehend the other’s message from the other’s 
perspective. This process entails ‘putting oneself at risk’ (Gadamer 1975:324). 
Attempting to understand the messages of different categories of people from their own 
perspectives, this study has reached what is, after all, a hardly surprising conclusion: 
that different sets of actors of the Ader Doutchi Majiya, faced with poverty, hunger and 
disease, valued concrete interventions which could help them to improve the resource 
base and infrastructures on which their system of production depends. The implications 
of this finding are hard to accept because they put some people’s positions at risk. If 
taken seriously, they involve, for anthropologists, the abandonment of romanticising 
images of exotic communitarian societies (cf. Robertson 1984:297), and direct their 
attention to the contemporary forces and institutions in which the subjects of their 
research are integrated. And for international policy, to consider strategies better suited 
than development projects and programmes to assist Southern States in providing for 
the well being of their citizens.
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MAP I - Niger and the Project intervention area
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MAP III - Ader: physical map
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MAP V - Main Tuareg groups
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MAP VI - The Ader at the end of the XVII Century
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MAP VII - The Ader Kingdom in the XVIII Century
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APPENDIX 2: TABLES
TABLE 1 - P DR/A DM 1990 ORGANIZATION CHART (Direction and Divisions)
Project Direction
(FAO PTC and National Director
'ublic Works
Land
rehabilitation 
(project design 
and
organisation)
Construction 
of hydraulic 
works and 
roads
Construction 
of rural- 
buildings
Supervising 
rural wells 
construction
Environment
Choice of 
species for 
reforestation
Monitoring and 
technical 
assistance to 
reforestation 
work sites
Guarding of new 
plantations
Fishery
component
Agronomy
t osC
sC
Monitoring and
Technical
assistance of
agricultural
activities on
rehabilitated
lands
Producers groups
Variety tests and 
research
Diffusion of new 
agric. techniques
Diffusion of
irrigation
techniques
Diffusion of 
manure and 
other inputs
Training and Coop
Organisation and 
training of 
committees
Credit operations
Support to mills 
component
Organisation, 
training and 
monitoring of 
local people 
training in coop 
with other 
divisions
Training for 
transformation of 
agricultural 
produce
Alphabetisation
Women
Administration
Administration;
finances
Personnel
management
Local buys
Orders for
international
buys
Insurances
Transportation 
and taxes
Inventory update
I oca I contracts
PDR/ADM 
buildings 
management and
Supervision 
of resources 
used
Supervision 
of people’s 
participation 
to project 
activities in 
line with 
PAM norms
Assistance to 
Direction for 
documents 
and reports
Surveys
Cooperation
with
consultants
and
researchers
M&E Garage
Ordinary 
maintenance of 
machines
Reparations
Prevision of 
spare piece 
requirements
Maintenance 
and monitoring 
of the electric 
generator and 
of electricity 
distribution
TABLE 2: PR O JE C T  RESULTS (FIRST THREE PH ASES)
1 p h a se II p h ase III p h a se TOTAL
Rehabilitation g lac is ha 4 5 9 3 8 1 4 1 0 5 3 6460
Rehabilitation p lateaux ha 1 8 0 7 9 2 8 1 4 0 2875
Rehabilitation s lo p e s ha 4 3 5 1 4 8 0 583
T ren ch es number 1 1 4 1 2 8 7 1 6 5 2 6 0 0 1 1 6 3 7 7 6 3 9 5 7 6 6 3
D ikes number 19
Earthfill d am s number 41
E xtension  d am s number 0 2
Artificial lakes nombre 9 31 1 0 50
R eforestation  se e d lin g s nombre 9 1 5 8 0 0 0 4 5 4 4 3 6 7 2 5 4 9 7 7 1 16,252,138
Wind Break ha 6 5 3 6 0 0 6,536
D une fixation ha 2 8 7 3 9 1 4 340
R eforestation on river s id es km 7 6 6 0 8 774
Animal traction units number 1 9 0 71 0 261
D onkey carts number 0 18 0 18
W om en fields number 21 0 0 21
Irrigation w ells 
G abion-weir w ork shop s
number
number
1
3
0
0
0
0
1
3
Ironm ongers w ork shop s number 3 0 0 3
Store h o u se s number 51 16 0 67
Mills number 4 4 13 0 57
Village sh o p s number 0 14 0 14
Foyers fem inins number 1 0 0 1
Veterinary p osts number 3 0 0 3
Vaccination pares number 4 0 0 4
S ch o o ls  number 2 7 13 0 40
Infirmaries number 2 1 1 4
Maternity cen tres number 3 0 0 3
Village w ells number 41 2 2 2 65
D eep  bores number 4 0 0 4
Other m2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0
TABLE 3 - VARIATION OF THE PRICE OF A KG OF MILLET AT THE MARKET OF 
IBOHAMANE
IN 1999
Mois Prix/Kg (Fcfa) Variation %
Janvier 93 -
Fevrier 93 0%
Mars 95 +2%
Avril 95 0%
Mai 99 +4%
Juin 106 +6%
Juillet 116 +9%
Aout 107 i oo
Septembre 96 -10%
Octobre 91 -7%
Novembre 89 -2%
Decembre 99 + 10%
(Source : Service d'Arrondissement du Plan)
APPENDIX 3: FIGURES
Fig. 1 - The Basic Territorial Unit (BTU or UTE)
Fig. 2 - Request for the building of a dam
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APPENDIX 4: PICTURES
Picture 1 - View of a village of the Ader Doutchi Majiya.
Picture 2 - A compound (gida).
3 0 7
Picture 3 - Project headquarters in Keita.
Picture 4 - Project headquarters' interior.
3 0 8
Picture 5 - Tinkirana 
Tounga farmer.
Picture 6 - Village chief
3 0 9
Picture 7 - Young Bouzou 
shepherd.
Picture 8 - Little Fulani 
shepherd boy.
'Picture 9 - Bouzou elder.
Picture 10 - Tuareg woman with 
grandchild.
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Picture 11 - Tuareg women of Kossongo.
Picture 12 - Tuareg men of Kossongo.
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Picture 13 - Communal pounding site at the outskirts of Tinkirana Tounga.
Picture 14 - Hausa women preparing food for a marriage.
Picture 15 - Hausa girl selling foods 
prepared by her secluded mother.
Picture 16 - Woman preparing food in 
Tinkirana Tounga.
Picture 17 - Girl weaving a mat.
Picture 18 - Italian engineer and Project mechanic.
Picture 19 - Project tractors.
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Picture 20 
weaving a 
weir.
Picture 21 - Workers installing the gabions during the construction of a dike.
- Man 
gabion
Picture 22 - 
Workers 
assembling the 
spillway of an 
earthfill dam.
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Picture 23 - Nomad Fulani women watering donkeys at the Project dam of Seyte.
Picture 24 - Livestock watering at the Tabotaki dam.
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Pictures 25 and 26 - Femmes de 
Keita digging reforestation trenches. M
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Picture 27 - 'Stones work1 (aikin doutchi)
in the worksites (chantiers).
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Picture 28 - Youths working at 
Project worksites .
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Picture 32 - Women watering reforestation seedlings.
Picture 33 - Girls sewing skirts in the Foyer Feminin de Keita.
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Picture 34 - Author in 
the school of Tinkirana 
Tounga.
Picture 35 - Author's 
house in Keita.
Picture 36 - Author's 
house in Tinkirana 
Tounga.
